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

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THE VEDIC MITHUNA*

(Concept and Practice)

By

SADASHIV AMBADAS DANGE, Bombay

The word *mithuna* occurs at various places in the *Ṛgveda* (*RV*), and indicates a unit of both the masculine and the masculine-feminine sex. It has also the simple sense of " pair ", as against that of the " sex-couple ". Thus the Aśvins are said to form a pair = *mithuna* (*RV* X.40.12; also X.72.2, where Saraṇyū is said to have given birth to the *mithuna*). Sūrya and Vaiśvānara are said to form the wandering *mithuna* (X.88.11 *cariṣṇū' mithunáu*). The word has also the sense of the *dampatī*, indicating Heaven and Earth (I.159.4 *jāmī' sáyonī mithunā' sa sáṃokasā*). The *RV* testifies to the fact that, with the sense of a " pair ", the word indicates various ingredients of the sacrifice such as the *havirdhāna* (I.83.3), a trait which is seen in the sacrificial ritual-symbolism of the later times, as will be shown further. The *RV* also speaks of the three *mithunas* (IV.45.1 *mithunā's trāyaḥ*) which, according to Sāyaṇa, are " eating, drinking and seating " (*khāna. pāna, āsana*), and where, if we accept Sāyaṇa, a *mithuna* is to be taken as comprising three items and not two. One feels, however, that the concept is of three pairs and not three singles forming a *mithuna*. The *RV*

* From *Mithunikaraṇa* (sexual symbolism from the Vedic Ritual), forth-coming publication.

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also has a *mithuna* in the ritual-formulae called the *yājyā* and the *puronuvākyā* (I.173.2, if we follow Sāyaṇa). Even the days and the nights, 720 in all, are said to form together half the number of *mithunas*, in a year (I.164.11). There is also the usual sense of the " couple " at certain places, indicating the husband and the wife, performing the sacrifice (V.43.15; I.131.3; 83.3 etc.).

In the context of ritual, as is seen in the Brāhmaṇas, there is constant mention of the word *mithuna*, with the meaning of " sex-partners "; and the belief behind the employment of this word appears to be clearly that of the charm for progeny and general affluence of the sacrificer. Various things used in the sacrificial setting are coupled as *mithuna*, and the wife of the sacrificer plays a very important and a symbolic part in the scheme of *mithunīkaraṇa*.[1] A few instances would go well to support this. The very start of the *Darśapūrṇa-māsa* (New-moon and Full-moon) sacrifices presents the idea of a *mithuna*. Waters are carried for sacrificial purposes, the ritual being technically called " *praṇayana* " and the waters " *praṇītā* ". As is common with atmosphere of the sacrifice, all things are identified with, or are said to be the aspects of, the sacrifice; and, hence, the waters also are said to be the sacrifice itself (*Śat. Br.* I.1.1.12). After being fetched the waters are placed to the north of the *Gārha-patya* fire-place, being carried from the north of the *Āhavanīya*. The reason given is that the fire is the male and the waters the females, and that these two form a *mithuna* for procreation. The position of the waters to the north of the fire is explained in the most naturalistic human relationship, that the wife sleeps to the north and the husband to the south (*Śat. Br.* I.1.18 *tā utsicya-uttareṇa gārhapatyaṃ sādayati; yoṣā vā āpo vṛṣāgniḥ; gṛhā vai gārhapatyas tad gṛheṣv evaitan mithunaṃ prajananaṃ kriyate . . tā uttareṇāhavanīyaṃ praṇayati; yoṣā vā āpaḥ vṛṣāgniḥ; mithunam evaitat prajananaṃ kriyate ; evaṃ hi mithunaṃ kḷptam; uttarato hi strī pumāmsam upa śete*). If the couple faced the east, the natural seating position of the wife, seated to the north of him, will be to his left; and the husband will be to her *dakṣiṇa*, which would indicate both the south and the right. The same is indicated in the expression " *upa śete* ", which needs no comment, especially in the face of the expression " *prajananam* ". As the fire and the *praṇīta* waters formed the *mithuna* during the sacrifice they were not to be disturbed by going in between (*Ibid.*, I.1.1, 21—*nāntareṇa saṃ careyuḥ; na in mithunaṃ caryamāṇam antareṇa saṃ carān iti*).[2]

The expression " accomplished is this as a *mithuna* for procreation (*mithunam evaitat prajananaṃ kriyate*) " comes at a number of places in the

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1 More details in my papers (Marathi), Patnī āṇi Mithuna-saṅketa ", *Vidarbha Saṁśodhana Maṇḍaḷa Vārṣika*, 1974, pp. 8-23, and *Ibid.*, 1975, pp. 18-24.

2 This suggests them to form a whole. It was also forbidden to walk in between the sun and the *Āhavanīya*, for they were aspects of the same principle, *Śrauta Kośa*, Poona, I-i, p. 40.

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ritual-context in the Vedic literature, and leaves no doubt about the fact, that an important aspect of the sacrificial ritual was symbolic holy sex. Thus, when the various ladles are being made ready, it is the coupling of them; for, it is said, " When, indeed, two clasp each other in a close embrace the semen is produced " (*Ibid.*, 22, quoted further). The teachers of the Vedic sacrificial cult waft a sexual imagery even in the case of a casual detail. Speaking about the various ladles the *Śat. Br.* says that first the *sruva* (masculine) is to be cleansed and then the various *srucs* (feminine). The reason given is eloquent of the mutual status of men and women at that time. It is explained that even if there are many women going in a group, only a man, though small in stature like a boy and unimpressive to look at, leads them (*Śat. Br.* I.3.1.9 *ya eva tapasvī kumāraka iva pumān bhavati sa eva tatra prathamam eti anūcya itarāḥ*). As the waters and the fire formed a *mithuna*, so did the fire with the altar (*vedi*, fem). The *vedi* was the female partner of the sacrifiee (*Yajña*). They together were believed to help enhance weal and prosperity. The *vedi* was so built that it represented the woman. There are various references to this effect; but the details in the following expression are suggestive : " Facing the fire the shoulders of the *vedi* does he elevate; for the *vedi* is the female, the fire the male; embracing the virile male does the female lie; this way, surely, the procreative *mithuna* is created " (Ibid. I.2.5.16). As the *vedi* is the woman, she is profusely to be covered with the sacrificial grass, lest she be naked when the gods arrive, and in the presence of the learned priests (Ibid. I.3.3.8).

The motif of *mithunīkaraṇa* is to be prominently seen even in the sphere of Speech. The practice of uttering the syllable OM before the start of a *mantra* is well-known; and it goes as far back as the Vedic period. The reason for this is given in the ritual-context as follows : " The Sāman is not to be sung without the *hiṅ-kāra*;.....; with the *praṇava* does he accomplish the form of the Sāman " (*Śat. Br.* I.3.5.15; cf. I.4.1.1). Here the identification of the *hiṅkāra* and the *praṇava* is one aspect of the belief, the other being that between the *prāṇa* and the *praṇava* (OM). Further, *praṇava* (OM) is said to be the male; and Speech, of which the *mantra* is an aspect, is said to be the female. They form the *mithuna*. This *mithuna* is to be formed prior to the *Sāmidhenī* verses are recited (Ibid., *vāk vai prāṇaśca mithunam; tad etat purastān mithunam kriyate sāmidhenīnām; tasmād vai hiṅkṛtya anvāha*). Further it is said that *pra* and *ā* are to be prefixed to the *Sāmidhenī* verses, the reason being that with *pra* semen is released; and with *ā* progeny is born (Ibid. I.4.1.6 *pra iti vai retaḥ sicyate*; *ā iti prajāyate*).

Though the term *mithuna* does not always refer to human couples as such, the concept of anthropomorphism or zoomorphism is present in such couplings. The concept of such *mithuna*-formation (*mithunīkaraṇa*) evokes the idea of

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completeness and of welfare and prosperity[3]. That the motif of *mithuna* had a well-established and a wide application is clear from such expressions as " one who knows the *mithuna* of the *prayājas* " or " one who knows the *mithuna* of the cups " (*Taitt.sam.* II.6.1.4 *yo vai prayājānām mithunam veda* ; VI.5.11.3 *yo vai grahāṇām mithunam veda*). Ritual abounds in such *mithuna*s. Thus, Soma is purchased with a cow, or with a pair of cow and bull, to form a *mithuna*. In the first case, the cow forms a *mithuna* with Soma ; in the second, the cow forms it with the bull, which is the symbol for Soma (*Ibid.* VI.1.10.2 esp. *mithunābhyām krīṇāti mithunasya avarudhyai*). The colours of the sacrificial beasts are also said to form the *mithuna*. It is said, that a white beast should be sacrificed for Mitra, and for Varuna a black one (Mitra indicating the day, Varuna the night). This is to be done at the joint of water and the plants (Ibid. II.1.9.3). This suggests a double *mithuna*-motif : One of the colours, the other of the water and the plants. Soma is of two types : the one of a mixed type, the other of the pure, unmixed type. This itself is said to be the *mithuna* of Soma. The cups of Soma are of two types : made of wood and made of mud. This is the *mithuna* of the cups. One who knows this method of forming the *mithuna*s is said to gain cattle (*Maitt. Sam.* IV.6.3) ; and for the ritual of the Rājasūya, when waters from the river are to be collected, they are also of two types : those that are along the current, and those that are against it ; likewise, those that are taken from the " husband of the waters " (sea). These two form the *mithuna* (*Ibid.*, IV.4.1). The explanation given is that by this *mithuna* of the waters, couples (*mithuna*s) are formed in the country for prosperity (*Ibid.*).

At many rituals rice and milk are used to form the pap; and, along with the *mithuna* of milk and rice is knitted that of the two eyes (*Maitt. Sam.* II.1.7 *dhenvā vai ghṛtam payo 'naḍuhas taṇḍulāḥ; tan mithunam; mithunam caksuḥ*). This *mithuna* of rice and milk is said to be accomplished in a rite to restore eyesight. The plan of the *mithuna* is as follows : cow's milk=ghee (female); rice = bull's semen (male). Even the deities are brought in here to form the *mithuna*. In this particular rite the deities are Agni and Viṣṇu.

The power to procreate is said to be gained, not only in one's own body but also in the case of the cattle, if a rite signifying coupling is gone through. Thus it is said, " He who does not get issues, or has barren cows, should wear a garment made of bark (*barāsīm paridhāya*) and sleep on the floor, drinking hot milk? (*taptam piban*); for, by performing the heating rite (*tapo vai taptvā*, which has no sense of " penance " here, as is seen later) did Prajāpati establish himself; and having formed a *mithuna* of himself (*mithunam kṛtvā*), multiplied himself with progeny and cattle (*Maitt. Sam.* I.9.6)". Likewise it is said

3 See also Gonda J., *The Dual Deities in the Religion of the Veda*, North Holland Pbn., Amsterdam-London, 1974, p. 62.

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that a person desirious of progeny should offer (immolate) a eunuch (animal?) to Tvaṣṭṛ and the wives of the gods; for, Tvaṣṭṛ and the wives form a *mithuna*; from this *mithuna* does the sacrificer get procreated (afresh) with progeny and cattle (*Ibid.*, II.5.5). The immolation of the eunuch is, probably, to indicate the extinction of the lack of virility in the sacrificer. In the symbolism of the kindling of the fire, where the lower slab (*araṇi*) of wood is said to be Urvaśī and the churning rod Purūravas, it is said that Urvaśī is only Speech and Purūravas is indicated by the word "*asi*" (thou art); this is the *mithuna*, and it is said to be formed in the breath (*Ibid.*, III.9.5). Even the Full-moon day and the New-moon day are said to form the *mithuna*. Each of these days is subdivided into two. The first half of the Full-moon day (that starts on the previous day) is called Anumati; the second half is called Rākā. In the case of the New-moon day the first half is called Sinīvālī, the second Kūhū. Now, the two first parts and the two latter parts (of the New and the Full-moon days) are said to form the *mithunas*. Likewise the growing half month and the decreasing half month form the *mithuna* (*Ibid.*, IV.3.5). The performance of the Full and the New-moon day (*Darśa-pūrṇamāsa*) sacrifices, thus forming into *mithunas*, help the sacrificer to multiply with issues and cattle (*Ibid.*).

At various places the coupling is termed "*daivyam mithunam*" (cf. for ex. *Taitt. Sam.* II.4.6.1). Even the gods are said to have been ignorant of this method of *mithunīkaraṇa;* but, when they knew it, they saw all prosperity in it (*Ibid.*, II.1.9.3).

It will be, thus, seen that the motif of the creation of progeny and weal through sacrificial coupling (*mithunīkaraṇa* as we now put it) is seen in the Vedic ritual at various places and various levels. Actual copulation is rarely seen, though its presence cannot be denied on seeing such rituals as at the *Mahāvrata*, where the *Māgadha* and the hetaera are said to actually have a sexual union (*Jai. Br.* II.405 *māgadham ca pumścalūm ca dakṣiṇe vedy 'ante mithunīkārayanti—mithunatvāya prajananāya*). This actual sex-union gives place to symbolic acts in many other rituals, one important such motif being that of "eyeing", or what we may call the "eye-coitus" (or, to coin a Sanskrit term, *dṛṣṭimithuna*), where the wife of the sacrificer is required to gaze at such objects as the *gharma*[4] (the sacrificial pot of particular form used for heating the sacrificial milk), the clarified butter or the Udgātṛ priest. Then there is also the "touch-symbolism" (we may term *sparśa-mithuna*), with which the "wife" is said to assure progeny. In these symbolic acts the "wife" is the sex-partner in the *mithuna*, the other party being any of these things mentioned above, or the Udgātṛ. Whether actual sex-practices at rituals (borrowed or indigenous) gave

4 On *gharma* see C. G. Kashikar, "Apropos the Pravargya", PAIOC, Ujjain, 1972, pp. 137-52.

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place to symbolic acts or whether it was the other way round, if we take into consideration the Mahāvrata and the Horse-sacrifice, is a different question. But there is no doubt that the human, as well as the zoo-human, couple actually was the state of affairs. The first is vouched by the *Jai. Br.* noted above, while the Sacrifice of the horse is a case for the latter type. In the case of the Horse-sacrifice the expression is "These we two, may we spread our four legs together", spoken in respect of the queen and the silenced horse (i.e. ritually killed); and, further, the act is supported by such expressions as "*mithunasya avarudhyai*" and "*mithunasya eva sarvatvāya*" (*Śat. Br.;* XII 2.8.5; 4.1.8). Though this is not seen in the case of other rituals involving the sacrificial beast, there is clear suggestion that the beast was considered to be the male counterpart in the *mithuna*, the wife of the sacrificer being the "woman". The earliest of this sort of *mithuna* is to be seen in the ape *Vṛṣākapi* and the "woman" called Indrāṇī in the ritual symbolic set-up, where the sacrificer is symbolically termed Indra, the week one wanting to gain strength.[5] The motif is clear in the ritual-detail of applying water to the sacrificially killed beast. This is done by the "wife", and is said to be for the symbolic re-birth of the silenced beast, as a dead beast was not to be offered to the gods. The exact words, however, indicate that the beast was being rejuvenated for the "wife" (*Śat. Br.* III.8.2.4 *tad enam etasyai yoṣāyai pra janayati; tasmāt patnī upa spṛśati*; all such contexts show that the *yoṣā* is the same as the wife of the sacrificer, and the male is termed *vṛṣan*).

The concept of the *mithuna* brings us to another important point. It is that of the dual deities; and it is specifically mentioned that the dual forms a *mithuna* (*Ai. Br.* III.50 *dvandvāt mithunaṃ prajāyate*; cf. *Śat. Br.* IV.3.1.3 *dvandvam vai mithunaṃ prajananam*). This shows that for forming a *mithuna*, it was not necessary that the partners be of mutually different sex. It is on this concept that the *mithunas* of even the male deities were formed; and the same was the idea underlying the dual-deities in the *Ṛgveda*. This is also the case where in one deity itself there is the idea of a *mithuna*. Thus, Agni is both a male and a female; the second is the case in respect of the juice of soma (called *retas*, cf. *RV* I.164.35) being poured into it. In the ritual-context a priest, in himself, was believed to form a *mithuna*, if he was believed to have two deities in himself. Such, for example, was the case where Agni and Indra were believed to be present in the priest called *Acchāvāka*.

The concept of coupling (*mithunīkaraṇa*) was so well rooted in the Vedic ritual-tradition that we have the maxim of the six *mithunas*. According to the *Śat. Br.* there are six main *mithunas*, though the relationship is not exactly that of sex in all cases. The *mithunas* are as follows (*Śat. Br.* XI.3.3.1):

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5 Dange Sadashiv A., *Vedic Concept of 'Field' and the Divine Fructification*, Bombay Uni. Pbn., 1971, pp. 49-67.

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(i) The sacrificer and his wife (*patnī*).

It is ordained that the fire-ritual should be with one's wife (*patnī-vat agnihotram syāt*). This motif of being *patnīvat* marks also the *mithunas* of the gods.

(ii) The calf and the cow called Agnihotrī.

This cow's milk is used in the *agnihotra* offering. It is ordained that the cow whose milk is to be used for the *agnihotra* offering should be having a male calf (*tasmād asyā pumvatsā agnihotrī syāt*). It should be marked that here the *Mithuna* is not of the bull and the cow.

(iii) The fire-pan and the embers.

The pan is, obviously, the symbol of the female here, while the fire-embers suggest the male. The point is corroborated by the *ukhā* and the fire in another context.

(iv) The ladle called *sruva* and the one called *sruc*.

We have referred to this relationship earlier.

(v) The *Āhavanīya* fire and the fire-stick (*samidh*).

The first is the male, the other the female: and

(vi) The offering (female) and the *svāhākāra* (the utterance of the word *svāhā*); the latter is the male.

After enumerating the six *mithunas*, in the *Agnihotra*, the Br. ends in the usual strain, "With *mithuna* and *mithuna* (*mithunena mithunena*) does he get procreated with issues over and again—he who thus knows". The *mithuna* of the calf and the mother-cow reminds us of the concept of the *vṛṣa śiśu* of the RV, who is at once the child and the seeding male of the cow (*RV* VII.95.3; II.35.13).

The words "procreative couple" (*mithunam prajananam*) are not expressly used in the context of the six *mithunas*; but the idea of a charm for progeny is clear in the expression "*mithunena prajāyate*". This will show that the sacrifice was, among other things, a charm for procreation and fertility, which was sought to be achieved by the employment of the *mithuna*-motif. It could be seen that the motif of *mithuna* was not restricted to the six mentioned above. There were many more; and we shall further see another set, of four *mithunas*. As we have noted the water and the fire formed a *mithuna*; and even the ladles did so. The whole idea was that the formation of *mithunas* is conducive to procreation and prosperity. Not only the ladles but even other things used in the sacrificial context formed *mithunas*. The *water-fire mithuna* entered the rite of marriage on the one hand; and, on the other, it was at the base of the gain of rain.[6] On the sacrificial plane the following are additional *mithunas*:

6 Dange, "The Rgvedic Seer and the Fire-water Complex", J. U. Bombay Arts No. 78, Vol. XLII, pp. 18-42.

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Śūrpa-agnihotrahavaṇī (winnowing basket and the offering-ladle) the former the male the latter the female *sphya-kapāla* (wooden sword and the potsherd, the former being the male), *śamyā-kṛṣṇājina* (yoke-pin made of the *Śamī* tree and black-antelope-skin, the latter being the male), *ulūkhala-musala* (mortar-pestle, the latter being the male), *dṛṣad-upala* (the lower flat grinding-stone and the upper stone, the latter being the male). These are five in number ; but they certainly are not all even together with the six mentioned above. The point to be stressed is that *mithuna* was the symbol for procreation, and the number of *mithunas* was not the criterion ; it was enough to have two things to form a *mithuna*. Thus it is clearly stated that, "when, indeed, two firmly clasp each other, then is the semen produced ; for, a unit of two is a procreative couple" *Sat.Br.* I.1.1.22 *yadā vai dvau rārambhete atha tad vīryam bhavati, dvandvam vai mithunam prajananam, mithunam eva etat prajananam kriyate*). It is this belief aad principle that governs the formation of a number of couples. The following are a few more examples :

(i) Clarified butter and curds.

This is what is said about this *mithuna* : "This is the pair, the ghee and the curds ; a pair is, indeed, the procreative couple" (*Śat. Br.* III.8.4.7). The passage comes in the context of the beast for the gods Agni and Soma. An interesting detail in this connection may be noted. Here the oblation to the wives of the gods is also enjoined. For the purpose of sprinkling the liquid the tail of the immolated beast is used. The reason for the use of the tail (*jāghanī*) is given thus : "Half of the genitals (*jaghana*) is the tail (*jāghanī*) ; half of a woman's genitals (or hips) is the *jaghana* ; from half of a woman's genital-part (*jaghanārdhāt*), indeed, are the issues born." From the interior of the tail (*antarataḥ*) does he offer to the wives of the gods ; from the interior of the woman, indeed, is the progeny born (*antarato vai yoṣāyai prajāḥ prajāyante*). From the outer side (the hairy part of the tail) does he cut the offering for the lord of the house, Agni ; for, indeed, from the outside does the male copulate with the female running (*Ibid.*, III.8.5.7). (The imagery, here, is that of the copulation of beasts.)

(ii) *Payasyā* and the *vājina*.

The material called *payasyā* is prepared from milk by putting curds into it when hot ; the same preparation is also known as *āmikṣā* (Sāyaṇa on the passage referred to just further). The *payasyā* was believed to be the female (*yoṣā*) the male (*vṛṣan*) being the *vājina*, which is the liquid of the curds. The text states that these two form the *mithuna* ; and that from this *mithuna* of the *payasyā* and the *vājina* (semen) was produced the unlimited world (of nourishing liquids) (*Śat. Br.* II. 5.1.16).

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(iii) The jar called Mahāvīra and the fire upon which it is kept.

The rite is that of Pravargya. It is said that the jar is the male organ, the milk the semen and the fire is the womb (female). The two handles of the jars are said to be testicles (*Ai. Br.* I. 22 *etad deva-mithunam yad gharmaḥ; sa yo gharmas tac śiśnam, yau śaphau tau śaphau,..., yat payas tad retaḥ; tad idam agnau deva-yonyām prajanane retaḥ sicyate, agnir vai deva-yoniḥ*). It is to be noted that Agni is said to be the womb (female), the point already hinted at above.

We have already noted how the milk and the rice-grains were believed to form a *mithuna*. In the ritual at the Full and the New-moon day sacrifice, or the Soma-sacrifice, also such a preparation from milk and rice was necessary. This was called the *brahmaudana*, and it was to be partaken of by the priests. Also to it was added clarified butter when the rice was being boiled. About the whole preparation this was said, " That which is clarified butter is the milk of a woman; the rice-grains are the particles of the male-body; this is the *mithuna*; with this *mithuna* alone does he (the priest) create him (the sacrificer) with cattle, and progeny for prosperity " (*Ai. Br.* I.1). In another context the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) and the clarified butter (*ājya*) are said to form a *mithuna*. The cake represents also the cattle. It is said that the cake is the womb and the clarified butter is the semen; that when he offers the cake and the clarified butter thereupon, it is in the womb itself that the semen is established (*Jai. Br.* II. 287; also Pañc. Br. XXI. 10).

Even the hair of the body of the sacrificial beast are conceived as forming the *mithuna* (*Śat. Br.* V.1.3.9 *śuklam caiva roma kṛṣṇañ ca, dvandvam vai mithunam prajananam*). In the Rājasūya sacrifice there are seventeen beasts, and it is ordained that their hair should be both white and black for forming the procreative couple. There are, again, such *mithunas* as *vrata* and *dīkṣā*, *satya* and *śraddhā*, *manas* and *vāk*. It is said that these *mithunas* are to be contemplated at the very start of the sacrifice (*Śat. Br.* XII. 8.2.6 in the context of the Sautrāmaṇī, *vṛṣā vai vratam yoṣā dīkṣā, vṛṣā satyam yoṣā śraddhā, vṛṣā manaḥ yoṣā vāk*; and there itself, *vṛṣā patnyai yajamānaḥ*). The forming of the *mithunas* was purposeful and was for the general weal, as we have noted already (cf. *Ibid.-atho yajamāna evaitan mithunāni karoti prajātyai*). This with the belief that Prajāpati himself was " procreation " (*Ibid.*, 9 and 10), would make it clear that the sacrifice was identified with Prajāpati on the one hand; and, on the other, it was contemplated as having a sexual aspect, which was a prerequisite for weal, prosperity and procreation.

The concept of Mithuna and the Agnicayana :

One of the most important, and equally complex, rituals is that of Agnicayana, or " the Piling of the altar ", in which the cosmos is sought to be sym-

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bolically constructed. Fire being the central source of creation. At this ritual at the base of the great altar a living tortoise was placed. The tortoise was the symbol of the sun and Prajāpati in one; and it was also indicated as the cosmic *prāṇa* (breath) principle. The explanation of the laying of the tortoise and near it the brick called *Āṣāḍhā* (obviously the female concept of the month of Āṣāḍhā, indicating the various months to be copulating "women" of the sun-tortoise) is given as follows :

> "Now, this tortoise; taking this form alone it is that Prajāpati created the the progency; that tortoise—he is, indeed, the very sun; he is laid to the south of the (brick) Āṣāḍhā; the virile male (*vṛṣā*), indeed, is the tortoise, the woman (*yoṣā*) is the Aṣāḍhā; to the south (or right, *dakṣiṇataḥ*) of the woman alone does the male lie. Prāṇa, indeed, is the tortoise, Speech the Āṣāḍhā; Prāṇa is the *vṛṣā* of Speech; Prāṇa is the *mithuna* (with Speech)" (*Śat. Br.* VII. 5.1.5-7).

In the same context are mentioned to be placed the two bricks called "semen-sprinklers" (*retaḥ-sicau*) (*Ibid.*, 35). These two indicate the sex-couple from their very name. Among other things to be placed in the layers of the altar there is the mortar and the dish called *ukhā* (used for placing the fire in). The *ukhā* is placed above, while the mortar is placed below; for, it is said, the *ukhā* is the stomach and the mortar the womb. To the right (or south) of these two is placed the pestle, as it is the male-organ. And, the male sleeps to the right of the woman (*Ibid.*, 38 *udaram ukhā yonir ulūkhalam,....śiśnam musalam:....tad dakṣiṇata upa dadhāti; dakṣiṇata vai vṛṣā yoṣām upa śete*). It is to be noted that in the tradition of Vedic beliefs the mortar and the pestle form a couple; and to this, now, the *ukhā* is joined, as a female due to its shape and being the receptacle of the fire. Thus the pestle forms a *mithuna* with the *ukhā* and the mortar. On the *ukhā* offering of clarified butter is enjoined, which signifies the sprinkling of semen (*Ibid.*, 32; for *ukhā* in similar symbolism see also 26; also 5.2.2, where in another layer, in the *ukhā* the heads of the five animals, including that of a man, are placed, saying that thereby the animals are laid in their womb for further procreation). In another phase of the ritual of the *ukhā*, it is edjoined that the milk of a she-goat is to be dropped into it. It is said in this contex, that the *ukhā* is the woman (*yoṣā*); the milk is established in the woman (*Śat. Br.* VI. 5.4.15 *atho yoṣā vā ukhā, yoṣāyām tat payo dadhāti*). It is well known that the goat is the zoo-*morph* of Agni, and, here, the she-goat is only the female form of Agni[7], who is, thus, suggested to be bi-

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7 It was customary to place the offering in the ear of a she-goat, *Śrauta K.* I-i, p. 182 f; 31; 36; cf. Mbh,, Śāntī. 262-41 ajo 'gnir varuṇo *meṣaḥ sūryo 'śvaḥ*; for the fire-god and the sheep or goat in sculpture see R. C. Agrawal, J. Ind. H. XLIII-i, p. 152 f.

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sexual. Further it is said in the same context, that Agni is the virile male (*vṛṣā*) and the *ukhā* the " woman " (*yoṣā*) (VI. 6.2.8).

About the offerings into the *ukhā* it is said that they are the various forms of Prajāpati, and, verily, the semen (*Ibid.*, X. 4.1.1 *prajāpatim vi-srastam devā samaskurvan; tam ukhāyām yonau retobhūtam asiñcan, yonir vā ukhā*). And this is indeed, placing the very sacrificer into the *ukhā* (*Ibid.*). Thus the offerings placed into the *ukhā* are for the safe placement and re-birth of the sacrificer, who is only another form of Prajāpati = sacrifice. The *ukhā* is the *yoni* i.e. the receptacle of the fire-principle in the three worlds (*Ibid.*, VI. 1.3.26). This is like placing the soma-juice (offering it) in the fire, so that the god may be secure even after being ritually killed in pressing (*Ibid.*, XI. 1.2.2 *tam hatvā yajñam agnāv eva retobhūtam siñcati, agnir vai yonir yajñasya*). In a striking case of symbolism regarding the *ukhā*, milk and sand figure; and the following is said. First sand is placed in the *ukhā*; and it is said that the sand is the semen:

> " Now he places in her (*ukhā*) the milk; he places the semen (sand) first; " woman ", indeed, is the *ukhā*; hence when the woman takes in the semen (first), then does she hold milk; the sand is lower, the milk above; at the lower position (in the womb), indeed, is (placed) the semen; at the upper (in the breasts) is the milk " (*Śat. Br.* VII. 1.1.44).

The *ukhā*, being considered as the woman, is indicated to hold semen afresh for subsequent deliveries. Thus it is said that once the fire is placed in the *ukhā* she (!) is to be released; and sand is placed in her prior to the pouring of milk. This is placing fresh semen and gaining fresh milk (Ibid. 42). At various places it is indicated that sand is the semen of Agni (*Śat. Br.* VII. 1.1.10; 12; 16; 41; semen is white, and so is sand VII. 3.1.11).

In the context of the *Agnicayana* fresh sets of *mithuna*s on the cosmic level are presented. In all the male principles the presence of Prajāpati is seen; but a new symbol is ushered in here, in the word " *aśru* ", which indicates the cosmic fluid. The *mithuna*s are four in number; and the expression common to all is " he became the *mithuna* ". They are as follows :

(i) Fire and Earth (female).

In this connection it is said, that Prajāpati thought. He formed a *mithuna* with the earth, himself being Fire. Then was produced an egg. The foetus (the solid of the egg) that was in the mid-region formed the air; and that which was the " *aśru* " became the birds. The fluid of the two halves became the rays. The (space between the) two halves of the egg (seen as the *kapāla*) became the mid-region (*antarikṣa*).

(ii) Vāyu and the Antarikṣa (female).

This *mithuna* produced an egg. The *aśru*, in this case, became the *pṛśni aśman* (= cloud, acc. to the Comm.).

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(iii) The Sun and the Sky (female).

This *mithuna*, or rather the sky (*dyauḥ*), produces an egg; then the *retas* (semen); and thence comes the moon. The *aśru* that gets dropped becomes the stars and the constellations; and the two halves become the minor quarters.

and (iv) Mind and Speech (female).

From this an egg gets produced. There is no mention of the *aśru*. The progeny includes the eight Vasus, eleven Rudras and the All Gods (*viśve devāḥ*). (*Śat. Br.* VI. 1.2.1-9).

As we noted above, the *aśru*[8] indicated in this symbolization the cosmic fertilizing fluid, and not so much the tear, restricted to an individual.

According to the Vedic tradition, both of ritual and belief, the fire was first kindled on the lotus-leaf (*RV* VI.16.13); and this corroborated the belief that it came out of the waters, of which the lotus-leaf is the solid symbol. In the rite of *Agnicayana* this is explained as follows: "Now he collects the fire (in the form of the lump of earth); womb, indeed, is the lotus-leaf; in the womb thereby does he sprinkle the semen (*Śat. Br.*VI.4.1.7). Earlier it is stated that this is done with the *sruva*-ladle; for the *sruva* is the *vṛṣā*. This is done with the utterance of the formula "*svāhā*" for *svāhā* is the male (*vṛṣā*); and it is the male (*vṛṣā*) that sprinkles the semen (*Śat.Br.* VI.3.3.18). The identification is, Fire=*sruva*=*svāhā*, all indicating the male in the *mithuna*, in which the female is the lotus-leaf. At another place the altar is said to be the female, the male being the lump of earth signifying Fire (*Ibid.*, VI.4.4.19), the actual words being, "Indeed, this is the womb; semen is the lump; covertly (*tiras*), indeed, is the semen planted. Of the form of the womb (vagina) is this (place of the altar) prepared; hence it is that with one's own wife does one like to unite covertly". The lump of earth (which represents the fire) is to be placed to the south, facing the north where the altar is. The reason given is as follows: "From south (=the right) to the north (=the left, which is where the wife sleeps) is the semen sprinkled (*Ibid.*, VI.4.2.8). Sāyaṇa explains "as by the man sleeping on the right (*dakṣiṇataḥ sthitena*) semen is sprinkled (later) in the womb of the woman lying on the left (*vāmataḥ sthitāyāḥ striyā yonau retaḥ sicyate*)". Likewise is a *mithuna* formed between the *Āhavanīya* fire and the *abhri* (spade made of wood), the latter being placed to the north (left) of the *Āhavanīya*; the *abhri* is the female (*Ibid.*, VI.3.1.30).

The *Agnicayana* has many such *mithuna*s buried in its layers. It is not improbable that the position of the male and the female (both human) referred to in this context is suggestive of joint burial; for, in the actual coitus, the

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8 With this concept of *aśru* in the RV-hymn of Urvaśi see Dange, "Urvaśi. The water-Belle", J. O. Instt. Baroda, XXV, Sept. 1975, pp. 17-47.

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position is hardly of lying side by side, and is indicative of pre-coitus lying by. In this context reference may be made to the brick called "*lokampṛṇā*" (lit. the pervader of the world). This brick is said to form a *mithuna* with the fire-principle. The *lokampṛṇā* bricks are actually two in number; and they are further identified with the eyes. Likewise the golden image of the Man to be placed in the altar and representing the cosmic Man (the anthropomorph of the cosmic fire), is identified with the Man in the right eye of the mortal man (or the sacrificer). It is said that the cosmic Man and the Man in the right eye form the *mithuna*. The passage is excellent and needs to be quoted:

> "To the lokampṛṇā does the whole fire-principle accrue; of him (i.e. of the cosmic Man-Fire) is the *mithuna* the Man that resides in the left eye. Half of one's own is what a *mithuna* is; when one is with the *mithuna*, then is one the whole.[9] When one is the whole, that is conducive to fulness. Hence are they two halves (for fulness). The pair (so conceived) is the procreative *mithuna*; hence, the *lokampṛṇa*s are laid in twos" (*Śat. Br.* X. 5.2.8).

Out of the two Men—the cosmic and the one in the individual eye—none is said to be a female; hence, this *mithuna* has both males. Probably, one of them is conceived as also the female. We have already marked how the fire was conceived as a female also. This would mean that in a *mithuna* where both are apparently male, one of them is conceived as bi-sexual, or having also the feminine element for the purpose of the rite. A similar motif appears in the case of Indra, in the same context. Thus it is said, "He alone is Indra who is present in the right eye; and she (i.e. present in the left eye, Sāyaṇa) is Indrāṇī. For these two (did the gods make) the nose as the separating support" (*Ibid.*, 9); and further we are told, "Those two, indeed, form themselves into a *mithuna*, advancing to the space of the heart (*tau hṛdayasya ākāśam praty 'avetya mithunībhavataḥ*); when they reach the climax of coitus (*mithunasya antam gacchataḥ*) then this Man (in the right eye; mark the position to the right even here) sleeps; this is like at the human coitus, (where) reaching completion (the man) becomes, as if, without consciousness (*asamvidaiva bhavati*); likewise, indeed, is this. He (the man in the right eye) becomes, as if, without consciousness. Divine, indeed, is this *mithuna*; supreme this bliss" (*Ibid.*, 11).

The passage is important. It refers to the Man in the right eye as the male; and the one in the left eye as the female (Indrāṇī), while both were men in the previous passage in the same context. Their *mithuna* at the region of the heart, along with the supporting nose, indicates the state of contemplation and meditation (*yoga*). This shows how the motif of *mithuna* glides into the state

9 For wife as half of oneself see *Taitt. Sam.*, VI. 1.8.5; *Śat. Br.*, V. 2.1.10.

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of meditation, crossing that of sex. It also shows the influence of *yogic* concentration as early as this period, and how ritual and contemplation blended together at places. Probably, this is the basis of the later sex-rituals in the sphere of the *Tantra* schools, the aim of which was to realize the highest Bliss through actual sex in secret sacred rituals. It has to be noted that the Vedic couple of Indra-Indrāṇī is ushered in here in this context. Indrāṇī does occur in the *RV* six times ; but it is in the sexual setting that the occurrence is important. This is where she appears as the " woman " against the virile male, *Vṛṣākapi*, in a sexual dialogue mingled with ritual (X.86), the aim of which is the fructification of the field and the womanhood [10]. There is hardly any other ' goddess ' in the *RV* that has acquired this unique sexual importance. It is Indrāṇī, again, who is said to have her genital part (*jaghana*) thirty leagues spacious, which is indicative of her nature as the fructifiable earth, or the altar that symbolizes her (*Maitr. Sam.*, III.8.4 ; *Kāṭhaka Sam.*, VIII.17 62). What has been suggested above about the influence of meditation is corroborated by the fact that the same couple occurs in the *Bṛhad. Up.* (IV.2.3), where Indra is said to be the supreme soul : " The man in the right eye is called Indra ; him, though *Indhra*, they call Indra impliedly (*parokṣa-rūpeṇa*) ; and this Man, who is in the left eye, is the ' wife ' of this Indra. Their meeting place is the region of the heart ". The exact passage shows the bi-sexual nature of the Man in the left eye : " *athetad vāme akṣiṇi puruṣa-rūpam, eṣā patnī* ".

Another important *mithuna* in the context of the ritual of *Agnicayana* is that of the Apsarases. It is said that by forming the *mithuna*, the Apsarases become full (or whole), and sit in the heavenly world contemplated in this ritual. Likewise does the sacrificer sit in this mortal world, with progeny. In this context Urvaśī and the fore-layer are identified (*Śat.Br.*, VIII. 6.1.20, 21).

The motif of *mithuna* touches the ritual of Soma also, for he is said to form the *mithuna* with the quarters (*Vāj. Sam.*, VI.36 where the quarters are said to run to him; and *Śat. Br.*, III. 9.4.21 *ābhir digbhir mithunena priyeṇa dhāmnā samsparśayati*). There is not the least doubt that, like the churning of the fire from the two *araṇis*, the pressing of the juice of soma was believed to be a sex-act; and the *RV* clearly knew this belief (*RV.* I. 28.2, 3; see Veṅkaṭamādhava). Further, in the purchase and the pressing of Soma there is covert indication of a *mithuna*. Already in the *RV* we have the " Daughter of the sun " who is said to charm Soma to arrive at the sacrifice (IX. 1-6; 72.3; 113.3). This " Daughter of the sun " is the Gāyatrī-Sāvitrī in the later ritual-texts. In the ritual of the Brāhmaṇas she is represented as the cow called *Soma-krayiṇī* " (Purchaser of Soma), " who is also called Mahānagnī (*Ai.Br.*, I.27 *tayā mahānagnayā bhūtayā somam rājānam akrīṇan*). The *mithuna* of the Mahānagna-Mahānagnī is men-

10 Note 5 above.

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tioned in the *Atharva V.* (XX. 136.10 f) in the verses termed '*āhanasyāḥ*' (*RV Khila,* V. 22.9).

Another interesting *mithuna* comes in the context of the Varuṇapraghāsa ritual of the Four-monthly sacrifice (Cāturmāsya). In it a ram and an ewe, made of parched barley-flour (*karambha*) are used. Following the pattern noted above, the ram is placed in a vessel filled with the *payasyā* liquid to the right of the ewe placed in another vessel filled with the *payasyā* liquid. This is done to save the progeny from the bonds of Varuṇa (*Śat. Br.*, II. 5.2.17 ff). The point to be noted is that the two *payasyās* indicate the female and the male, one being called Vāruṇī and the other Māruta. The first is the female ; and in it the figure of the ewe is merged. The second is the male, in which the figure of the lamb is merged. This indicates an interesting point, we have already noted earlier. In this rite, predominantly meant for Varuṇa, the Maruts are conceived as the male counterpart of Vāruṇī ; this also shows that Varuṇa is conceived as the female, which suggests his bi-sexual concept and is corroborated elsewhere (*Śat. Br.*, II.4.4.9 *etām rātrīm mitro varuṇe retaḥ siñcati,* which shows Mitra to be the male and Varuṇa the female). On the ritual-plane such *mithuna*s are common (cf. *Śat. Br.*, IV 3.1.3 *dvau hi indrāgnī, dvandvam hi mithunam prajananam*) ; and this is seen even in the case of the priests. Thus, the Udgātṛ is said to be the male, the Neṣṭṛ the woman (cf. *Ai.Br.*, VI.3 (*udgātṛ*) *neṣṭur upastha āsīno bhakṣayati, patnībhājanam vai neṣṭā*).

We have noted above the *mithuna*s on the cosmic level in the ritual of *Agnicayana.* The *Śat.Br.* indicates elsewhere that non-personal *mithuna*s revert to the cosmic concept of the Gandharva and the Apsarases. So it is said, "The *mithuna*s of Prajāpati, getting loose, flew away taking the form of the Gandharvas-Apsarases. Taking the form of a chariot Prajāpati went round them ; going round them, he absorbed them into himself and made them part of himself". (IX.4.1.3). The various *mithuna*s are as follows ; both forming Prajāpati's person :



It will be seen that the Gandharva is always one, while the Apsarases are many. The myth of Prajāpati going round these *mithuna*s in the form of a chariot is

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connected with the ritual at the Rāṣṭrabhṛt offerings, which are placed on the fore-part of the chariot. The chariot is said to be Āditya=Prajāpati, and by these offerings the sacrificer is said to multiply in wealth.

The concept of *mithuna* could, possibly, never be complete without the examination of the allied concept of *jāmi.*[11] The word already occurs in the *RV*, and has been understood by Yāska as : (i) Something in excess, which also includes the sense of twins ; for in the latter one is in excess ; (ii) Foolish or of boyish appearance ; and (iii) *a-jāmi* is some one of a different species (*Nir.*, IV.20). At another place Yāska explains the word as " that which has more or less the same or similar meaning in the same verse, the difference being slight ", this meaning being allied to that of being in excess (*Ibid.*, X.16). Probably, we have to understand the difference as very significant. The ritual-texts refer to this word at a number of places with an additional shade of meaning to indicate dissimilarity to form *mithunās* ; and in this process are included pairs of words apparently similar in meaning or form but with a slight difference. The same principle is applied by the *Jai.* and the *Pañc.Br.* to indicate *mantras*, considered as *jāmi* or *a-jāmi* in respect of each other. But only the mutually *a-jāmi* pair forms the right *mithuna* for procreation, and for the multiplication of cattle. The *jāmi* types of verses are said to be homosexual. Hence they cannot procreate. It is like two men or two women sleeping together (cf. *Jai.Br.*, *amithunam tad a-prajananam yaj jāmi, yathā pumāmsau vā saha sayātāṃ striyau vā; kiṃ pumāṃsau saha śayānau pra-janayetām kiṃ striyau, tau cen mithunīkartāram na labheyātām ; atho yad eva a-jāmi tan mithunam, tat pra-jananam*). The passage is important. It shows that *jāmi* indicates not only two males or two females, if we follow strictly the wording therein ; it also indicates two such partners of different sex, who cannot, or are forbidden by custom or tradition to, sexually unite, the result being non-procreation ! It is in this sense that the brother and the sister are mutually *jāmi.* Yama and Yamī are *jāmi* in this sense. In a secondary sense the word *jāmi* means " sister ", (it can also mean " brother "), but with the non- copulatory shade of meaning. Yama insists that the two are a *jāmi mithuna* ; and hence should not perform the *a-jāmi* act (sexual copulation). Sacrifice being the very form of Prajāpati, who was multipllication in himself, it was necessary to form *a-jāmi* types of *mithuna*. And this was done in various aspects—offerings, verses, priests, deities and even the ladles and the utensils.

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11 Mehendale M. M. discusses this word, *Summaries of Papers* AIOC, 1969, Calcutta, but he does not go into this sexual implication ; he generally follows Yāska, and dwells only on the *RV.* passages.

Chart showing the *Mithuna*s mentioned in the article

M = Male; F = Female; "Wife" = Sacrificer's Wife. Prajāpati = Sacrifice (All *mithuna*s in him) ∴ Bi-sexual

MITHUNAS

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Chart showing the *Mithunas* mentioned in the article

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MITHUNAS

NON-PERSONAL

(i) TIME:
Day (M)—Night (F);
Anumati—Sinivalī
(Full—Mn, New—Mn, I pt.) ;
Rākā-Kūhū (II pt.);
Black-White (*pakṣas*);
Half-years.

(ii) Speech (F)———Mind (M)

Hiṅkāra, Omkāra, *Pra-ā* sounds (All M)	Verse, or part (F); *ṛc*

(iii) Svāhākāra (M)– Offering (F)

(iv) *vrata* (M)—*dīkṣā* (F)
(Vow) (Consecration)

(v) *Satya* (M)—*Śraddhā* (F)
(Truth) (Faith)

(vi) Sacrificial Items :

A. Fire (M)—{ *vedi, ukhā, lotus-leaf, samidh, praṇītā* waters (All F)
(F)—Mahavīra jar

B. Upper *araṇi* (M)—lower (F)
pestle (M)—mortar (F)
sand (M)—*ukhā* (F)
sruva (M)—*sruc* (F)
śūrpa (M)—*agnihotrahavaṇī* (F)
sphya (M)—*kapāla* (F)
dṛṣad (F)—*upala* (M)
kṛṣṇājina (M)—*śamyā* (F)

C. Hair of beast: White-Black

D. Tail of beast :
outer, hairy side (M)—Inner (F)

D. Waters: Along current—Against it
From river—From sea

E. Soma (M) } Cow, *krayiṇī* (F)
Bull (M) }

F. Rice (M)—Milk (F);
Ghee (M)—Curds (F)
vājina (M)—*payasyā* (F);
ājya (M)—*puroḍāśa* (F)

G. Tortoise (M)—Aṣāḍhā brick (F)
Sacrifice (M)—Gifts (F)
Lokampṛṇā, two bricks (M–F)

H. Water—plants;

I. Cups: wooden—earthern
Soma: Pure—Mixed

PERSONAL

(i) GODS:
BI—SEXUAL
Agni: (M)
(F)—Soma (M)
(F)—Viṣṇu (M)
Indra: in right eye (M)
in left (F, Indrāṇi)
Varuṇa: (M)—Vāruṇī
(F)—Mitra (M)
(F)—Maruts (M)

(ii) Tvaṣṭṛ (M)—Gods' wives (F)

(iii) PRIESTS :
Acchāvāka (Bi-sexual)
Udgātṛ (M)—Neṣṭṛ (F)

(iv) Udgātṛ (M)—" Wife " (F)
Māgadha (M)—*pumścalū* (F)
Sacrificer—his wife

(v) MIXED SYMBOLIC:
Sacrificial beast: goat, Horse, Ape, *ghṛta, gharma* } (M)—" Wife "

COSMIC

(i) Fire (M)—Earth (F)

aśru (√*aś*)
(Comic fluid)
Birds

(ii) Vāyu—Antarikṣa
(M) (F)

aśru
prśni aśman
(Coud, acc. Com.)

(iii) Sun (M)—Sky (F)

aśru
Stars

(iv) Gandharva—Apsaras
(one) (many)
(M) (F)
↓ ↓
Soma—Quarters
Sun—Rays
Fire—Plants
Moon—Constellations

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ṚGVEDIC RUDRA, AN EXTREMELY UNSOCIAL AND NON-CO-OPERATING GOD

By
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The *Ṛgveda* amply testifies to the facts that Rudra, though being basically a god of thunderstorm and lightning-fire as well as of the storm-clouds, has a number of features in his character which make him more an ordinary human being of flesh and blood, or rather a man-killing demon, than a mere god of nature, that he is a relentless slayer of the Vedic people, particularly male, and of their domestic animals, particularly cows, and that he is a powerful destroyer of Vedic sacrifices and a slayer of the wealthy institutors or patrons of these rites[1]. Besides these peculiar features, which give him a unique distinction, there are a few others, mentioned below, which mark him out from the group of the Vedic gods and stand him practically outside this group.

Although anthropomorphism, not rarely very imperfect, forms one of the most remarkable features of the Vedic deities, human passions have not been allowed to play a very prominent part in their character. Like ordinary human beings led by passions, they are not jealous or intolerant of one another, nor do they entertain mutual hatred or quarrel among themselves or engage in bloody warfare either for attaining particular selfish ends, or for establishing their personal supremacy, or for extending their domains of influence. They are always compromising and co-operating and find no objection to accept joint invitation at a sacrifice, to present themselves jointly at it, or to accept joint eulogies or salutations, although their formation of small groups is often found to differ under different circumstances. Thus, the *Ṛgveda* contains a good number of hymns and a very large number of verses or groups of verses in which Vedic deities have been invoked or praised in duals, triads, etc., such as Mitra-Varuṇa, Indra-Varuṇa, Indra-Vāyu, Indra-Maruts, Indra-Viṣṇu, Indra-Agni, Agni-Soma, Agni-Maruts, Div-Pṛthivī, etc., Varuṇa-Mitra-Aryaman, Indra-Bṛhaspati-Soma, Sūrya-Mitra-Varuṇa, Indrāṇī-Varuṇānī-Agnāyī, etc., Div-Pṛthivī-Agni-Aśvins, etc., Agni-Mitra-Varuṇa-Aditi-Sindhu-Pṛthivī-Div, etc., the Viśve-devas (i.e. groups of Vedic gods of varying numbers), and so on ; in *Ṛv* (i.e. *Ṛgveda*) 1.131.1 all gods (*viśve devāsaḥ*) are said to have been of one accord (*sajoṣasaḥ*) and set Indra in front ; in 9.18.3 it is said that all deities (*viśve-devāsaḥ*), being of one accord, came to the sacrifice to drink Soma-juice ; in

1 For these characteristic features see my article entitled "An overlooked Aspect of Ṛgvedic Rudra" in *Journal of Ancient Indian History* (Calcutta), Vol. V, Parts 1-2, 1971-72, pp. 123-148.

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9.5.11 all the gods, viz., Vāyu, Sūrya, Bṛhaspati, Indra and Agni, are said to have been equally pleased (*sajoṣasaḥ*) to come to the consecrating rite of Soma Pavamāna ; in 1.45.10 Agni is asked to bring the celestial host (*daivyaṃ janam*) with joint invocations (*sahūtibhiḥ*) ; in 1.44.2 Agni is implored to be accordant with the Aśvins and the Dawn in granting heroic strength and lofty fame ; in 1.44.9 a prayer is made to Agni to bring the gods who wake at dawn ; in 1.17.9 Indra and Varuṇa are said to dignify joint eulogy (*sadha-stuti*) ; in 1.25.6 it is said that Mitra and Varuṇa accept in common (*samānam āśāte*) the oblation offered to them ; in 8.38.4 Indra and Agni are said to be gods having joint eulogy (*sadha-stutī*) ; in 8.26.1 joint eulogy is made of the Aśvins ; in 1.14.1-3 Agni is asked to come to the sacrifice ' with the gods Indra, Vāyu, Bṛhaspati, Mitra, Agni[2], Pūṣan, Bhaga, Ādityas, and the host of the Maruts ' and to drink Soma ; in 1.34.11 the Aśvins are invited to come ' with the thrice-eleven gods ' to the drinking of the mead ; in 1.45.1-2 Agni is implored to bring ' three-and-thirty ' gods to the sacrifice ; in 1.45.9-10 a prayer is made to Agni to bring with joint invocations (*sahūtibhiḥ*) the host of gods (*daivyaṃ janam*) who come at early morning and to seat them on sacred grass at the sacrifice; in 1.89 3 Bhaga, Dakṣa, Mitra, Aditi, Aryaman, Varuṇa, Soma and the Aśvins are said to have been called to the sacrifice ' with a hymn of olden time ' (*pūrvayā nividā*). Scores of instances of these types may be cited from the *Ṛgveda*, but it is needless to multiply them.

It is a fact that in glorifying Indra as the mightiest of all gods in *Ṛv* 4.30, statements have been made in verses 3, 5 and 8-11 that, when Indra lengthened the days into the nights, not even all the gods together could fight him with their might,[3] that Indra alone fought against all the opposing gods and struck down (*ahan*) the harmful ones, and that, when Uṣas rose up in pride, Indra crushed (cf. ' *vadhīḥ* ') her by breaking her car and making her flee far away. Although Indra's destruction of the car of Uṣas has been referred to in other Ṛgvedic verses also (viz., 2.15.6, and 10.138.5), his extremely sweet association and most friendly relation with the Vedic deities in all other places of the *Ṛgveda* shows that the said statements about him are unique and abnormal and must be due to the unrestrained priestly zeal in glorifying this god and presenting him as the most powerful of the Vedic deities. The accounts of Indra's unfavourable

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2 The *Ṛgveda* distinguishes between different Agnis, viz., Agni the Fire-god to whom sacrifice is offered, Agni who summons the gods and carries oblation to them; and so on. According to Sāyaṇa, Āhavanīya, Gārhapatya and other Agnis are the outer forms (*avayava*, vibhūti) of Agni the Fire-god. See Sāyaṇa on *Ṛv* 1.26.10, 1,59.1, 6.10.2, 6.11.6, etc.

3 As Sāyaṇa takes ' *tvā devāsa indra yuyudhuḥ* ' *to* mean ' he *indra*, ... *devāḥ* ..... *tvāṃ sahāyaṃ labdhvā* ..... *asuraiḥ saha yuddhaṃ cakruḥ* ', in which he makes ' *tvā* ' (= *tvām*) the object of the verb ' *labdhvā* ' supplied by him, his explanation of this verse cannot be accepted as plausible.

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attitude to the Aśvins[4] and also to the Maruts[5] before their entrance into the Vedic fold, must be due to these gods' coming from extraneous sources.[6]

But very different is the nature of Rudra, who, being extremely unsocial and uncompromising, is dead against common invocation and salutation made to himself and some other Vedic gods[7], or invocation and salutation made at the same time to a number of deities including Rudra. Thus, in *ṚV* 2.33.4 a prayer is made to Rudra in the following words:

mā' tvā rudra cukrudhāmā námobhir mā' dúṣṭutī vṛṣabha mā' sáhūtī |
únno vīrā̃' arpaya bheṣajébhir bhiṣaktamaṃ tvā bhiṣájāṃ śṛṇomi ||

From the word '*namobhiḥ*' in the first quarter of this verse it would appear that 'prostrations' (or, 'salutations') made to Rudra, did not please him at all but created his rage. As a matter of fact, Veṅkaṭamādhava explains this quarter thus: "he *rudra, namaskāraiḥ mā tvāṃ krodhayāmaḥ*"; and, following him, Max Muller translates it as "Let us not incense thee, O Rudra, by our *worship*",[8] Muir as "Let us not, Rudra, provoke thee by our *prostrations*",[9] Griffith as "Let us not anger thee with *worship*, Rudra",[10] Ludwig as "mogen wir dich nicht erzürnen durch unsere *anbetungen*",[11] ("May we not provoke thee by our *adorations*"), and Geldner as "Nicht wollen wir dich, Rudra, mit unsere *Verbeugungen* erzürnen"[12] ("May we not provoke thee, Rudra, with our *obeisances*" or, "We do not want, Rudra, to provoke thee with our *obeisances*"). But this interpretation and translation of '*namobhiḥ*' cannot be accepted as correct, because even a devil can be softened by prostrations and there is no reason why Rudra, a god, should be enraged by these. On the other hand, the *Ṛgveda* contains a number of verses in which Rudra is said to be pleased by prostration (or, salutation,—*namas*), single or repeated, made to him by his devotees. Some of these verses are the following :

"*mṛḷā' no rudrotá no máyaskṛdhi kṣayád-vīrāya námasā vidhema te*"
(*ṚV* 1.114.2a-b)

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4 See *Ṛv* 10. 61. 1-3. Also Pischel in *Vedische Studien*, I, pp. 71-77.

5 See *Ṛv* 1.170-171, particularly 1.6.4 and 1.87.5.

6 Questions relating to the origin of the Aśvins and the Maruts will be dealt with separately in future.

7 I shall explain on a different occasion how and when Rudra came to be associated with Soma and the Maruts.

8 Max Müller F., *Vedic Hymns* Vol. I (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 32), p. 426.

9 Muir J., *Original Sanskrit Texts* (Second edition, London, 1873), Vol. IV, p. 308.

10 In foot-note 4 Griffith gives for 'with worship' the equivalent 'with imperfect worship', evidently following Sāyaṇa. See Griffith R.T.H., *Hyms of the Ṛgveda*, Vol. I (Varanasi, 1963), p. 299.

11 Ludwig A., *Der Rigveda*, II, No. 708 (p. 326).

12 Geldner K. F., *Der Rigveda*, I, p. 317.

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" Be gracious to us, Rudra, [and] also minister to our happiness ; with prostration we will serve thee, the destroyer of heroes ".

" *divó varāhám aruṣáṃ kapardínaṃ tveṣám rūpáṃ námasā ní hvayāmahe* "
(*ṚV* 1.114.5a-b)

" The shining boar of heaven having a *kāparda* (i.e., hair tied on the crown of the head in the form of a cowrie shell) and a brilliant form we invoke intensively with salutation (or, prostration, or humble submission) ".

" *avocāma namo asmā avasyavaḥ śṛṇotu no havaṃ rudro marutvān* "
(*ṚV* 1.114.1a-b).

" [Being] desirous of [his] protection [we] have spoken out [our] homage (or, humble submission) to him ; may Rudra, with the Maruts, hear our call ".

" *Yájante asya sakhyáṃ váyaś ca namasvínaḥ svá ṛtásya dhā'man /*
ví pṛ'kṣo bābadhe nṛbhiḥ stávāna idáṃ námo rudrā'ya préṣṭham // "
(*ṚV* 7.36.5)

" [Men] paying homage [to Rudra] in [their] own place of sacrifice, attain by sacrifice his friendship and [an advanced] age.

Being praised by men [Rudra] bestows food [on them]. [So,] to Rudra be this prostration (or, humble submission) [which is] dearest [to him] ".

" *stómaṃ vo adyá rudrā'ya śikvase kṣayád-vīrāya námasā didiṣṭana /*
.. .. .. śiváḥ .. .. .. diváḥ síṣakti sváyaśāḥ .. .. .. // "
(*ṚV* 10.92.9)

" With prostration (or, humble submission) present your hymn of praise to-day to mighty Rudra, the destroyer of heroes.

.. .. [who], being auspicious and having his own [peculiar] renown, attends [to the sacrificers] from heaven. "

" *prá babhráve vṛṣabhā'ya śvitīcé mahó mahī'ṃ suṣṭutím īrayāmi /*
namasyā' kalmalīkínaṃ námobhir gṛṇīmási tveṣáṃ rudrásya nāma // "
(*ṚV* 2.33.8)

" To the tawny, white [strong] Bull I utter forth a good hymn of praise [which is] greater than the great.

Reverence the fiery [god] with prostrations (i.e., repeated prostration). We celebrate the glorious name of Rudra ".

" *te no mitro varuṇo aryamāyur indra ṛbhukṣā maruto juṣanta /*
namobhir vā ye dadhate suvṛktiṃ stomaṃ rudrāya mīḷhuṣe sajoṣāḥ // "
(*ṚV* 5.41.2)

" May they—Mitra, Varuṇa, Aryaman, Āyu, Indra, Ṛbhukṣan, (and) the Maruts—be pleased with us,—

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They, who, being of equal love, accept (or, hold up) the eulogy [which has been made by us] to bounteous Rudra with prostrations (i.e., with repeated prostration) [and] from which thorough elimination [of other gods] has been made ".

" *yákṣvā mahé saumanasā'ya rudráṃ námobhir devám ásuraṃ duvasya* "

(*ṚV* 5.42.11c-d)

" Worship Rudra for [his] great goodwill, [and] worship the powerful god with prostrations (i.e., repeated prostration) ".

These verses show that for winning the grace, goodwill, friendship and protection of Rudra and also for attaining an advanced age and happiness in life, the priests and the sacrificers invoked Rudra with prostration (or salutation, or humble submission) which was *dearest* (*preṣṭha*) to him. So, the said interpretation and translation of the word '*namobhiḥ*' have no basis to stand upon.

There is another interpretation of '*namobhiḥ*', viz., that of Sāyaṇa, who takes it to mean '*ayathā-kriyamāṇair namaskārair havirbhir vā*' ['by prostrations or (offer of) oblations not being properly made']; and Sāyaṇa's interpretation is followed by Wilson and Grassmann (and also, as we have already seen, partially by Griffith), of whom the first translates it as 'by (imperfect) adorations', and the second as 'durch schlechtes Lob' ('by bad eulogy'). But we cannot overlook the fact that in tae said verse (*ṚV* 2.33.4) there is no word which qualifies '*namobhiḥ*', nor is there any indeclinable (*avyaya*) like 'dus' or 'dur' prefixed to it (as in '*duṣṭuti*', '*durmati*', etc.). There is also no statement anywhere in the *Ṛgveda* that '*namas*' (prostration or salutation was ever made to any god indifferently or improperly (*ayathā-kriyamāṇa*). Moreover, Rudra was such a terrible and malignant god that people, particularly those who keenly felt the need of his favour and goodwill, could hardly venture to antagonise or displease him with improper or badly done prostrations or salutations. So, Sāyaṇa's interpretation also does not stand scrutiny.

Under the circumstances stated above we have to take '*namobhiḥ*' to mean 'by prostrations [made to Rudra and other gods simultaneously], and this meaning finds strong support not only in the plural number of '*namobhiḥ*' (which, in the said verse, has to be taken to mean a number of prostrations made, one or more each, to a number of Vedic gods including Rudra, and not repeated prostration made to one god, viz., Rudra) but also in the word '*sahūtī*' (meaning 'by common or simultaneous invocation),' which points to the presence of a number of gods at the same time.

So, we should translate the said verse (*Ṛv* 2.33.4) thus:

" Let us not, Rudra, enrage thee *by* [*our*] *prostrations* [*made to thee and other gods at the same time*], by [our] bad praise, [o] vigorous [deity], (or) by [our] common invocation,

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Raise up our heroes by [thy] medicines; I hear thee to be the best physician among the physicians."

From this verse as well as another (5.41.2) quoted above it is evident that Rudra could not tolerate the presence of any other Vedic god by his side, nor did he like that people should invite any god other than himself in a sacrifice in which he was given a place or offer oblation to that god in it. He did not allow the presence even of the name of any other god in a hymn meant for himself (cf. *suvṛktiṃ stomam—ṚV* 5.41.2). So, the *Ṛgveda* rightly says that Rudra had his own peculiar reputation, which was quite different from that of the other Vedic gods and made him extremely unsocial and non-co-operating.[13]

It should be mentioned here that the said verse (2.33.4) of the *Ṛgveda* occurs in the *Atharva-veda* (*Paippalāda-saṃhitā*[14] 1.95.1) in a somewhat different way, thus :

"*rudra mā tvā jihīḍāma suṣṭutyā maghavan mā suhutyā |*
bhiṣaktamaṃ tvā bhiṣajāṃ śṛṇomy unno vīrāṁ īraya bheṣajībhiḥ ||"

"[O] Rudra, let [us] not enrage thee with good praise,
[O] Maghavan, or with good offering [of oblation].
I hear thee to be the best physician among the physicians; raise up our heroes with [thy] medicines".

This verse shows that according to the *Atharva-veda* it was good praise and good offering of oblation (i.e., praise and offering of oblation made in the Vedic way), and not prostration (or, salutation, —*namas*) of any kind, which displeased Rudra and created his rage. But this change of idea about Rudra was certainly due to the belief of the people of later days that Rudra was to be pleased with '*daurvratya*' (i.e., the conduct of those who follow ignoble and difficult practices),[15] as the *Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā*[16] says.

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13 See *Ṛv* 10.92.9 (quoted above) and 1.129.3 (....*rudrāya sva-yaśase*/....).

14 Ed. Durgamohan Bhattacharya, Calcutta, Part I, 1964.

15 The world '*daurvratya*' reminds us of the queer practices of the Śiva-worshippers of comparatively late days, for which Rudra-Śiva has been said to be 'denounced by all' (*sarva-garhita*) in *Brahma-purāṇa* 40.39.

In commenting on *Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā* 39.9 Mahīdhara explains "*rudraṃ daurvratyena* (*prīṇāmi*)" thus : "*duṣṭaṃ skhalanocchalanādi vrataṃ yasya sa durvrataḥ tasya bhāvo daurvratyam, tena rudraṃ devaṃ prīṇāmi*".

Griffith translates '*daurvratya*' as 'disobedience'.

But it is more probable that '*daurvratya*' refers to the '*Loka-yajña*', i.e., the popular method of Rudra-worship (which has been mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*, Poona Critical Edition 10.18.5-6, and was looked down upon by the Vedic people), and to the Rudra-worshippers' practice of Yoga (which was much more difficult than the mechanical way of performing a Vedic sacrifice and of which the Vedic people appear to have little or no knowledge in the early Vedic period).

16 *Mādhyaṃdina* 39.9 and *Kāṇva* 39.7.

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That Rudra was extremely intolerant of other Vedic gods, is also evident from the statement "*eka eva rudro na dvitīyāya tasthe*" made in *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 1.8.6.1 in connection with *Tryambaka-homa* forming part of *Sākamedha* in *Rājasūya*. In his commentary on the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* Sāyaṇa explains this line thus: "*rudro jagaty eka evāsti / dvitīyāya na tasthe / dvitīyo rudro na ko'py avasthitaḥ*".[17] As it is not possible for us to overlook the fourth case-ending in '*dvitīyāya*', the questions naturally arise as to why the word '*dvitīya*' has the fourth case-ending (and not the first), and whether the expression '*dvitīyāya tasthe*' gives the same meaning as '*dvitīyaḥ tasthe*'. Pāṇini says that the root '*sthā*' takes the *Ātmanepadīya* form when it means 'disclosing (one's intention to another) or 'declaration of (one as) an umpire',[18] and that, in case of use of this root, the person who is desired to be informed (of something) is placed in the *Saṃpradāna Kāraka*.[19] So, according to Pāṇini '*eka eva rudro na dvitīyāya tasthe*' means "Rudra is one only, [and he] does not disclose [his intention] to the (or, to a) second [one]." As this meaning relates to Rudra's disclosing his intention to one second to himself and not to the latter's existence (cf. '*tasthe*'), and as still it admits of the existence of a second Rudra, '*dvitīyāya tasthe*' cannot be taken to be equivalent to '*dvitīyo'sti*'. Yāska must have been fully conscious of this difficulty, as, in a *prima facie* argument in favour of presence of contradictions in the Veda, he reads, in his *Nirukta* 1.15 (= 1.3.4.9), the said line as '*eka eva rudro ava tasthe na dvitīyaḥ*' ['There exists only one Rudra (and) not (a) second (one)']. Although this line, as read by Yāska, is not found in any of the extant Vedic texts, it was certainly not his own creation but must have been derived by him from some Vedic text (like the *Hāridravika Brāhmaṇa*) which is now lost to us. Whatever the source of this line may have been, we cannot say that the reading '*dvitīyāya tasthe*' of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* is a mistake for '*dvitīyo'va tasthe*', because no manuscript of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* is found to give this variant or one similar to it. On the other hand, the said reading ('*dvitīyāya tasthe*') of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* has been repeated, without any variation in reading, in the *Baudhāyana-śrautasūtra* (ed. (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 5.16, p. 151) and *Āpastamba-śrautasūtra* (ed. Bibl. Ind., 8.17.8) and also finds strong support in *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* 3.2, in which the said line of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* occurs as '*ekohi rudro na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ*'. The *Atharvaśiras-upaniṣad* 5 has '*eko rudro na dvitīyāya tasmai*', in which the reading '*dvitīyāya*' is remarkable. So, we cannot change the reading of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* arbitrarily, nor can we take it to be equivalent to the reading '*dvitīyo'sti*' or '*dvitīyo'va tasthe*'. Consequently, we have to offer a

17 *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* (Poona, Ānandāśrama ed.), Part III, p. 923.

The said comment of Sāyaṇa may be translated into English, thus: "Rudra, in the world, there is one only. (There) is no second. There exists no second Rudra".

18 *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.3.23—*prakāśana-sthey-ākhyayoś ca.*

19 *Ibid.*, 1.4.34—*ślāgh-hnuṅ-sthā-śapāṃ jñīpsamānaḥ.*

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better and more reasonable explanation for the reading of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā*, which must have been based on a very ancient tradition about the conduct of Rudra.

We have already seen that the *Ṛgveda* presents Rudra as an exrremely unsocial and non-co-operating deity. So, in the line '*eka eva rudro na dvitīyāya tasthe*' of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* the word '*dvitīyāya*' is to be taken to have the fourth case-ending by Pāṇini's rule "*kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninaḥ*" (2.3.14), which means that the fourth case-ending is to be employed in denoting the Object of that verb ending in *tumun* (> *tum*) which is suppressed in a sentence, in case there is actual use, in that sentence, of the verb for which the action of the verb ending in *tumun* (i.e., *tum*) is intended. Consequently, the expression '*na dvitīyāya tasthe*' is to be taken to be equivalent to '*na dvitīyaṃ soḍhuṃ* (*mānayituṃ draṣṭuṃ vā*) *tasthe*' [which means 'is not in a position (or, does not exist) to tolerate (or recognize or see) a second'].

It is to be noted that, in our said interpretation, the verb '*tasthe*' though used in the *Ātmanepadīya* form, has been taken in its usual sense to mean '*asti*' ('is in a position' or 'exists') and not to mean '*prakāśayati*' ('discloses') according to Pāṇini's rule 1.3.23 quoted above. But this interpretation of 'tasthe' must not be rejected as wrong, because '*tasthire*' (an *Ātmanepadīya* form of the root *sthā*) means '*tiṣṭhanti* in *Ṛv* 9.62.27—

> "*túbhyemā' bhúvanā kave mahimné soma tasthire /*
> *túbhyam arṣanti síndhavaḥ //*"

"For thy majesty these worlds *are* [O] seer Soma; to thee the rivers go".

It is not that the *Ṛgveda* did not know that the root '*sthā*', used in the sense of 'disclosing (one's intention)' (*prakāśana*), took the *Ātmanepadīya* form, and that the person who was desired to know that intention, was placed in the *Saṃpradāna Kāraka*. In *Ṛv* 10.109.3 there is the expression '*na dūtāya ...tasthe*', which, according to Sāyaṇa, means '*na dūtāya svātmānaṃ prakāśayati*'.

We have already seen that the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* (3.2) reads the said line of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* as '*eko hi rudro na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ*'. If the plural '*tasthuḥ*' has been used irregularly for the singular '*tasthe*', like the singular '*astu*' for the plural '*santu*' in *Ṛv* 1.162.8, 9 and 14, then '*na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ*' of the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* becomes equivalent to '*na dvitīyāya tasthe*' of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā*. If, again, the word '*janāḥ*' or '*brahmavidaḥ*' (understood) is taken to be the Subject of '*tasthuḥ*; then '*na dvitīyāya tasthuḥ*' becomes equivalent to '(*janāḥ brahmavido vā*) *na dvitīyaṃ* (*rudraṃ*) *draṣṭuṃ* (*jñātuṃ svīkartuṃ vā*) *tasthuḥ*' ['(People, or those who have thorough knowledge of the Brahman) exist not to, see (or know or admit) a second (Rudra)'] and thus admits of the possibility of the existence of a second Rudra. So, the said

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reading of the *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* is questionable and does not lead to any decision as to what the correct reading for '*na dvitīyāya tasthe*' should be.

Under the circumstances mentioned above we are to take the line '*eka eva rudro na dvitīyāya tasthe*' of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* as it is and to translate it thus :

" Rudra is one only (or, single), [and he] is not in a position (or, does not exist) to tolerate (or recognize or see) a second (i.e., a rival) ".

In support of our above interpretation and translation of the said line of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* we may refer to the custom of lighting a *single firebrand* (*ekolmukam*) from the *Dakṣiṇa* Fire and carrying it to a crossroad in the north for kindling a fire there for the performance of *homa* to Tryambaka (Rudra) with the citation of the said line ('*eka eva rudro na dvitīyāya tasthe*')[20]. According to some of the Vedic works, a fumigating (*dhūpāyat*) firebrand was used for the purpose.[21] It is hardly necessary to say that as Rudra was extremely intolerant of other Vedic gods and as a second firebrand would indicate a sacrifice to be offered to a Vedic god other than Rudra and would thus incite the latter to destroy it, a single firebrand was taken to kindle a fire for the performance of *homa* to Rudra.[22] The terror from Rudra must have been so great that some thought it wiser to take fire from the *Dakṣiṇāgni* for the performance of *Tryambaka-homa* by means of a fumigating firebrand, and not by a blazing one, so that Rudra's notice might be avoided and Rudra might not attack the bearers of the firebrand on the way, mistaking it to be meant for the performance of sacrifice for some other Vedic deity.

Here we cannot help mentioning that Keith translates the said line ('*eka eva rudro na dvitīyāya tasthe*') of the *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* as " Rudra alone yieldeth to no second[23] ", and thus takes the root '*sthā*' to mean ' to yield, ' ' to submit, ' evidently by following the Sanskrit Dictionaries of some modern scholars, in which '*sthā*' has been given the said meaning most probably in view of Bhaṭ-

20 For this custom (with or without mention of the cross-road or the said line) see *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 1.8.6.1; *Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā* (Bombay ed.) 36.14 (25-27, p. 362); *Kapiṣṭhala-kaṭha-saṃhitā* (ed. Raghu Vira, Lahore) 8.10-11; *Maitrāyaṇī-saṃhitā* (Bombay ed.) 1.10.20 (48-50, p. 94); *Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa* (Poona, Ānandāśrama ed.) 1.6.10.1-3; *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* (Banaras ed.) 2.6.2.7; *Baudhāyanaśrautasūtra* 5.16 (p. 151); *Āpastamba-śrautasūtra* 8.17.8; *Kātyāyana-śrautasūtra* (Chowkhamba ed., with Karka-bhāṣya) 5.10.7; *Bhāradvāja-śrautsūtra* (ed. C. G. Kashikar, Poona) 8.22.5-9; *Satyāṣāḍha-śrautasūtra* (*alias Hiraṇyakeśi-śrautasūtra*) ed. Ānand-asrama Press, Poona) 5.5.7-11 and *Mānava-śrautasūtra* (ed. Gelder, New Delhi, 1961) 1.7.7.3-5.

21 See the *Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā, Maitrāyaṇi-saṃhitā, Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra, Bhāradvāja śrautasūtra, Satyāṣāḍha-śrautasūtra* and *Mānava-śrautasūtra* referred to in the immediately preceding foot-note.

22 That this single firebrand was meant only for Rudra is evident from *Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa* 1.6.10.1-2—*ekolmukena yantiltaddhi rudrasya bhāgadheyam.*

23 See Keith A. B., *Taittirīya Saṃhita* (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 18), p. 118.

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ṭojidīkṣita's use of '*sthā*' in the line "*gopī smarāt kṛṣṇāya tiṣṭhate*" cited by him as an instance in commenting on Pāṇini's rule 1.4.34 (cited above). But, as we have already seen, this meaning of '*sthā*' is against Pāṇini and also against the context in which the said line has to be cited in carrying the single fire-brand for the performance of the *Tryambaka-homa*. Moreover, in his translation of this line Keith completely overlooks the word '*eva*' (because "*eko rudraḥ*," meaning "Rudra alone" or "Rudra only," cannot be taken to convey the same idea as "*eka eva rudraḥ*," which means "Rudra is one only;" and "Rudra..... yieldeth to no second" may mean that this god yields to only one. So, Keith's translation of this line is open to serious objections and cannot be accepted as correct.

From *ṚV* 2.33.4 and 5.41.2 (quoted above) and from the said line of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* it is evident that Rudra did not allow his paramountcy to be challenged by any other Vedic god, nor did he tolerate the presence of a Vedic god by his side in a sacrifice or the mention of the name of such a god in a hymn meant for himself. Nay, his self-conceit went so far as to make him look upon himself as the only god deserving the people's respect and humble submission and, consequently, not allow the offer of sacrifice to any other god. So, there is hardly any scope for doubt that he was extremely proud, selfish, touchy, unsocial and uncompromising, and, in these respects, he was unparallelled and stood in great contrast with the other Vedic deities.

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FOOD AND EATER IN NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF EARLY INDIA

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0.1. Food and eater are basic categories in biology. Plants and animals survive only provided they assimilate or eat food and at the same time avoid being eaten by others, at least until they are able to procreate. Hence, animals in particular have developed sensory organs with which they can investigate their natural environment so as to ascertain whether it can be eaten or threatens to eat them. In order to survive man in his natural condition is also forced to evade his eaters and to procure food for himself by killing or exploiting animals and plants.

0.2. The ancient Indo-Aryans were well aware of this natural relations. So we find in their language the respective terms *ánna* "food" and *attár* "eater" which though opposed to each other are derived from the same root *ad*.[1] As stated in the Brāhmanas all phenomena on earth are based on this pair of oppositions,[2] including human society: All human beings constitute a common class of eaters as opposed to their food consisting of domestic animals (cattle, horses, goats and sheep) and food plants (rice and barley). On the same principle human society is also divided :

The aristocratic warriors (*kṣatra, kṣatriya*) live on the agriculturists (*viś*) and the king (*rājan*) devours all being[3]. Thus, the distribution of eater and food depends on the relative power of the individual : each eater, in turn, is eaten by another more powerful being—except for the king at the top of this eating hierarchy.[4]

0.3. However, even the king is subject to death. If not in this world he will be eaten in the beyond, for :

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1 *ánna* is either formed like *svấp-na* by the addition of the suffix *-na-* to the accented root *ad* or it was originally a perfect participle passive of the type *pan-ná* (from the root *pad* "fall"), which in this function was supplanted by *jagdhá* (from the root *ghas* "eat") and then limited in usage to a neuter noun with shifted accent (cf Wackernagel (1954) p. 733. Synonyms of *ánna* are *ādyà* and *adyamāna*, a synonym of *attár* is *annādá*, all based on the same root *ad*. Later, we find also the analogous pair *bhojya* (or *bhogya*)/*bhoktar* both derived from the root *bhuj* "enjoy" or "eat". In this sense, *bhojya* is documented in *MU* 6, 10; *bhogya* in *ŚU* 1, 12 and *bhoktar* in *KaU* 3, 4; *ŚU* 1, 8; 1, 12 and *MU* 6, 10

2 *ŚB* 14, 4, 2, 13 = *BhU* 1, 4, 6 : *etā'vad vā' idáṁ sárvam ánnaṃ caivânnādáś ca.* "So far, forsooth, everything here (on earth) is food and food-eater." *ŚB* 10, 6, 2, 1 : *dvayáṃ vā' idám : attā' caivâdyáṃ ca.* "A pair (of oppositions), forsooth, is here (on earth) : the eater and what can be eaten." Cf also *ŚB* 10, 3, 4, 4

3 This is documented by the excellent diagram given by Rau (1957), p. 34

4 Canetti (1960), pp. 243 draws a vivid picture of the most-eater ("Meistesser").

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" Which food, forsooth, a man eats in this world, it eats him in turn in yonder world. " [5]

Thus, the primary biological cycle of food is closed : the eater will be eaten and what has been eaten will become eater.

0.4. The natural philosophers of the early Upaniṣads drew upon these prephilosophical ideas. In their ardent quest for the ultimate principle of life [6] and in their attempt to surpass each other in their wisdom [7] the adherents of different philosophical schools felt sure they had found the source of life either in water [8], in food [9], in wind-breath [10] or in fire [11]. Except for the adherents of water, these philosophical schools may be divided into two groups : One group worships food as the foundation of all existence just as the agriculturists who, by their products, procure the necessary means for the aristocrats to live on. In contrast to these " rustic " realistic worshippers of food the other, aristocratic, group asserts that the eater is the ultimate source of life. For, just as the aristocrats live on food that they take for granted, distributing it and organizing the social body, so the eater, be it wind or fire, digests the food served to him and distributes the resulting energy to the other vital forces of the body.

1. First of all I shall deal with the doctrine of food.

1.1. The doctrine of food, probably, developed into an accomplished philosophical system under the influence of the water cycle theory. According to this theory, water in its different transformations is the source of life. In form of rain it " falls from the sky on to the earth. This moisture revives the plants which contain it in the form of sap or juice. Man in turn assimilates it with his food, is thereby nourished and grows. In the act of procreation it constitutes the basis of new life in the form of sperm which the man passes on to the woman. [12] "

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5 *ŚB* 12, 9, 1, 1 : *sá yád dha vā' asmiṃ loké púruṣò'nnam átti, tád enam amúṣmiṃ loké prátyatti.*

The coherent complex of killing, eating, procreating and dying is prevalent in the mythical thought of the early plant cultivators Cf. Jensen (1966) passim; Campbell (1973) p. 4. In *RV* 10, 16, 3 the dead is inovked to enter the plants and in *RV* 10, 90, 2cd the expression *yád ánnenātiròhati* (" that which grows by food ") signifies the mortal world in contrast to immortality (*amṛtatvá*).

6 Frauwallner (1953), p. 49; Schneider (1973), p. 310

7 Ruben (1929), pp. 239

8 Frauwallner (1953), pp. 49; Schneider (1961), pp. 2; Schneider (1973), pp. 311

9 For a very sketchy treatment of the doctrine of food see Ruben (1947), pp. 123 and pp. 162. Ruben's purely materialistic point of view is criticized by Heimann (1964), pp. 42

10 Lüders (1940), pp. 361; Frauwallner (1953), pp. 55; Schneider (1973), pp. 313

11 Frauwallner (1926), pp. 6; Frauwallner (1953), pp. 60; Schneider (1973), p. 314

12 These traits of the water doctrine pertaining to our investigation are quoted from Schneider (1973), p. 311.

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From this water cycle theory the adherents of food isolated the two adjacent elements "food" and "sperm" and adapted them to their system. Thus, we read :

> "Food, forsooth, is *Prajāpati* (the Lord of creation). For, out of food grows sperm and out of that grow the creatures here (on earth)." [13]

So, in the form of myth, the thesis is put forward that, in reality, food is the creator of all beings because food produces sperm, the source of all existence.

1.2. In the text just mentioned the ultimate principle of all beings was expressed in terms of the mythical figure *Prajāpati*. Later on, *Prajāpati* was substituted by *Brahma*, a more abstract notion, originally meaning "sacred formula.[14]" Then, in the Upaniṣads, *Brahma* was used as a kind of blank formula in order to express the ultimate cause of all creation, be it food, breath, intellect or the unthinkable unmanifested absolute. Thus, a purely formal definition of *Brahma* is given in the following text :

> "Out of what these beings are born, by what, when born, they live and into what, on dying, they enter, that is *Brahma*." [15]

After having given this formal definition of *Brahma* the same text continues by substantiating it as follows :

> "*Brahma* is food, for beings here are born of food. When born they live by food and, on dying; they enter into food." [16]

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13 *PU* 1, 14 : *annaṃ vai prajāpatis. tato ha vai tad retaḥ. tasmād imāḥ prajāḥ prajāyanta iti.*

Deussen (1919), p. 25 attributes the *PU* (as well as *MU*) to the third layer of the Upaniṣads However, he also rightly points out that "All the principal Upaniṣads contain earlier and later elements side by side, and therefore the age of each seperate piece must be determined by itself....from the degree of development of thoughts which find expression in it" (o.c. p. 23). Our text, being a quotation as shown by the particle *iti* is still attached to mythical thinking which is proved by the fact that *Prajāpati* is identified with the primary substance just as in the Brāhmaṇas. So I do not hesitate to attribute it to the earliest layer of the Upaniṣads.

14 For the meaning of *brahma* see Thieme (1952), pp. 110.

15 *TU* 3, 1 : *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jivanti, yat prayanty abhisaṃviśanti, tad....brahmêti.* Cf. also *ŚB* 10, 3, 5, 6

16 *TU* 3, 2 *annaṃ brahmêti....annād dhy eva khalv imāni bhūtāni jāyante, annena jātāni jivanti, annaṃ prayanty abhisaṃviśanti.* A (versified?) variant of this formula is found in *TU* 2, 2 : *annād (vai) prajāḥ prajāyante yāḥ kāśca pṛthivīṁ śtitāḥ atho annena (iva) jivaṇti athaînad apiyanty antataḥ.* With slight variants, this is quoted in *MU* 6, 11 : *annād (vai) prajāḥ prajāyante yāḥ kāścit pṛthivīśritāḥ ato'nnenaiva jīvant(i)y athainad apiyanty antataḥ.* Furthermore, a variant of *pāda ab* is found in *TU* 2, 2 and in *MU* 6, 12 : *TU : annād bhavanti bhūtāni, jātāny annena vardhante MU : annād bhūtāni jāyante, jātāny annena vardhante.* The variant of *MU* though being contained in a later text (cf. note 13) has preserved the formula better than *TU* which is clear from the paronymous expression *jāyante jātāni* also used in the prose version of *TU* 3, 2. In *TU* 3, 3-6 (and only here) the Brahma-formula is used successively

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Here, the biological food cycle assumes a definite, philosophical, structure : Food is the material substratum of all beings. After they are born of food, they live by it, eating other beings that have likewise arisen from food and, on dying, they return to food. Hence, the term food is used in a double sense : it means

(1) pre-existing matter and

(2) empirical food consisting of beings eating each other.

1.3. The ancient philosophers were well aware of the ontological difference between metaphysical and empirical food and accordingly, tried to verbalize it:

" Food is eaten and eats the beings Therefore it is called food. "[17]

Evidently, the author of this passage is attempting to express the idea that metaphysical food transcends the empirical pair of oppositions of food and eater by embracing both the passive and active aspect on a higher level. In other words: empirical food and empirical eater are only temporal modifications of the one pre-existing matter which itself remains the same. This statement is " proved " by grammatical analysis : Since the noun *annam* is derived from the root *ad*, which in turn is the basis of the active verbal form *atti* " eats " as well as the passive form *adyate* " is eaten ", the noun *annam* itself includes both the active and the passive aspect of the root *ad*. In short: against the rules of grammar our philosopher has transferred the abstract meaning of the root *ad* to the concrete noun *annam* in order to formulate his idea of unspecified pre-existing substance.[18]

1.4. Now, by means of this universal *Brahma*-food-formula the whole world of phenomena could be reduced to the *one* metaphysical substance. That is exemplified by the following text:

" One should not blame food. That is an observance.[19]

Breath, forsooth, is food;[20] the body is a food-eater. On breath the body is founded; on the body breath is founded. So food (= breath) is thus founded on food (= the body). He who knows that food is founded on food is (firmly) founded. Rich in food he becomes a food-eater. He becomes great in offspring, in cattle and in brahmanical brilliance, great in fame.

One should not look down on food. That is an observance.

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also in connection with *prāṇa*, *manas*, *vijñāna* and *ānanda*. In my opinion, this is a later enlargement which, in a future publication, I shall try to prove by a detailed analysis.

17 *TU* 2, 2 = *MU* 6, 12 : *adyate'tti ca bhūtāni tasmād annaṃ tad ucyate.*

18 Cf. also above under O.2.

19 For the meaning of *vrata* see Hacker (1973), p. 139.

20 Cf. *AB* 33, 1 : *annaṃ ha prāṇaḥ.*

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Water, forsooth, is food; light is a food-eater. On water light is founded; on light water is founded. So food (= water) is thus founded on food (light). He who knows....

One should think much of food. That is an observance.

Earth, forsooth, is food; space is a food-eater. On earth space is founded; on space earth is founded. So food (=earth) is thus founded on food (=space). He who knows....

So one keeps on singing this chant....I am food, I am food, I am food; I am a food-eater, I am a food-eater, I am a food-eater... I am food; I eat him who eats food. I have overcome the whole world...."[21]

To some extent the text quoted is still rooted in the magical thinking of the Brāhmaṇas : He who knows the secret of food will receive as reward food in abundance and, in consequence, he will occupy a dominant position in this empirical world. However, in the context as a whole, these ideas are not more than ancient survivals of a time long past. Not magic but logical thinking inspires the philosopher: In the first place, the whole universe is divided into three pairs opposed to each other: breath and body, water and light, earth and space. Secondly, these elements, so different in appearance, are reduced to *one* functional pair of oppositions: Since breath is inhaled by the body, water is " sucked up " by sunlight[22] and space envelops the earth, the whole universe is nothing but food and eater.

Finally, these two basic functions are merged into *one* because the eater turns out to be food also: The body bears and nourishes breath,[23] sunlight produces water[24] and the earth bears space. So, the functional contrast

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21 *TU* 3, 7-10 : *annaṃ na nindyāt. tad vratam. prāṇo vā annaṃ; śarīram annādam. prāṇe śarīraṃ pratiṣṭhitam; śarīre prāṇaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ. tad etad annam anne pratiṣṭhitam. sa ya etad annam anne pratiṣṭhitaṃ veda pratiṣṭhati. annavān, annādo bhavati. mahān bhavati prajayā, paśubhir, brahmavarcasena, mahān kīrtyā.* (7)

annaṃ na paricakṣīta. tad vartam. āpo vā annam; jyotir annādam. apsu jyotiḥ pratiṣṭhitam; jyotiṣy āpaḥ pratiṣṭhitāḥ. tad etad annam anne pratiṣṭhitam. sa ya etad....veda....(8)

annaṃ bahu kurvīta. tad vratam. pṛthivī vā annam; ākāśo'nnādaḥ pṛthivyām ākāśaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ; ākāśe pṛthivī pratiṣṭhitā. tad etad annam anne pratiṣṭhitam. sa ya etad...veda (9)

etat sāma gāyann āste : ....aham annam, aham annam, aham annam; aham annādo3 'ham annādo3 'ham annādaḥ....aham annam, annam adantam ā3dmi. ahaṃ viśvaṃ bhuvanam abhyabhavā3m....(10)

22 The sun takes up food (water) by its beams (cf. note 43).

23 In *AU* 1, 2, 1-3 the *prāṇāḥ* (also called *devatāḥ*) are looking for a firm place where they can eat food and finally they get the human body for that purpose : *tā* (sc. *devatāḥ*).... *abruvan : āyatanaṃ naḥ prajānīhi, yasmin pratiṣṭhitā annam adāmeti.* (1) *....tābhyaḥ puruṣam ānayat....*(3)

24 *ChU* 6, 2, 3 : *tad* (sc. *tejas*) *apo'sṛjata. tasmād yatra kva ca śocati svedate vā puruṣas tejasa eva, tad adhy āpo jāyante.*

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between food and eater disappears before the enlightened eyes of the philosopher. In reality, the whole universe is nothing but food. This holds true also as regards man : Man is food, man is eater and man is the eater of the food eater. In other words : in substance, man is identical with the metaphysical food called *Brahma* out of which everything is born and to which everything returns.[25] Hence the ecstatic joy of the philosopher who has realized that there is no difference between man and universe, between subject and object. Whereas ordinary people live in dread of the everlasting biological cycle of food and eater, the enlightened know that food and eater are only ever changing functions of the one persistent substance. By this act of cognition they overcome the phenomenal world, the world of food and eater, the world of birth and death.

The doctrine of food may thus be summarized in the following diagram :



2. Now, we proceed to the philosophers who extoll the aristocratic eater.

2.1. I begin with the wind-breath-doctrine. Its most ancient form is probably preserved in two stanzas of *JUB* which, judging by language can be attributed to the Saṃhitā period.[26] The setting of these stanzas, humorously alluding to our problem is as follows : A *brāhmaṇa* student begs for food from a *kṣatriya* called Abhipratārin and his priest Kāpeya who are seated eating at leisure. On their paying no notice to him the *brāhmaṇa* student attempts to defeat them by reciting a philosophical riddle. For, if the two "eaters" were not able to answer they had to acknowledge him as their master and teacher.[27]

Now the riddle goes like this :

> "The one god, the guardian of the world, devours the four high spirited ones ; who is that ? Some do not know him, O Kāpeya, even though he has settled down in many places, O Abhipratārin."[28]

ChU 7, 11, 1 : *tejo vāvâdbhyo bhūyaḥ....teja eva....apaḥ sṛjate.*

MU 6, 37 : *ādityāj jāyate vṛṣṭir, vṛṣṭer annaṃ, tataḥ prajāḥ.*

25 Cf. above under 1.2.

26 See Lüders (1940), pp. 378.

27 Cf Ruben (1929), pp. 239.

28 *JUB* 3, 2, 2 : *mahātmanaś caturo deva ekaḥ sa jagāra bhuvanasya gopāḥ taṃ, kāpeya, na vijānant(i)y eke,(a)bhipratārin, vahudhā niviṣṭam.*

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The solution of this riddle is : breath. For, breath devours the four vital forces : intellect (*manas*), vision (*cakṣus*), hearing (*śrotra*) and speech (*vāc*) whilst man is asleep. But summoned by Abhipratārin, Kāpeya outwits the *brāhmaṇa* student by giving the following answer :

> "It is the breath of gods and men, golden toothed like the son of power.[29] Great is his greatness——so they say——because he eats the eater without being eaten." [30]

Now, the expression "breath of gods...who eats the eater without being eaten" signifies the wind.[31] For, at the time of death the four vital forces are assimilated or eaten by the individual breath, which, in turn is eaten by its macrocosmic equivalent, the wind.

According to this doctrine, the wind, respectively breath, does not only eat the vital forces; it also digests food consumed by man and distributes the energy extracted from it throughout the body.[32] But because this food was taken for granted it did not come into consideration as a life substance. Here, the rustic adherents of food could intervene, arguing with their aristocratic opponents like this:

> "The highest form of Self, forsooth, is food. Because breath consists of food. If man does not eat he stops thinking, hearing, touching, speaking, smelling and tasting. And he exhales the vital forces....But if man eats he abounds in breath and starts thinking, hearing, touching, speaking, tasting, smelling and seeing." [33]

So, the adherents of food proved by a convincing physiological experiment that food is the source of breath and the other vital forces.

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29 The son of power (*rabhasaḥ sūnuḥ*) is the fire god *agni* (cf. Lüders (1940), pp. 379. Here Lüders also justifies the reading *rabhaso* for the traditional *rapaso*.

30 *JUB* 3, 2, 4 : *ātmā devānām uta mart(i)yānāṃ hiraṇyadanto rabhaso*[19] *na sūnuḥ mahāntam asya mahimānam āhur anadyamāno yad adantam atti.*

31 In *RV* 10, 168 the wind is likewise called "breath of the gods (4a : *ātmā' devā'nam*). Moreover, he is the first-born (3c : *prathamajā'ḥ*) and "the germ of the world" (4a : *bhúvanasya gárbhaḥ*). The wind as the principle of life may thus be traced back as far as the *RV*.

32 Cf *MU* 6, 12 : *annenâbhiṣiktāḥ pacantī me prāṇāḥ.*
BhG 15, 14 (= *Mbh* 6, 37, 14) : *aham vaiśvānaro bhūtvā prāṇināṃ deham āśritaḥ*
prāṇāpānasamāyuktaḥ pacāmy annaṃ caturvidham
Further *AU* 1, 3, 1-10; Jolly (1901), p. 40; note 35.

33 *MU* 6,11 : *paraṃ vā etad ātmano rūpaṃ yad annam. annamayo hy ayaṃ prāṇaḥ atha na yady aśnāty amantâśrotâspraṣṭâvaktâghrātârasayitā bhavati. prāṇāṃś cotsṛjati. ity evaṃ hy āha.* Cf. also *ChU* 7, 9, 1-2

JUB 4, 12, 9-10 : *athânnam abruvan : katham u tvaṃ śreṣṭham asīti. tad abravīd :.... mayi pratiṣṭhāya vāyur ākāśam anubhavati....mad eva prāṇo, mad vāk. sa yad ahaṃ na syāṃ, tata idaṃ sarvaṃ parābhavet, tato na kiṃcana pariśiṣyeṭêti.*

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On the other hand, the worshipper of wind, supported by equally strong arguments, pointed out that man cannot live without breath.[34] Since no side could outdo the other, judicious philosophers arrived at the conclusion that the riddle of life could not be solved by a strict *monocausal* approach. So, they merged both the rival doctrines into a *dualistic* system. This development is concisely depicted in the following passage :

" ' *Brahma* is food '—so some say. That is not so: food, forsooth, rots without breath. ' *Brahma* is breath '—so others say. That is not so: breath, forsooth, dries up without food. However, both these deities having become one reach the highest state. " [35]

So, breath, the eater, and food, its material basis, keep man alive only if they become united.

2.2. Fire still surpassed the wind as regards voracity.[36] As early as *RV* *Agni*, the fire god, was treated with the greatest respect not least because of his tremendous capacity to devour everything he came across: plants and trees, sacrificial gifts, sorcerers, demons and the foes of the aryan invaders.[37] Moreover, inside the human body *agni vaiśvānara* " who belongs to all men " digested or ate the food eaten by man and, for a hundred years, kept his host alive.[38] In the macrocosmic sphere, *agni* appeared as the sun, an open door in the otherwise impenetrable firmament through which the dead heroes entered heaven.[39] The philosophers worshipping fire drew on these ancient ideas and formed them into a coherent system: Just as the microcosmic fire inside man eats food, so does the macrocosmic fire in the firmament, namely, food, which the rays of sun in the form of tiny chanels take up from the earth. Through these sun-beams which enter the veins spread over the human body the microcosmic fire and the sun are connected[40] so that what has been eaten by man serves also the sun and vice versa. This process has been formulated in terms of the following paradox:

34 Cf. *JUB* 4, 12, 5-7; note 10; Ruben (1947), pp. 115.

35 *BhU* 5, 12, 1 : *annaṃ brahmêty eka āhuḥ. tan na tathā. pūyati vā annam ṛte prāṇāt. prāṇo brahmêty eka āhuḥ. tan na tathā. śuṣyati vai prāṇa ṛte'nnāt ete ha tv eva devate ekadhābhūyaṃ bhūtvā paramatāṃ gacchataḥ.*

For further evidence of this dualistic system of food and breath see *ŚB* 10, 3, 5, 6; *TU* 3, 1; *BhU* 3, 9, 8; *JUB* 3, 3, 6-12; *AU* 1,3, 1-10 (Cf. also Schneider (1963), pp. 61.

36 That is the reason why the all-eating wind has been compared with fire (cf. note 29).

37 Cf. Lüders (1940), p. 380; Geib (1975).

38 Geib (1975), *JUB* 4, 11, 5-6 : *....ahaṃ devānām annaṃ vikaromi, ahaṃ manuṣyāṇām. sà yan na syām....na devānām annaṃ vikriyeta, na manuṣyāṇām.*

" I digest the food of the gods, I digest the food of men. If I were not....neither the food of the gods nor the food of men could be digested. "

BhU 5, 9, 1 : *ayam agnir viaśvānaro yo'yam antaḥ puruṣe yenêdam annaṃ pacyate yad idam adyate....*" This is the fire of all men which is here within man by which this food is cooked (digested) which is eaten here (by man)....

39 Schneider (1974), pp. 396.

40 Frauwallner (1926), pp. 6; Frauwallner (1953), pp. 61.

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"....the golden man in the sun who looks down on this earth from his golden abode, that same man, dwelling inside the heart-lotus eats food.

But that man, who, dwelling in the heart-lotus eats food, that same man having gone to the sky as fire and being called "the invisible heavenly god of death"[41] eats all beings and his food."[42]

So, in reality, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic fire are one and when, on death, *agni vaiśvānara*, the microcosmic principle of life, is eaten up by the sun he simply returns to his celestial abode.

This doctrine of the all devouring fire as principle of life was disputed by the worshippers of food with the very same arguments as they used against the doctrine of wind. Without food—so they said—fire cannot burn. Hence it is food, not fire, which constitutes the basis of all existence.[43] Consequently, one might expect fire and food to be likewise merged into a dualistic system just as in the case of food and wind. However, I have so far not found any passage in the Upaniṣads that meets with our expectations. Instead something quite different has happened:

2.3. Between fire and food on the one hand and wind and food on the other there are the following close correspondences: Sun and wind are both macrocosmic all-eaters. Their equivalents in the macrocosmic sphere are *agni vaiśvānara* and breath respectively which, both dwelling inside the human body, consume the food they receive and thus keep the body alive. On dying, both of them, in turn are eaten up—*agni vaiśvānara* by the sun and breath by the wind. Thus we get the following parallelism:

$$\frac{\left.\begin{matrix}\text{sun} & — & \text{wind} \\ \text{fire} & — & \text{breath}\end{matrix}\right\}\ \text{eater}}{\text{food}}$$

As a result of this parallelism the doctrines of fire and wind could be interchanged or even merged into one system.

When the wind doctrine was the basis, then the sun[44] appeared as one of its aspects, for example in the following passage:

41 For the sun as god of death see Frauwallner (1926), pp. 7.

42 *MU* 6,1-2: *....ya eṣo'ntar āditye hiraṇmayaḥ puruṣo yaḥ paśyatīmāṃ hiraṇyavasthāt, sa eṣo'ntare hṛtpuṣkare evâśrito'nnam atti. atha ya eṣântare hṛtpuṣkara evâśrito'nnam atti sa eṣo'gnir divi śritaḥ sauraḥ kālākhyo'dṛśyaḥ sarvabhūtāny annam atti.* Cf. also *ChU* 3, 13, 7-8.

43 In *JUB* 4,12, 10 food speaks thus: *mayi pratiṣṭhâyâgânir dīpyate....mayi pratiṣṭhâyâditya udeti...*." On me as basis fire burns....on me as basis the sun rises...." *MU* 6, 12: *sūryo raśmibhir ādadāty annam. tenâsau tapati....agnir vā annenâbhijvalati....*" The sun takes up food with its rays. Thereby it heats....Fire, forsooth, only burns by means of food...."

44 Besides the sun other macrocosmic deities also are eaten by the wind according to a later development of this doctrine (cf. Lüders 1940, pp. 387; Frauwallner (1953), p. 59; *ChU* 4, 3, 1-8)).

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"O breath,....you walk through space, you are the sun, the lord of the stars. (9)

O breath, you are the eater of all, the lord of reality. We are givers of food, O wind, you are our fathers. (11)" [45]

When the fire doctrine was the basis, breath was looked on as a microcosmic equivalent of the sun :

> "Twofold, forsooth, this one (the highest *ātmā*) supports the Self which here (in the body) is breath and there (in the firmament) the sun.....The outer Self (*ātmā*) is yonder sun, the inner Self is breath." [46]

However, breath as the counterpart of the *sun* has changed its former nature since it also embraces the qualities of the celestial fire. Therefore, it is here called by the more abstract term *ātmā*. Now, for the initiated, the act of eating is in reality a sacrifice addressed to this *ātmā* on which, after a meal, one should meditate like this :

> "As breath and fire, forsooth, the highest *ātmā* dwells together with the five winds [47] (inside the body). Pleased, may he please all, he who enjoys eating everything.
>
> You are all, you are the fire of all men. Everything that has been born is supported by you. May all sacrifices enter you. The creatures are there where you are, the all-immortal." [48]

After this prayer to the highest *ātmā* the text continues :

> "Thus, forsooth, through this practice the eater never again enters the condition of food." [49]

This remarkable passage stands on the threshold of a new philosophical concept. On the one hand, there is still the idea of the all-eater (*viśvabhuk*) who enjoys the food sacrificed to him when man eats. On the other hand, this eater within the human body no longer consists of any particular element, be it fire or breath, for he embraces everything including fire and breath. Thus, he

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45 *PU* 2 : (*prāṇa*....) *tvam antarikṣe carasi sūryas tvaṃ jotiṣāṃ patiḥ* (9)
(*prāṇa*)....) *attā viśvasya satpatiḥ*
vayam ādyasya dātāraḥ pitā tvaṃ mātariśva, naḥ (11)

46 *MU* 6, 1 : *dvidhā vā eṣa ātmānaṃ bibharty ayaṃ yaḥ prāṇo yaś cāsā ādityaḥ..... asau vā ādityo bahirātmā, antarātmā prāṇaḥ....*

Already in *ŚB* 2, 3, 3, 7-9 the *prāṇas* are connected with the sun. Cf, also Frauwallner (1926), pp. 7.

47 For the five winds or *prāṇa*s see *ChU* 3, 12, 3-5; Jolly (1901), p. 40.

48 *MU* 6, 9 : *praṇo'gniḥ paramātmā vai pañcavāyuḥ samāśritaḥ*
sa prītaḥ prīṇātu viśvam viśvabhuk
viśvo'si vaiśvānaro'si viśvaṃ tvayā dhāryate jāyamānam
viśantu tvām āhutayaś ca sarvāḥ prajās tatra yatra viśvāmṛto'si

49 *MU* 6, 9 : *evaṃ na vidhinā khalv anenâttânnatvaṃ punar upaiti.*

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transcends all material existence and at the same time supports all creatures dwelling within him. Whosoever meditates on this *ātmā* dwelling in his heart becomes one with it and thus frees himself from the condition of food.

Conclusion and Further Perspectives : The purpose of my paper was to show that, to some extent, the biological cycle of food and eater influenced the structure of thought of early Indian philosophy. Here, we can distinguish three main tendencies.

(1) *Materialism* : Food is considered the basic substance of all existence. This trend, when consequently pursued, leads to a realistic materialism as exhibited in *ChU* 6, 5 where the main vital forces namely intellect (*manas*), breath (*prāṇa*) and speech (*vāc*) arise from food.

(2) *Idealism* : The eater (wind or fire) is looked on as the ultimate principle of all existence. This line, finally, leads to monistic idealism where the absolute embraces ("eats") and at the same time surpasses everything.

(3) *Dualism of Matter and Spirit* : Since food and eater together are required to keep man alive, both are combined into a dualistic system which finally leads to classical Sāṅkhya. Here, the eater (*attar*) or enjoyer (*bhoktar*) has become the eternal soul (*puruṣa*) and food (*anna*) on the other hand, has become the dynamic primary substance (*prakṛti*) ever procreating and reabsorbing itself [50]

Literature and Abbreviations :

AB=*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, crit. ed. by V. G. Apte. Vols 1-2 (=Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 32, 1-2) Poona 1930-31

AU=*Aitareya Upaniṣad* (L.)

BhG=*Bhagavadgītā* quoted from the crit. ed. by V. S. Sukthankar etc.

BhU=*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (L.)

Campbell (1973)=J. Campbell. *The masks of God*, vol. 2: *Oriental Mythology*. London 1973

Canetti (1960)=E. Canetti. *Masse und Macht*, vol. 1 (=Reihe Hanser vol. 124). Regensburg 1960

ChU=*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (L.)

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50 Cf. *MU* 6, 10 : *puruṣaś.... pradhānāntaḥsthaḥ. sa eva bhoktā, prākṛtam annaṃ bhuṅktāiti....bhoktā puruṣaḥ, bhojyā prakṛtiḥ....* "The soul stands within matter. He is the enjoyer (eater) for he enjoys (eats) the food of primary substance.... The soul is the enjoyer (eater), the primary substance is what is to be enjoyed (eaten)."

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JUB=Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa (L.)

KaU=Kaṭha Upaniṣad (L.)

(L.)=*Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads*, vol. I, ed. by V. P. Limaye and R. D. Vadekar. Poona 1958

Lüders (1940)=H. Lüders. *Philologica Indica.* Göttingen 1940

MU=Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad (L.)

PU=Praśna Upaniṣad (L.)

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RV=Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, vols. 1-5, Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala. Poona 1933-51.

ŚB=Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, ed. by A. Weber (=Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 96). Varanasi 1964

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TU=Taittirīya Upaniṣad (L.)

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ON THE SEVENTH ROCK EDICT OF AŚOKA

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In RE VII E we read:[1]

Dh	*vipul[e]*	*pi*	*cā*	*dāne*	*asa*	*n[athi*	*sa]yame*
Jg	*[v]i[pul]e*	*[p]i*	*cā*	*[d]ā[ne]*	..	..	..
Gi	*vip[ul]e*	*tu pi*		*dāne*	*yasa*	*nāsti*	*sayame*
Er	*vipule*	*pi*	*cu*	*d[ā]ne*	*asa*	*nathi*	*sayame*
Ka	*vipule*	*pi*	*cu*	*dān[e]*	*asā*	*nathi*	*sayame*
Sh	*vipule*	*pi*	*cu*	*dane*	*yasa*	*nasti*	*sayama*
Ma	*[v]ipule*	*pi*	*c[u]*	*dane*	*yasa*	*nasti*	*sayeme*

Dh	*[bh]āvasudhī*						*ca*
Jg	.. .. *[dhī]*						*ca*
Gi	*bhāvasudhitā*	*va*	*kataṃñatā*	*va*	*daḍhabhati[t]ā*		*ca*
Er	*bhāva[su]dhi*		*kiṭanata*	*ca*	*diḍhabhatitā*		*ca*
Ka	*bhā[va]sudh[i]*		*kiṭanāt[ā*		*d]iḍhabhatitā*		*cā*
Sh	*bhavaśudhi*		*kiṭrañata*		*driḍhabhatita*		
Ma	*bhavaśuti*		*kiṭanata*		*driḍhabhatita*		*ca*

Dh	*nīce*	*bāḍhaṃ*
Jg	*nīce*	*[b]āḍhaṃ*
Gi	*nicā*	*bāḍhaṃ*
Er	*nīce*	*bāḍhaṃ*
Ka	*ni[ce]*	*bāḍhaṃ*
Sh	*nice*	*paḍhaṃ*
Ma	*nice*	*baḍhaṃ.*

Taking into consideration that Dh Jg Gi on the one hand and Er Ka Sh Ma on the other belong to separate branches of textual tradition, we can reconstruct the following archetype (probably the original written or dictated by Aśoka himself):[2]

vipule pi cu dāne asa nathi sayame bhāvasudhi (or: *-sudhī*) *kiṭanatā diḍhabhatitā ca nīce bāḍhaṃ.*

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1 Text according to Hultzsch (1924) except for Er (v. below "Literature and Abbreviations"); but arrangement of the parallel versions according to Schneider (1973) p. 226.

2 On the problem of reconstructing the text underlying the seven (to a very limited extend : eight) versions v. Schneider (1973) *passim*. The stemma given there calls for some slight modifications which, however, do not concern the topic of discussion in this paper.

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[Skt.: *vipulam api tu dānaṃ yasya nāsti saṃyamo bhāvaśuddhiḥ kṛtajñatā dṛḍhabhaktitā ca nīcaṃ* (or: *nīco*) *bāḍhaṃ.*]

Hultzsch (1924) p. 14, 36 etc. translates:

"But even one who (practises) great liberality, (but) does not possess self-control, purity of mind, gratitude, and firm devotion, is very mean."

Hultzsch's translation is based upon Lüders (1940)[3], p. 324:

"Wenn einer aber auch grosse Freigebigkeit besitzt, nicht aber Selbstbezähmung und Herzensreinheit, so ist er ein sehr gemeiner (oder sicherlich ein gemeiner) Mensch." (Translation of Dh Jg.)

This is impossible for syntactical reasons, nor is it supported by the order of the words—as has been rightly observed by J. Bloch who writes, (1950), p. 111 n. 7:

"....car on traduit comme s'il y avait *yassa* (*asti*) *dāne*, (*yassa tu*) *nāsti*.., (*se*) *nīce*."[4]

[Engl.: "....for one translates as if the text runs *yassa* ...." etc.].

On the other hand, J. Bloch's own translation:

"Même pour qui n'a pas une grande libéralité, la maîtrise des sens, ou la pureté de l'âme, la reconnaissance et la fermeté dans la foi restent toujours l'important."

[Engl.: "Even for one who does not possess great liberality, self-control, or purity of mind, gratitude and firmness of belief remain essential, at all times."]

is also untenable; even more so, for *nīca*, or even *nice* (cf. Ka Gi) cannot be = Skt. *nitya* ("toujours") which, as Lüders already points out, must become *nitiya* in Aśoka's Ardhamāgadhī (his "Kanzeleisprache"). Furthermore, J. Bloch ignores the fact that nominal stems in *-a* (both masculine and neutral) have *-e* for the nom. sg. whereas *-aṃ* denotes the acc. sg. (which, however, makes no sense in our case) and the adverb. His "..... restent toujours l'important" would, therefore, at least postulate **nīcaṃ* (or rather, as we have already seen, **nitiyaṃ*) **bāḍhe* instead of the transmitted *nīce bāḍhaṃ*.
Hence we propose to translate:

"A donation, however, no matter how great, if one does not possess self-control, purity of mind, gratitude, and firm devotion, is a mean (thing) indeed."

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3 First published in 1914; v. also Hultzsch (1924), p. 14 n.1.

4 Sircar, D. C. (1965), p. 26 seems to have the same feeling; he writes in his *Sanskrit-Chāyā*: *vipulam api tu dānaṃ* [*yasya asti, parantu*] *yasya nāsti saṃyamaḥ, bhāvaśuddhiḥ, kṛtajñatā, dṛḍhabhaktitā* (= °*dharmāsaktiḥ*) [*ca*]——[*tasya dānaṃ*] *nīcaṃ* (= *tulānayā hīnaṃ*) *bāḍham* (= *atyantam, asandeham*).

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Or, if one admits the possibility of an anacoluthon, there is an alternative:

> " A donation, however, no matter how great—(one) who does not possess self-control, purity of mind, gratitude, and firm devotion, is a mean (man) indeed."

In any case, donation (*dāna*) is the main topic, not only of the sentence under consideration, but also of the whole edict. That much can be concluded from its contents: Aśoka desires that all sects may reside everywhere, because they all desire self-control and purity of mind [A-B]. To some extend, he is also willing to overlook human weakness [C-D]. But—and this is the essential of E—he is not willing to tolerate donations, if they do not go hand in hand with the two above mentioned virtues, self-control and purity of mind, and, in addition to these, with " gratitude " and " firm devotion ".

As to donation (*dāna*) the following remark may be made : judging from *savapāsaṇḍā vasevu* (Skt. *vaseyuḥ*) we may infer that it also comprises donation of land to the various sects for settlement.

Bearing this in mind, we can now tackle the problem why " gratitude " and " firm devotion ", the two virtues added in VII E, are missing in the Orissan versions, Dh Jg. In this respect Lüders (1940), p. 325 writes: " From the whole context there can be no doubt that " gratitude " and " firm devotion " are later additions in K[a] Sh M[a]; Dh Jg being nearest to the original, not only from the linguistic point of view, but also as regards content."

Here, Lüders is mistaken. This is evident from the fact that " gratitude " and " firm devotion " are not only transmitted in Ka Sh Ma, but also in Gi, and, furthermore, in Er not yet known to Lüders. Of particular importance is the testimony of Gi. Gi, it is true, is of lesser value as regards textual criticism, because its redactor, when dictating to the engraver,[5] apart from his wilful treatment of the text as a whole, translated his copy (written in the original eastern language) into his western dialect. This, however, does not alter the fact that Gi and Dh Jg have a common source. That is why Gi must be preferred to Dh Jg whenever it is supported by parallel versions belonging to the other branch of textual tradition, provided the contentof the reading is of relevance. Here, this is clearly the case: the common evidence of Gi on the one hand and of Er Ka Sh Ma on the other, proves that " gratitude " and " firm devotion " belong to the common source (probably the original) of all extant versions of the rock-edicts. Dh Jg are, at least in this regard, not " nearest to the original ". The opposite is ture.

Moreover, that " gratitude " and " firm devotion " belong to the edict from the outset can also be supported from the content. For it is quite under-

5 Schneider, V. (1973), p. 228 f.

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standable that Aśoka, desiring to sponsor residences for the sects, speaks of "self-control" and "purity of mind" as qualities of all sects, at the beginning of the edict. Towards the end, however, when he turns to "donation", he adds "gratitude" and "firm devotion", for, after all, he had also to consider the interests of the donators, including himself.

The question remains: Why have "gratitude" and "firm devotion" been omitted in Dh Jg ? Aśoka himself answers this question in general terms in RE XIV which is a kind of colophon to all inscriptions hitherto engraved. In XIV B he states:

no hi savatā sava ghaṭite [Skt.: *no hi sarvatra sarvaṃ ghaṭitam*].
"For not everywhere was everything suitable."

That this principle was followed, is evident for example in RE XIII J. Here is a remarkable omission in Sh. In order to demonstrate the philological situation, the whole sentence (reconstructed text) may be quoted, omission of Sh in brackets:

nathi ca (se janapade, ata nathi ime nikāyā aṇṇatā yonesu: bābhane ca samane ca. nathi kuvāpi janapadasi, ata nathi, munisānaṃ) ekatalasi pi. pāsaṃḍasi no nāma pasāde.

[Skt.: *nāsti ca (sa janapado, yatra na santi ime nikāyā anyatra yavanebhyo: brāḥmaṇāś ca śramaṇāś ca. nāsti ca kvāpi janapade, yatra na santi, manuṣyāṇām) ekatarasminn api pāṣaṇḍe no nāma prasādaḥ.*]

"Neither is there a country, where these classes, viz. Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas, do not exist, except among the Greeks. Nor is there in a country, where they do not exist, no attachment of men to some sect."

In Hultzsch's opinion, (1924), p. 69 n.2, the omission in Sh was "by the fault of the writer". This seems to me unlikely in view of the considerable length of the text omitted. Furthermore, the lacuna, cannot be inferred from the transmitted text of Sh alone; as it stands, this text makes perfect sense:

"Nor is there no attachment at least to some sect".

In addition to this, there are no formal criteria for a clerical error (homoeoteleuton etc.).

Taking all these points into consideration we arrive at the conclusion that the redactor of Sh has cut short his text intentionally, probably because the Yonas with whom he must have been well acquainted are referred to in such strange, even unflattering terms.

Similarly we may explain the omission of "gratitude" and "firm devotion" in Dh Jg VII E. Either to Aśoka himself or to one of his local representatives responsible for the engravings it must have seemed too much to demand "gratitude" and "firm devotion" in Kaliṅga itself. The dreadful massacre committed

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there by the Mauryan army clearly weighed heavily, as can be inferred from the fact that Aśoka did not dare to mention the Kaliṅga war in the country where it took place.

Literature and Abbreviations

J. Bloch (1950) = Bloch J.: *Les inscriptions d'Aśoka*. Paris, 1950.

Dh = Dhauli

Er = Erṛaguḍi, acc. to D. C. Sircar in: *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXXII (1957-1958), p. 17.

Gi = Girnār.

Hultzsch (1924) = Hultzsch E.: *Inscriptions of Aśoka*. Corpus Inscr. Indicarum, Vol. I. New Ed. Delhi, Varanasi, 1969.

Jg = Jaugaḍa.

Ka = Kālsī.

Lüders (1940) = Lüders H.: *Philologica Indica*. Gottingen, 1940.

Ma = Mānsehrā.

RE = Rock-Edicts of Aśoka.

Schneider (1973) = Schneider U.: 'Zum Stammbaum der grossen Felseninschriften Aśokas'. In: *Indologen-Tagung* 1971. Wiesbaden 1973, p. 224ff.

Sh = Shāhbāzgaṛhī.

D. C. Sircar (1965) = Sircar D. C.: *Select Inscriptions bearing on Indian History and Civilisation*. I. From the 6th Century B.C. to the 6th Century A.D., Calcutta, 1965.

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ON RULES OF PĀṆINI'S GRAMMAR SAID TO EXPATIATE ON OTHER RULES

By

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In the famous verse of his *Vākyapadīya*

prāptarūpavibhāgāyā yo vācaḥ paramo rasaḥ/
yat tat puṇyatamaṃ jyotis tasya mārgo'yam āñjasaḥ//

Bhartṛhari speaks of grammar as being the most direct path to the highest essence of speech which has attained a state of differentiation. Commenting on *tasya mārgo'yam āñjasaḥ* and *Vṛtti* (43.6-7)[1] he says that the grammar, a set of rules (*lakṣaṇa*) in which are treated both general and particular features (*sāmānya-viśeṣavat*, cf. *Vṛtti* 1.134 [221.4] : *sāmānyaviśeṣavaty asmiṃl lakṣaṇe vyākaraṇākhye*), is what permits one to attain unity with *śabdabrahma* in a brief manner, that is, which allows one to discriminate what is correct by means of a short set of statements. In addition, the *Vṛtti* here says that this is done by means of both rules (*lakṣaṇa*) and expatiations (*prapañca*) : general rules and expatiations on them are required. Elsewhere also the *Vṛtti* speaks of general and particular rules (ad VP 1.134 [p. 221.4], ad VP 2.13 [p. 35], ad VP 2.40 [p. 93])——that is, general rules and exceptions——and also of general rules and expatiations on them (ad VP 1.29 [p.85.2-3]).

All of this has an earlier history, as is well known. Patañjali (*Bhāṣya* I.25) too speaks of the grammar as consisting of general rules and exceptions, this being the only real means to one to achieve a knowledge of correct usage, as opposed to an item-by-item listing (*pratipadapāṭha*). And Patañjali too speaks of general rules (*lakṣaṇa*) and expatiations on them (*prapañca*). Twice (*Bhāṣya* ad 2.1.58, 6.3.14 [II.633-634, IV.593-594]), he says that a series of rules follows upon a general rule, expatiating on this, because there is a multiplicity of examples (*udāharaṇabhūyastvāt*) and goes on to say: *te khalv api vidhayaḥ suparigṛhītā bhavanti yeṣu lakṣaṇaṃ prapañcaś ca/ kevalaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ kevalaḥ prapañco vā na tathā kārakaṃ bhavati.*

I wish here to consider just what is accomplished by such rules of expatiation. We may indeed accept that operations (*vidhi*) are well and truly en-

1 References to the *Vākyapadīya*, its *Vṛtti*, the *Paddhati* and Helārāja's commentary are : K. A. Subramania Iyer's edition of the first kāṇḍa (Poona, 1966) and the first part of the third kāṇḍa (Poona, 1963) and Raghunātha Sharma's edition of the second kāṇḍa (Varanasi, 1968); page and line numbers are referred to where appropriate. References to the *Mahābhāṣya* are for the Rohatak edition (ed. Vedavrat, 1962-1963), by volume and page.

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compassed only if, with respect to them, one has both general rules (*lakṣaṇa*) and expatiations. And we may accept that an expatiation alone does not accomplish what needs to be done, and that both are needed. Yet the question remains to be considered: just what does Pāṇini do with rules which *Pāṇinīya*s treat as *prapañcârtha*?

Let us consider first the Pāṇinian rules concerning which Patañjali makes the statement cited above. And let us begin by considering examples of what these rules account for. A nominal form denoting a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) combines with a related nominal denoting a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) to form a *tatpuruṣa* compound. Thus, there is a compound *nīlotpala* 'blue lotus' formed from the related nominals *nīla*-s and *utpala*-s (nominative forms before other operations). Like most other *tatpuruṣa* compounds, moreover, *nīlotpala* alternates with an analytic sequence: *nīlotpalam* (nom. sg.) and *nīlam utpalam* are alternants. Now, there is a compound *kṛṣṇa-sarpa*, comparable to *nīlotpala* formally. But this does not refer to just any black (*kṛṣṇa*) snake (*sarpa*); it refers specifically to a cobra. In referring to a cobra, then, one cannot use *kṛṣṇaḥ sarpaḥ* as an absolute alternant of *kṛṣṇa-sarpaḥ*: the former refers to any black snake. There are also sequences such as *rāmo jāmadagnyaḥ* 'Rāma the son of Jamadagni', to which there does not correspond any compound. That is, one must provide for cases where: *1.* A qualifier combines with a qualificand to form a compound which is semantically equivalent to a string containing the same items, with which the compound alternates; *2.* A qualifier combines with a qualificand to form a compound which is not semantically an alternant of a string; *3.* An item denoting a qualifier does not form a compound with a qualificand.

Let us say also that a rule which lets an operation apply optionally (*vibhāṣā, vā, anyatarasyām* etc.) quite literally provides that this operation either applies or not (*na vā*, Pāṇini 1.1.44: *navêti vibhāṣā*). A rule of composition which let a qualifier and a related qualificand optionally combine to form a compound, then, would not account for all the instances of *tatpuruṣa* compounds noted. Moreover, let us posit that in the various dialects of Sanskrit spoken at Pāṇini's time and known to him there was a situation of flux such that it was not possible either to enumerate exhaustively which items conformed to types 1-3 noted earlier or simply to stop at noting these three types. That is, there was a variation such that types 2 and 3 above were not closed sets and also such that some qualifier-qualificand compounds always conformed to the pattern of regular alternation between a compound and a string. A reasonable procedure in this case would be the following. Give a rule accounting for the variation noted and also try to capture as much as possible what instances conform to regular alternation. This would take two kinds of rules. First, what we may call an extraordinary option, providing that a qualifier and a qualificand combine to

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form a *tatpuruṣa* compound in various ways, according to the three conditions noted. Second, extract from this general domain of extraordinary option those instances where usage has become fixed to the extent that a compound is always optional, that is, it always is an alternant of a related string. If, now, we let the term *bahulam* mean 'variously',[2] then the rule giving an extraordinary option is:

2.1.57: *viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyeṇa bahulam* '(A nominal form denoting (a) qualifier (combines with a related coreferential nominal form denoting (a) qualificand (the result being a compound of the *tatpuruṣa* class, and this applies) variously.' One rule which would extract from this general domain of variation would be

2.1.58: *pūrvâpara-prathama-carama-jaghanya-samāna-madhya-madhyama-vīrāś ca*

By this rule a series of qualifiers form compounds with related qualificands, and this operation is optional in the normal way (2.1.11: *vibhāṣā*). Thus, for example, *vīra-puruṣa* 'heroic man' is now always susceptible of alternating with *vīraḥ puruṣaḥ* etc.: the two are always semantically equivalent alternants. It is not the case that such a compound is sometimes specialized in such a way that it does not alternate with its analytic counterpart.

What a rule such as 2.1.58 does then is to remove a set of compounds from the domain of indeterminacy reflected in 2.1.57. 2.1.58 is one of the rules which, according to *Pāṇinīyas*, is a mere expatiation. That is, 2.1.57 alone would account for everything required, and 2.1.58 merely goes into details.

Consider now two other rules related in the same way:

6.3.14: *tatpuruṣe kṛti bahulam* (*saptamyāḥ 9, alug uttara-pade 1*).

6.3.15: *prāvṛṭ-śarat-kāla-divāṃ je.*

These have to do with the retention of endings in the first member of a compound. Any compound is a nominal base (*prātipadika*, 1.2.46: *kṛt-taddhita-samāsāś ca* [*prātipadikam* 45]), and a nominal ending included within such a base is regularly deleted (2.4.71: *supo dhātu-prātipadikayoḥ* [*luk* 58], as in *nīlotpala* (< *nīla*-s-*utpala*-s). There are, however, also compounds in which the ending of the first member is retained. A set of rules of the third pāda of the sixth adhyāya provide for such non-deletion (*aluk*), and 6.3.14, 6.3.15 are

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2 I think the usual interpretation of *bahulam*, as given in an oft-cited verse:
kvacit pravṛttiḥ kvacid apravṛttiḥ kvacid vibhāṣā kvacid anyad eva/
vidher vidhānaṃ bahudhā samīkṣya caturvidhaṃ bāhulakaṃ vadanti//
e.g., *Siddhahemaśabdānuśāsana* 8.2.1, commentary, Anantabhaṭṭa on *Vājasaneyiprātiśākhya* 3.18; (cf. Uvaṭa on the latter) is proper. However, I think that this is in effect what *Pāṇinīyas* call a *vyavasthita-vibhāṣā* and I hold that the usual optinal rules are not of this type; rather, such rules provide that something applies or not. Details on this are discussed in §2.2.9 of my *Pāṇini, volume II*, in preparation.

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two such rules. The first of these provides that a seventh-triplet ending (*saptamī*, locative ending) is not deleted in a first member of a *tatpuruṣa* compound if the second member contains a *kṛt* affix. Moreover, this applies variously (*bahulam*). For example, in *karṇe-japa* 'tale teller, informer' (literally: 'who chatters in the ear') the first member (*karṇe* < *karṇa-i*) retains the locative singular ending *i*. There are also compounds like *kuru-cara* 'who goes about in the Kuru country', also *tatpuruṣa* compounds whose second member ends in *kṛt* affix, in which the ending of the first member is obligatorily deleted. Moreover, *karṇe-japa* has an alternant *karṇa-japa*. In addition, it is not possible to enumerate exhaustively which compounds of this type always have the ending of the first member deleted, which do this optionally and which always retain the ending. Hence, it is not possible to state for these a normal either-or option. 6.3.15 extracts from this general domain of indeterminacy some compounds. 6.3.15 provides that a locative ending in the first member of a *tatpuruṣa* compound of the type discussed is not deleted in certain instances: where the second member is *ja* and the first member is a form of *prāvṛṣ* 'rain season,' *śarad* 'fall,' *kāla* 'time', *div* 'heaven'; e.g., *prāvṛṣi-ja* 'born in the rain season'.

6.3.15 is also a rule which, according to *Pāṇinīyas*, is a mere expatiation, on 6.3.14. We have now to consider just what this means. Quite straightforwardly, what is meant is this: 2.1.57 and 6.3.14 alone accomplish everything needed, and 2.1.58, 6.3.15 merely go into details. This is indeed defensible. It is true that the general rules (*lakṣaṇa*) in question do account for the variation found in domains of indeterminacy. It is also true that a native speaker of Sanskrit from Pāṇini's time——a *śiṣṭa*——could, upon some reflection, be able to tell which qualifier-qualificand compounds are optional, which obligatory, which qualifiers do not form compounds with qualificands, which compounds retain endings in first members obligatorily, which do this optionally and which have this deleted obligatorily. Yet this does not mean that the expatiation rules are eliminable. Indeed, Pāṇini would be shirking his duty if he did not reduce the domain of indeterminacy by showing in which subdomain of this general domain there are usages amenable to normal rules. For, the whole basis of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is that features of Sanskrit can be captured by general rules (*utsarga*) and exceptions (*apavāda*) relative to large domains and subdomains of these. Thus, the rules in question are not "merely" intended for expatiation; they are needed.

Let us now consider another major set of rules which, according to most *Pāṇinīyas*, are mere expatiations on a general rule. The *Paddhati*, commenting on one of the *Vākyapadīya* passages referred to earlier (I.221.20-21), gives an example already considered (2.1.58). Elsewhere (on the *Vṛtti* ad VP 1.12 [43.21]), Vṛṣabhadeva says: *dhruvam apāye iti lakṣaṇam uttaraḥ prapañcaḥ.*

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Thus,

1.4.24 : *dhruvam apāye'pādānam*

is, according to this, a general rule (*lakṣaṇa*). What follows is an expatiation on this rule. By 1.4.24, that participant (*kāraka*, 1.4.23: *kārake*) in the act of departing (*apāya*) which functions as relative stable point (*dhruva*)—that is, a point of departure—is assigned to the *kāraka* category *apādāna*. The next rule

1.4.25: *bhī-trârthānāṃ bhaya-hetuḥ*

also assigns to the *apādāna* category a source of fear (*bhaya-hetu*) relative to actions denoted by verbs with the meanings of *bhī* 'fear', *trā* 'protect'. Still another rule to consider here is

2.3.42: *pañcamī vibhakte* (*yataś ca nirdhāraṇam* 41)

according to which a nominal is followed by an ending of the fifth triplet (an ablative ending) to designate that what it denotes is something with respect to which there is a specification and also that there is a separation between it and a relatum. For example, one says

(1) *māthurāḥ pāṭaliputrakebhya āḍhyatarāḥ* 'The people of Mathurā are richer than those of Pāṭāliputra'.

using the ablative *pāṭaliputrakebhyaḥ*. In Pāṇini's system, an ablative ending is here introduced in a way distinct from rule

2.3.28 *apādāne pañcamī*

whereby a fifth-triplet ending occurs after a nominal when an *apāddna* is to be designated. Thus, in

(2) *grāmād ā gacchati* 'He is coming from the village.'

the ablative *grāmāt* refers to a point of departure, classed as *apādāna* by 1.4.24. Similarly for

(3) *caurebhyo bibheti* 'He is afraid of the thieves.'

where *caurebhyaḥ* refers to persons who are a cause of fear, hence classed as *apādāna* by 1.4.25.

Before considering in detail just what Vṛṣabhadeva means, it is necessary to consider a division which Bharṭhari (*Vākyapadīya* 3.7.136) makes for the category *apādāna*. He distinguishes three types of *apādāna*, depending on whether the departure (*apāya*) in question is: (a) directly denoted by a verb, (b) one action of a composite designated by a verb, or (c) there is no verb used to denote departure but it is required to understand an utterance; these are called respectively *nirdiṣṭa-viṣaya*, *upātta-viṣaya* and *apekṣita-kriya*. Sentence (2) has an example of the first type: the verb *āgam* 'come' directly designates a kind of departure. An example of the second type appears in

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(4) *valāhakād vidyotate*

where the cloud (*valāhaka*) is *apādāna* relative to lightning (*vidyut*): the verb here is analysed as denoting either lightning accompanied by movement or vice versa, a departure accompanied by lightning (Helārāja ad VP 3.7.136 [338.14-18]). An example of the third type is

(5) *kuto bhavān* 'Where are you from?'

where a verb such as *āgam* (*āgataḥ*) is to be understood.

Now, what Vṛṣabhadeva means in the passage cited above is simply this, that 1.4.24 accounts for the usages for which 1.4.25 accounts. In this, he is not saying anything original. Bhartṛhari himself (*Vākyapadīya* 3.7.147) directly says that the provision made by 2.3.42 (*nirdhāraṇe vibhakte yo....vidhiḥ*) and by 1.4.25 (*bhī-trâdinā ca yo vidhiḥ*) are equally well provided by 1.4.24 with 2.3.28 alone. A sentence such as (1) exemplifies an *apādāna* of type (c) (*apekṣita-kriya*) and (3) exemplifies an *apādāna* of type (b) (*upātta-viṣaya*, Helārāja ad VP 3.7.147 [345.19-21, 346.12-20]). The separate *apādāna* classification made in 1.4.25 and the special rule 2.3.42 concern these varieties of *apādāna* and are intended only for such as are not insightful (*upāttâpekṣitâpāyaḥ so'budha-pratipattaye*). Thus, in Bhartṛhari's view, 1.4.25 and 2.3.42 merely expatiate on 1.4.24 (with 2.3.28): what is accomplished by these particular rules is already provided for by the more general classification rule.

Bhartṛhari himself has an antecedent in his position. In his discussion on 1.4.25, Patañjali (*Bhāṣya* II.392) says that this rule can be left unstated (*ayaṃ yogaḥ śakyo'vaktum*). A sentence

(6) *vṛkebhyo bibheti* 'He is afraid of the wolves.'

is explained as follows. A man who is foresighted (*ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati*) considers that, if the wolves see him, his death is a certainty (*sa paśyati yadi māṃ vṛkāḥ paśyanti dhruvo me mṛtyur iti*). He thus reaches the wolves mentally and departs from them (*sa buddhyā saṃprāpya nivartate*). Therefore, the wolves here are a point of departure by 1.4.24. Similarly, Patañjali argues that

1.4.26: *parājer asoḍhaḥ*

too can be left unstated (*Bhāṣya* II.393: *ayam api yogaḥ śakyóvaktum*). By this rule, that *kāraka* relative to the act of being overcome, not bearing, as denoted by *parāji*, is assigned to the *apādāna* category which is something one cannot bear (*asoḍha*). For example, study in

(7) *adhyayanāt parājayate* 'He is overcome by his study, cannot bear it.' Here too Patañjali invokes mental reaching and departure. A providential man sees that study is a hardship, difficult to bear, and that teachers behave badly (*duḥkham adhyayanaṃ durdharaṃ ca guravaś ca durupacārā iti*). He thereby

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comes into mental contact with the study and turns back from it (*sa buddhyā saṃprāpya nivartate*). Again, Patañjali considers (*Bhāṣya* II.388-389, ad 1.4.24) that

(8) *sāṃkāśyakebhyaḥ pāṭaliputrakā abhirūpatarāḥ* 'The people of Sāṃkāśya are handsomer than those of Pāṭaliputra' (cf. (1) above) does not require rule 2.3.42. There is a *kāraka* involved here which is *apādāna* by 1.4.24, as follows. A person who uses such a sentence first has reached an equality — that is considered both peoples equal — with respect to the property of being handsome and then made a mental separation (*yas taiḥ sāmyaṃ gatavān sa etat prayuṅkte* cf. Helārāja ad VP 3 7.147 [345.24-346.2]).[3]

For the present discussion, let us put aside the question of reaching something in ones mind. Instead, let us concentrate on what Patañjali's and Bhartṛhari's position entails concerning the verbs in question. If (3), (6) are analysed in the manner suggested, this means that the verb *bhī* has to have a complex meaning: departure preceded by fearing (Helārāja 346.16 : *bhaya-pūrvikāyāṃ nivṛttau bibheter vartanād asty evâpāyaḥ*). Similarly, *parāji* in (7) now has to denote a turning back from something preceded by affliction (Helārāja 346.19-20 : *parājayatiś câtra kheda-pūrvake nivartane vartate*). And, in the case of sentences such as (1) and (8), one now has to assume that ablative forms in construction with comparatives imply an action : departing from an equality.

If now, as Patañjali argues, one can do without 1.4.25, 1.4.26, and 2.3.42, it is reasonable to ask why Pāṇini should have stated these rules. We thus get back to rules of expatiation : one possible answer is that these rules merely expatiate on 1.4.24. Yet one has still to ask what is accomplished by such an expatiation. A possible answer is this. Though it is true that everything is accounted for by the general rule 1.4.24 and the general classification as *apādāna*, still the extra rules are needed to provide a restriction with respect to someone who might not comprehend that there is mental departure involved in such instances. One has to tell him that, in these instances, one must intend to express a mental departure.[4] This case of *prapañca* is thus obviously different from the two other instances considered earlier.

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3 Compare also *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.4 :

buddhyā samāhitaiktvān pañcālān kurubhir yadā|
punar vibhajate vaktā tadâpāyaḥ pratīyate||

The position is thus that one first brings two entities together with respect to a property— treats them as same——and then makes a separation between them. Note that part of the argument involves the use of *gam*, which also means 'understand'. Helārāja, commenting on the *Vākyapadīya* verse just cited (235.13-16), quotes the *Bhāṣya* passage given by me and directly glosses *gatavān* with *jñātavān*.

4 Helārāja ad VP 3.7.147 (346.8-9) : *evaṃ sāmānyenaiva siddhe sūtrârambho bauddham apāyam apratipadyamānaṃ prati vivakṣā-niyamârtham : apāya-vivakṣaivâtra kartavya ity arthaḥ.* This is said specifically with respect to sentences of the type (1).

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A neutral bystander may now step in and make some suggestions, as follows. It is true that one can speak of doing something mentally. And it is true that some such distinction is reflected in grammar. One can say

(9) *grāmaṃ gacchati* 'He is going to the village.'

and

(10) *grāmāya gacchati* 'id'.

But one can say only

(11) *manasā pāṭaliputraṃ gacchati* 'He is going to Pāṭaliputra in his mind.'

One cannot use an alternant with the dative *pāṭaliputrāya*. The grammarian has to account for this. Indeed, Pāṇini does. He provides that nominal endings of the second and fourth triplets are both used to denote an object (*karman*) of verbs of movement other than a path (*anadhvan*), so long as true physical activity (*ceṣṭā*) is involved:

2.3.12: *gaty-artha-karmaṇi dvitīyā-caturthyau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani*.

Nevertheless, I question the validity of claiming that the semantics of (1), (2), (3) and (7) all involve some kind of departure. Especially do I doubt this for (1). It is one thing to say that (5) implies a verb such as *āgam* 'come' and quite another to say that (1) involves some movement necessarily. For (5) can be elliptical in a straight forward manner, but (1) is clearly not elliptical. As for (3) and (7), one may reasonably ask why *bhī* and *parāji* are said to have complex meanings. Why not say the obvious, that *bhī* means 'fear' and *parāji* means 'be overcome', 'not stand'. Nor is it cogent to argue that, since all the sentences (2), (3) and (7) contain nominal forms with fifth-triplet endings (ablatives) in construction with verbs, the sentences all involve some movement away from a point of departure. After all, one would not want to claim that, because

(12) *vṛkṣasya śākhā* 'branch of a tree'

(13) *vajrasya bhartā* 'bearer of the vajra'

both contain genitive forms, they involve the same relation. Clearly they do not: the branch is a part of the tree, but (13) speaks of a person (the god Indra) who bears an object (*vajraṃ bharati*).

Such an argument merits serious attention. Let us suppose that (2), (3) and (7) do indeed involve different semantic relations. If *bhī* and *parāji* have the simple meanings noted, then (3) and (7) have to do with relations different from that of (2). (2) involves a movement away from a point (a village) with which one has been in contact. (3) and (7) now involve no such contact or movement: someone is simply afraid of something and cannot stand something.

Obviously, we have come a long way from viewing 1.4.25 and 1.4.26 as mere expatiations on 1.4.24. The question now arises why 1.4.25 and 1.4.26 are

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necessary. One possible reason is that the semantic relations of (3) and (7) are different. But this is not enough. It is not the case that Pāṇini makes distinctions only on semantic grounds. Indeed, quite the contrary is true. Consider again (12), now in connection with

(14) *putrasya pitā* 'father of the son'

(15) *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* 'king's man (servant, minister)'

These all obviously involve different relations: a branch is part of a tree, a father is the progenitor of his son, and a king supports his ministers. Yet Pāṇini does not distinguish these for purposes of grammatical operations as stated in rules. All these sentences contain nominals with sixth-triplet endings (genitives), and these endings are introduced by one single rule :

2.3.50 : *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*

whereby sixth-triplet endings occur after nominals when a residue (*śeṣa*) of relations is to be denoted, that is, relations which do not directly involve participants in actions. Now, Pāṇini does distinguish among some of these. For example, to account for a sentence such as

(16) *Vidyayā yaśaḥ* '(There is) fame due to knowledge.'

he makes a distinction and recognizes a relation between a cause (*hetu*) and a result. But the basis for this is not purely semantic. It is more formal : (16) contains not a genitive form but an instrumental (*vidyayā*). To avoid getting

(17) *vidyāyā yaśaḥ*

which should mean 'the fame of knowledge', and to provide for (16), he states a rule whereby a third-triplet ending (*tṛtīyā*) introduced to denote a cause (*hetu*):

2.3.23 : *hetau* (*tṛtīyā* 18)[5]

Similarly, Pāṇini distinguishes true physical movement from mental movement because of sentences like (9)-(11). One should, then, find a similar reason for Pāṇini's having to formulate 1.4.25 and 1.4.26. And this is not far to seek. Consider three rules whereby a participant in an action (a *kāraka*) is assigned to the category *karman* ('object') :

1.4.49 : *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*

1.4.50 : *tathā-yuktaṃ cānīpsitam*

1.4.51 : *akathitaṃ ca*

Assigned to the *karman* category are : that participant in an action which another participant—classed as *kartṛ* ('agent')—wishes to attain (*īpsitatama*)

5 On this and related rules, see *JOIB* 21 : 22-40 (1971). The argument presented here was earlier presented in *JOIB* 16 : 211 (1967), but not very clearly. The last sentence on that page should be emended to read '....the semantically multiple non-*kāraka* relations which are the final domain of 2.3.50.' That is, rules like 2.3.23 extract parts of the general residual domain (*śeṣa*), leaving 2.3.50 to operate for the rest.

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more than any other; a participant related to an action in a similar manner (*tathā-yukta*), though the *kartṛ* may not wish to reach it or may be neutral towards it; and a participant which is not assigned to any other *kāraka* category. Now, if we consider (3), it is obvious that the *kāraka* here being assigned to the *apādāna* category is a cause (*hetu*) of fear. Further, there is no other *kāraka* classification rule which assigns such a participant to any other category. If, then, rule 1.4.25 were not stated, the cause of fear would be assigned to the *karman* category by 1.4.51. And rule

2.3.2: *karmaṇi dvitīyā*

provides for using a second-triplet ending (*dvitīyā*) when a *karman* is to be designated. Consequently, if this classification were allowed, one would derive

(18) **caurān bibheti*

instead of (3). In the same vein, consider again (7). This can be treated as paraphrasable by

(19) *adhyayanaṃ na sahate* 'He cannot stand his study.'

or

(20) *tasyâdhyayana-janyā glāniḥ* 'He is characterized by exhaustion produced by his study.'

If (19) is adopted as a paraphrase, then the study of (7) is assignable to the *karman* category by 1.4.50. If (20) is adopted, the same participant is *karman* by 1.4.51 : the study is the cause of exhaustion, and no other *kāraka* classification rule assigns this to a particular category if 1.4.26 is deleted.[6] Rules 1.4.25 and 1.4.26 are, then, exceptions (*apavāda*) to 1.4.50, 1.4.51. As in other instances, here too, Pāṇini's distinctions as reflected in these rules are formally motivated : one has to account for the correct syntactic cooccurrence of certain verbs with certain nominal forms.

We have now not only come a considerable distance from the view that 1.4.25 and 1.4.26 are mere expatiations (*prapañca*) on 1.4.24 ; we have in effect eliminated this possibility. And this is as it should be. As I noted earlier, there is nothing essentially unreasonable in treating 2.1.58 and 6.3.15 as expatiating on 2.1.57 and 6.3.14, though these latter rules are not thereby rendered useless : Pāṇini has to show that in some instances there is indeterminacy but in others there is not. 1.4.25 and 1.4.26 do not involve this. What is at issue here is something quite different, namely whether a grammarian is going to impose certain interpretations on sentences. Pāṇini and Patañjali are here quite clearly opposed. For Patañjali, at least in so far as one can tell from what he says in his discussions of the pertinent rules, it is licit to interpret

6 Full details concerning these questions are dealt with in §6 of my *Pāṇini, volume II* (see note 2 above).

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sentences such as (3) and (7) as involving some sort of movement. Pāṇini does not adopt this view.

The result is that Patañjali can posit a single category *apādāna* with one single, semantic, characterization : point of departure. Pāṇini does not do this. His *apādāna* category includes semantically varied entities : points of departure, sources of fear, things one cannot bear, etc. All of these are assigned to one category for one simple reason : to account for the syntax of certain sentences.

In sum, I do not think it possible to justify the view that Pāṇini formulated some rules whose sole purpose was to expatiate on something already fully accounted for by other rules.[7]

7 Another conclusion that imposes itself is that Pāṇini is quite obviously not a case grammarian or a generative semanticist. He does not operate with *kāraka* categories characterized in terms of semantic features alone, each such category is not defined in terms of one semantic feature or a set of compatible semantic features, and these categories are not universal. For details of bibliography on this question, see sections III.1.5.5c, 1.5.7 of my *Pāṇini, volume I : A Survey of Research* (The Hague : Mouton), soon to appear.

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PARTICLE IN SANSKRIT

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The term particle is etymologically understood as 'a small word'. "In flexional languages they are indeclinables and they differ from later adverbial and prepositional formations by the circumstance that no original process of declension can be identified".[1]

In Ṛgveda particles like *aṅga* (showing address), *accha* ('towards', used with accusative nouns), *atha* ('and so', beginning a new pāda', *adha* ('later on', used conjunctively), *it* ('indeed', used with verbs), *u* (a metrical tag used after a verb or sometimes before or jointly with another particle), *uta* ('but also', used with nouns), *khalu* ('indeed', used with verbs and nouns), *ca* ('and', used with nouns), *cana* ('indeed', used with pronouns), *cit* ('and', used with nouns and verbs), *na* ('like', used with nouns and pronouns), *sīm* ('indeed', used with verbs), *ha* ('indeed', used with a verb) and *hi* ('verily', used with nouns) are of frequent occurrence. Of these the most prominent are *accha*, *atha*, *it*, *cit*, *nu*, *hi* and *sīm*. We also find combinations of two particles like *ādit*, *idu*, *innu*, *uto* and so on. All these are evenly used in the different maṇḍalas of *Ṛgveda*.. One may be tempted to conjecture that *aṅga*, *aha*, *it*, *kam*, and *gha* belong to the oldest period, while *u*, *cit*, *sma* and *cana* belong to the later period. While we find a greater variety in the use of particles in *Ṛgveda*, the Brāhmaṇa works employ particles like *gha*, *vai*, *cana*, *vāva*, *atha*, *svid* and *khalu* more frequently. The Upaniṣads employ *api*, *u*, *uta*, *eva*, *kila*, *khalu*, *ca*, *nu*, *vāva*, *vai*, *sma*, *svid*, and *ha*. Ṛgvedic poetry being a mature composition of inspired poets employed all particles freely in context of meaning and poetic beauty. In the Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣad works we find a great number of emphasising particles because the narratives, the ritual discussions and the serious discourses in these works demanded their presence in that manner. In the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas we find particles like *atha*, *khalu*, *cit*, *nu*, *sma* and *ha*. Later ornate poetry consciously avoided the use of particles. Subandhu and Bāṇa frowned on writers who employed them.

Modern scholars classify particles in a number of ways. Some of them emphasize their meaning, others their position in a verse or a sentence and still others their relation with word-order. Whitney[2] divides them into asseverative, negative, interrogative, particles of comparison, particles of place, particles of

1 Entwistle, W. : Aspects of Language, p. 223.
2 Sanskrit Grammar, p. 403.

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time and particles of manner. Macdonell[3] divides indeclinables into prepositions, adverbs, particles and interjections. He also divides them into conjunctive and adverbial particles.[4] Delbruck's[5] classification emphasises the position of particles in a verse or in a sentence, e.g: particles placed after a word to which they belong, viz. *ā, iva, eva, ca, cit* and *vā*, particles after the first word of a sentence, viz. *aṅga, aha, u, kam, kila, id, khalu, tu, nu, vai, hi, svid, sma, ha*, particles which begin a sentence viz. *atha, api, iti, uta, evam*, and negative particles. Renou[6] divides particles into copulative, disjunctive, assertative, adversative, conclusive and comparative.

Nipāta is the technical term employed by ancient Indian grammarians for particles. It is different from '*nipātam*' or accidental occurrence or subordinate mention, a term often employed by Yāska in *Nirukta*. It is also different from *n pātana* or irregular formation or a word-form which could not be proved by grammatical rules.

The word *nipāta* seems to have become current in technical literature very early. Yāska[7] while mentioning four classes of words refers to particles or *nipāta* and pairs it along with prepositions (*upasarga*). *Niruka Pariśiṣṭa* a later addition to *Nirukta* quotes ṚV. I.164.45 and while explaining it refers to the view of the grammarians about four classes of words. Patañjali quotes two verses from *Ṛgveda* (IV.58.3; I.164.45) and while explaining the epithets '*catvāri śṛṅā* and *catvāri vākparimitā padāni*' accepts their grammatical significance.[8] Although Yāska has quoted and explained twenty-three verses from a single hymn viz. one sixty-fourth hymn of the first maṇḍala, he omits verse number twenty-five of that hymn. All this points out that in Yāska's time the technical terms about the four classes of words were well-known. Yāska's detailed discussion about (*nipāta*) has not been surpassed later on by any one except the grammarians. The reason can be sought in his emphasis on *nipāta* as a meaningful unit in the four-fold classification and its importance as a literary device already employed by Ṛgvedic poets.

Yāska while explaining the four-fold classification of words refers to an important controversy regarding permanence of speech (*vacana*) "According to Audumbarāyaṇa speech (*vacana*) is permanent in the organs only. In that case the four-fold division (of words) will not hold good, nor the grammatical connection, nor the mutual reference of sounds which are not produced simultaneously. Words are used to designate objects with regard to everyday affairs in

3 Vedic Grammar, pp. 414-432.
4 Vedic Grammar for Students, pp. 213-253.
5 Alt-indische Syntax, p.67.
6 Grammaire Sanscrite, pp. 515-520
7 Catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyāte copasarganipātāśca /—Nirukta, I.1.
8 Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn), I. 3.

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the world on account of their comprehensiveness and minuteness ".[9] This clearly refers to the view held by Audumbarāyaṇa that the character of speech is not permanent. Durga supports this meaning of the *Nirukta* passage. According to him the objector's point of view is enunciated by the remark attributed to Audumbarāyaṇa. The refutation begins with '*vyaptimattāttu śabdasya*'. Skandaswamin understands the passage differently. For him the objector's point of view is, 'According to Audumbarāyaṇa speech is permanent in the organs only. In that case the four-fold classification of words will not hold good'. The reply begins with, grammatical connection and mutual reference to sounds will be possible because words are produced simultaneously'. Skanda,[10] here accepts the reading '*Yugapadutpannānām*' instead of '*ayugapadutpannānām*'. Both Skanda and Durga understand '*indriyanitya*' as impermanent.

Another important interpretation of Audumbarāyaṇa's statement, 'speech is permanent in the organs (only),' has not been much noticed by scholars. Bhartṛhari[11] understands speech (*vacana*) as sentence (*vākya*), organ (*indriya*) as mind (*buddhi*) and permanent (*nitya*) as really permanent. In other words *vacana* or sentence which he has always understood as an indivisible and integral linguistic unit is really permanent in the mind of the speaker and the listener. Hence according to Audumbarāyaṇa (and Bhartṛhari also refers to another scholar viz. Vārtākṣa having propounded a similar opinion) there cannot be four classes of words nor can one distinguish a verb (*ākhyāta*) as emphasising becoming (*kriyā*) or a noun (*nāma*) as emphasising being (*sattva*).[12] If one were tempted to ask, "why then bother about all this grammatical analysis," Bhartṛhari would quickly answer that in common usage as well as in grammar the description of a sentence in terms of words is both comprehensive and easy. Hence the artificially employed technique of analysis is accepted.[13] In the absence of an evidence to the contrary, it will be difficult to brush aside the interpretation

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9 Nirukta, I. ii.

10 Asya pratisamādhānārthamuktam yugapadutpannānāmityadi / Vaśabdaḥ pakṣavyāvṛttau / Yaduktamindriyanityatvāt padacatuṣṭānupapattiriti tanna yugapadutpannānāmitaretaropadeśaḥ /

11 Vākyapadīya, II. 343.

12 (a) Kriyāpradhānamākhyātam namnām sattvapradhānatā/
Catvāri padajātāni sarvametadvirudhyate//
—Vākyapadīya, II. 342

(b) Vākyasya buddhau nityatvam arthayogam ca laukikam/
Dṛṣṭvā catuṣṭvam nāstīti vārtākṣaudumbarāyaṇau//
—Vākyapadīya, II. 343.

13 Vyāptimānśca laghuścaiva vyavahāraḥ padāśrayaḥ/
Loke śāstre ca kāryārtham vibhāgenaiva kalpitaḥ//
—Vākyapadīya, II. 344.

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given by Bhartṛhari.[14] Audumbarāyaṇa may be accepted as the earliest exponent of sentence as an indivisible unit of language (*akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭavādin*).

All the Prātiśākhyas echo the words of *Nirukta* in the classification of words. According to Śaunaka[15] words are of four kinds, those expressing being (*sattva*) are *nāma* and those that express becoming (*bhāva*) are *ākhyāta.* In the next verse[16] twenty prepositions are enumerated and it is further stated that they are meaningful only when related to a verb or a noun. Regarding *Nipāta* Śaunaka summarises notions prevalent in his days, viz. (1) they are metrical tags, (2) some are significant and one cannot be certain about their exact number in prose literature or poetry.[17] *Taittirīya Prātiśākhya* does not mention *nipāta*, *Atharvaprātiśākhya*[18] recalls to mind the statements of Yāska, the tradition going under the name of the famous grammarian Śākaṭāyana and Pāṇini *Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya*[19] and *Bṛhaddevatā*[20] also have followed *Nirukta* in discussing the four parts of speech and *nipāta.*

To Pāṇini *nipāta* was a technical term already well-known. While discussing exceptions to *sandhi* he uses the word *nipāta* in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* for the first time. In sūtras from fifty-six to ninty seven of the fourth pāda of the first adhyāya he has treated *nipāta* in a very elaborate manner. For him *nipāta* or a particle is a generic term for indeclinables which include adverbs, interjections, single-vowel particles, pre-verbs, prepositions, *gati* or close adverbs and post-positions (*Karmapravacanīya*). Already before him there were complete lists (*gaṇas*) of these. They included particles used in Vedic language and in languages current in Pāṇini's time. He has some particles and labelled them as *cādi* when not signifying substances (*asattve*, Pā. 1.4.57). The *cādi* list includes adverbs, negatives, expletives, interjections, indeclinables used for address, single vowel particles, onomatopoetic particles like *hāhā, haihai, pāṭ, pyāṭ, phaṭ, chambaṭ,* and particles, utilised by later tantric literature, like *kum, khum, gham.* Even a hurried reading of the words of the *cādi* list shows that a majority of them have

14 (a) Etasmādevaudumbaradarśanāttatra catuṣṭvam nopapadyata ityucyate /
—Bhartṛhari, auto com. on Vā. 343
(b) Bharatamiśra : Sphoṭasiddhi, p. 1.

15 Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya, XII. 5.

16 Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya, XII. 6.

17 Nipātānāmarthavaśānnipātanādanarthakānāmitare ca sārthakāḥ /
Neyanta ityasti saṁkhyeh vāṅmaye mitākṣare cāpyamitākṣare ca //
—Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya, XII. 9.

18 (a) Atharvaprātiśākhya, I. i.
(b) Samāsāvagrahavigrahānpade yathovāca chandasi Śākaṭāyanaḥ /
Tathā vakṣyāmi catuṣṭayam padam nāmākhyātopasarganipātānām //
—Commentator's Introduction to the fourth chapter of Atharvaprātiśākhya.

19 VIII. 55.

20 II. 89.

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been selected from the current spoken language or even dialects of Sanskrit known to Pāṇini. The list of twenty particles beginning with *pra* is known as prepositions when not signifying substance and when compounded with a verb. They are also called close adverbs (*gati*). This technical term is invented by Pāṇini to include all those preverbs like *uri*, *urari* etc. and words ending with *ḍāc*, *sat*, *asat*, *antar*, *kṛñe*, *manas*, *puras* when indeclinable, *astam*, *accha*, *adas*, *tiras*, *upāje* and *anvāje*, *sākṣāt* and so on and a few others which are optionally called *gati*. Pāṇini notes another sub-group of particles viz. *Karmapravacanīya* (free adverbs or post-positions). In this group he has listed *anu*, *upa*, *apa*, *pari*, *āṅ*, *prati*, *abhi*, *su* and *adhi*. He has noted their use as *Karmapravacanīya* in context of their definite meanings. Pāṇini's enumeration, classification and nomenclature are in context of their use in current language and Vedic literature.

Yāska's discussion about prepositions (*upasarga*) and particle (*nipāta*) is strictly in context of their meanings.[21] Quoting the famous grammarian Śākaṭāyana and Gārgya he says that prepositions isolated from the verbal forms have no meaning. Taking his stand on the etymology of the word *nipāta*. Yāska states that they occur in various senses. They are used in a comparative sense, in a conjunctive sense and are used as expletives. He enumerates *iva*, *na*, *cit* and *nu* as used to denote comparison. The conjunctive particles are *ca*, *vā*, *aha* and *ha*; in the sense of mutual opposition are *u*, *nu*, *kila*, *mā*, *khalu*, *śaśvat*, *nūnam* and *hi*. The expletives are *kam*, *īm*, *id* and *u*. They are used to fill up verses and prose sentences. The particles *cit* and *hi* enumerated by Yāska are not included in the *cādi* list of 195 particles referred to by Pāṇini. Yāska has explained only twenty-two particles out of the *cādi* list of Pāṇini. Pāṇini's treatment of *nipāta* is certainly superior to that of Yāska but the numerous Vedic illustrations offered by Yāska point out his detailed knowledge of particles used in Vedic verse and prose.

Patañjali while commenting on the sūtras of the *nipāta* section (I.4.56 to 57) follows the line of argument laid down by Pāṇini. He does not comment on a number of sūtras in this section. In *Mahābhāṣya* he makes the following statements about *nipāta*: (1) Single vowels like *a*, *i*, *u*, *ā* etc. can be termed *nipāta*[22] and they can be used in different senses, e.g. *ā* can be used in the sense of little, action, limit upto and limit including (a particular place) (*Bhāṣya* on I.i.14), (2) Like nouns, verbs and suffixes the particles also are innumerable and no one is really able to teach all the meanings in which they are used[23],

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21 Nirukta, I. 2, 3.

22 The seemingly meaningless particles like a, i, and others have a meaning. This can be understood from Pāṇini calling adhi and pari as Karmapravacanīya, although they may be seemingly meaningless. Cp. Mahābhāṣya, I. 221.

23 Ko hi nāma samartho dhātuprātipadikapratyaya-nipātānāmarthānadeṣṭum/
—Mahābhāṣya (Keilhorn), I. 363

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(3) they are externally identical with prepositions, declined nouns, conjugated verbs and vowels[24] and (4) the two different technical terms *nipāta* and *avyaya* are necessary because in the absence of one a detailed enumeration would be necessary.[25]

Bhartṛhari has summarised different views regarding kinds of words.[26] According to one view they are two *viz.* noun and verb. According to one view they are four, *viz.* noun, verb, preposition (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*). According to still another view they are five when post-positions (*karmapravacanīya*) are added. Particles, prepositions and post-positions come under nouns and verbs. Some particles like *svaḥ* primarily express things (*sattvapradhāna*) and thus come under nouns. Particles like *hiruk* come under verbs because they are primarily expressive of actions.[27] Prepositions, particles and post-positions express some peculiarity in a process.[28] A verb primarily expresses a process, therefore the prepositions, particles and post-positions come under verbs. A noun is also related to some kind of process. Thus a verb will constitute a single indivisible and integral unit of language. This will emphasise the position of the *akhaṇḍavākyavādin* grammarian.

For daily usage and grammatical analysis particles and prepositions are classed separately. They express a peculiarity in the meanings expressed by nouns and verbs. Prepositions express a peculiarity in verbs only whereas particles express peculiarities of meanings both in nouns and verbs.

Post-positions, or free adverbs (*Karmapravacanīya*) as they are called by some, may be understood as a fifth kind of a word. Their function is the delimitation of a relation with reference to some action (*kriyāviśeṣasambandhāvaccheda*). They refer to an action that is past and not to one that is present.[29] Helārāja further says that this delimitation is in its own form or it is brought about by a particular action. Hence they may be understood separately from prepositions and particles.

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24 Upasargavibhaktisvarapratirūpakāśca nipātasaṁjñā bhavanti/
—Mahābhāsya, I. 425.

25 Mahābhāṣya on svarādinipātamavyayam/
(Pā. I. i.37)

26 Dvidhā kaiścit padaṁ bhinnaṁ caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā /
Apodhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivat//
—Vākyapadīya, III.1.1.

27 Svarādayastu kecit sattvapradhāna eveti tepi nāmapadameva / Ye tu hirugādayaḥ kriyāpradhānāḥ teṣāmākhyātentarbhāvaḥ/
—Helārāja on Vā. pa. III.1.1.

28 Siddhasādhyārthaviṣayaviśeṣadyotakatvānnipātānām sādhyaikaniyatatvāccopasargāṇām parasparato bhedaḥ/
—Hetārāja on Vā. pa. III.1.1.

29 Atikrāntakriyākhyānalakṣaṇasya vyāpārasyātra sambhavo na tu vartamānasyetyupsargebhyo bhedaḥ /
—Helarāja on Vā. pa.III.i.1

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Are the prepositions, particles and post-positions significant by themselves? In other words do they have an independent expressive meaning? Opinions have differed on this point. Yāska quotes Śākaṭāyana[30] who says that prepositions have no significance when isolated from nouns and verbs. They suggest the subordinate sense of nouns and verbs. Same is the case with particles. *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* understands some particles as significant and others as meaningless. It does not enter into a detailed discussion about them but notes only their presence in literature. According to Yāska who follows the opinion of Gārgya the prepositions as well as particles are significant.

Śākaṭāyana's remarks as noted by Yāska, suggest that prepositions and therefore particles, are indicative of meaning rather than denotative or expressive of meaning. Grammarians like Bhatṛhari have elaborated this view and his commentators explain it at some length. According to Bhartṛhari some particles are indicative, others denote meaning independently while there are still others which like augments express meaning when united with words which govern them.[31] Picking up a variant reading '*pṛthagarthaprakalpane*, Puṇyarāja suggests that particles are either significant or meaningless.[32] Puṇyarāja's interprettiaon is worth rejecting because even when the above three alternatives are not accepted the emphasis is on the indicative nature of some particles and the denotative nature of others, there being no dispute to their being significant. The next verse in *Vākyapadīya* clarifies this point well. Whether they are placed before or after the words with which they are united or used in different meanings, their capacity to indicate meanings does not alter [33] The particles like *ca* although they are words (pada) and not used independently as suffixes although expressing meanings are not used independently. When their independent use is not possible they will not be capable of expressing meanings. They will rather indicate them.[34]

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30 (a) Na nirbaddhā upasargā arthānnirāhuriti Śākaṭāyanaḥ /
—Nirukta, I.3.

(b) Sākṣānnateṣāmabhidhānaśaktirasti pṛthagviracitānāmityabhiprāyaḥ/
—Durga on the above.

31 Nipātā dyotakā kecit pṛthagarthābhidhayinaḥ/
Āgamā iva kepi syuḥ sambhūyārthasya vācakāḥ//
—Vākyapadiya, II.192

32 Puṇyarāja on the above verse.

33 Vākyapadiya, II. 194.

34 Bhartṛhari makes some very interesting remarks about the indicativeness and the expressiveness of prepositions and post-positions.

(a) Prepositions (upasarga) express particular aspects of an action or indicate these aspects which potentially exist in the action or they work as helpers to bring out the inherent powers of a verb. —Vāk. Pad II. 188.

(b) Post-positions (Karmapravacaniya) establish the relationship generated between nouns by verbs when the relationship has come into being and when the verb

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The grammarians later than Bhartṛhari generally follow the line of discussion given by Bhartṛhari. Kaiyaṭa[35] accepts the indicative nature of particles. Bhaṭṭoji Dīxita has the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṁsaka views as objector's point of view to be refuted. The former understand prepositions (*upasarga*) as indicative and the particles (*nipāta*) as expressive of sense. The latter opine that particles are expressive of sense.[36] Commenting on Bhaṭṭōji's verses Koṇḍabhaṭṭa with remarkable clarity proves the grammarian's view as the correct view.[37] Similar remarks are made by Dīxita in *Śabdakaustubha*[38] also. Nāgeśa does not like to be dogmatic on this point. He would rather emphasise the context and usage for determining the indicativeness or expresiveness of particles.[39] Abhinavagupta while commenting Ānandavardhana may be understood as reflecting the views of Ālaṅkārikas when he says that the indicative nature of particles is being loudly proclaimed in the camps of grammarians.[40]

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has withdrawn. They do not indicate action, nor do they express a relation nor do they imply a verb but they define a relation :
Kriyāyā dyotako nāyam sambadhasya na vācakaḥ/
Nāpi kriyāpadākṣepi sambandhasya tu bhedakaḥ //
—Vākyapadīya, II. 204.

35 Nipātānām dyotakatvādabhidhyeyārthābhāvepi dyotyārthasadbhāvādyeṣāmarthavatvam teṣām siddhyatyeva saṁjñā /
—Kaiyaṭa on Bhāṣya on I. 2. 45.

36 Nipātānām pareṣām yat tadasmākamiti sthitiḥ /
—Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā, 479.

37 Pareṣām mate yadeva nipātatvamasattvārthatve sati cādigaṇapaṭhitatvam....tadeva dyotakatāyāḥ śaktatāyā vyavacchedakam yuktamityarthaḥ /
—Vaiyākaraṇabhuṣana on the above.

38 Athaśabdaḥ prārambhasya dyotako, na tu vācakaḥ nipātatvādupasargavat....upasargatvāpekṣayā nipātasyādhikavṛttitayā tadavacchedenaiva dyotakatākalpanācca/
—Śabdakaustubha, I.

39 (a) Eṣāṁ dyotakatvam vācakatvam ca yathākāryam yathāprayogam boddhavyam/
—Laghuśabdenduśekhara, p. 58.

and Evam sati yatra dyotakatām vinā na gatistatra dyotakatvasyaiva svīkāra ucita iti nāsmākamekatara pakṣāgrah ityāśayenāha yathākāyaṁ yathāprayogamiti/
—Bhairavamiśra on the above

(b) Kvacittu kriyāgataviśeṣabodhakatātirikta nipātānām vācakatvamapi /
—Laghumanjūṣā, p. 612.

40 Vaiyākaraṇagṛheṣu hi prākprayogasvātantryābhāvat ṣaṣṭhyādyaśravaṇāllingasaṁkhyāvirahācca vācakavailakṣaṇyena dyotakanipāta ityudghoṣyata eveti/
—Dhvanyālokalocana, p. 354.

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MODERN ECOLOGY AND THE RELEVANCE OF SĀṄKHYA

By

A. G. JAVADEKAR, Baroda

(1) *The Points of Comparison between Sāṅkhya and Ecology*

The main emphasis of the new biological science of ecology is on the inherent balance of nature. It is this thought that led me to consider the relevance of *Sāṅkhya* system to ecology. The second equally important thought in ecology is that it is man who has been mainly responsible for upsetting the original balance of nature. That also stimulated in me the idea of comparing ecology to *sāṅkhya* especially with reference to the role of *puruṣa* in the system. Further while ecology is essentially a biological science in a very wide sense, *Sāṅkhya* too appears to be largely a biological-psychological science. Looked at from these points of view the suggestions made in this article would contribute to the fields of comparative study in philosophy, science and also to philosophy of science.

(2) *The Inherent Principle of Harmony in Nature*

Ecology, which studies the interrelationship between the living creatures on the one hand and their environment on the other, ultimately finds that a certain kind of harmony is reached between them. The five elements, the mineral kingdom, the microbiological, the vegetative, the herbivorous and the carnivorous kingdoms of living species together form a network of interrelations which ultimately culminates in giving rise to a grand harmony among everything. This inherent adjustment among all the aspects of nature has a tendency to maintain itself in endlessly repeated cycles. Everything emanates from nature and returns to nature without any hindrance. *Sāṅkhya prakṛti* inherently is in such *guṇa-sāmyāvasthā*. It maintains a balance, a harmony in its tripartite aspects or *guṇas*.

(3) *Man is the Cause of Disturbance in Harmony*

Ecology, however, draws our attention to the disturbance caused to this inherent harmony in nature by the so-called intelligent activities of man. For a very long period there was a mutual adjustment between nature and man, so much so that nature which had thrown out man out of herself had not given man any independent existence, but he formed actually a part and parcel of nature. But gradually there emerged in man a growing consciousness of his independence, a sense of egoism and a superiority complex due to his intelligence. He thought he could have a better and better understanding of the natural phenomena and their causal relationships. He felt that such intelligent knowledge of nature's ways would help him to get a control over nature. Knowledge he realized was a real power through which he could put the natural forces into

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his subservience for the realization of his own utilitarian ends. Thus a dichotomy was created between nature and man. Man became the enjoyer at the cost of nature. Man became the master and nature ministerd to his needs.

During the last two centuries and especially during the last one or two generations there has been so much explosion of this scientific knowledge of the potentialities and the workings of nature that mankind has been able to give rise to new technological civilization of physical comforts and plentifulness. But while this was going on there was so much intervention into the smooth working of nature that ultimately the inherent balance of nature was lost. The natural ecology was to a large extent upset, with the result that while there was quantitative gain, there was a qualitative loss in life. While there was physical abundance, there was a spiritual impoverishment. The various problems of pollution of soil, water, fire, air and ether proved to be symptoms of a grave disease of the fundamental maladjustment between nature and man. The split from the unity of reality to the dichotomy of nature versus man proved to be suicidal to man's existence itself. In order to gain the original harmony of life and its environment, nature is bound to compensate the loss of balance by finding out ways and means which will undo the undesirably extensive and perverse intervention on the part of man. If man acts, nature must suitably counteract. In this struggle between man and nature, nature is bound to prove its original superiority.

(4) *Nature Minister or Master* ?

This ecological discovery fits in appropriately with the *Sāṅkhya* system. The credit (or discredit) of disturbing the balance of *prakṛti* is given to the appearance of man as a separate principle. That is the principle of *puruṣa*. There is a manifestation of intelligence (*mahat*) in man which also engenders in him a sense of separate existence, a complex of egoism (*ahaṅkāra*). These indeed are the principles which indicate the disturbance in the original *sāmyāvasthā* of *Prakṛti*. It is man who is responsible for causing *vaiṣamya* in nature. Man considers himself to be the master and enjoyer (*bhoktā*) of all creation, and looks upon nature as his minister (*pradhāna*) who must serve his—that is master's—own ends.

But as ecology points out, the real master of the situation is nature and not man. Nature rules supreme. Nature tries to regain its balance. If the intervention on the part of man is trifle, the counteraction on the part of nature is just enough to mitigate that. But if, on the other hand, the action of intervention is shocking enough upsetting the total balance, then the nature also vehemently counterattacks to nullify the effect of the shock. The principle is that the harmony must be maintained at all and at any cost. In this struggle to return to the balanced state, even if it comes to the destruction of man,

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nature will not have any hesitation. Thus in the effort of man to overdo things not tolerable to the maintenance of the total order of things, ultimately he creates conditions which are not helpful to his own existence. He, as it were, digs his own grave. And thus nature uproots man, and proves beyond all doubt that the ultimate authority and sovereignty rest with nature. It is in this sense also that *prakṛti* deserves to be called *pradhāna*, that is the chief, the master. Man's subsidiary or creaturely status is thus evident.

(5) *Prakṛti and Vikṛti*

The original and inherent character of *prakṛti* is to remain in a state of internal harmony. In this *prakṛti* there arises *vikṛti* owing to the disharmony effected into *prakṛti* by the *puruṣa*. The problems of pollutions to which ecology draws our attention are owing to this disharmony brought into nature by extravagant human interventions. They are the symptoms of the *Vikāra* caused in the healthy balanced condition of nature.

It is therefore not in the fitness of things that we describe this *vikṛti* of *prakṛti* as if it is its evolution. If evolution is a positive increase in the purpose of things, then what we find is not really evolution, but just the reverse of it. The modifications of the *prakṛti* in the world-forms are not what could be called in the Vedāntic terminology as *āroha* ascent or going up, but it is *avaroha* descent or coming down. But we are wont to call this *avaroha* as if it was evolution. But actually it is degradation of *prakṛti* into *vikṛti*. It is a stepping down from a state of balance to imbalance, from health to disease, from normality to abnormality. There is no end to multiplicity and infinite variety. What appears to be enrichment in this differentiation and separation is indeed an impoverishment of the original unity and harmony of reality. Ecology is a lesson into the maintenance of the unity and harmony inspite of multiplicity and variety. The splitting of the unity into duality, and further into multiplicity which we see operating in the universe is welcome so long as the principle of unity and harmony is not lost. There is no virtue in mere multiplicity if the multiple elements have separatist tendencies. When they cease to synthesize and harmonize they tend to destruction.

(6) *The Organic Unity of Reality*

Ecology demonstrates as to how the whole world constitutes one home (*Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam*). In it no element can afford to break away, or to go at a tangent, and thus weaken the whole structure. It is principally the dichotomous intelligence of man, further strengthened by the spirit of separatist egoism and motivated by self-seeking enjoyment that has worked against the principle of unity and harmony. The universe forms an organic unity. When this is broken, evil consequences are bound to take place. Ecology as a biological science looks upon the whole universe from this point of view of organic unity of

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everything. The principle of life has a capacity of assimilating the inorganic into the organic. That which cannot be so assimilated constitutes a danger to the organic existence. Many of the technological products are of such nature that they do not fit into the organic system. They constitute a serious rift into the whole system.

The *Sāṅkhya* system, in so far as it puts an emphasis on the unbridgeable dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, indicates that it is a step below the Vedāntic system of unitary reality. According to the *Advaita Vedānta* the whole reality is unitary in character. This one reality holds its supreme sway everywhere. So long as this is not questioned everything sails smoothly. But as soon as the principle of dichotomy or dualism enters into it, it causes unsurmountable difficulties. When thus there is a sense of belonging to, or identification with the supreme reality, the individuals stand in relationship of dependence and harmony. But as soon as the sense of egoism overcomes the individual, the separatist tendencies start and a trail of difficulties are given rise to.

(7) *Prakṛti and Puruṣa as Dual Manifestations of Brahman*

It is in this sense that *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are the two manifestations of the supreme reality or *Brahman*. They are not therefore antagonistic, but mutually complementary. As manifestations of the supreme reality, they both possess latently the characteristics of *saccidānandatva* in them. It is a mistake to consider that intelligent consciousness is present merely in the *puruṣa* and absent in the *prakṛti*. In the case of *puruṣa* this intelligence is apparent, while in the case of *prakṛti* it is latent. As a matter of fact *prakṛti* is a repository of inmost wisdom of which the *puruṣa* is not aware, only because of his egoism.

It is our habit of thought to consider that *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are antagonistically opposite in character, and therefore while *puruṣa* is conscious the *prakṛti* is unconscious. We value *puruṣa* for this consciousness in him while we regard *prakṛti* to be inferior in status and characteristic. But there is a need for improving our way of looking at this phenomenon, and take a review of the situation.

(8) *While Man is merely intelligent, Nature is a Repository of Wisdom*

Ecology points out that there is an inherent capacity in nature to adapt to the changing circumstances with a view to maintain the balance and harmony. It tends to preserve itself by finding out suitable means to overcome shocks and interventions. Just as the suffering organism has a tendency to recoup its health, so by and large nature tends to recoup its healthy condition of *sāmyāvasthā*. How nature does it is not always within the comprehension of the so-called intelligent man. The total knowledge which man possesses of nature, through the study of various sciences, is far too little than the extremely complicated ways of nature by means of which it constantly remains vigilant regarding its own pre-

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servation. That is the law of *dharma* or *dhāraṇā* which rules supreme in nature. When we take into consideration this state of affairs regarding the working of nature, it is difficult to understand why we should persist in calling nature insentient, unconscious, unintelligent or *jaḍa*.

Man is only self-aware, or self-conscious. But simply because of this it is not correct to regard him as wise. On the whole it is a strange thing that man is intelligent, but unwise. While nature does not seem to be self-aware or self-conscious, and yet it does seem to be an immense storehouse of almost infinite practical wisdom,—practical in the sense that its wisdom is not theoretical but operational. *Prakṛti* is *Kartrī*. Man can and does commit mistakes because of his possessing intelligence along with a sense of egoistic superiority complex. Actually his intelligence is of a *jaḍa* character. It is not transparent or without mistakes. Man learns by trials and errors. It is very rarely that he has a direct insight into things. As compared to this, nature commits no mistakes. It has a first-hand knowledge of everything and deals directly with the problems as and when they occur. Inspite of this infinite wisdom inherent in nature, simply for want of self-awareness comparable to that of man, to look upon nature as an insentient principle appears to be the gravest mistake on the part of the egoist man. It would therefore be not at all too much to grant the characteristic of wisdom to nature; which wisdom man, generally speaking, miserably lacks. At the most we can say that while man is free to be foolish, nature is bound to be wise.

This *Sāṅkhya* mistake appears to be corrected in the *Advaita Vedānta* view which looks upon everything as manifestation of *caitanya*. The principle of *cit* is as much present in the world outside, which we call nature, as it is present within. Thus alone the rift between man and nature could be overcome. The Vedāntic position is thus superior to that of the *Sāṅkhya*.

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VIDYĀSĀGARA AND HIS NYĀYASŪTRAṬĪKĀ

By

ANANTALAL THAKUR, Patna

Mm. Keśavamiśra Tarkācārya (C. 1525 A.D.) of the Kaṭakā branch of the Sodarapuria family of the Maithila *Śrotriya* Brahmins wrote the *Gautamīya-sūtraprakāśikā*, a critical commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*s while engaged in teaching *Nyāya* and *Vedānta* at Varanasi[1]. In his exposition of the *Īśvarakāraṇo-pādanatā* section he refers to the view of one venerable Vidyāsāgara—

विद्यासागरास्तु परिणामेनेश्वरोपादानकं जगदित्याक्षिप्तपूर्वपक्षकं सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् ॥

ईश्वरः कारणं निमित्तकारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् । पुरुषव्यापारोऽफलोऽपि दृश्यते यतः, अतः कारणान्तरापेक्षेत्यर्थः । न तूपादानं कार्यैकजात्यादिति भावः । देश्यम्—

न, पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः ॥

पुरुषव्यापारमन्तरेण न कार्यम् । अतो दृष्टेनैवोपपत्तेर्नातिरिक्तकारणकल्पनेत्यर्थः । सिद्धान्तः

तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः ॥

न ह्यचेतनं चेतनानधिष्ठितं प्रवर्तते इति द्व्यणुकादेस्तत्कारितत्वात् तदायोजितपरमाणुजन्यत्वादीश्वर-सिद्धौ तन्निषेधोऽहेतुरित्यर्थ इत्याहुः ।

The passage seems to give the gist of Vidyāsāgara's detailed exposition of the three *sūtra*s (IV. 1.19-21) seeking to establish the agency of God in all activities. It again shows that Vidyāsāgara commented on the *Nyāyadarśana*. A casual reference may be made to a single *sūtra*. But here we find a whole section consisting of three *sūtra*s involved. In his *Nyāyasūtraṭīkā* (*avayaviparī-kṣāprakaraṇa*) Vaṁśadhara also refers to Vidyāsāgara's view. No further information with regard to the *Nyāyasūtraṭīkā* of Vidyāsāgara is available.

Vidyāsāgara is only a title. The identification of the author is therefore beset with difficulties. Maithila scholars do not generally use their titles. Only in two cases—those of Keśavamiśra *Tarkācārya* and Devanātha Thakkura *Tarkapañcānana*[2], titles are found associated with their names. On the other

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1 a. सुखेनाध्यापयन् काश्यां न्यायवेदान्तदर्शने ।
श्रीकेशवकवीन्द्रेण कृता सूत्रप्रकाशिका ॥
b. तीरमुक्तिमहीपालपरिषन्मुख्यसूरिणा ।
श्रीकेशवकवीन्द्रेण कृता सूत्रप्रकाशिका ॥

2 Here the titles seem to have come as outside influence. Devanātha was associated with the court of Kāmatā under Malladeva Naranārāyana.

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hand, Bengali scholars, since long, used their titles as parts of their names and their titles alone were also used without the name. Now we know of no Maithila scholar with this title. But in the history of Indian Philosophy several scholars are known by this title. We cannot be absolutely sure if the author in question should be identical with some one of the known *Vidyāsāgaras*. In the present state of our knowledge, we may consider each individual case for establishing the identity.

The oldest known '*Vidyāsāgara*' was Ānandapūrṇa,[3] who commented on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa. No *Nyāya* work of his is known to have existed, nor has he shown any partiality to the *Nyāyaśāstra* in his extant works. The second scholar to claim the title in question was Jñānapūrṇa. A Naiyāyika having a commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* to his credit, Jñānapūrṇa does not offer the view in question in this commentary. Any special view of an author is expected to be referred to in his other works also.

According to the *Advaitaprakāśa* of Īśānanāgara (1568 A.D.), Śrīcaitanya of Navadvīpa received the title of *Vidyāsāgara* from Advaitācārya on attaining proficiency in the Vedic lore.[4] Śrīcaitanya was neither a Vedic scholar nor a Naiyāyika. Most of his biographers are silent on this point. Again there is a commentary on the *Mahābhārata* attributed to a *Vidyāsāgara*[5] who also does not show any inclination towards the *Nyāyaśāstra*. We hear of a Vāṇinatha *Vidyāsāgara*[6] of Sylhet, and one Puṇḍarīka *Vidyāsāgara*[7] of Kasipur, Barisal. Very little is known about these two scholars and it is highly improbable that the work of either of them should attract the attention of a scholar from Mithila or Varanasi.

Prof. D. C. Bhattacharya in his *Vange Navya-Nyāyacarcā* gives a detailed account of Puṇḍarīkākṣa *Vidyāsāgara*[8] a cousin brother to Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma of Navadvīpa. He was a great scholar and had several works to his credit. His *Durgāsaptaśatīṭīka* is extant in manuscripts. His *Kātantravṛttiṭīkā* called *Kātantrapradīpa* is partly available in print. His *Kalāpadīpikā* is a commentary on the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* according to the *Kalāpa* school of Sanskrit Grammar. Besides, he had a *Kātantraparišiṣṭa* to his credit. His *Kātantrakaumudī* and *Nyāsaṭīkā* are also known from references. In *Alaṁkāraśāstra* Puṇḍarīkākṣa is said to have written commentaries on the *Kāvyādarśa* of Daṇḍin, *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra* of Vāmana and *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammata.

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3 *Annals of Oriental Research*, Vol. IV, pt. I.
4 *Vange Navya-Nyāyacarcā*, pp. 53-4.
5 *Ibid.*, p. 53.
6 *Ibid.*, p. 60.
7 *Ibid.*, p. 60.
8 *Ibid.*, pp. 53-60.

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No *Nyāya* work of this *Vidyāsāgara* is extant. But he is found to refer to his *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa*. Again he quotes a *Nyāyasūtra*, passages from the *Nyāyavārttika* and the *Nyāyakandalī*. He criticises Gaṅgeśa, quotes the *Tattvabodha* of Vardhamāna, the *Nyāyabhāskara* and the *Nyāyanibandhodyota* of Divākaropādhyāya. The above shows that Puṇḍarīkākṣa *Vidyāsāgara* was a *Nyāya-Vaiśeśika* scholar also. Born in the family of great *Nyāya* scholars, he must have attained eminence during the age of Vāsudeva *Sārvabhauma* and Raghunātha *Śiromaṇī*. Narahari *Viśārada*, Puṇḍarīkākṣa's uncle was also a great *Nyāya* scholar having a *Tattvacintāmaṇiṭīkā* to his credit.

In the light of the above, the suggestion comes that Puṇḍarīkākṣa was identical with the *Vidyāsāgara* referred to by Keśavamiśra *Tarkācārya*. His *Nyāyasūtraṭīkā* might have reached Mithilā along with other *navya-Nyāya* works from Bengal. At the time of Keśavamiśra, relation between the logicians of Mithilā and Bengal was intimate and there is nothing known to stand against the proposed identification.

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IDEAL SYLLOGISM ACCORDING TO VĀDIVĀGĪŚVARĀCĀRYA

By

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The *Mānamanohara*[1] of Vādivāgīśvarācārya (early half of the 12th cent. A.D.) is an important work of the *Vaiśeṣika* system of philosophy which was known till now only through references—mainly in works on *Vedānta*—but has now seen the light of day thanks to the efforts of Svāmi Yogīndrānandajī. It is named *Mānamanohara* perhaps as a retort to the criticism levelled at the *Vaiśeṣika* system or its mode of approach that it is dry and does not put forth a fully rational exposition.[2] As if to answer this criticism, Vādivāgīśvara has expressed himself mainly through syllogistic reasoning (*māna-anumāna*) at every step. As a matter of fact, he has overdone it. At the very outset, he establishes the reality of God, *avayavin* (whole) and *paramāṇu* (atom), refuting the views of rival thinkers—mainly the Buddhists.

Let us see what Vādivāgīśvara has to say about the syllogism. The *Vaiśeṣika*s, like the followers of the *Nyāya* school, recognize five *avayava*s (members) of a syllogism :

शब्दः अनित्यः (प्रतिज्ञा),
कार्यत्वात् (अपदेश),
यत्कार्यं तदनित्यं यथा घटः (निदर्शन),
कार्यश्च शब्दः (अनुसंधान),
तस्मात् शब्दोऽनित्यः (प्रत्याम्नाय).

(Vādivāgīśvara has also used the technical terms of the *Nyāya darśana* rather he prefers them *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya*, *nigamana*).

This is the standard syllogism against which a number of views were put forth by thinkers of other schools. The Buddhists, though they initially followed the traditional type of syllogism of five *avayava*s, settled down with the advent of Diṅnāga, to the acceptance of a syllogism of only two *avayava*s:

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1 *Mānamanohara* of Vādivāgīśvarācārya—edited by Svāmī Yogindrānanda (ṣaḍdarśana Prakāśana Pratiṣṭhāna, Vārāṇasī, May, 1973).

2 See अतिविरसमसारं मानवार्ताविहीनं
प्रविततबहुवेलप्रक्रियाजालदुःखम् ।
उदधिसममतन्त्रं तन्त्रमेतद्वदन्ति
प्रखलजडधियो ये तेऽनुकम्प्यन्त एते ॥
—Kiraṇāvali. p. 2 (Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1971).

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(यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निः यथा महानसादौ,
अस्ति च पर्वते धूमः)—

viz., the *udāharaṇa* (*-vyāpti-*) and the *upanaya* (*-pakṣadharmatva*). Dharmakīrti says in his *Pramāṇa-vārttika* (3.26) that even one member—Reason—would suffice (-of course, the rest would be implied in the discussion and could be easily comprehended by an intelligent person from the context). The Jaina logicians ordinarily recognize two *avayavas*—*pratijñā* and *hetu*—but are not rigid on this point. According to them, even one member may be employed, viz., the *hetu*, or two or three or five or even ten (as recognized by Bhadrabāhu) (-See *Syādvādaratnākara*, pp. 548, 565-) according to the intelligence of the person who is to be convinced. Generally two *avayavas* are sufficient (-See *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, 3.46).

Now as to the suggestion that it can be left to the other party to supply one or more *avayavas*, Śridhara, the author of the *Nyāya Kandalī* answers that *parārthānumāna* (inference for another, syllogism) is not always addressed to the expert and the form of the syllogism cannot be determined in accordance with the degree of understanding of the person addressed. It is difficult to know the working of other people's minds, and so it is not possible to assess just how many *avayavas* would produce understanding and how many would fail to do so in any particular case.[3] His idea is that the syllogism must follow the nature of the thing and not the nature of the person to whom it is addressed. Hence it is always good to adopt the standard form.

The *Nyāya* thinkers—especially those who have been forgotten—seem to have appreciated the spirit behind the Buddhist (and the Jain) stand-point, yet they mostly justify the need for all the five *avayavas*, which promote gradual conviction, leaving no ambiguity. Otherwise even one *avayava*—the *hetu* (reason)—would suffice to convince the other party, as the intelligent man could be expected to supply all that is implied.

Vādivāgīśvarācārya has given an exposition of the standard exposition in brief.[4] But then he boldly says : 'I do not subscribe to this view, for any statement which is not (strictly) useful for the proving of something is certainly redundant.[5] The other party in a debate would like to know what the proof is for a particular stand, and so the proof with only as many constituents as are (strictly) required should be put forth. And such constituents are two only—

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3 न च प्रतिपाद्यस्य क्वियत्यङ्गे प्रतिपत्तिरस्ति क्वियति नास्तीति शक्यमवगन्तुं परचित्तवृत्तेर्दुरुन्नेयत्वात् ।
—*Nyāyakandalī*, p. 615 (Vārāṇasī, 1965).

4 *Mānamanohara*, pp. 84-85.

5 वयं तन्न बुध्यामहे, साधनानुपयुक्तवचनस्याधिकत्वात् ।
—*Mānamanohara*, p. 85.

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vyāpti and *pakṣadharmatva*. Anything more than that would not be a component of the activity. What more is to be known, for which accessories would be required.'

It may be argued that the five *avayavas* are required to avert the suspicion of the different fallacies of reason - *asiddha* (unreal or unproven reason), *viruddha* (contradictory), *anaikāntika* (inconclusive), *bādhita* or *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* (contradicted) and *satpratipakṣa* (counter-balanced). *Vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatva* (i.e. the *avayavas udāharaṇa* and *upanaya*) may suffice to keep away *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *anaikāntika*, but more *avayavas* are required to safeguard against *bādhita* and *satpratipakṣa*.

Vādivāgīśvara answers this by saying that the fallacy of contradicted reason (*bādhita*) can be subsumed under *anaikāntika*, and so the *vyāpti* keeps it at a distance. And there cannot be anything like *satpratipakṣa* for two reasons free from *upādhi* (extraneous or accidental condition) (and so equally valid) are not possible in respect of one thing; that is to say, two such *hetus* would not be available to prove contradictory attributes in respect of the same thing, and so they would not be able to counter-balance each other. Or, if they be possible, who could stop a thing from having a dual nature? And then one would have to accept a thing as having two contradictory characters—which is absurd. And if a *nirupādhika hetu* (probans free from extraneous condition and so valid) were to betray its probandum, that is to say, not prove it, it would be giving up its nature as a *hetu* - it would no longer be probative in character. This being so, there are two forms (—the concomitance of the probans with the probandum, and the presence of the probans in the subject,—*vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatva*) and to express these only two statements are required. The statement of the probans, which is invariably concomitant with the probandum, as an attribute of the subject (*pakṣa*) achieves the task.

Thus the *anvayi anumāna* (affirmative syllogism) would be as follows:

यत्कार्यं तदनित्यं यथा घटः,
कार्यश्च शब्दः;

and the *vyatireki* (negative)—*anumāna*:

यन्नित्यं तदकार्यं यथा व्योम,
कार्यश्च शब्दः

Therefore, only two *avayavas* should be employed in a syllogism.[6]

Moreover, Vādivāgīśvara does not recognize the third type of *parārthānumāna—anvayavyatirekin* (affirmative-negative). Where the inferential cogni-

6 Citsukhācārya has accepted this view of Vādivāgīśvara—a powerful antagonist of the *Kevalādvaitins*. See *Citsukhī*, p. 401, (Udāsīna Vidyālaya, Vārāṇasī, 1956).

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tion is brought about by one mode of syllogistic reasoning—affirmative or negative—there is no authority for regarding the two as jointly probative.[7]

Thus in the *mānamanohara*, we find one of the rare cases where a writer boldly asserts himself against the traditional view of his school. It may be mentioned in passing that Vādivāgīśvara seems to have been a follower of the *Kaula Mārga* and he has been accused of being a follower of the *Vāma Mārga* and of indulging in wine, by Ānandānubhava (1150 A.D.), the author of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali*.[8] It is quite likely that thinkers attached to such a sect got an opportunity to come into contact with such thinkers of other schools also, and thus Vādivāgīśvarācārya could have come to appreciate the Buddhist stand in respect of the syllogism (—which after all was not the main concern of the *Vaiśeṣika* school). Nevertheless, throughout the *Mānamanohara*, Vādivāgīśvara sticks to the traditional syllogism, voicing his own view only when he comes to the exposition of *parārthānumāna*.

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7 अन्वयव्यतिरेकीत्यपरो नेष्यते, एकेनैवानुमितिसिद्धौ समुदितस्य हेतुत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् ।
—*Mānamanohara*, pp. 86-87

8 वाममार्गानुसारिणा मानमनोहरे प्रलपितम्.....संभावितमद्यपानस्य वेदान्तद्विषः मतमुपेक्षणीयम्
—*Nyāyaratnadīpāvali* (—adduced from Svāmī Yogīndrānanda's Introduction, p. 9 to the *Mānamanohara*).

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF JAGANNĀTHA AS A DEITY

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The iconography of the plump wooden images of Jagannātha, Balabhadra and Subhadrā with their thick and massive heads and the short arm stumps emerging out of the middle of the head, however devoid totally of the legs, betray its tribal origin and character even to a layman. Long after the total integration of the Jagannātha figures into Hinduism, their iconography persistently reminded the people of their origin and when the texts propagating the glory and the holiness of this religious place were composed, the tribal origin of the figures was neither concealed or suppressed, perhaps because it could not possibly be suppressed or overlooked, being too prominent and obvious.

But, on the other hand, the Hindus of the upper class who had now taken to the worship of these Deities, never felt quite comfortable about admitting the fact that they just took them over from the aboriginals living in forests and transformed the whole into the worship of Viṣṇu in his aspect of Jagannātha, the Lord of the universe. A necessity was always felt to justify the adoption of these tribal figures into the greater Hinduistic tradition. Such justifications and explanations are best offered in the religious field by introducing some supernatural or divine element expressing the will of the Deity Herself.

During the period when the wooden image or images of Jagannātha were accepted in the Hinduistic fold, the most popular Viṣṇu images in Orissa were those of Mādhava, who was also known as Nīlamādhava since these statues were carved out of the black chlorite—black or blue being the bodily hue of Viṣṇu. Mādhava is a standing form of Viṣṇu with four arms in which he holds (beginning from the upper left) a conch, a mace, a lotus (in Orissa, however, this lower right mostly displays the *varada-mudrā* and a discus respectively[1]. Hundreds of such statues belonging to the 8th to 10th centuries have been found and excavated in the valley of the river Prācī, not far from Puri.[2] These

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1 cf. Smith H. Daniel, *Vaiṣṇava Iconography*, Madras, 1969, p. 164 f.
mādhavo gadayā sārdhaṃ cakraśaṅkhāmbujāyudhaḥ (§ 400)
and
savyādhaḥ paṅkajaṃ yasya pāñcajanyaṃ tathôpari|
dakṣiṇordhvaṃ yasya cakraṃ gadā cādho vyavasthitā|
ādimūrtes tu bhedo'yaṃ mādhavêti prakīrtyate|| (§ 402)

2 cf. Mahapatra K. N., "Purānic Literature of Orissa", in *Orissa Hist. Res. Journal*, XI (1962), 1, p. 26.

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Mādhavas of Prācī were so popular and important that the poet Balarāmadāsa (1475 - 1548 A.C.) writing as late as the 16th century invites in his work *vaṭa avakāśa* twelve of such Mādhavas to the court of Jagannātha which he holds under the shade of the *kalpavṛkṣa* (a *vaṭa* tree) in the Puri temple.

In the beginning of the present millenium, therefore, when the worshippers of Jagannātha felt the need and the necessity to explain to themselves and to others this strange form and the wooden character of their Deity, thought naturally first of Nīlamādhava which was the most common form of Viṣṇu in those days. They claimed and propagated that their Jagannātha had not all along been so. He was, in fact, originally a Nīlamādhava of stone which stood under the shade of a tree and was worshipped by the chief of the *Śabara* race. But when a Brahmin emissory of the king Indradyumna of Mālwā who wanted to have a *darśana* of the Lord, discovered Him once, He vanished and a divine voice (or a dream) gave the king to understand that He would now no more be visible to the people in his Nīlamādhava form which was appropriate only for the golden age of the humanity (*kṛtayuga*) but would instead assume a new shape more suitable to the prevailing time, to be worshipped as a Deity made of wood. [3]

Why the wooden statues of Jagannātha etc. have exactly these peculiar and uncommon features, has also been explained either as the will of Viṣṇu who himself appears as a carpenter to fashion the images or as a result of the uncalled for curiosity of Guṇḍīcā, the legendary queen of Indradyumna, who opened the doors of the carpenter's workshop after the lapse of just 14 days whereas they were to remain shut up for three weeks; a fact which offended the divine carpenter so much that he disappeared leaving the work unfinished.

It is quite obvious that in this legend the element of Nīlamādhava has been brought in as a sort of apology born out of a certain lack of self-confidence in worshipping the strange looking wooden statues. That the *Śabaras* had been worshipping the original Jagannātha in a forest, might be true. But it is quite inconsequent to claim that it was the beautiful stone statue of Nīlamādhava, fashioned according to the principles of Hindu iconography, since they are known not to possess any such images.

The effort to explain the queer form and the unusual substance (wood) of Jagannātha—which at no stage seem to have just taken for granted—is the beginning of the speculations, not only about the 'origin' of Jagannātha but

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On the importance of the river Prācī for the cultural development of Orissa, see *Prācī nadīra aitihāsika bibhaba* (in Oriya) by Dr. Panda R. C., Bhubaneswar, 1967.

3 The story called 'Indradyumna Legend' has been critically examined in all its versions (both Sanskrit and Oriya) by Geib R. in his excellent monography, *Indradyumna-Legende*: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Jagannātha-Kultes, Wiesbaden, 1975 (Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie, Bd. 7).

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also about his 'true nature'. Leaving aside here the question, how this wooden statue was identified exactly with Viṣṇu and none else, we may recall that Jagannātha has very often been characterized as the *Buddha* incarnation of Viṣṇu in the Orissan literary tradition. Already Sāralādāsa (first half of the 15th c.) refers to this identification several times in his *Oriya Mahābhārata*[4]:

1. *saṃsāra janaṅku tāribā niminte /*
   baudharūpe bijaya karichanti jagannāthe // Madhyaparva
2. *bolai jagannātha nīlagiribāsī /*
   baudharūpare nīlakandare chanti isi // Madhyaparva
3. *dvāpara juga śeṣare deba jagannātha /*
   baudharūpare bije karibe je etha // Sabhāparva
4. *balabhadra subhadrā e kṛṣṇa tini rūpa /*
   baudharūpare hele emanta svarūpa // Vanaparva
5. *jaya nīlādribihārī he jagannātha /*
   baudharūpe kalijuge mahimā bikhyāta //
6. *kalijuge rahibāku kichi dina icchā /*
   baudha abatāre niśce bihāribū // Musaliparva

This tradition persisted and flourished in the works of *Pañcasakhā* (the five associates of Caitanya in Puri, beginning of 16th c.) and others in the 16th century and was again revived in the 19th century by the sect of *Mahimā Dharma*. In the dancing hall (*nāṭamandira*) of the Jagannātha temple one finds the figures of all the incarnations of Viṣṇu carved beautifully on a wall where the place of the 9th, or the Buddha incarnation is occupied by Jagannātha Himself.[5]

Such associations with Buddha led many scholars in the 19th century, especially Hunter[6] and Cunningham,[7] to conclude that Jagannātha has originally been a Buddhist deity. Cunningham even goes to the extent of postulating that the figures of Jagannātha etc. are but a three dimensional representation of the Buddhist sign of *Triratna*. If, however, one closely

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4 These and other quotations from the Oriya *Kāvya*s in this article have been taken from an unpublished monography named "Devotional References to Jagannāth in the old Oriya Literature" by Sri Mahapatra K. N., Retd. Supdt. of Archaeology, Orissa which he very kindly prepared for the "Orissa Research Project" of which the present author has been a member.

The author expresses his deep sense of gratitude to Mr. Mahapatra for his valuable help.

5 For a pictorial representation of these incarnations, see Misra K. C., *The Cult of Jagannātha*, Calcutta, 1971, Plate No. 18.

6 The views of Sir Hunter W. W. have been quoted and thoroughly discussed by O-Malley L. S. S. in the chapter "*The Worship of Jagannātha*" forming part of the District Gazetteers, PURI (rev. Ed. by Mansfield, Patna, 1929) see pp. 98-104.

7 See mainly his work *Bhilsa Topes*, A Buddhist monument of Central India, London 1854 (reprint Varanasi, 1966), pp. 231 ff. and the interesting Plate No. XXXII (Fig. 10-23).

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compares the symbol of *Triratna* with the statue of Jagannāth, it immediately strikes that Cunningham—who had probably never seen the original statues of Jagannāth—was misled by the *pictorial representations* of the deities with both arms stretched upwards, as they are commonly sold in Puri bazaar but which does not correspond to the actual shape of the images in the temple,[8] not to the position of the arms at least. Though the theory has been recently revived vigorously by H. K. Mahatab,[9] it is so far-fetched that no scholar of repute seems to take it seriously.

In my opinion, the association of Jagannātha with Buddha is not due to the fact that Jagannātha *has* originally *been* Buddha of Triratna etc. but again due to the necessity to explain the nature of this extra-ordinary and strange figure, once it had already been identified with Viṣṇu. Once the figure *was* Viṣṇu, the question which naturally came up next, was, which aspect or incarnation of Viṣṇu this wooden figure after all represented? The Buddha incarnation came here handy, as it stood outside the pale of Brahmanism but still loosely connected with it and further, the iconography of the different forms of Buddha was not so well-known to the Hindus that they would have hesitated to accept this identity. Besides, this was the incarnation of Viṣṇu which could have been most easily dislodged for the sake of Jagannātha from the classical scheme of the incarnations since it was not so firmly established in the Hinduism.

Yet Buddha was not the only form of Viṣṇu which Jagannāth was identified with. There are sufficient evidences in the cult practices to show that at least in a certain phase of his development, Jagannātha has really been considered as identical with Nṛsiṃha, the Man-Lion. The *Puruṣottama-māhātmya* of *Skanda-Purāṇa*, for example, views Nṛsiṃha as a *combined form* of all the three deities, Jagannāth, Balabhadra and Subhadrā (Adhy. 28, Śl. 8-40). Even to this day, on the occasion of the renewal of the wooden images (the festival of *navakalevara*) when the wood for fashioning the images is cut in the forest, the *vanayāga* is conducted mainly with the Nṛsiṃha *Mantra*s and even the consecration ceremony of the images, later, is uniformly performed with the 32-syllabic *Mantrarāja Nṛsiṃha-Mantra*.[10]

It was the Kṛṣṇa incarnation, however, which was to succeed in the end; partially also due to the reason that the cult of Kṛṣṇa became increasingly

8 This fact never became so clear to me as on the occasion of a lecture on the iconography of the Jagannātha images delivered with slides in 1974 in the South Asia Institute of the Heidelberg University by my friend Dr. Starza Majewsky of tne School of Oriental and African Studies, London. I want to thank him here for the convincing evidence, that he put before us with the help of the transparencies.

9 *History of Orissa* (in 2 Vol.), Cuttack, 1959-60, Vol.-II, 519 ff.

10 For further details, cf. Tripathi G. C., " Das Navakalevara-Ritual in Jagannāth-Temple von Puri," in *Z.D.M.G.* (Supp. II) 1974, pp. 410-18.

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popular in the beginning of 11th and 12th centuries not only in the South but also in Bengal and Orissa owing to the tremendous influence of *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. Latest by 1250 A.C. there stood three statues in the temple of Puri which were identified with Kṛṣṇa, his elder brother Balarāma and the sister Subhadrā. In a copper plate inscription of Rājarājadeva II (1170-90 A.C.) issued towards the end of the 12th century, however, the temple is still mentioned as a palace built for Puruṣottama and Lakṣmī by the mighty Coḍagaṅgadeva (1077-1146 A.C.) which shows that there were probably only two deities at this time in the temple, one having a male and the other a female form.[11]

Till the time of Sāralādāsa the identification of Jagannātha with Kṛṣṇa must have become so very popular that he was inspired to evolve an interesting story about the *material* identification of the wooden image of Jagannātha with the (dead) body of Kṛṣṇa. Deviating from the classical tradition, Sāralādāsa narrates that the body of Kṛṣṇa could not be burnt on the funeral pyre, after he was shot dead by an aboriginal (*Śabara*) hunter. The body was thrown into the sea near Dvārakā, it came floating to Puri (round Cape Comorin) and remained in the custody of the *Śabara* for some time to become later mysteriously a tree out of which a statue was carved in the form of Buddha,[12] this being the incarnation of Viṣṇu which follows immediately on that of Kṛṣṇa.

Sāralādāsa thus ingeniouly combines *two* different traditions regarding the nature of Jagannātha—the one declaring him to be Buddha and the other to be Kṛṣṇa. The *substance* of the wooden statue of Jagannātha is Kṛṣṇa himself whereas its *form* is that of Buddha.

Most of the fundamental works on the mode of the worship of Jagannātha have been composed a little after Sāralādāsa, i.e. towards the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th century.[13] These works build up the procedure of Pūjā either on the 10-syllabic or the 18-syllabic *Gopāla-mantra* in which Kṛṣṇa is depicted as the beloved of the *Gopīs* (*gopījanavallabha*).[14] Gajapati Puruṣottama-

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11 The relevant portion of the inscription is as follows :

prāsādaṃ puruṣottamasya nṛpatiḥ ko nāma kartuṃ kṣamaḥ|
tasyêtyādyanṛpair upekṣitam imam cakre'tha gaṅgeśvaraḥ||
lakṣmījanmagṛhaṃ payonidhir asau sambhāvitasya sthir|
no dhāmni śvarusaya pūjyata iti kṣirābdhivāsād dhruvam||
nirviṇṇaḥ puruṣottamaḥ pramuditas tad vāsalābhād ramā'-
pyetad bhartṛgṛhaṃ varaṃ pitṛgṛhād prāpya pramodānvitā||

The inscription was first discussed as bearing upon the date of the construction of the Temple by Chakravarty M. M. in *J.A.S.B.*, Vol. 67 (1898), 328 ff. under the title "The Date of the Jagannāth Temple in Puri".

12 cf. Geib, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-144.

13 The first of these works is the *Gopālārcanavidhi* traditionally ascribed to Gajapati Puruṣottamadeva (1464-96) and most probably composed on his behest.

14 The *Mantras* are as follows :

(a) *gopījanavallabhāya svāhā* (10-syllabic)

(b) *klīṃ kṛṣṇāya govindāya gopījanavallabhāya svāhā* (18-syllabic)

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deva, the powerful monarch of Orissa (1464-1496 A.C.), himself worshipped Jagannātha as Kṛṣṇa with the 10-syllabic *Mantra* as is attested by a reference in a contemporary Oriya work[15] and the *Gītagovinda* of Jayadeva describing the amorous sports of Kṛṣṇa with Rādhā and other cowmaids was regularly recited before the deities in the night.[16] Jagannātha *is* now Kṛṣṇa.[17]

The *Pūjā* manuals of Jagannātha enjoin that a meditation on the Deity (Kṛṣṇa) is to be done against the setting of the beautiful Vṛndāvana situated on the bank of Yamunā. The Deity is sitting in an eight-petalled lotus on a golden pavement under the shade of *Kalpavṛkṣa* in Vṛndāvana.[18] This, of course, simultaneously makes the place Vṛndāvana in North India the main

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15 The work in question is *Cakaḍā Potḥi o Cakaḍā Bhasāṇa* (also known as *Cāyanī Cakaḍā*) which seeks to narrate the traditional history of Orissa from the earliest times (ed. by Sudhākar Pattanayak and publ. in Cuttack, 1959). Puruṣottamadeva has been described in it as "*gopījanavallabha-padapaṅkajamadhukaravīra*" (Mahatab H. K., *Hist. of Orissa*, I. 322).

The popularity of *daśākṣara-mantra* is attested by a further reference by Rāya Divākara Miśra, the court poet of Puruṣottamadeva (and the person who wrote most of the works which were later ascribed to the Gajapati, e.g. *Abhinava-gītagovinda*; see Raghavan V. in *Journal of Kaling Historical Society*, Vol. II, 1, 19 ff.) in the last *sarga* of his work *Bhāratāmṛtam* (end of *sarga* 32):

tattoṣāya daśārṇavena manunā gopālam ārādhyatā, etc.

16 Pratāparudradeva (1497-1540) in an Oriya inscription appearing at the Jaya-Vijaya door of the temple (i.e. in the dancing hall) orders the use of exclusively the *Gītagovinda* for the purpose of singing and dancing before the Deities and expressly forbids the use of any other text. The order was incised in the year 1500 A.C. The inscription was first read by Mitra R. L. and published in his *Antiquities of Orissa*, Vol. II. A better reading was later supplied by Chakravarty M. M. in the *J.A.S.B.*, 62 (1893), 96 f. and a still better by Tripathi K. B. in *Evolution of Oriya Language and Script*, Bhubaneswar, 1962, 300-01; cf. also Mahapatra K. N., *Śrījayadeva o Śrīgītagobinda*, Bhubaneswer, 1973, Pp. 88 f.

A different view has recently been advanced by Desh G. N. (in the article "The King and the Priests: an Analysis of the Gitagovinda tradition" going to be published shortly in the *Z. D.M.G.*) acc. to whom the *Gitagovinda* meant in the inscription is *Abhinavagītagovindu* of Puruṣottamadeva, the father of Pratāparudradeva.

17 The total and perfect identity of Jagannātha with Kṛṣṇa of the *Dvāpara*-era is expressed in a legend originating in this period which says that once a maiden went around plucking brinjals in her field while singing *Gītagovinda*. Jagannātha, who is extremely fond of the songs of *Gītagovinda*, followed her closely so that his clothes got torn through the thorns of brinjal plants. Next morning the servants of the Temple noticed that the clothes of the Lord were completely tattered. When the mystery was revealed, the king Pratāparudradeva had to prohibit the recitation of *Gītagovinda* outside the sphere of temple worship.

18 cf., for example, the following from the *Gopālārcanapaddhati* of Vāsudeva (preserved in Orissa State Museum, Bhubaneswar under the number Dh. 179; a paper transcript available in South Asia Institut of Heidelberg):

ramye vṛndāvane kanakasthalīṃ vicintya tatra
kalpadrumatale ratnakuṭṭimamadhye yogapīṭhaṃ
vicintya tatrāṣṭadalāruṇapaṅkajôpari devatāṃ
pītavastrāṃ indranīlaprabhāṃ:...cintayet/ Folio 40 a

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abode of the Deity and the temple in Puri or the Blue Mountain (*nīlācala*), as it is commonly designated in the literary tradition of Orissa, only a subsequent and subsidiary spot of divine manifestation. The beginning of the 16th century witnessed a reaction on this predominance of Vṛndāvana. The five Oriya associates of Caitanya (*pañcasakhā*) who were also great philosophers, declared the Blue Mountain to be the "eternal place", the *nityasthala* of Kṛṣṇa. Jagannātha to them was an eternal Entity which has been there since the beginning of the creation and which would remain there for all times to come. "Vṛndāvana, Mathurā, Dvārakā and Ayodhyā etc. are the places which have originated from the *Nīlācala* and contain hence only a part of the glory of Puri", says Balarāmadāsa in his *Vedāntasāraguptagītā* : [19]

e nīḷagiri nitya sama teṇu śrīkṛṣṇa nitya dhāma/
e nīḷagiri nitya dui abhinna abheda aṭai/
gopa mathurā dvārāvatī śrīkṛṣṇa ajodhyāra pati/
emāne nityasthaḷu jāta abhinna na kara ho pārtha//

The *Puruṣottama-māhātmya* according to *Viṣṇurahasya* [20] which, in all probability, has been composed in the first half of the 16th century, also considers *Nīlācala* as the eternal *dhāma* of Viṣṇu from where the *Bhaktas* do not have to come back to the mundane regions once they arrive at it :

yad gatvā na nivartante yat kāṅkṣanti maharṣayaḥ/
tan nityaṃ dhāma nīlākhyaṃ bhūdhare nyastavān vibhuḥ/

Adhy. 2, śl. 19

This is an obvious effort to identify the *Nīlācala* with the '*paramaṃ dhāma*' of kṛṣṇa mentioned in the *Bhagavadgītā* (15.6) :

yad gatvā na nivartante tad dhāma paramaṃ mama/

The author goes even a step further and connects the Jagannātha temple with the blissful "highest step/place", the *paramaṃ padam* of Viṣṇu [21] often referred to in the *Ṛgveda* (cf. especially RV I.22.20) :

vedeṣu yad vadantîha " tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam "/
tat padaṃ tad vijānîha yan nīlācalamastake//

Pur.Māh. (*Viṣṇurahasya*) II.20

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19 Mahapatra K. N., *op. cit.* (Devotional References....), typed manuscript pp. 13f.

20 This is a Sanskrit work in 10 Adhyāyas which aims at propagating the glory of the Wooden Deities mainly to the learned Brahmins of Orissa by bringing it into contact with the Vedic and Tantric traditions. There are three manuscripts of this work which are preserved in the Orissa State Museum, Bhubaneswar; Asiatic Society, Calcutta and in the India Office Library, London. I quote from the MS preserved in the Orissa State Museum (No. P-19).

Prof. Schneider U. of the Freiburg University is presently engaged in bringing out a critical edition of this work combined with a critical study of the text.

21 For the concept of the Jagannātha Temple as the 'highest step' of Viṣṇu, see Schneider, U. Viṣṇus hochste Fusstapfe, in *Z.D.M.G.* (Supp. II), Wiesbaden, 1974, pp. 390-409.

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The etymology of the word *nīlācala* itself seems to confirm its eternal character to the author of the *Puruṣottama-māhātmya*. The place is *acala*, immovable or eternal, and *nīla* means that it is a place where "all the beings *get merged* in this *unchangeable*": *nir-vikāre layaṃ yānti...*, *ni* (*r*) + *i* + *la* (*ya*); *kadāpi na calati* = *acala* (II.16)! The place consists of Consciousness and Bliss (*cidānandamaya*) and Jagannātha is identical with the highest Ātman, which can be realized by the great *Ṛṣi*s only in the highest form of meditation (*nirvikalpakasamādhi*, II.21, 22).

The upvaluation of Jagannātha is, in fact, a natural consequence of the upvaluation of *Nīlācala*. The Jagannātha of 16th century is no more Kṛṣṇa for many of his devotees, but Viṣṇu Himself from whom Kṛṣṇa has been born, just as the birthplace of Kṛṣṇa, i.e. Vṛndāvana, is born of the eternal *Nīlācala*. Jagannātha is, in other words, not an incarnation but the Incarnator Himself.

To Balarāmadāsa, one of the *pañcasakhā*s and the author of the *Oriya Rāmāyaṇa*, He is the person who also assumes the form of Rāma to destroy the wicked. Lord Jagannātha once takes Balarāmadāsa——so narrates the poet himself——in the night after the temple is closed for the nocturnal rest of the deities to Laṅkā to show him around there and returns before dawn. But since Balarāmadāsa forgets to place back the golden water vessel of the Lord at its proper place, he is caught the next morning but is greatly honoured, of course, when the truth is discovered.[22]

The relationship between Kṛṣṇa and Jagannātha is now completely changed and the Oriya poet Kārttikadāsa writing a little later in the same (16th) century tells us that it was Jagannātha who became the son of Devakī in the Dvāpara age, not the other way round:

Jagannātha hoilāka debakīra bāḷa

——*Rumiṇībibhā*, II,28

That Jagannātha is the *avatārin* from whom all the ten *avatāra*-s have emanated, is propagated vigorously in the 17th century also by the poets like Dīnakṛṣṇadāsa in his *Rasakallola* and especially by Divākaradāsa in his *Jagannāthacaritāmṛta* who declares Kṛṣṇa to be only the 16th part (one *kalā*); of Lord Jagannātha.[23] "Many millions of *avatāra*-s," says he, "emerge out of the body of Jagannātha and get merged into Him again who is the highest *Brahman* Himself. He remains unchanged and unaffected by these incarnations since He is the Substance which lies beyond the field of incarnations:"

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22 Mahapatra K. N., *op. cit.* (Devotional References....), typed manuscript, p. 13.

23 cf. *śrījagannātha ṣoḷa kaḷā*
ethū kaḷā-e nandabāḷa/
kaḷā (= *jagannātha*!) *ke ṣoḷa kaḷā hoi*
gheni janmile gopa jāi/ —Adhy. 18, pada 29-30.

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parama brahma jagannātha abatāra pare saṃsthita /
koṭi koṭi je abatāra jagannātha aṅgu bāhara /
pṛthvīro bhāra uśvasanti leuṭi śrīaṅge misanti /
—Adhy. 4.41, 42 & 23.121

In an interesting article published in the Jagannātha Temple Bulletin in the beginning of the year 1969 (Jan., 29th; p. 3) an Oriya scholar expresses the opinion that the unusual shape of Jagannātha is due to the fact that it is a *combined form* of all the incarnations put together. "Just as seven colours put together produce the white, so also all the ten *avatāra*s brought together assume a shape which is that of Jagannātha.[24]"

It is of significance to note here that the superiority of Jagannātha and *Nīlācala* over Kṛṣṇa and Vṛndāvana is propagated not only by the Oriya poets of Orissa but also by some 'northerners' who should have less reasons to be so enthusiastic about the *kṣetra*. Such is, for example, the case with Bhūpati Paṇḍita, a Brahmin from Uttara Pradesh, who settled down in Puri towards the end of 17th century, learned Oriya and composed the famous Oriya *kāvya Premapañcāmṛta*. He in his work makes Vasudeva, the father of Kṛṣṇa, stay at Puruṣottamakṣetra for three years and constantly worship Lord Jagannātha till the Lord is pleased and grants him the boon that pleased with his devotion He would be born as his son towards the end of the *Dvāpara* age :

āmbhara āmbhe paṭāntara āmbhe hoibu to kumara /
dvāpara juga heba śeṣa āmbhe hoibu tora śiṣa /
—*Premapañcāmṛta* (Prācī Samiti ed.), p. 96.

Hand in hand with the development of the concept of Jagannātha as a deity proceeds also the upvaluation of the wooden image. Both the form and the substance of it seem to have disturbed the upper strata of the Hinduistic society from the very beginning. We have already referred to the efforts of Sāralādāsa to identify the wood of the image of Jagannātha with the unburnt body of Kṛṣṇa. He also explains why Jagannātha does not possess any arms, legs, ears and nose etc. These are namely those portions of the body of Kṛṣṇa which were burnt out on the funeral pyre whereas the central part of the body and the head remained unburnt.

The *Puruṣottama-māhātmya* of *Skanda-Purāṇa* (composed around 1300 A.C.) speaks of a divine tree born out of a hair from the body of Viṣṇu on Śvetadvīpa which goes into the making of the image of Jagannātha.[25] This

24 "*sehi anudhyānare cintā kale jaṇā jiba, je śāstrôkta bhagabānankara daśabidha abatāraka saṃmiśraṇa kale sehi saṃmiśrita rūpara ehi maulika abasthā hī śrījagannātha svarūpa....*"

25 cf. Adhyāya 18, śl. 6-14, esp. 12cd-14:
śvetadvīpe viśvamūrtir dṛṣṭo yo viṣṇur avyayaḥ/
tadaṅgaskhalitaṃ romaṃ tarutvam upapadyate//
aṃśāvatāraḥ sthāsnur yaḥ pṛthivyāṃ parameṣṭhinaḥ/
tadrūpāvataraṃ yāti bhagavān bhaktavatsalaḥ//

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seems to be inspired from the older descriptions of the *viśvarūpa* of Viṣṇu according to which the trees are the hair on the body of the cosmic form of Viṣṇu.[26] Such references also seem to point towards the fact that there was not yet perhaps the rite of *navakalevara* (the periodical renewal of the images after every 12 or 19 years) in those days and that the wood out of which Jagannātha was fashioned, was considered to be absolute and eternal. This would explain, at least partially, the term *dārubrahma* which is applied to the statues of Jagannātha right since the beginning—not only in the Sanskrit but also in the Oriya sources beginning with Sāralādāsa. The most popular and the famous *dhyāna* (meditation verse) of the statues of Jagannātha which is spoken by the *Arcaka*s and the pilgrims alike and is found as the *maṅgalācaraṇa* in many texts on the *Pūjā* of Jagannātha, refers to the statues collectively as *Brahmadāru*, viz.

nīlādrau śaṅkhamadhye śatadalakamale ratnasiṃhāsanastham
sarvālaṅkārayuktam navaghanaruciraṃ śobhitaṃ câgrajena/
bhadrāyā vāmabhāge rathacaraṇayutaṃ brahmarudrendravandyam
vedānāṃ sāram īśam svajanaparivṛtaṃ brahmadāru smarāmi //

The *Muktcintāmaṇi*, an anthology of the references to the glory of Jagannātha[27] (around 1500 A.C.), quotes *Bṛhadviṣṇupurāṇa* as saying that "the glow which shines like a streak of lightning in the space of the heart of the Yogins, is visible on the Blue Mountain in the shape of a wood":

yoginām hi hṛdākāśe vidyudvarṇaḥ prakāśate /
sa eva dārurūpeṇa āste nīlācale mahaḥ //

If one were to interpret the psychological need which lies behind such identifications, one would immediately notice that this arose out of a certain insecurity or uncertainty, i.e. out of the feeling that these unusual wooden figures may not commonly be accepted and regarded as deities One, therefore, always operated with superlatives and tried to bring the wood in connection with what was the highest, the supermost in the philosophy—the *Brahman*, though Viṣṇuism, in fact, does not accept the idea of *Brahman* and the Vedāntic *Mukti*.

The same tendency is visible, I would say, in designating the chief of these wooden deities as *Puruṣottama* or *Jagannātha* which was rather clever, it must be conceded, on the part of the people who first took up the worship of these images. No other Viṣṇuite deity has the high sounding name "the Lord of the universe" and in the course of further philosophical speculations, it is obvious,

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26 cf., for example, *Bhāgavata-Pur.*, II. 1.33 (Gitā Press Ed.)
nadyo'sya nāḍyo'tha tanūruhāṇi
mahīruhā viśvatanor nṛpéndra/

27 Edited by Miśra Sadāśiva and printed in Jayanti Press, Calcutta, 1896.
There are several manuscripts of this work in the Orissa State Museum of Bhubaneswar.

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that the god was to gain upper hand over such deities as *Badarīnātha*, *Varadarāja*, *Śeṣaśāyin*, *Madanagopāla*, *Pāṇḍuraṅga* or *Veṅkaṭeśvara* in the mind of his devotees simply due to the magic of the word itself; after all no other god is called the *jagat-nātha*! Thank to the title '*puruṣottama*' it was, besides, possible to connect this god with the highest divine principle of the Universe, since It lies, as the *Bhagavadgītā* says, beyond the limits of the perishable bodies and also the imperishable souls, which are the two types of *puruṣa* in the Viṣṇuite-*Sāṃkhya* philosophy :

dvāvimau puruṣau loke kṣaraś cākṣara eva ca /
kṣaraḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni kūṭastho'kṣara ucyate //
uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyaḥ paramātmêty udāhṛtaḥ /
yo lokatrayam āviśya bibharty avyaya īśvaraḥ //
yasmāt kṣaram atīto'ham akṣarād api côttamaḥ /
ato'smi loke vede ca prathitaḥ puruṣottamaḥ //

—*Bhagavadgītā* 15 16-18

One also did not spare the efforts to explain the word *dāru* grammatically in such a manner as to exhibit the philosophical importance of these images and the necessity to fashion them exactly out of wood. The *Puruṣottama-māhātmya* of *Skanda-Pur.*, for example, explains *dāru* as consisting of the two roots ; *do* = *avakhaṇḍane*, to cut up, and *rā* = *dāne*, to give. Jagannātha is made of *dāru* because a *dāru* [image] : *dyati saṃsāraduḥkhāni dadāti sukham avyayam* (Adhy. 4, śl. 73), i.e. cuts up the miseries of this world and imparts the eternal bliss. The *Puruṣottama-māhātmya* acc. to *Viṣṇurahasya* also explains the word in almost the same terms, only preferring the use of the root *dṛ* = to split, break etc. for the derivation of the first half of the word *dāru* (*dāraṇāt sarvaduḥkhānām akhaṇḍānandadānataḥ* / Adhy. 3, śl. 144 ; *dṛṇāti iti dār*, *rāti iti ru* (*ḥ*) *auṇādika* ; for the disappearance of the first *r* cf. Pāṇini VIII. 3.14). The *Māhātmya*, however, very prudently says before that the Lord of the Universe is, in reality, neither of stone nor of wood ; he assumes these forms just to delude the world :

nâhaṃ dārumayas tāta nêndranīlamayo hy aham ।
lokānām mohanārthāya tādṛgbhūto bhavāmy aham ॥

—Adhy. 3. śl. 143

In other words, there is no need of giving preference to a stone image over a wooden image, since God is neither one nor the other. But if at all one has to decide, one should decide in favour of a wooden image, because of the clear advantages laid down in the etymology of the word itself.

The best, the most plausible and the most acceptable explanation of the as much queer as strange shape of these wooden statues came from the quarters of those who were influenced by the philosophy of the *Pañcasakhās*. These people made a nice virtue of the necessity and since the Jagannātha figures in this

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peculiar form are unique in the whole of India, they declared that this is exactly the *sva-bhāva* " the original state " or the *sva-rūpa* " the original form " of Viṣṇu. The *Pur. Māh.* acc. to *Viṣṇurahasya* refers often to this *svarūpa* of the highest *Paramātman*, consisting of bliss, which permanently shines there in the highest abode (*paramaṃ padam*) of Viṣṇu (identified with the temple in Puri) :

paramātmā parānanda-svarūpeṇāsti tatra (*parame pade*) *vai* /
—Adhy. 2, śl. 21 cd

Kavīndra Upendra Bhañja Deva, the greatest of the Oriya poets, writing in the second half of the 18th century, describes the images of Jagannātha etc. as *shapeless, devoid of form* being the *svarūpa* of Viṣṇu.[28] He finds it quite natural that Jagannātha has no arms, legs, ears or nose etc. and that his head and belley also do not correspond to the reality. It need not be and it should not be ; since God is shapeless, *arūpa*. Jagannātha, to him, represents the *nirguṇa* (non-qualified) form of God. His shape shows that God can best be worshipped as a shapeless symbol !

It is a different type of self-confidence that reflects from the sayings of this poet. He is no more apologetic about the curious figures of Jagannātha and does not invent a story to explain it, but leaning upon the tradition of *Vedānta* as represented in the *Śūnyasaṃhitā* (by Acyutānandadāsa, the youngest of the *Pañcasakhās*) etc. feels convinced that there cannot be a better representation of God, the Shapeless. Shapes and forms are transitory, whereas the shapelessness is eternal.

Upendra Bhañja stands, in a certain manner, at the end of a development which starts with more or less helpless apologies for the form and the substance of a deity which, in the first instance, looks so strange and out of place in the pantheon of Hindu gods. The development of the concept of Jagannātha is also a history of the development of the philosophical speculations in Orissa. The extra-ordinary shape of Jagannātha has been of great advantage to this figure because it was free to accept in this form almost any philosophical interpretation. He and the other figures standing on the '*ratnavedī*' in the sanctum have been associated with the different *mātrās* of the mystic syllable *Oṃ*, the monosyllabic symbol of the Highest God (*a* = Balarāma, *u* = Subhadrā, *m* = Jagannātha, *ardhamātrā* = Sudarśana, *nāda* = Bhūdevī or Sarasvatī, and *bindu* = Lakṣmī). Peterson (*Asiatic Researches*, Vol. VIII) even tried to show graphically how the shape of Jagannātha and Balabhadra as well as of Subhadrā in the middle, could have developed out of the symbols of two ' Oṃ-s '

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28 cf. *Subhadrā-pariṇaya* (Chanda I, pada 7) :
svarūpa e nāsā karṇa hasta pāda hīna
also Mahapatra K. N., op. cit., typed manuscript, p. 67.

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placed back to back.[29] K. C. Misra in his work "*The Cult of Jagannātha*" (cf. Note 5 ; P. 171 f.) reproduces the figures of the different parts of the *Oṃ* in Oriya script as they belong to the four Deities (Balabhadra, Jagannātha, Subhadrā and Sudarśana) from a palmleaf manuscript titled *Sayantra-śūnya-saṃhitā* and again a long article has been published in the Bulletin of the Jagannātha Temple (Vol. I, 1969, No. 1-8) to establish the identity of these figures with *praṇava*. Acyuta on the other hand, in his *Śūnyasaṃhitā* connects Balabhadra, Subhadrā, Jagannātha and Sudarśana with the four Vedas commencing from the *Ṛgveda* ;[30] the same figures are found associated with the four *Vyūhas* (Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha) of the *Pāñcarātra* system of thought in the *Pūjāpaddhatis* of the Temple and for the Vedāntists these four figures represent the four states of an individuum, the *viśva, taijasa, prājña* and *śānta* or *turīya*, i.e. the body, the subtle body, the individual soul and the highest soul ; or, alternatively, the four states of consciousness: *jāgrat* (wake), *svapna* (dream), *suṣupti* (sleep) and *turīya* (the ultimate state of pure consciousness). Still others consider Subhadrā as the *māyā* or *avidyā* standing between the Absolute (Jagannātha) and the individual soul or the universe (Balarāma).[31]

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29 Reproduced by Miśra K. C. (cf. note 5 above), Plate No. 61. The figure shows again, as in the case of Cunningham A., that Peterson had not seen the actual images of Jagannātha. He takes the *candra* (crescent) of the *candrabindu* (i.e. ◌̐, the uppermost symbol of the symbol *oṃ*) as leading to the arms of Jagannātha and Balabhadra, which he thinks are in upright position.

30 The association is occasionally mentioned in later texts also, cf., e.g., the following passage from the *Nīlādrimahodaya* (a voluminous work on the glory and the rituals of the Temple, written about 1750 A.C.; published by the Raja of Sonepur, Cuttack, 1928). Brahmā praises the newly constructed four wooden images of the Jagannātha Temple with the verses taken from their respective Vedas :

viṣṇuṃ dṛṣṭvā sa hṛṣṭātmā romāñcitavapurdharaḥ|
sāmavedena tuṣṭāva stotrair anyair anekaśaḥ||
tathaiva baladevaṃ ca namaskṛtya pitāmahaḥ|
ṛgvedenātha tuṣṭāva, tato bhadrāṃ prajāpatiḥ||
yajurvedena saṃtoṣya, tataś cakraṃ sudarśanam|
mādhavaṃ ca dharāṃ lakṣmīṃ ātharvaṇaṛcā stuvan||

—Adhy. 5 (p. 51)

There does not however seem to be any ritual or philosophical justification for this association and it looks that the images have been brought into relation with the four Vedas just according to the order of their position on the platform, from left to right. For an unsatisfactory attempt to explain this association by means of "references" to these Deities in their respective Vedas, (e.g. "Jagannātha is referred to in '*tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam*' which appears in *Sāmaveda* 2.1022" ! The verse is originally from the *Ṛgveda* I.22.20) see *Jag. Temple Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 8, p. 1.

31 "....*eṭhāre yogamāyā subhadrārūpare jīva caitanya madhyare adhiṣṭhitā achanti| jīva vā brahmāṇḍasvarūpa bhuvanādhipati baladeva, caitanya vā paraṃ brahma svarūpa mūlapuruṣa vā jagannātha madhyare nirliptā śakti yogamāyā avasthita....|Jag. Temp. Bull.*, 1.8, p. 1.

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There has been no end to such associations and identifications in all the ages. I remember that in 1971, when I was in Bhubaneswar, the *Pragativādī Daḷa*, a political party, fought the state elections with an emblem showing a plough and a wheel, symbolizing obviously the agricultural and industrial advancement which the party promised to its voters, but these were interpreted by the founder of the party at a meeting in Puri as the symbols of Balarāma and Jagannātha (the *hala* being the weapon of Balarāma and the *cakra* that of Viṣṇu) who were thus invoked to be the presiding deities of this party !

And Jagannātha admits all such explanations. He allows all and accepts all, yet remaining aloof from it. He is all of it but at the same time, none of it. He is like a clear mirror in which everybody finds himself reflected and confirmed, but which remains untouched, unspoiled and uneffected by all. Generations after generations have tried to solve his mystery, but he looks as if sarcastically smiling at the vain efforts of the mortals who try to unveil his mystery, perhaps because He *has* no mystery to hide. He is only that, what the people have made Him to be from time to time.

Manifesting that it is not the outwardly form of the deity that matters, but her intrinsic philosophical character, He majestically stands there on his throne graciously smiling down to his devotees ; stands as a unique symbol of the great flexibility and dynamics of Hinduism, of its capacity to absorb, integrate and remodel, of its tolerance and magnanimity.

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THE DATE OF THE BHĀRATA WAR

By

V. V. MIRASHI, Nagpur

There has been a great divergence of opinion among scholars about the date of the Great War fought on the battlefield of Kurukṣetra. Various dates ranging from 3140 B.C. to 350 B.C. have been proposed for it.[1] Recently interest of scholars and the general public in this subject has been revived by the assertion of a scholar that the War was a myth. Discussions of the problem have been carried on in periodicals and seminars during the last six months, but even now there is no sign of the interest in it abating at all. I too have taken part in the controversy and expressed my view on the problem. Last month my friend Prof. G. V. Kavishwar of Indore sent me an off-print of his article in Marathi in the issue of the *Mālavikā* published on the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee of the Mahārāṣṭra Sāhitya Sabhā, Indore. At about the same time I received a request from the Editor of this Journal for a contribution. So I have taken up this subject for a fresh discussion.

Yudhiṣṭhira took a prominent part in this war and after his success in it he is stated to have started an era in his name. Again, the *Kali* Age is said to have commenced just after the War. So these three events, *viz.* the Great War, the Era of Yudhiṣṭhira and the commencement of the *Kali Yuga* are believed to have occurred at about the same time. We shall discuss briefly the main views about their date.

The First View—3102 B.C.

According to the prevailing tradition, the Great War was fought in 3102 B.C. The first reference to it in an inscribed record occurs in the following verses in the Aihoḷe stone inscription[2] of the reign of the Early *Cālukya* king Pulakeśin II—

त्रिंशत्सु त्रिसहस्रेषु भारतादाहवादितः ।
सप्ताब्दशतयुक्तेषु गतेष्वब्देषु पञ्चसु ॥
पञ्चाशत्सु कलौ काले षट्सु पञ्चशतासु च ।
समासु समतीतासु शकानामपि भूभुजाम् ॥

These verses state that the Jaina temple at Aihoḷe was erected when 3735 years had elapsed after the *Bhārata* War in the *Kali* Age and 556 years had

1 For the dates from 3140 B.C. to 1151 B.C., see the references in the *History and Culture of the Indian People* (*HCIP*), p. 316, n. 4. For the date 950 B.C., see Pargiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition* (*AIHT*), pp. 179-83.

2 *Epigraphia Indica* (*EI*), VI. 7.

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passed according to the era of the *Śaka* kings. The Christian year corresponding to *Śaka* 556 is A.D. 634-35. So the *Bhārata* War must have been fought in (3735 minus 633 *i.e.*) 3102 B.C.

This era of Yudhiṣṭhira is, however, cited nowhere in early Indian inscriptions. Our ancient method of dating any event was by citing the regnal year of the ruling king. All inscriptions of Aśoka are, for instance, dated in this manner. It is not, therefore, surprising that no early Indian inscription is dated in this so-called *Yudhiṣṭhira* or *Kali Yuga* era. It seems that this era was first conceived in the time of Āryabhaṭa (*circa* A.D. 400) for the purpose of astronomical calculations and then it was antedated by about 3500 years. So it was supposed to have commenced in 3102 B.C. This supposition has continued to this day and so years of this era are cited in modern Indian *pañcāṅgas*.

Kalhaṇa (*circa* 12th cen. A.D.) has mentioned this date of the *Kali-Yuga* in his *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, but since it did not square with the scheme of the chronology of the dynasties of Kashmir, he stated that though the *Kaliyuga* commenced in 3102 B.C., the Yudhiṣṭhira era began 653 years thereafter.[3] This involves contradiction, which Prof. Kaviswar has rightly pointed out in his article. Again, if we accept this view for the date of the *Kaliyuga*, we shall have to push still backward the dates of the Vedic literature, which preceded it by some centuries. This runs counter to the evidence of the Harappa or Indus Valley Civilization. So none now propounds this view seriously.

The Second View—2500 B.C.

Varāhamihira, the renowned astronomer who flourished in the first half of the sixth century A.D., has stated this view in the following verses of the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* (XIII, 1-4).

सैकावलीव राजति ससितोत्पलमालिनी सहासेव ।
नाथवतीव च दिग्यैः कौबेरी सप्तभिर्मुनिभिः ॥ १ ॥
ध्रुवनायकोपदेशान्नरिनर्त्तोत्तरा भ्रमद्भिश्च ।
यैश्चारमहं तेषां कथयिष्ये वृद्धगर्गमतात् ॥ २ ॥
आसन्मघासु मुनयः शासति पृथ्वीं युधिष्ठिरे नृपतौ ।
षड्द्विकपञ्चद्वियुतः शककालस्तस्य राज्ञश्च ॥ ३ ॥
एकैकस्मिन्नृक्षे शतं शतं ते चरन्ति वर्षाणाम् ।
प्रागुदयतोऽप्यविवराद्वजून्नयंति तत्र संयुक्ताः ॥ ४ ॥

Varāhamihira says, "I shall now proceed to describe the movements of the seven sages according to the view of Vṛddha-Garga (Elder Garga)—on account of whom the North looks beautiful as if she has a lord and is smiling

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3 See शतेषु षट्सु सार्धेषु त्र्यधिकेषु च भूतले ।
कलेर्गतेषु वर्षाणामभूवन्कुरुपाण्डवाः ॥ १.५१.

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being adorned with a one-stringed pearl-necklace or with a wreath of white lotuses, and is, at it were, dancing at the bidding of her lord, the Dhruva (*i.e.* the pole-star).

When Yudhiṣṭhira was ruling over the earth, the (seven) Sages were in the constellation of the *Maghās*. The date of that King is 2526 added to the year of the *Śaka* era. They are united with each *nakṣatra* for one hundred years. They are said to be united with that *nakṣatra*, to the east of which the Sages rise."

These verses are variously interpreted. That the first half of the third verse cited above is the view of Vṛddha-Garga is admitted by all; but according to some, the statement in the second half of that verse is the view of Varāhamihira himself. It seems better to take the whole verse as stating the view of Garga himself.[4] After stating that the Sages were in the constellation of the *Maghās* during the reign of Yudhiṣṭhira, Garga states the exact time when he was ruling. It was the year 2526 before the commencement of the *Śaka* era, *i.e.* 2526 minus 78 = 2448 B.C. or 2500 B.C. in round numbers.

This view is stated in several Purāṇas also. See *e.g.* the following verses :

सप्तर्षयस्तु तिष्ठन्ति पर्यायेण शतं समाः ।
सप्तर्षीणां युगं ह्येतद् दिव्यया संख्यया श्रुतम् ॥
सप्तर्षीणां तु यौ पूर्वौ दृश्येते उदितौ निशि ।
तयोर्मध्ये तु नक्षत्रं दृश्यते यत्समं दिवि ॥
तेन सप्तर्षयो युक्ता ज्ञेया व्योम्नि शतं शतम् ।
नक्षत्राणामृषीणां च योगस्यैतन्निदर्शनम् ॥

These verses repeat the view of Vṛddha-Garga and Varāhamihira stated in the afore-cited passage of the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā*. As for the date of the *Bhārata* War, the Purāṇas say as follows :—

सप्तर्षयो मघायुक्ताः काले पारिक्षिते शतम् ।
अन्ध्रान्ते तु चतुर्विंशे भविष्यन्ति शते समाः ॥

The Seven Sages crossed twenty-four *nakṣatra*s from the time of Parikṣit to that of the downfall of the Andhras. This means that the duration was of 2400 years. Now we know that the period of the Andhras (*i.e.* the Sātavāhanas) came to an end in *circa* 230 A.D. So the date of Parikṣit is (2400 minus 230 =) 2170 B.C. Parikṣit was the grand-nephew of Yudhiṣṭhira. If we add to this

4 Varāhamihira says that he is going to describe the motion of the Seven Sages, according to Vṛddha Garga. That motion is stated in XIII. 4. So the statement about the date of Yudhiṣṭhira in XIII. 3 must also be of Garga himself. However, it makes no difference if that statement is taken as that of Varāhamihira himself.

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the regnal years of Yudhiṣṭhira and Parikṣit (totalling 96)[5], the date of the Great War would be 2266 B.C., which is not far from the date 2448 B.C. given by Vṛddha Garga and Varāhamihira.

But is there any basis for the statement that the Seven Sages moved through twenty-four *nakṣatra*s in the period from Parikṣit to the downfall of the Andhras (i.e. the Sātavāhanas)? In the first place, the supposition that the Sages move through the *nakṣatra*s is fallacious. They are not planets and, therefore, have no motion. Sh. B. Dikṣit[6] says that several *nakṣatra*s such as *Maghā, Pūrvā, Uttarā, Hasta, Citrā* etc. appear in the firmamental region opposite to the Seven Sages, and any one of them can be supposed to be conjoined with them. Garga supposed that they were conjoined with the *Maghā*s in his days, and so did Varāhamihira. There was a tradition that they were in the *Maghā nakṣatra* in the time of Yudhiṣṭhira. Therefore they supposed that the Sages had made a complete revolution through the *nakṣatra*s since the time of Yudhiṣṭhira, and so took the intervening period as of twenty-four hundred years. But even today the same position of the Seven Sages can be affirmed. So this statement about the Sages being in the *nakṣatra* of the *Maghā*s in the time of Yudhiṣṭhira and the date of the Great War deduced from it have no basis.

L.D. Swamikannu Pillai, the well-known author of the *Indian Ephemeris*, has offered another explanation of this date of Yudhiṣṭhira given by Garga and Varāhamihira. He says,[7] "Varāhamihira, or rather his authority says that the *Sapta Ṛṣi*s were at that time in the *Maghā nakṣatra* and nobody has attempted to discover what this means. The *Sapta Ṛṣi*s were supposed to spend 100 years in each *nakṣatra* in succession. This is a pure convention, equivalent to a reckoning by centuries, because the ancient astronomers knew very well that the *Sapta Ṛṣis, i.e.* the constellation Ursa Major or Great Bear had no motion of the kind. It is exceedingly probable that the conventional motion of the *Sapta Ṛṣi*s through the *nakṣatra*s was made to start, like the motions of the planets, with the first *nakṣatra* at the date of O *Kaliyuga*. That first *nakṣatra* was in all probability *Kṛttikā* and not Aśvinī according to the modern usage. The astronomers of Varāhamihira's time knew that *Kṛttikā* was the first *nakṣatra* in Vedic times, and in quoting a *nakṣatra* for the *Saptarṣi*s in the reign of Yudhiṣṭhira, they probably conformed to the ancient usage, rather than to their own fixation of Aśvinī as the first *nakṣatra*. If so, *Maghā* would be the eighth *nakṣatra*, beginning with *Kṛttikā*; that is, the entry of the *Ṛṣi*s into the *Maghā nakṣatra* would

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5 Yudhiṣṭhira ruled for 36 years and Parikṣit for 60 years. See the references in Chitrao's *Bhāratavarṣiya Caritrakoṣa* (Hindi).

6 Sh. B. Dikshit, भारतीय ज्योतिःशास्त्राचा इतिहास (1931), p. 118.

7 *Indian Ephemeris*, I. 483.

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mean the beginning of the eighth century reckoned from O Kaliyuga, *i.e.* from 3102 B.C. This takes us to 2402 B.C , which is not very distant from 2448 B.C., the date recorded in Varāhamihira's verse."

It will thus be seen that there is no real basis for the supposition that the Sages move through each *nakṣatra* in a period of one hundred years and also none for the conventional view that they were in the *nakṣatra Maghā* in the time of Yudhiṣṭhira. So this view of the date of the Great War cannot be accepted.

The Third View—1400 B.C.

This view of the date of the Great War is held by many scholars. Lokamānya Ṭilak has adopted it in his *Gītārahasya*. It has also been advocated by Dr. Pusalkar in the *History and Culture of the Indian people*, Vol. I, p. 269. Kavishwar also has subscribed to this view and tried to show that it was supported by the aforecited verse from the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā*. We shall examine his interpretation of that verse later.

The main basis for this view is the following statement in the Purāṇas[8] :—

यावत्परीक्षितो जन्म यावन्नन्दाभिषेचनम् ।
एवं वर्षसहस्रं तु ज्ञेयं पञ्चाशदुत्तरम् ॥

(A period of 1050 years passed from the birth of Parikṣit to the coronation of Nanda.)

The period of the rule of the Nandas has been fixed as 364-324 B.C. Parikṣit was born soon after the Great War. So it must have been fought in 1050 *plus* 364 = 1414 B.C. or 1400 B.C. in round numbers.

Kavishwar has attempted to show that this very date is intended in the afore-cited verse of Varāhamihira. His reasoning is as follows :—

In षड्द्विकपञ्चद्वियुतः etc., *shaḍ-dvika* means the square of six or 36. *Pañca-dvi* denotes 55. *yuta* which follows means their multiplication. So the number intended here is 36 multiplied by 55 or 1980. *Śaka-kāla* which is connected with this number is the era (*śaka-kāla*) of Yudhiṣṭhira, and not the era of the *Śaka*s (or the Scythians). That the era started by Yudhiṣṭhira was known as *śaka-kāla* is clear from the following verse :—

सत्ये ब्रह्मशको मुनेर्विरचितस्त्रेतायुगे वामन-
स्तत्पश्चाज्जमदग्निपुत्रनिहते रामः सहस्रार्जुने ।
रामो रावणहन्तृशाक उदितो यौधिष्ठिरो द्वापरे
पश्चाद्विक्रमशालिवाहनशकौ जातौ युगेऽस्मिन्कलौ ॥

So Varāhamihira states in the aforecited verse that when he composed the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* (in *circa* 566 A.D.), the year 1980 of Yudhiṣṭhira era was

8 Pargiter, *Dynasties of the Kali Age* (*DKA*), p. 58.

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either current or expired. So the era of that King must have commenced in 1980 minus 566 = 1414 B.C.

This interpretation of Varāhamihira's verse is open to several objections. *Ṣad-dvika-pañca-dvi* cannot mean the multiplication of 36 and 55. Mere juxtaposition of two numbers does not indicate their multiplication. If the multiplication is supposed to be indicated by the word *yuta*, it should have preceded *pañca*, not followed it. That word qualifies *Śaka-kāla* which follows and denotes that a certain number of years elapsed before the commencement of that era.

Again, *Śaka-kāla* cannot refer to the era of Yudhiṣṭhira. The expression *Śaka-kāla* is noticed in innumerable inscriptions as denoting the dates of the *Śaka* era, starting in A.D. 78. That era was really started by the *Kuṣāṇa* king Kaniṣka, who commenced to reign in that year. It was used for more than 300 years by the Western *Kṣatrapa*s ruling in Malwa and Kathiawad and so it came to be known as the *Śaka* era as they belonged to the Scythian race. That era was used later by several dynasties for a number of centuries and is invariably referred to as the *Śaka-kāla*. It was only during the rule of the kings of Vijayanagara that it came to be associated with the name of Śālivāhana (ancient Sātavāhana).[9] But it was not started by Sātavāhana king. The inscriptions of the Sātavāhanas themselves are dated in their regnal years, and not according to any era. As a matter of fact, the word *Śaka* does not denote the meaning of "an era" in Sanskrit. It has attained that meaning only in recent times.

The afore-cited verse mentioning the *Śaka* of Yudhiṣṭhira is not old. It is not noticed in any ancient anthology of verses. Kavishwar tells me that he has taken it from Khedwal's book. There also its source has not been indicated. So the supposition that the aforecited verse of Varāhamihira mentions the year 1980 of the era of Yudhiṣṭhira which was current in the time of Varāhamihira is absolutely unfounded.

This view (1400 B.C.) is supported by the mention of certain personalities of the Epic age in Vedic literature as shown in the sequel. We shall now state the fourth view.

The Fourth View—950 B.C.

This view has been advocated by Pargiter in his *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*. The Purāṇas state that 26 kings reigned between Adhisīmakṛṣṇa and Nanda. Taking 18 years as the average duration of a reign, the interval between the two comes to (26 multiplied by 18 =) 468 years. Mahāpadma Nanda

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9 There is only one date of the Yādava period which connects the era with Śālivāhana. See EI, XXVII. 40 f. The earlier dates of the kings of Vijayanagara also refer to the era as *Śaka-kāla*, or *Śak-ābda*, but in later ones like Ś. 1301, the era is called *Śālivāha*. See Kielhorn's *List of Inscriptions of South India*, pp. 78 f.

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ascended the throne in 382 B.C. So Adhisīmakṛṣṇa must have commenced to rule in (468 *plus* 382 =) 850 B.C. Adhiṣīmakṛṣṇa was the great grandson of Janamejaya. So taking the period from Yudhiṣṭhira to Janamejaya to be of 100 years, Yudhiṣṭhira must have begun to rule in *circa* 850 *plus* 100 = 950 B.C.[10]

This view has recently been supported by Dr. B. B. Lal on the evidence of the excavations which he conducted at Hastināpura. The Purāṇas say that during the reign of Nichkṣu, the son of the aforementioned Adhisīmakṛṣṇa, Hastināpura had to be deserted on account of the flood of the Gaṅgā. The people then moved on to Kauśāmbī (modern Kosam). Lal found evidence of the flood in the excavations at Hastināpura, and at Kauśāmbī the same type of the painted grey ware as at Hastināpura. Their evidence substantiates the description in the Purāṇas.

Both Pargiter and Lal have taken a low average of 18 or 14 for a generation. Besides, one cannot be sure about the number of generations stated in the Purāṇas. We find that even in respect of the historical period of the Sātavāhanas, there is a great divergence in the Purāṇas in regard to the number of Kings and the total period of their rule. There is possibility of even a greater mistake in respect of the earlier period which preceded it by more than a thousand years.

Besides, this statement of the Purāṇas about the number of generations which intervened between Yudhiṣṭhira and Mahāpadma Nanda is contradicted by their other statement that the interval was of 1050 years. So we cannot accept this view.

The Fifth View—600 B.C.

Recently some archaeologists like Dr. Sankalia have been propounding the view that the Great War could not have been fought before 600 B.C. Their reasoning is as follows :—

Archaeological evidence shows that iron was not in regular use before the sixth cen. B.C. and unknown before 1100 B.C. The most prolific use of weapons before this period was a terracotta sling ball found stored in huge quantities behind a defensive mud-brick wall at Mohenjodaro and arrow-heads of copper, bronze, bone and bamboo possibly tipped with poison. The swords and spear-heads had no sockets and hence these had to be fastened to wood bamboos or bone shafts. If the *Mahābhārata* heroes fought in 1400 B.C. we shall have to suppose that they used insignificant looking microliths, small mace-heads, sling balls of stone and terracotta (not more than three inches in diameter and twelve oz. in weight). The battle then was a contest between two individuals whose personal bravery and skill in handling a mace or even managing a chariot was everything. There could not have been a pitched infantry

10 *AIHT*, pp. 179-83.

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battle. The use of the horse was not yet common or widely documented ; probably it was yoked to chariots, but not ridden. The people had scanty astronomical knowledge. They did not know the division of the year into months and of months into days and of a day into *ghaṭis* and *palas*. This picture of the civilization and culture of the period between 3000 and 1000 B.C. shows that the Geat War as described in the *Mahābhārata* could not have been fought in that age. The *Ṛgveda* was not composed before 1000 B.C. and the war could not have been fought between this date and 600 B.C. As for the literary references, they are incidental and cannot be taken at their face value. As no scholar is prepared to accept as late a date as 600 B.C. for the Great War, it must be a myth.[11]

When Dr. D. C. Sircar set the ball of this controversy rolling, he also said that the Great War was a myth. So we must first examine this view before we proceed to determine the date of it. The reasons stated for it are critically examined below.

The objections to the authenticity of the Great War are stated and critically examined below –

Objection I—There are no references to this war in the Vedic literature. Bhagadatta, king of Assam, is said to have taken part in it, but he is nowhere mentioned in the literature of the period.

Answer—This is an *argumentum ex silentio*. It is unreliable. The extant Vedic literature is not historical but religious. It is only in historical literature where we might expect such references. Two Great World Wars were fought during the last seventy years. Do we find them referred to in *every* work published in this period? They are, however, mentioned invariably in the historical works covering this period. We have no such historical works of the Vedic age.

Objection II—There are diverse views about the date of this War. If it had really taken place, there would have been a consensus about its date.

Answer—The real reason for want of unanimity on this point is the absence of historical works of the ancient times. We have no history of the Vedic age. There are diverse views not only about the events of the Vedic age but even about those of an admittedly historical period. The genealogies in the Purāṇas are wholly untrustworthy. The Purāṇas say that thirty Andhra (*i.e.* Sātavāhana) kings ruled, but none of them mentions thirty names.[12] Do we reject the Purāṇic evidence altogether and say no such kings ruled in that period?

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11 See his statement reported in the newspapers, dated 24 September 1975.

12 *DKA*, p. 36.

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Objection III—According to the *Mahābhārata*, several eastern and southern kings took part in the Great War, but no such states existed in that age.

Answer—The *Mahābhārata* describes the state of things in the post-Vedic age. But we find that such southern countries as Kaliṅga and Vidarbha are mentioned in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. Again, the Buddhist literature mentions as many as sixteen Mahājanapadas flourishing in the age of the Buddha (sixth cen. B.C.).[13] They did not evidently spring into existence in that period but must have been flourishing long since. That Āryan culture had spread far in South India is shown by the mention in Buddhist literature of a sage living in the region of the Godāvarī, who sent his disciples to meet the Buddha in that age.[14] So it is not improbable that the rulers of East and South India took part in the Great War.

Besides, there are positive references to the War and the personages who took part in it. That these references are incidental should be a mark of their trustworthiness and not doubtful character as Sankalia supposes. These references are scattered in various works. The *Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* explicitly refers to the Great War. The *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* of the *Yajurveda* mentions Dhṛtarāṣṭra, son of Vicitravīrya, as a great donor.[15] He was reigning at the time. Vicitravīrya is not a common name. So it could not have been concocted purposely. This Dhṛtarāṣṭra can be none else than the father of Duryodhana and other Kauravas. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* mentions Devakī-putra Kṛṣṇa,[16] who can be none but the expounder of the *Gītā* doctrine. Pāṇini, who flourished not later than the sixth cen. B.C., composed the *sūtra*s of his *Aṣṭādyāyī* explaining the formation of the names Yudhiṣṭhira and Vidura.[17] Vāsudeva (Kṛṣṇa) and Arjuna had become venerable persons in his age and he has composed *sūtra*s denoting their devotees.[18] Patañjali mentions Bhīma, Nakula and Sahadeva.[19] The *Āśvalāyana Gṛhya-sūtra* includes the *Mahābhāratācārya* (the redactor of the Great Epic) among the *ṛṣi*s to whom libations of water are to be offered daily.[20] So there is no doubt that these personages did flourish in the Later Vedic Age and must have participated in the Great War. Their incidental mention in the Vedic and Sūtra literature is an unchallengable proof of their existence in ancient times.

Having thus proved the authentic nature of the Great War, we proceed to determine its date.

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13 See *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (Pali Text Society), I. 213 etc.

14 *Suttanipāta*, Pārāyaṇavaggo, vatthugāthā, 5. 2.

15 *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, X. 6.

16 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. 17.6.

17 Pāṇini, VIII. 3.95; III. 2.162.

18 *Ibid.*, IV.3.98.

19 *Mahābhāṣya*, IV. 1.4.

20 III. 4.4.

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From the painted grey ware, terracotta sling balls, small arrow-heads, axes without sockets etc. found in excavations, which Sankalia ascribes to the period between 1000 and 600 B.C. on the evidence of Carbon-14 tests, he infers that the Great War could not have been fought in that period. The civilization indicated by these finds did, no doubt, exist *some time* in India, but it was *not* of the Vedic age. No concrete evidence that it belonged to that age has yet been discovered. The Carbon-14 test is not infallible. In his article in *the Times of India*, dated 19th October 1975, Sankalia also has admitted that there is one Carbon-14 date which does not agree with the other Carbon-14 dates of the painted grey ware from Hastināpur. Besides, the dates supposed to be denoted by the Carbon-14 tests are in conflict with important literary evidence as shown below.

Sankalia places the *Ṛgveda* in 1000 B.C. His picture of the Ṛgvedic civilization is contradicted by unimpeachable evidence of that Veda. The elephant and the horse were not unknown in the Ṛgvedic age. There are innumerable references to the horse. The Aśvins derived their name from the horses which they rode. As for Sankalia's statement that there were only duels and no pitched infantry battles, we would draw his attention to the description of the *Dāśarājñayuddha* (the Battle of Ten Kings) in the Seventh *Maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda*.[21] In that battle King Sudās was opposed by ten kings. In describing the outcome of the battle, the poet says, "The loot-seeking Anus and Druhyus, numbering six thousands and sixty thousands lay down in eternal slumber ; sixty warriors and six more in addition to them did the same." Had these warriors assembled there to see the duel of Sudās with his opponent ? And did so many thousands perish there as a result of an earthquake ? If such pitched battles took place in the age of the Ṛgveda, is it inconceivable that the Great War took place in the later Vedic age ?

Dr. Sankalia thinks that the people in that age had no conception of the year and its division into months, days, *ghaṭikās* and *palas*. I wonder what evidence he has for this. Not only in the time of the *Bhārata* War but hundreds of years before in the age of the *Ṛgveda* the Āryans had much greater knowledge of astronomy. In praising Varuṇa, one sage says[22]—

वेद मासो धृतव्रतः
द्वादश प्रजावतः ।
वेदा य उपजायते ।

This *ṛk* says that Varuṇa not only knows the twelve months of the year but also the thirteenth month required to adjust the lunar with the solar year. I wonder how archaeologists dare to make unfounded assertions!

21 *Ṛgveda*, VII. 18.
22 *Ibid.*, I. 25.8.

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On the evidence of Carbon-14 tests of the painted grey ware found at Hastināpur, Sankalia fixes the date of the *Ṛgveda* at 900—at most 1000-B.C., but this is contradicted by the literary evidence of the entire Vedic literature as pointed out by Winternitz long ago.

About the middle of the last century Max Müller showed that Buddhism at about 500 B.C. absolutely presupposes the existence of the *whole* of Vedic literature. For the composition of that literature several centuries must have been required. In the age of the *Ṛgveda* the Āryans were living in Eastern Afghanistan and the extreme north-west of India. The *Ṛgveda* contains reference to old and new hymns. It must have taken several centuries for their composition. That Veda lies behind all other works of Vedic literature. Its language is much more archaic than that of the other Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. The composition of these works must have taken several centuries. "And yet," says Winternitz,[23] "we see that during the whole of this time which lasted from the first beginnnigs till the last off-shoot of Vedic literature, the Indo-Āryan people conquered only the comparatively small stretch of land from the Indus as far as the Ganges. If this advance from the extreme Northwest over into the Eastern Ganges already took so long, how many centuries must the conquest of the whole of the Central and Southern India have taken!" As stated before, there were settlements of the Āryans in South India in the time of the Buddha (600 B.C.). Is it likely that this vast country was conquered by the Āryans in the short span of about (1000 minus 600 =) 400 years ?

But perhaps nothing but archaeological evidence will convince doubting archaeologists like Sankalia. So we proceed to state that evidence.

"The clay tablets from the archives of the capital of the ancient Hittite kingdom, which were found in Boghazkoi, included records of treaties concluded by the king of the Hittites and the king of Mitani at the beginning of the 14th century B.C. The gods of both kingdoms are invoked as guardians of the treaties, and in the list of gods there appear, besides numerous Babylonian and Hittite deities, the names of Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra and Nāsatyau (Aśvins).[24]" The importance of this mention of the gods of the Indo-Āryans has not been realized by our Indian archaeologists. These deities are *not* Indo-European, *not* Indo-Iranians. *They are purely Indo-Āryan.* So the people who worshipped them in Asia Minor must have gone there from India either for commerce or for matrimonial relations. The date of this inscription is fixed as the beginning of the 14th cen. B.C. This shows that the Vedic hymns in which we find these gods eulogized must, in any case, be dated at least a couple of centuries before. The *Ṛgveda* which contains the hymns addressed to these gods could not have

23 *History of Indian Literature* (Eng. Tr.), Vol. I, p. 303.

24 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 304 f.

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been composed as late as 1000 B.C. as supposed by Sankalia on the evidence of Carbon-14 tests. The sooner Indian archaeologists will realize the untrustwothiness of Carbon-14 tests the better it will be for their chronological research !

What is then the date of the Great War ? We have shown above that of the five views about the date of that War, the first two and the last one are unacceptable for the reasons stated above. The third view that the War was fought in 1400 B.C. appears probable. In this connection the following passage from the *Kāṭhaka-saṁhitā*[25] of the *Black Yajurveda* is of utmost importance—

नैमिष्या वै सत्रमासत । त उत्थाय सप्तविंशतिं कुरुपञ्चालेषु वत्सतरानवन्वत । तान्वको दालिभ-ऋवीयूयमेव तान्विभजध्वमिममहं धृतराष्ट्रं वैचित्रवीर्यं गमिष्यामि । स मह्यं गृहान्करिष्यतीति तमागच्छत ।

This passage states that some sages performed a sacrifice in the Naimiṣa forest. After its completion they obtained twenty-seven young bulls by way of *dakṣiṇā*. Then Baka, son of Dālbha, said to them, " You divide these among yourselves. I shall go to Dhṛtarāṣṭra, son of Vicitravīrya. He will donate a dwelling to me. Saying so he approached him.

This passage shows that Dhṛtarāṣṭra was ruling at the time (evidently) over the Kuru country and was known for his liberality. This event must be dated before the Great War. There is no reason to doubt the truth of this event. We have seen above that the *Ṛgveda* must have been composed in *circa* 1600 B.C. at the latest. The *Yajurveda*, which represents considerable change in language and theology, can be dated in *circa* 1400 B.C. at the latest. Another passage which substantiates this date occurs in the *Atharvaveda* (XX. 127. 9-10)–

कतरत्त आ हराणि दधि मन्थां परिश्रुतम् ।
जाया पतिं वि पृच्छति राष्ट्रे राज्ञः परिक्षितः ॥ ९ ॥
अभीवस्त्रः प्र जिहीते यवः पक्वः पथो बिलम् ।
जनः स भद्रमेधति राष्ट्रे राज्ञः परिक्षितः ॥ १० ॥

These verses eulogize king Parikṣit, the grandnephew of Yudhiṣṭhira. He is described as ruling over the Kuru country. Owing to his benevolent administration, the land is said to be overflowing with milk and honey.

This passage also points to about the same date. As shown above, the statement in the Purāṇas that 1050 years passed from the birth of Parikṣit to the coronation of Nanda also corroborates this very date. We have shown above that several post-Vedic works contain incidental references to the Great War and the personages like Kṛṣṇa, Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhīma, Arjuna, Nakula, Sahadeva etc. The war itself is mentioned in the *Śāṅkhāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra.*

25 VIII. 3.65.

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This, however, does not mean that the Epic *Mahābhārata* is equally old. It itself states that it has gone through three recensions. At first it was of 8800 verses and was known as *Jaya* 'Victory' as it described the victory of the Pāṇḍavas over the Kauravas. Then it swelled into a work of 24000 verses and came to be known as *Bhārata* Later, it assumed the gigantic form of a lakh verses and attained the name of the *Mahābhārata*. Several passages, large and small, have been interpolated into it as shown in the Critical Edition prepared by the Bhandarkar Institute. But even in its latest form the *Mahābhārata* of a lakh verses is not as late as the 4th cen. A.D. as Sankalia supposes. I have shown elsewhere that its *Khila-parvan*, the *Harivaṁśa*, which must have been included in it in order to attain the size of a lakh verses, goes back to 200 A.D.[25] at the latest; for the earlier version of it containing the *Pārijātāharaṇa* was utilized by the *Vākāṭaka* King Sarvasena (c. 330-355 A.D.) and it was evidently the source of some of the plays of Bhāsa, who preceded Kālidāsa by a century or two.

The literary evidence detailed above leaves no doubt that the Great War was fought about the middle of the second millenium B.C.

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26 *Literary and Historical Studies in Indology*, pp. 3 f.

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VĀMANA'S CONTRIBUTION TO SANSKRIT POETICS

By

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It is always an interesting study of an author like Vāmana with a view to evaluating the contribution he makes to the subject of his study. The founder of a new discipline always gets full credit for his vision in spite of the many wrong solutions that he might have offered for the pressing questions of his discipline. The reasons are too obvious, for it is always thought that to think of pressing questions is of greater importance than finding correct solutions, for these solutions come by and by. In a way, wrong solutions pave the way for the correct ones and thus offer a scope for development. Equally, very fortunate is the position of an author who comes towards the close of an era, for his work is valued because of the compromises that he is seen effecting out and thus trying to evolve a system based on all that is best in the contribution of his predecessors. His synthesis is of greater importance than any originality. Bharata and Mammaṭa can be cited as instances to the point. But the case is otherwise with those authors who come midway in a stream and Vāmana belongs to this class of writers. There is an era that has preceded and there is another era that succeeds and the importance or the value of such mid-stream writers is judged on two counts invariably; one, as to how far he has improved upon the earlier thinkers in the matter of correct approach and depth of thought and two, as to how far he has been able to influence the thought of those who follow him. The founder needs only originality and the last needs only a synthetic mind. The mid-stream authors need something more, possibly something of both.

Vāmana wrote after *Agnipurāṇa*, Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and was followed by the great Ānandavardhana, Rājaśekhara, Kuntaka, Mammaṭa and others, not to forget Abhinavagupta. The very fact that the *Rīti* School is known after Vāmana would go to show the admission as well as the direction of the contribution that he has made to Sanskrit Poetics. As an original thinker, therefore, his place is by the side of those gifted writers who founded the *Alaṅkāra*, the *Dhvani*, the *Rasa* Schools in the field of Sanskrit Poetics. It may be that he has not been quite successful in discovering the 'soul' of poetry but that does not in any way minimize the importance of his effort. The *Rasa* School and the *Dhvani* School criticized him no doubt, but these schools could not ignore him altogether as is clear from their acceptance of some of his views. He found the elements of poetry recognized in earlier writers; since the doctrines of the *Guṇas*, the *Alaṅkāras*, the *Mārgas*, the *Vṛttīs* appear again and again in Bharata, Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha and the like, the doctrine of the *Doṣas* included.

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But it was Vāmana who tried to put all these different elements together in a harmonious manner and evolved something like a coherent doctrine out of these several embellishments of poetry. He in this sense may be said to have evolved a synthesis of the earlier doctrines. The *Rīti* School of Vāmana is indeed nothing but the *Mārga* concept vitally brought into relation with the doctrines of the *Guṇa*s and the *Doṣa*s.

Daṇḍin does discuss the *Mārga*s, the *Vaidarbhī* and the *Gauḍī* and in the process defines the ten *Guṇa*s which are the very soul, *prāṇa*s of the *Vaidarbhī Mārga*. The *Gauḍī* is constituted of the reverse, the '*viparyaya*', of these ten *Guṇa*s. Daṇḍin's treatment is somewhat crude and very broad and he has, it appears, not taken the troubles of going to the root of the matter; for instance, one may refer to his treatment of the *Gauḍī*. Having discussed the ten *Guṇa*s of the *Vaidarbhī*, he observes that in the *Gauḍī* there is a '*viparyaya*' of these *Guṇa*s, '*eṣām viparyayaḥ prāyaḥ dṛśyate gauḍavartmani*' (I.42). Little does Daṇḍin stop to think that perhaps the '*viparyaya*' of a *Guṇa* would be a *Doṣa*, a fact that Vāmana has noticed when he observed while defining the *Doṣa*s, '*guṇaviparyayātmāno doṣāḥ*' (II.i.1). Daṇḍin's treatment of the *Gauḍī* may lead one to form the impression that it is a style without any merits at all, an impression which is not correct. It is Vāmana who makes it clear that *Gauḍī* has *Ojas* and *Kānti* while *Vaidarbhī* has all the *guṇa*s in it, '*samagraguṇā vaidarbhī / ojaḥkāntimatī gauḍīyā /*' (I.ii.11.12) Again, Daṇḍin spoke only of the ten *Guṇa*s but Vāmana has increased their number to twenty by admitting the '*śabdaguṇa*s' and the corresponding '*arthaguṇa*s'. It is clear that Vāmana has thought of the problem anew and from a quite different angle since he felt the necessity of defining the *Guṇa*s anew, differing from Daṇḍin on many occasions in the concepts of these *Guṇa*s. As a case in point, one may refer to the concept of the *Guṇa* '*samādhi*' which according to Daṇḍin is transference of a property, since he defines it as '*anyadharmaḥ tatonyatra lokasīmānurodhinā / samyagādhīyate yatra sa samādhiḥ smṛto yathā / kumudāni nimīlanti kamalāni unmiṣanti ca / iti netrakriyādhyāsāt labdhā tadvācinī śrutiḥ //* (I.93,94) Vāmana, however, defines *Samādhi* as '*ārohāvarohakramaḥ samādhiḥ*' (III.i.13) and this involves the idea of a symmetrical construction by observing due order in ascent and descent. Vāmana takes pains to discuss the possible relations of this *samādhi* with *Ojas* and *Prasāda* and gives his view that these *Guṇa*s are different. One may refer to another case to show this originality of Vāmana in his treatment of the *Guṇa*s. Daṇḍin regards *Śleṣa* as a *Guṇa* and defines it as '*śliṣṭam aspṛṣṭaśaithilyam alpaprāṇākṣarottaram /*' (I.43) which approximates to Vāmana's *Ojas* which he defines as '*gāḍhabandhatvamojaḥ*' (III.i.5). The illustrations given by Daṇḍin and those given by Vāmana make this fact quite clear. Daṇḍin defines his *Ojas* as '*samāsabhūyastva*' and regards it as the essence of good prose. *Śleṣa* to Vāmana is *masṛṇatva*, (III.i.11) a pleasing

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compactness. These illustrations will make it clear that Vāmana did not follow Daṇḍin and had his own independent ideas when he formulated his own doctrine of the twenty *guṇas*. To Bhāmaha also perhaps the idea of the *Guṇas* was not quite clear, for he appears to regard some *guṇas* as belonging to the entire composition and not to the word or the sense, the *śabda* or the *artha*. He regards '*bhāvika*' as a *guṇa*. There is yet another important point to be remembered in this context and which clearly shows Vāmana's originality. Neither Daṇḍin nor Bhāmaha can be said to have declared clearly the distinction between a *guṇa* and an *alaṅkāra*. To them both, the *guṇa* and the *alaṅkāra* were the elements that created grace in poetry, *kāvyaśobhākarāḥ dharmāḥ*. It was Vāmana who clearly distinguished between the two elements observing that the *guṇas* generated the grace while the *alaṅkāras* enhanced it. *kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāḥ guṇāḥ / tadatiśayahetavastvalaṅkārāḥ //* (III.i.1,2) Further, the *Guṇas* according to Vāmana are '*nitya*,' '*pūrve nityāḥ*' a permanent and inevitable feature of poetic grace, *tairvinā kāvyaśobhānupapatteḥ*, while the *alaṅkāras*, by implication, are not so. One may think that this idea is latent in Daṇḍin when he describes the *guṇas* as '*prāṇas*' of the *rīti* and the *alaṅkāras* as '*kāvyaśobhākaradharmas*.' But what is not clear and is perhaps implied in Daṇḍin has been made very clear by Vāmana. Vāmana reveals a reasonable view in the matter of the *rītis* and the *guṇas* when he describes the best *Vaidarbhī* as the '*samagraguṇā*' and the *Gauḍī* as '*stokaguṇā*.'

What Vāmana has done with reference to the concept the *Guṇas*, he has repeated it with reference to the concept of the *Doṣas*, for he speaks of the *Arthadoṣas* and the *Śabdadoṣas*. In the writings of the earlier writers like Bharata, Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, this distinction is not to be seen and their concept of the *Doṣas* includes *doṣas* of the two types Vāmana is speaking of. The credit then for systematizing this discussion of the *Guṇas* and the *Doṣas* should naturally go to Vāmana. It is true that later writers, especially Mammaṭa are seen reconsidering the whole matter again and reducing the plethora of the *Guṇas* of Vāmana to only three. But that does not diminish the value of the effort of Vāmana.

Vāmana believed that by resorting to the *Guṇas* and by avoiding the *doṣas* graceful poetry can be produced. He insisted upon purity of the diction and has therefore discussed '*saušabdya*' a topic in which Bhāmaha also is interested. It is true that Vāmana mostly looks upon the work of literary art in an objective manner rather than from a subjective point of view. He has the poet before him rather than the reader, the '*kavi*' before him rather than the '*rasika*'. It was left to Ānandavardhana and others of the *Rasa* and the *Dhvani* Schools, to adopt that point of view and thus to constitute an advance over the position of Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Vāmana and others. But at the same time it must be admitted that in poetry or literary art, organization is also of importance and it

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cannot be altogether overlooked. The '*rasika*' may be there quite alright but there must be something that has '*saundarya*' or '*viṣeśa*' in it. Where does 'beauty' reside, in the mind or in the object, is an eternal question in aesthetic experience to which there will always be two answers. According to one, an object, a work of art, can continue to be beautiful, even if there be no one to appreciate it; for on this view the beautiful is the cumulative effect of the constituent elements that have been deliberately put in there by the artist. Spectator or not, these properties will always be there and so the object will remain beautiful, just as the Taj does stand in a majestic manner on the banks of the Jumanā, even if there be no tourist visitor on any day to see it. According to the other it is the perceiving mind that makes a thing beautiful or otherwise. A picture or a poem is not the same to a '*rasika*' and an '*arasika*'. The work of art is what the '*rasika*' makes it. Thus it is the mind and the intellect that matter here. Vāmana, it is clear, holds the first view, according to which it is the object that is beautiful on account of the certain properties that the artist has very carefully bestowed on it. It is therefore that he speaks of the '*saundarya*' as arising from the '*doṣaguṇa-alaṅkārahananādāna*' of beauty arising from the use of the *guṇa*s and *alaṅkāra*s and from the avoidance of the *doṣa*s. It is in this context, not surprising that he declared the *rīti*, the *Viśiṣṭa padaracanā*, to be the soul of *kāvya*, and further declared that *viśeṣa* is *guṇātmā*. His position ultimately becomes that the '*guṇa*s' are the soul of poetry.

Any work of art has threefold properties, the physical, the emotional and intellectual, the last two having a reference to the responses the work is able to evoke from the appreciative critics. When Vāmana deals with the *padaracanā* and the *guṇa*s, he may appear to be a formalist, laying a heavy emphasis on the form and the organizing of the different elements that go to make the form. The properties that bestow beauty or grace naturally become of paramount importance to him. Vāmana should not be condemned for this approach of his, which appears to deal with the externals of poetry. It is, on the other hand, significant that when he spoke of the different *guṇa*s and the form beautiful, he recommended only the *Vaidarbhī* for its perfection, *guṇasākalya*, for he realized that as a matter of fact, there are no degrees of beauty which is always perfect. The other forms which only approximate to beauty are not perfect, since these forms are, as he puts it, *stokaguṇa*. He might not have been quite successful in his effort to discover the very soul of literary beauty but it will have to be admitted that in his discussion of the *guṇa*s, he has laid his hands on very vital qualities of that Beauty. His *Śleṣa*, which he defines as *masṛṇatva* is the 'smoothness, which Gilpin, Price, Thompson also regard as a very vital element of a significant form. His '*udāratā*' which he defines as '*yasmin padāni nṛtyanti iva..*' appears to refer the graceful movement; while his '*samatā*' which he defines as '*upakramasya atyāgaḥ* and *avaiśamya*, is nothing but the

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quality of symmetry. His *mādhurya* which he defines as *uktivaicitrya* perhaps refers to the quality of variety, while his *ojas* which he defines as *prauḍhiḥ vyāsasamāsau ca sābhiprāyatvamasya ca*, refers to another quality, 'intricacy'. Further, his *prasāda* which he defines as '*arthavaimalya*' and '*prayojakamātra-parigraha*' is the quality of simplicity, while his *kānti* which he defines as *dīptarasatva* is possibly the quality of attractivity. Viewed in this manner, it will be seen that Vāmana's contribution is indeed very significant. It is true that nowhere does Vāmana say that *saundarya* is not merely the total of these qualities, but is a different quality,-*dharmāntara* as Abhinava would like to put it,--altogether which arises as a result of the use of these elements, a fact which the great Ānandavardhana recognized when he defined *lāvaṇya* as something which is '*praśiddhāvayavatirikta*', '*anyadeva vastu*' and is *pratīyamāna*. But one would be justified in thinking that the origins of the celebrated doctrine of *saṅghaṭanā* formulated by Ānandavardhana seem to lie in these discussions of Vāmana in his *Sūtra*s and the *Vṛtti*. Vāmana developed from the discussions of the *Mārga*s, the *Guṇa*s, the *Doṣa*s, to be found in the earlier writers like Bharata, Daṇḍin and others and left something for the later writers like Ānandavardhana to be used in their own theories. *Kāvya*, as a work of art has, '*indriyagrāhya saundarya, buddhigrāhya dhvani* and *hṛdayasamvādi rasa*'. Vāmana concentrated his attention on the first and discovered elements of vital importance which writers who followed him freely used. This is certainly no mean achievement for a mid-stream writer like Vāmana who had eminent predecessors and brilliant successors.

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THE IDEA OF PRAUḌHOKTI IN SANSKRIT POETICS

By

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The words '*Prauḍha*', '*Prauḍhi*', '*Prauḍhavāda*,', '*Prauḍhivāda*' and '*Prauḍhokti*' have a general sense of bold assertion or *argumentum ex cuncessio* and they occur freely in literary as well as *śāstra*-works. The word *prauḍha* is etymologically explained for the first time by Kātyāyana in his *Vārttika*- (No. 3605)

प्रादूहोढोढ्येषैष्येषु ।

according to which we can justify the general meanings already noted. But the word has a more specific connotation in works on *Alaṅkāra-śāstra* as well as poets who show their acquaintance with poetics. It is the object of this paper to review briefly the evolution in the idea of *prauḍhokti* among literary theorists.

Bhavabhūti is the first to use the word *prauḍhitva* in a more than general sense. His famous saying:—

यत्प्रौढित्वमुदारता च वचसां यच्चार्थतो गौरवं
तच्चेदस्ति ततस्तदेव गमकं पाण्डित्यवैदग्धयोः ।[1]

implies that he is referring here to the literary elegance in respect of verbal usage, an excellence possibly held high as a *guṇa* by earlier literary theorists. Dr. V. Raghavan has pointed out[2] another early usage of the literary term *prauḍhi* in the play, *Rāmābhyudaya* of Yaśovarman cited in Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*—

शुद्धिः प्रस्तुतसंविधानकविधौ प्रौढिश्च शब्दार्थयोः ।

Though we do not find any mention of *prauḍhi* as a literary excellence as such in the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, we find hints of it in Vāmana who characterizes the *artha-guṇa* (excellence of content) of *ojas* (forcefulness) as imbued with *prauḍhi* or elevation of *artha* or content.[3] What is remarkable in Vāmana's *vṛtti* is his proposing a five-fold division of *prauḍhi* itself[4] :—

पदार्थे वाक्यवचनं वाक्यार्थे च पदाभिधा ॥
प्रौढिवाक्यसमासौ च साभिप्रायत्वमेव च ॥

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1 *Mālatīmādhava*, I, 8.

2 Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, Madras, 1963, p. 261.

3 अर्थस्य प्रौढिरोजः —*Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra*, III.ii.2. The *vṛtti* thereon explains it as

अर्थस्याभिधेयस्य प्रौढिः प्रौढत्वमोजः ।

4 The commentary *Kāmadhenu* observes :—

प्रौढिं पद्येन पञ्चधा प्रपञ्चयति ।

indicating thereby that this *Kārikā* is not a quotation from another author but a composition of Vāmana himself.

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The five varieties are—(i) use of a whole sentence in lieu of a word; (ii) use of a single word in place of a whole sentence; (iii) compoundless syntax; (iv) compounded syntax; and (v) suggestive intent. While the first four relate to the poet's stylistic choice, the last anticipates in its own way what came to be developed later on as *Vastudhvani* by Ānandavardhana. It is also significant that the poet's art itself was being termed *praudhi*, so to say.

A full and complete treatment of *praudhokti* as equivalent to poetic art or poetic imagination itself is seen even in the few fragments of Bhattatauta from his *Kāvyakautuka* preserved by his disciple Abhiñavagupta in his celebrated commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.[5] Some of these are noted below :—

प्रयोगत्वमनापन्ने काव्ये नाखादसम्भवः ।
वर्णनोत्कलिकाभोगप्रौढोक्त्या सम्यगर्पिताः ।
उद्यानकान्ताचन्द्राद्या भावाः प्रत्यक्षवत् स्फुटाः ॥

Abhinavagupta introduced these dicta as follows :—

काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकल्पसंवेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्यायाः । यदाहुः काव्यकौतुके—

The point under discussion is that art-experience is not possible unless and until there is felt aesthetic experience on a par with perceptual sensation. The remarks of Tauta declare in no uncertain terms that this is true as much of non-dramatic literature as of drama. The place of acting in drama is taken over by *Varṇanā* or imaginative description in non-dramatic literary forms. The purpose served by both, however, is the same. The themes described in literature such as garden, beloved, moon, will appear as vivid to the imaginative eye of the reader as a perceived scene. The *praudhokti* here is the very embodiment of the literary or imaginative vision of the poet. It is because of this new realization indeed that Tauta also defined a *Kavi* as one having the inseparable attainment of *varṇanā* which is a hall-mark of *pratibhā*.[6] He goes on to explain that though poetic vision was always present in Vālmīki, he could not be deemed a *kavi* until his *varṇanā* appeared embodied as the *Rāmāyaṇa*.[7]

This whole idea of *varṇanā* or *praudhokti* as the *sine qua non* of all literature seems to have been derived by Tauta primarily from his understanding of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, especially in its exposition of literary elements such as *guṇa*s and

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5 *Vide* : *Abhinavabhārati*, G.O.S. Vol. I, 1956, p. 291. The printed text has the misreading वर्णनोत्कलिता भोग-

6 प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।
तदनुप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुणः कविः ॥
quoted widely by Hemachandra etc.

7 तथा हि दर्शने स्वच्छे नित्येऽप्यादिकवेर्मुनेः ।
नोदिता कविता लोके यावज्जाता न वर्णना ॥

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*lakṣaṇa*s. What was originally applicable to dramatic *rasa*s in particular, were given a wide extention by him to cover all literary forms, even as Ānandavardhana had done in his own way in developing his philosophy of *dhvani*. That is why Abhinavagupta finds more occasions to quote his preceptor's views *in extenso* only in his *Abhinavabhāratī*, mostly on literary issues. Every *lakṣaṇa* involves some element of *varṇanā* itself, because all *varṇanā* is concerned directly with *rasa*. As an example we may see the following prefatory remark of Abhinavagupta while citing the authority of Tauta under *pracchedaka*.[8]

एवं रसोपयोग्यलौकिककालविशेषग्रहणं प्रच्छेदकादुपजीवितम् । यदाहुरुपाध्यायपादाः—

यद्यत्रास्ति न तत्रास्य कविवर्णनमर्हति । (कवेः ?)
यन्नासम्भवि तत्रास्य तद्वर्ण्यं सौमनस्यदम् ॥
देशोऽद्रिदन्तुरो द्यौर्वा तडित्कुण्डलमण्डिता ।
ईदृक् स्यादथवा न स्यात् किं कदाचन कुत्रचित् ॥

Though apparently the subject under treatment is an inconspicuous one, Abhinavagupta does not lose the opportunity to fill it with profound significance culminating in *rasa*, influenced as he was by Tauta. Tauta has made a clear distinction in the above citation between the real object in nature as it is and the ideal form given to it in the imaginative vision of the poet, otherwise termed *varṇanā*. It is no business of a poet to describe the real as it is. It is only when he succeeds in making plausible what is even impossible, that he delights the reader.[9] A land may be jagged with hills or otherwise ; the goddess of the sky may be adorned with ear-rings, or may not be. These may never be true or real anywhere ; but do they not ring as real ?

The same idea that everything can serve as grist to the poet's mill, provided it succeeds in revealing *rasa*, is further borne out in the following citation from Tauta.[10]

एवंप्रकारं यत्किञ्चिद्वस्तुजातं कथार्पितम् ।
अन्यूनाधिकसामग्रीपरिणामोन्मिषद्रसम् ॥
रसपोषाय तज्जातं.....
प्रतिभायाः प्रगल्भायाः सर्वमोङ्कषं(?)एष सः ॥

Tauta is categorically stating here that anything and everything in ample or excessive measure may be transfused into the delight of *rasa*. Because, for an imagination endowed with poetic sensibility, everything can serve as an effective means.

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8 *Abhinavabhāratī*, G.O.S. Ed., Vol. III, 1954, p. 71.

9 This remarkably echoes Aristotle's theory that the poet's business is to treat of plausible impossibility rather than implausible possibility.

10 *Abhinavabhāratī*, G.O.S. Ed., Vol. III, 1954, p. 78.

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If we have considered Tauta's observations earlier than that of Ānandavardhana, it is because the former seems to be more in line with the literary tradition dating from Bharata, though in fact his predecessor Ānandavardhana also was an inheritor of the self-same tradition, but a tradition, however, a little twisted by him to suit his own new theory of *dhvani*. And it is certainly not unlikely that Tauta had also imbibed the *dhvani* theory himself. While in Tauta's exposition of *varṇanā*, tantamount to *praudhokti*, the emphasis is throughout on the ultimate delight of *rasa*, Ānandavardhana, strangely enough, keeps *rasadhvani* out of the picture while giving his well-known classification of *vyañjakārtha* leading to merely *vastudhvani* viz. *svataḥ-sambhavi* and *kaviprauḍhoktisiddha* (or *kavinibaddha-prauḍhoktisiddha*).[11]

The contrast made here between a naturally existent fact and a fact invented only by the poet's genius is unmistakable as in Tauta's statements seen above.

While commenting on the word *praudhokti*, the *Locana* states :—

प्रकर्षेण ऊढः संपादयितव्येन वस्तुना प्राप्तस्तत्कुशलः प्रौढः । उक्तिरपि समर्पयितव्यवस्त्वर्पणोचिता प्रौढेत्युच्यते ।

II.24

The *Bālapriyā*[12] explains समर्पयितव्य etc. as identical with सहृदयहृदयार्पणयोग्या ! The example given in the *Dhvanyāloka* is

सज्जेहि सुरहिमासो ण दाव अप्पेइ जुअइ जणलक्खमुहे ।
अहिणवसहआरमुहे णवपल्लवपत्तले अणङ्गस्स शरे ॥

II.24

and

शिखरिणि क्व नु नाम कियच्चिरं किमभिधानमसावकरोत्तपः ।
तरुणि येन तवाधरपाटलं दशति बिम्बफलं शुकशावकः ॥

I.13

for the two kinds of *praudhokti* mentioned. Unfortunately the text of the *Locana* on this passage is somewhat corrupt in the *Bālapriyā* and Nirnaya Sagar Press editions. We must be thankful to the edition of *Kalpalatāviveka* recently published by the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad (1968) for getting a complete text of the *Locana* passage on the example ' *sajjehi*.... ' :—

अत्र वसन्तश्चेतनोऽनङ्गस्य सखा सज्जयति केवलं न तावदर्पयति इत्येवंविधया समर्पयितव्यवस्त्वर्पणकुशलयोक्त्या सहकारोद्भेदिनी वसन्तदशा यत उक्ता अतोऽनर्पितेष्वपि शरेषु यद्येवं मन्मथः प्रतपति, तदर्पितेषु कियद्विजृम्भिष्यत इति मन्मथोन्माथकस्यारम्भं क्रमेण गाढगाढीभविष्यन्तं व्यनक्ति । अन्यथा वसन्ते सपल्लवसहकारोद्गम इति वस्तुमात्रं न व्यञ्जकं स्यात् । एषा च कवेरेवोक्तिः प्रौढा । द्वितीयो

11 Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's edition of *Dhvanyāloka*, Karnataka University, Dharwar, 1974, p. 86.

12 *Dhvanyāloka-Bālapriyā* Ed., Benares, 1940, p. 255.

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यथा—शिखरिणीत्यादि । लोहितं बिम्बफलमयं शुको दशतीति न व्यञ्जकता काचित् । यदा तु कविनिबद्धस्य साभिलाषस्य तरुणस्य वक्तुरित्थं प्रौढोक्तिस्ततो व्यञ्जकत्वम् ।

pp. 144.45

(The portion printed in bold is missing in the *Bālapriyā* edition. But it has ध्वन्यमानं instead).

Even this long explanation does not make Abhinava's meaning quite clear what he means by *samarpayitavyavastvarpaṇa*. The problem is whether he is alluding only to *vastu* as he apparently seems to, or, whether he is thinking of *rasa* also. The problem arises because, the commentators on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* like Śrīdhara[13] have explained the second verse *Śikhariṇi* etc., as relating to the *rasāveśa* of the *vaktā* or speaker. (Even they do not talk of the *rasa* of the reader)—

प्रौढोक्तिः क्वचित् कविसम्बन्धिनी यत्र तादृस्थ्येन वर्णनम् ।
क्वचित्तु कविनिबद्धस्य सम्बन्धिनी यत्र रसाद्याविष्टो वक्ता ।

This is a very jejune distinction because, except that of the first and third grammatical persons, there is no other distinction between *Kavi* (poet) and *kavi-nibaddha* (character invented by the poet). There is nothing to indicate that the poet is neutral and his character emotional because we are not talking at all of any one poem in the third person, but of two separate poems, the speaker in one being a poet himself and the other only a character. Another commentator Bhaṭṭagopāla has also been very wary in just comparing the overflowing imagination of the poet to the overflowing of the *rasa* in the creative process[14]—

कविगतं प्रतिभानमेव रसपरिपूर्णकुम्भोच्चलनवत् प्रौढोक्तितया परिस्फुरति ।

But Mammaṭa himself has underlined the full significance of the word *prauḍhokti* in his *vṛtti* on IV.40 as given in the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series Edition, 1921, p. 72 :—

इदं प्रथमकल्पितः स्वतःसम्भवी चेति द्विविधोऽर्थः । तत्र स्वतःसम्भवी न केवलं भणितिमात्रनिष्पन्नो यावद्बहिरपि औचित्येन संभाव्यमानः । कविना प्रतिभामात्रेण बहिरसन्नपि निर्मितः कविनिबद्धेन वा वक्त्रेति द्विविधोऽपर इति त्रिविधः ।

The *Saṅketa* commentary of Māṇikyacandra pinpoints the fact by observing—

अयं प्रथमः स चासौ कल्पित इति इदं प्रथमकल्पितः कविव्रह्मसृष्ट इत्यर्थः ।

This will leave no doubt on the exact significance of *prauḍhokti* as the inventive genius of the poet at work in all poetry.

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13 Śridhara's Com. on *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Calcutta edition by S. P. Bhattacarya, IV, 40.
14 *KP.* Trivandrum ed., Part I, 1925, p. 159.

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Coming back to Abhinavagupta we would not be wrong in concluding that his idea of *praudhokti* as *samarpayitavyavastvarpaṇa* must be taken literally to refer to *vastu* only and not to *rasa* also as Tauta would have done. The *Kaumudī* on the *Locana* is crystal clear on the point under *śikhariṇi* etc.[15]

यद्वैदग्ध्येन चाटुविरचनं तदात्मकं.....यद्वस्तु तदिह श्लोके व्यङ्ग्यमित्यर्थः ।

But it is possible that the word *rasa* is given an extention of meaning far beyond its connotation in the text of Bharata, as Rājaśekhara does. When *rasa* thus means only general aesthetic delight, it could be said that all *varṇanā* partakes of *rasavattā*. Rājaśekhara says that the things described do not delight us in poetry, but the poetic expressions only which either delight us or disturb us[16] :—

काव्ये तु कविवचनानि रसयन्ति विरसयन्ति च, नार्थाः ।

When he quotes Avantisundarī to the effect that things have no determinate nature in poetry but only a nature endowed to them by the verbal art of the poet's genius. This *vidagdhabhaṇitibhaṅgī* may be deemed as closely approximating to the idea of *praudhokti* itself detailed above.[17] But this general sense, while giving the broadest significance to *praudhokti* would leave no scope at all for naturalistic or factual descriptions (*svataḥ-sambhavī*).

But within the frame of the *dhvani*-theory itself the distinction between *vastu* and *rasa* is more logical than experimental. Though all *dhvani* is divided into *asaṁlakṣyakrama* (in the case of *rasādi*) and *saṁlakṣyakrama* (in the case of *vastu* etc.) it is not a watertight distinction as it allows the former sometimes to come under the latter. But the latter can never come under the former. That is why in the famous verse of Kālidāsa—

एवं वादिनि देवर्षौ पार्श्वे पितुरधोमुखी ।
लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास पार्वती ॥ (*Kumārasambhava*, VI. 84)

Ānandavardhana explains bashfulness a *bhāva* as coming under *saṁlakṣyakrama* though ordinarily we expect it to be *asaṁlaksyakrama.*

[cf. असंलक्ष्यक्रमत्वं च यत्र विभावानुभावादिवशादाशुभाविनी रसाभिव्यक्तिस्तत्रैव । अन्यत्र तु रसादिध्वनिरपि संलक्ष्यक्रम एव । तदुक्तमभिनवगुप्ताचार्यैः—'यद्यपि रसभावादिरर्थो ध्वन्यमान एव, न वाच्यः कदापि, तथापि न सर्वोऽप्यसंलक्ष्यक्रमविषयः, इति ।

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15 *Dhvanyāloka*, KS.R.I. Ed. Madras, 1944, p. 255.

16 *Kāvyamīmāṁsā*, G.O.S. Edition, 1934, p. 45.

17 वस्तुस्वभावोऽत्र कवेरतन्त्रो
गुणागुणावुक्तिवशेन काव्ये ।
स्तुवन्निबध्नात्यमृतांशुमिन्दुं
निन्दंस्तु दोषाकरमाह धूर्तः ॥ *op. cit.*

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(*Kaviširobhūṣaṇa* of Ahobala, a writer on Telugu poetics and grammar in Sanskrit (17th century), Guntur, 1972, p. 38.)

In the verse under question (viz. *Śikhariṇi* etc.), all the description given goes to build up the lover (*Nāyaka*) as a most worthy *vibhāva* or object for *śṛṅgāra-rasa* to be portrayed. Hence it is a *vastu* with a rich potentiality for *rasa*.

But late commentaries like the *Madhumatī*[18] (of Ravibhaṭṭācārya) and the *Nāgeśvarī-ṭīkā*[19] have completely misunderstood the wide implication of *prauḍhokti* when they narrowly identify it with *Kavisamaya*, a concept brought to the fore by Rājaśekhara. *Kavisamaya*s are poetic conventions such as redness of anger, whiteness of fame, the *cakora*'s feeding on moonlight, the swan's separating milk from water and so on. Though they are untrue in the factual world they have a reality so far as the poets are concerned because of a time-honoured tradition of their own. They are no better than cliches of poetry. The scope left for imagination in their usage is but little. Hence, we should have no hesitation in dismissing the following explanation of *prauḍhokti* as stemming from confusion of the *dhvani*-theory and wrongly identifying *kaviprauḍhokti* with *kavisamaya*, though they are totally different.

(1) इदं पुनरत्रावधातव्यम्— कविसमयसिद्धं असत्यमपि कविप्रौढोक्तिसिद्धमित्यादरणीयम्, कीर्तौ शौक्ल्यवितरणवत्, अकीर्तौ श्यामत्ववत्, नृपप्रयाणे रजसा दिशो व्याप्तिवत्, भूकम्पे भयादिवच्च। व्यवहारस्तु समुचित एव वर्णनीयः। अन्यथा असत्यताप्रतिभासेन नायकवत् वर्तितव्यम् ' इत्याद्युपदेशे काव्यं न पर्यवस्येत्।[20]

(2) कवेः काव्यकर्तुः प्रौढोक्तिमात्रात्सिद्धः लोकेऽदृष्टोऽपि कविप्रतिभामात्रेण कल्पितः, यथा कीर्त्यादेर्धावल्यादिः... भणितिमात्रनिष्पन्नः-प्रौढोक्तिमात्रकल्पितः, ' अत्यन्तासत्यपि ह्यर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि ' इति न्यायात्।[21]

The concept of *prauḍhi* as an independent *guṇa* reached its high watermark in the works of Bhoja. Bhoja raised the status of *prauḍhiguṇa* to the highest peak of *pāka* or literary maturity both in thought and expression. As this has been fully explicated by Dr. V. Raghavan, it does not require any detailed consideration.[22]

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18 Critically edited by Venkatanathacharya M. S., and published by Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1974.

19 Kashi Sanskrit Series Benares, 1926.

20 *Madhumatī*, p. 312, for details see fn. 18 above.

21 *Nāgeśvariṭikā*, p. 84, for details see fn. 19 above.

22 (a) उक्तेः प्रौढिः परीपाकः प्रोच्यते प्रौढिसंज्ञया ।

Sarasvatikaṇṭhābharaṇa, I 17.

Ratneśvara's comments thereon—

पदानामावापोद्वापाभ्यां सन्निवेशचारुत्वेन योऽयमभ्यासिको नालिकेरपाकः मृद्वीकापाकः इत्यादि वाक्यपरिपाकः सा प्रौढिरित्युच्यते ।

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The *Sāhityamīmāṁsā*, states that the view of writers who regard *prauḍhi*, *preyas* etc., as separate *guṇas* is not tenable because they are really comprehended by the broad category of *Vakrokti*, ostensibly formulated by Kuntaka[23] :—

प्रौढिप्रेयोविस्तराद्यान् यान् वदन्त्यपरे गुणान् ।
वक्रोक्त्यादिषु सर्वेषामन्तर्भावः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥ (IV. concluding verse).[24]

That *guṇas* are key factors in the make-up of a poet is a long established tradition of Sanskrit poetics. Abhinavagupta has recorded this tradition in these words :—

(1) एकेषां तु दर्शनम्—कवेर्यः प्रतिभात्मा प्रथमपरिस्पन्दः तद्व्यापारबलोपनता गुणाः प्रतिभावत एव हि रसाभिव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्यं माधुर्यादेरुपनिबन्धनसामर्थ्यं, न सामान्यकवेः ।[25]

(2) गुणशून्यं तु न काव्यं किञ्चिदपीयति च महापुरुषो दृष्टान्तः । अहेयत्वप्रदर्शनार्थमेव हि प्रसादादीनां गुणवाचोयुक्त्या व्यवहारः, तद्विना काव्यरूपत्वाभावात् ।[26]

Bhoja seems to be more in line with this tradition than that of the *dhvani* or *vakrokti* schools, in regard to his conception of *prauḍhi*.

Bhoja's idea of *prauḍhi* as *pāka* was followed by Vidyānātha in his *Pratāparudrīya* who says—

प्रौढिरुक्तेः परीपाक इति काव्यविदो विदुः ।
(VI.31, Sanskrit Education Society, Madras, 1970, p. 224).

But the example cited thereon contains only an elegant variation of numerous metaphors regarding the king described. As the commentary *Ratnāpaṇa* observes ; it is only *Āropalakṣaṇa-vaicitrī-viśeṣa*, which is described as *prauḍhi* here.

A further stage in the characterization of *prauḍhatva* is seen in Viśveśvara's (1325-1400 A.D.) *Camatkāracandrikā* wherein *prauḍhatva* of *artha* and *śabda* is described as the essence of *ārabhaṭī-vṛtti* :—

(b) विवक्षितार्थनिर्वाहः काव्ये प्रौढिरिति स्मृतः । *op. cit.*, I.88.

This relates to अर्थगुण. For fuller details see Dr. Raghavan, V.: Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, pp. 112 f., 379 f. etc. He has also noted that the *Agnipurāṇa*, like Bhoja counts *prauḍhi* as a separate *artha-guṇa* and also as equivalent to *pāka* (*Ibid.* p. 319).

23 Kuntaka also uses the word *prauḍha* often but only in a general sense since his idea of *vakrokti* renders *prauḍhokti* superfluous; for example see :—

प्रतिप्रकरणं प्रौढप्रतिभाभोगयोजितः ।
एक एवाभिधेयात्मा बध्यमानः पुनः पुनः ॥ *Vakroktijīvita*, IV. 7.
प्रौढप्रतिभाभोगयोजितः = प्रगल्भतरप्रज्ञाप्रकरप्रकाशितः । *Vṛtti* Thereon.

24 Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 1934, p. 31.

25 *Abhinavabhāratī*, G.O.S. ED., Vol. 1394, p. 296.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 322.

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वृत्तिमारभटीमाहुः प्रौढत्वादर्थशब्दयोः ।

(IV.33, Andhra University, Waltair, 1969, p. 75).

Just like Kuntaka who uses the term *prauḍhi* and *prauḍha* in a general sense as (noted in fn. 23 above), Mahimabhaṭṭa's commentator Ruyyaka also uses it in a similar general sense. He explains *asabhyatva*[27] as

प्रतिभानेऽप्यप्रौढरूपत्वमसभ्यत्वम् and प्रौढत्वेऽपि गुणासहिष्णुत्वलक्षणं मात्सर्यम् ।

Again he characterizes his author *Atiprauḍha* attempting to prove anything and everything at his sweet will[28] :—

'यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते' इति न्यायेनात्रातिप्रौढतया ग्रन्थकारो निजायत्तां पदार्थ-व्यवस्थां कर्तुमारब्धः..... ।

It is embarassing to see how even a very seasoned scholar of *Alaṅkāra-śāstra* can confuse the general meanings of *prauḍhokti* with the rhetorical sense. Dr. V. Raghavan, who does not hesitate to describe himself so flamboyantly as "the modern *Alaṁkára* trinity—Kane, De and myself (sic)!"[29] has this statement to offer regarding Ruyyaka's famous remark[30] :—

भट्टनायकेन तु व्यङ्ग्यव्यापारस्य प्रौढोक्त्याभ्युपगतस्य काव्यांशत्वं ब्रुवता न्यग्भावितशब्दार्थ-स्वरूपस्य व्यापारस्यैव प्राधान्यमुक्तम् ।

"Says Ruyyaka that Bhaṭṭanāyaka accepted *vyañjanāvyāpāra* as an element of *prauḍhokti* as part of poetic power or *kavivyāpāra*".[31]

This is wrong to say the least. Bhaṭṭanāyaka neither accepted *vyañjanā-vyāpāra* (of Ānandavardhana), nor *prauḍhokti* (in the sense of any writer on poetics), which fact was known to Ruyyaka perfectly. Ruyyaka is only remarking that Bhaṭṭanāyaka indulged in *prauḍhokti* or *prauḍhivāda* or *argumentum ex cuncessio* when he said that *vyañjanāvyāpāra*, even if accepted for arguments' sake, would only be an *aṁśa* or partial aspect of poetry and never its *ātman* or soul as Ānandavardhana would aver. As already seen in foot-note No. 23, Kuntaka has made crystal-clear what *prauḍhivāda* is. If further evidence were needed, we could cite the famous observation of Vijñānabhikṣu on *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* (I·92) ascribed to Kapila :—

अयं चेश्वरप्रतिषेध एकदेशिनां प्रौढवादेनैवेति प्रागेव प्रतिपादितम् ।[32]

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27 *Vyaktiviveka*, Dr. R. P. Dwivedi's Ed., Varanasi, 1964, p. 183.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 338.

29 Umesh Mishra Commemoration volume, Ganganath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad, 1970, p. 793.

30 *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, Introduction portion.

31 Dr. Raghavan, V.: Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, Madras, 1963, p. 152.

32 *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, Harward Oriental Series, 1943, p. 46, line 29.

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Similarly, we have another example of the proper usage of the word '*Prauḍhi-vāda*' in Appayya Dīkṣita's *Vṛttivārttika* [32a] :—

ननु 'भ्रमिमरतिं...इत्यत्र...मम्मटाचार्येणाप्रस्तुते शक्येऽपि शब्दशक्तिमूलो वस्तुध्वनिरुक्तः। सत्यम्। अप्रस्तुतार्थप्रतीतिमूलतया प्रतीयमानयोर्वैरत्वलङ्कारयोर्व्यक्तयवश्यंभावदार्ढ्यायाश्रितम् 'अप्रस्तुतार्थेऽपि व्यक्तिः' इति प्रौढिवादमात्रमवलम्ब्य तत्प्रवृत्तमिति नात्राभिनिवेशः कार्यः।

Jayaratha the Kashmirian commentator of Ruyyaka has not committed this mistake. He rightly explains the passage as follows :—

अत एवोक्तेः प्रौढत्वं यल्लक्षयितुमशक्यं तस्याप्यभ्युपगमः काव्यांशत्वमिति, न पुनः काव्यात्मत्वम्।

But Samudrabandha and Vidyācakravartin have committed another type of mistake altogether by confusing *prauḍhokti* with the *Bhoga-vyāpāra* of Bhaṭṭanāyaka. [33] But an absolutely fool-proof explanation of Bhattanāyaka's stand is preserved fortunately in the *Kaumudi* [34] :—

सिद्धेऽपीत्यनेनाभ्युपगम्यवादोऽयमिति दर्शयति। न तावदभिधादिभ्योऽस्य भेदो न्यायाघातसहः। तथाप्यभ्युपगम्यापि ब्रूमह इत्यर्थः। तस्य काव्येंऽशत्वमेव स्यात्, न स्वरूपत्वमात्मत्वं यद्भवतोऽभिलषितमित्यर्थः। विमतो ध्वनिः काव्यांशभूतो भवितुमर्हति, शब्दव्यापारत्वादभिधादिव्यापारवत्, इत्यनुमानबाधितं काव्यात्मत्वाभिधानमित्यर्थः। अपहस्तितं भवतीति। साक्षात्तदपह्नस्तनाप्रतिपत्तावपि तदभिप्रायसद्भावो दर्शित इति तमुद्घाटयति —तथाहीति। उक्तानुमानस्य स्वाभ्युपगमविरोधं दर्शयिष्यन् स्वाभ्युपगमं तावदाह—अभिधेत्यादि॥

व्यापारस्त्रिविधो बुधैरभिमतः काव्येऽभिधाभावना-
भोगोत्पादकतात्मना तदधिको नास्ति ध्वनिर्नाम नः।
सिद्धाद्या व्यवहारभूमिषु विभावाद्यर्थसाधारणी-
कारात्मा त्वपरा निरर्गलरसास्वादात्मिकैवान्तिमा॥

The same exalted living constituent of the "trinity" quotes a *Rāmāyaṇa* verse actually containing a *yathāsaṁkya-alaṁkāra* as having a *parisaṁkhyā-alaṁkāra* ! This is the passage from his '*Some Concepts of Alaṁkāraśāstra*' :—

"It is really surprising how there can be any beauty of figure in such an unpoetic expression as *Parisaṁkhyā* which can never be a spontaneous

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32a *Vṛtti-vārttika*, Kāvya-mālā edition, p. 14.

33 प्रौढोक्तिरिति संज्ञया निर्दिष्टस्येत्यर्थः—
Samudrabandha's Com., T.S.S., 1926, p. 8.
अथ भट्टनायकमतम्—प्रौढोक्त्याभ्युपगतस्येति। भोग इति
स्वकपोलकल्पितः व्यवहारः प्रौढोक्तिः, तया अङ्गीकृतस्येत्यर्थः।
ईदृशस्य व्यञ्जनव्यापारस्य काव्यात्मत्वं कथयता न्यग्भावितशब्दस्वरूपोऽयं व्यापारः तस्यैव प्राधान्यमुक्तम्।
—*Sañjīvini*, Ed. Janaki S. S. and Raghavan V., Delhi, p. 11.

34 *Dhvanyāloka*, K.S.R.I. Ed., Madras, 1944, p. 79,

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utterance. The following *parisaṅkhyā* is a description of the rainy season in the *Rāmāyaṇa* :—

वहन्ति वर्षन्ति नदन्ति भान्ति ध्यायन्ति नृत्यन्ति समाश्वसन्ति ।
नद्यो घना मत्तगजा वनान्ताः प्रियाविहीनाः शिखिनः प्लवंगाः ॥
—*Kiṣ.* 11.27.

It is proper that Kuntaka should reject this '*Alaṅkāra*'." [35]

This is Dr. Raghavan who would never deign to spare others for their sin of venturing into *his* preserve of *Alaṅkāra-Śātrā* !

In the evolution of this idea of *prauḍhokti* we reach the last stage when it is recognized as one of the *alaṅkāra*s or figures of speech. Jayadeva in his *Candrāloka* is the first writer to define *prauḍhokti* as an *alaṅkāra*. His definition is—

प्रौढोक्तिस्तदशक्तस्य तच्छक्यत्वावकल्पनम् ।

and the illustration given is—

कलिन्दजातीररुहाः श्यामलाः सरलद्रुमाः ।[36]

Gāgābhaṭṭa's commentary gives the following explanation—

तत्रासमर्थस्य तत्र सामर्थ्यवर्णनं प्रौढोक्तिरित्यर्थः । यमुनातटरोहस्य नैत्यहेतुत्वाभावेऽपि तद्धेतुत्वेन कथनात् ।

'when something is ficticiously described as causing an extraordinary effect, it comes under the category of the figure *prauḍhokti*'. Appayyadīkṣita has simply copied this definition of *prauḍhokti* in his *Kuvalayānanda* without adding anything of his own. [37]

Thus the connotation of *prauḍhokti* has touched the fringes of almost every concept in Sanskrit poetics like, *guṇa*, *rasa*, *dhvani*, *pāka*, *vṛtti*, *vakrokti* and *alaṅkāra* ; and it is quite distinct from its general sense of a concessional argument in philosophical works.

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35 1942 Ed., p. 75.

36 *Candrāloka*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Ed., Benares, 1938, p. 74.

37 *Kuvalayānanda*, N.S.P. Ed., 1912, p. 135.

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THE PĀÑCARĀTRAKAṆṬAKODDHĀRA : A BRIEF ANALYSIS

By

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The *Pāñcarātrakaṇṭakoddhāra* or *Pāñcarātrakaṇṭakoddhāra-saṅgraha* is an unpublished work on palm-leaf and paper, deposited in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.[1] Its author is Vādhūla Varadācārya, a disciple of Mahācārya alias Doḍḍayācārya, the famous author of the commentary *Caṇḍamāruta* on the *Śatadūṣaṇī* of Veṅkaṭanātha (Vedānta Deśika). So he can be assigned to the 16th Cent. A.D. The *Pāñcarātrakaṇṭakodhāra* follows the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*[2] of Yāmunācārya in establishing the validity of the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas*. The following is a brief analysis of this post-Yāmuna work.

It has to be admitted that there are many arguments in this work which are common with those given by Yāmuna in support of these *āgamas*. But there are other new points which Vādhūla Varada discusses in greater detail, thus complementing Yāmuna's work. Towards the end of his *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, Yāmuna states that the authority of the *Ekāyana Śākhā* on which the *Pañcarātra* is supposed to have been based, was established in the *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya* itself.[3] But this work is not available now. The important contribution of Varada is his detailed discussion on the *Ekāyana* Veda.

The objection is first raised that there is no proof to the existence of such a Veda apart from the four well-known ones. *Ekāyana* is not *prasiddha* as a Veda. There does not seem to be any tradition connected with its study.[4] In reply, Varada says that *Ekāyana* is not *aprasiddha*. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* refers to it as distinct from the four Vedas. The word "*ekāyana*" cannot be explained otherwise. The *Pādmsaṁhitā* refers to it as "*ādyam ekāyanam vedam.*" Varada says that a good number of sentences from this Veda are quoted in the commentary *Viṣṇuvallabhā* on the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. Reference is also made to the *Tattvavicāraṇā* of Yādavaprakāśa wherein the context of explaining the *Pañcarātra* method of worship, a number of passages from the *Ekāyana* Veda are quoted.[5]

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1 D. Nos. 5279 and 15424 respectively. Also a Restored paper ms. R. 5596.

2 My critical edition, *GOS*, No. 160.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

4 References here are to the paper ms. R. 5596. See p. 2 :

"एकायनवेदतदध्येतृपुरुषप्रसिध्यदर्शनेन....."

5 See *Ibid.*, p. 17 :

"तथा चैकायननिरुक्तं ब्राह्मणं भ इत्येतस्मिन् भकारात् भर्ता संभर्तेति। तथा ह्येकायननिरुक्तं बलं भगवान् सङ्कर्षणः, वीर्यं भगवान् प्रद्युम्नः, शक्तिर्भगवान् अनिरुद्ध इति।" etc.

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Regarding the objection that the *Pañcarātra* speaks of the origination of Saṅkarṣaṇa from Vāsudeva, the reply given by Varada is on the same lines as that given by Yāmuna. But we may note that Varada compares the process to the lighting of one flame from another. The objection of Śaṅkara that an instrument like *manas* cannot arise from the agent is thus answered. He says, the Lord can be both the *kāraṇa* and *kārya*. But as the Vedic text "*tasya dhīrāḥ parijānanti yonim* ", points out only the yogins can see the cause of the Lord's manifestations. Varada quotes the *Gītā*, *Bhāgavata* and the *Pādmasaṁhitā* in support of this point.

The next objection is regarding the partial validity of these *āgamas* as in the case of the Kalpasūtras which hold good to a particular group of people following a particular Vedic branch. But in the case of the *Pañcarātra* which is held unauthoritative by all the orthodox followers of the Veda, no such claim can be made. This argument is based on the belief that they are composed by sages like Śāṇḍilya and Śaunaka.

In reply Varada points out that these sages are not the authors of the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas*. They are only the exponents of these texts but not their authors. They, on the other hand, are the direct revelations by Lord Viṣṇu to the sages.

The next important point raised by the opponent is that the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the *Mahābhārata* which is said to eulogise *Pañcarātra* does not form a genuine part of the original text. It was interpolated by some votaries of this school.

In reply Varada observes that the section called *Nārāyaṇīya* is found in all the manuscripts of the *Mahābhārata* found in the eastern and western India. It comes after ch. 157 and runs to 19 chs. in the *Mokṣa-dharma* portion.[6] He says further that some manuscripts might not contain this section since the scribes would have deliberately omitted it, being inimical by nature to Lord Nārāyaṇa and the Bhāgavata religion. He points out that a number passages from the *Nārāyaṇīya* are quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Viṣṇusahasranāma*. Thus even the Advaitins will have to accept it as an integral part of the Great Epic, he adds.[7]

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6 These figures do not correspond to our printed editions of the *Mahābhārata*. Since some of the verses of the *Nārāyaṇīya* quoted by Yāmuna in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya* are not traceable in the extant editions, we may conclude that some chapters of this section are lost.

7 See pp. 60-61 :

"यत्तु सूक्ष्ममविज्ञेयं" इति ब्रह्मप्रकृत्या "स ह्यन्तरात्मा भूतानां क्षेत्रज्ञश्चेति कथ्यते" इति चोक्त्वा "तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम" इत्याह। तथान्यत्रापि "अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन् निष्कले संप्रलीयते" इत्याहेत्युक्तम्। .....एवं नारायणीयनामनिर्वचनाध्यायगतान्यनेकवचनानि सहस्रनामभाष्ये परेणोदाहृताः॥

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Though not mentioned in the traditional list of the *Vidyāsthānas*, the *Pañcarātra* is valid like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* which are also not listed therein. That the *Pañcarātra* is in the tradition of the Vedas is vouchsafed by the *Mahābhārata* itself.[8] The *Nyāyapariśuddhi* of Vedānta Deśika includes the *Pañcarātra* in the *Dharmaśāstra*.

The mode of worship mentioned in the *Pañcarātra* is supported by Śrutis and Smṛtis. Varada quotes from *Śaunaka* and *Vyāsasmṛti* in support. The *Smṛtis* of Vyāsa and Dakṣa recommend five-fold observances which Vedānta Deśika identifies with the *pañcakāla*-rites viz., *abhigamana*, *upādāna*, *ijyā*, *svādhyāya* and *yoga*, laid down in the *Pañcarātra*.

Varada says that there is no truth in the allegation that Vāsudeva revealed the *Pañcarātra* with a view to delude the people. Even Amalānanda Sarasvatī, the author of the commentary *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī* of Vacaspati Miśra, admits that Vāsudeva is not given to deceit and that the *Pañcarātra* which is His revelation cannot be subjected to doubts regarding its authenticity.[9] As such the validity of the *Pañcarātra* may be established either on the ground of the faultless cognition of Lord Vāsudeva or by reason of its being based on the *Ekāyana* Śruti.[10] "If Vāsudeva in the form of *Māyāmohana*, is said to have given the Bauddhāgamas to deceive certain people, does it follow that the *Pañcarātra* also is a *Mohaśāstra*?" asks Varada. The *Pāñcarātra* is the *Mokṣaśāstra*, but not a *Mohaśāstra*. 'Do we condemn the *Smṛti* of Bṛhaspati on the ground that he once taught the Cārvāka philosophy?" questions our author.[11]

We may thus notice that the *Pāñcarātrakaṇṭakoddhāra* is important in its own way, although it is not as classical in nature as the works of Yāmuna or Vedānta Deśika. As pointed out earlier, the importance of this work lies in the new arguments advanced by the author. This work is also useful by the references it makes to some rare works and commentaries like Ṭādavaprakāśa's *Tattvavicāraṇā* and the *Viṣṇuvallabhā* where many *Ekāyana* passagees are said to have been quoted. This work is now being critically edited by the author of this paper.

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8 Cf. the following verse said to be from the *Śāntiparvan*, which is not traceable :

"वेदान्तेषु यथासारं संगृह्य भगवान् हरिः ।
भक्तानुकम्पया विद्वान् संचिक्षेप यथासुखम् ॥"

9 *Vide Kalpataru* under *Brahmasūtra*, II. ii. 42 :

"पञ्चरात्रकर्तुः वासुदेवस्य वेदादेव सर्वज्ञत्वावगमात् कपिलपतञ्जल्यादिनां च जीवत्वात्, पाञ्चरात्रस्य पुराणेषु बुद्धादिदेशनावत् व्यामोहार्थं ईश्वरप्रणीतत्वाश्रवणात्, न योगाधिकरणगतार्थता" ।

10 See p. 7 : "एवं च नित्यनिर्दोषभगवत्प्रत्यक्षभूलं वा त्रय्यन्तैकायनश्रुतिमूलं वा पञ्चरात्रमङ्गीकरणीयम् ॥"

11 *Ibid.* "अत एव चार्वाकमतप्रवक्तृकस्य बृहस्पतेः धर्मशास्त्रप्रणयनमप्युपपद्यते ॥"

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A PAINTED WOODEN BOOK-COVER IN THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE, BARODA

By

UMAKANT P. SHAH, Baroda

About eighteen years ago, a beautifully painted wooden book-cover of a Jaina palm-leaf manuscript was acquired by the Oriental Institute, Baroda. For various reasons, it is regarded as hailing from Jesalmere, but it could also have been originally painted in Gujarat, probably Patan. The book-cover measures 61 cms. in length × 6.5 cms. in width. The borders are sloping and decorated with a row of petals. Fig. 1 illustrates a part of the *paṭṭikā* beginning with its right end, fig. 2 shows the much damaged painting in the central portion of the book-cover, while fig. 3 illustrates the remaining left side portion of the book-cover.

Fig. 1 shows seven male figures in all, painted on a bright red background. Beginning from the slightly damaged right end of the cover, where some painted surface has peeled off, the first standing figure blows a conch, the second one, seated in *vīrāsana*, plays cymbals, the third holds some unidentified decorated object, the fourth male blows a long trumpet, while the remaining three figures carry with both hands, three auspicious pots (*maṅgala-kalaśa, pūrṇa-kumbha*) in an attitude of adoration and worship. The central panel (illustrated in fig. 2) is separated from this first panel by a circular flower motif with vertical bands on both sides, one of the bands on each side is perhaps a long wreath of some flowers. The central panel is almost completely ruined. On the right end are seen headless bodies of two standing males in worshipful attitudes. The missing figure in the centre of this panel was probably of some divinity, perhaps of a Jina. On the left end of the panel, we see only portions of textiles worn by a figure (male or female) and another headless figure who has worn a garment leaving the left shoulder and torso bear.

All the other male figures wear *dhoti*s reaching only upto the knees, the *dhoti*s are of various textile patterns, either printed or woven, and tied with a sash whose two ends flutter on one side, drawn in an artistic flourish. The males wear long scarfs over shoulders and the ends of the scarfs show beautiful broad circular patterns so commonly met with in early western Indian miniatures. The males have oblong healthy faces with long pointed noses, projected farther eyes, small thin whiskers and beards, and moustaches with pointed curved ends. U-shaped *tilaka* marks are seen on foreheads and the long hair of each male are tied into a prominent knot at the back of the head. Legs of all standing males in the two panels are somewhat stiff but the bodies, somewhat stunted with rela-

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tively heavier big heads, do breathe the spirit of joy and music coupled with an attitude of reverence and worship.

The third panel on the left end is even more lively and gay and is drawn on a similar bright red background (Fig. 3). The first male figure on the right end seems to play on a pipe, the second beats the *jallari*, the third male, dancing, beats a *mṛdaṅga*, the fourth figure is a female in a dancing posture, the fifth one, a male figure, bent and leaning towards the dancer, beats a *ḍamaru* with stick, the sixth figure is a male playing on the *mṛdaṅga*, the seventh, a male, plays the cymbals, the eighth also a male, again beats the *ḍamaru*, but with his hand and not with a stick. These *ḍamaru*-shaped drums may be what are called *ḍholakas*.

All the figures have U-shaped *tilaka* marks on their foreheads, their physiognomy being similar to that of the figures in panel 1. The *mṛdaṅga* players wear a *kañcuka*-like unbuttoned upper garment. The female dancer wears a *colī* of light blue hue. In front of her hair-knot on top of head is a crescent-shaped ornament (does it suggest that she is here enacting the dance of Śiva?). The highly accentuated curves of the torsoes of the female dancer and the drum-beater by her side are noteworthy and are reminiscent of similar representations of eleventh century sculpture from Prabhas-Patan, Kiradu etc.

Figures of different males in panel 1 are of light grey or yellowish brown hues; in panel three the figures are white, grey or yellowish brown, the female dancer is of reddish yellow complexion. All the colours used are bright and include black, light blue, red, pink, green, yellow, grey, light-brown, etc. The face of the female dancer, shown in three quarters profile, is squarish and not oblong like faces of male figures.

This book-cover reminds one of the famous book-covers narrating the dispute between Devasūri and the Digambara monk Kumudacandra,[1] once in the collections of Muni Jinavijayaji, now said to be in some other private collection. This book-cover also contains a panel showing a female dancer accompanied by *mṛdaṅga*-players etc. (figs. 4 and 5). But the male figures show thickly grown beards and have no long whiskers. The modelling of their faces is different. All the faces are squarish and not oblong with plump or full cheeks. The legs are long and thinner, the figures not so stunted as in the Oriental Institute *paṭṭikā*. However, both these *paṭṭikās* may not be far removed in age; though the provenance of the *paṭṭikā* of Devasūri seems to be Paṭan, Gujarat, the provenance of this *paṭṭikā* of the Oriental Institute (figs. 1-3) may be either Rajasthan or Gujarat. The Oriental Institute *paṭṭikā* may be assigned to about the first quarter of the twelfth century A.D.

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1 Moti Chandra, *Miniature Paintings from Western India*, figs. 193-198, pp. 59-62; Khandalawala and Doshi, in *Jaina Art & Architecture*, Vol. III, p. 400

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The famous *paṭṭikā* of the fight between Bharata and Bāhubali, now in the collections of Kusum and Rājeya Svali, is assigned by Khandalawala and others to c. first half of the twelfth century A.D. Its provenance is uncertain. I am still not convinced that its provenance is Rajasthan because the physiognomy of males and females depicted therein is not known in Jaina miniature paintings from Rajasthan and Gujarat published hitherto nor is it common to sculptures from these areas.[2]

In the special issue on Western Indian Art of the Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art, pp. 34-44, *Some painted wooden book-covers from Western India* were discussed by Muni Puṇyavijayaji and the present writer wherein at the end was appended by the latter, a list of almost all published Jaina painted wooden book-covers and an attempt was made to reassess the age of each of them. One book-cover showing representations of Vidyā-devīs, illustrated in the above-mentioned article, was assigned by me to the second half of the tenth century.[3] In a recent article[4] K. J. Khandalawala and Sarayu Doshi have preferred to assign these two book-covers to the age of Jinadatta Sūri who died in 1154 A.D. The arguments advanced are : (1) that these Vidyā-devīs are plainly derived from some illustrated Pāla Buddhist manuscript, probably of Rāmapāla's reign in the late eleventh or early twelfth century and (2) that the two female worshippers in the Vidyā-devī *pāṭalī* are almost identical with the female worshippers in the *pāṭalī* depicting Jinadatta Sūri and Jinarakṣitasūri, illustrated by Khandalawala and Doshi, as colour illustration 22, in their above article.

But a minute study of both these groups of female worshippers will immediately show that whereas at least one male in front of the two females in the *pāṭalī* with Jinadatta Sūri has the farther eye projected in space, the eyes of both the females in the Vidyā-Devī *pāṭalī* do not extend beyond the outline of the face and belong to the earlier tradition. Also, I may add, that the treatment of the ornaments with double pearl strings in the Vidyā-Devī *pāṭalī* is different, the lower garment of the first female, in this group covers both the legs and its design and treatment are different from those of the other *pāṭalī*. Besides, these ladies wear a scarf (*oḍhaṇī*) which is totally absent in the Jinadatta Sūri *pāṭalī* (*paṭṭikā*).

The representations of Vidyā-devīs certainly remind us of Pāla art but this is mainly due to the treatment of the arches under which the Vīdya-devīs are seated. The rendering of the eyes of these goddesses does not follow the Pāla idiom. For all such reasons I suggested that these book-covers were painted

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2 Khandalawala & Doshi in *op. cit.*, p. 401

3 *JISOA* (New Series Vol. I, March, 1966), p. 40, pls. XXVI-XXVIII.

4 In *Jaina Art and Architecture* (Delhi, 1975), Vol. III, chp. 31, p. 397.

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Fig. 1
Citra-Paṭṭikā from the Collections of the Oriental Institute, Baroda

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

Fig. 2
Citra-Paṭṭikā from the Collections of the Oriental Institute, Baroda

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Fig. 3
Citra-Paṭṭkā from the Collections of the Oriental Institute, Baroda



Fig. 4

Scenes from Citra-Paṭṭikā depicting controversy between Vādi Deva Sūri and Paṇḍita Kumudcandra

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Fig. 5
Scenes from Citra-Paṭṭikā depicting controversy between Vādi Deva Sūri and Paṇḍita Kumudcandra

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perhaps in a border region where both Western and the Pāla (Eastern) influences were available. To compare them with "some" (apparently not cited) *pāṭalī* of Rāmapāla's reign for fixing the age of the Vidyā-devī *paṭṭikās* is not a convincing mode of arriving at a probable date !

True it is that I also do not have such early *pāṭalī* from Western India for comparison, but I have tried to suggest a date by approximately calculating the time-lag required in the treatment of the figures of the two female worshippers in the Vidyā-devī *pāṭalī* and in the known other (obviously later) Jaina miniatures on wood or palm-leaf. The Vidyā-devī *pāṭalī* may be slightly later but certainly is not as late as the age of Jinadatta Sūri.

I have taken this opportunity to discuss the Vidyā-devī *pāṭalī* again because it is advisable to evolve now a generally acceptable *relative chronology* of all the known Jaina painted *pāṭalī*s from Western India. It will also help us to assess the age of the *pāṭalī* that is being published here for the first time.

I would also take this opportunity to answer the criticism of Khandalawala and Doshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-401, regarding a *pāṭalī* which has on it, painted in black, *Niśīthabhāṣya-pūjā Śrī-Vijayasiṃhācārjānam* as read by the two learned authors, who state that "This would indicate that the *pāṭlī*, and probably also the text for which it was meant as a book-cover, were got prepared and presented to Śrī-Vijayasiṃhācārya by one of his followers." Since this ācārya lived in the age of Siddharāja Jayasiṃha (1094-1144) and was a contemporary of Hemacandrācārya, they have assigned this *pāṭalī* to the age of Vijayasiṃhācārya in the 12th cent. A.D. The learned writers reject my suggestion about the *pāṭalī* having later come into the possession of this *ācārya* when it was inscribed as above. I am afraid both the critics have not carefully thought over the whole case. A look at the published photograph of this *pāṭalī* is enough to show that no sensible *ācārya* would ever prefer to spoil painting by inscribing over it these words in the way in which they are inscribed, especially if the beautiful *pāṭalī* was either painted at his order or for him at the order of a rich devotee. We have no such parallel instance from Jaina *pāṭalī*s. The few known cases of such titles are cases of later inscriptions. Nor should we forget the correct reading of the inscription. Sarabhai Nawab who published this plate in his *The Oldest Rājasthānī Paintings from Jaina Bhaṇḍāras* (Ahmedabad, 1959), Plate 1 (colour) and Plate 2 (black & white) and described it on p. 6, *op.cit.*, gave this reading and identified ācārya Vijayasiṃha as a contemporary of Siddharāja and Hemacandra. But the correct reading is—*Om Nisīhabhāṣya-pustakaṃ Śrī-Jayasiṃhācāryāṇām* / The letter preceeding *Jaya* can never be *Vi* since the *ra-kāra* (the sign for *ra*) is clearly visible and the reading *pūjya* is also wrong. The letter is *pu* and not *pū* and the remaining two partly preserved letters are *staka*. A small dot is also visible above *ka*. So, until we identify this Jayasiṃhācārya all the arguments of Khandalawalla and Doshi have no

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bearing on the date of this *paṭṭikā* and all later inferences based on the dating of this book-cover, noted by these writers, are not tangible.

Even though in this case the inscription is on one end of the border, it is much more reasonable to think that the portion of the border was partly worn out by repeated handling (or for some other accidental reasons) and when the book with its cover came into possession of Jayasiṃhācārya, he got his name inscribed on it. The original owner of the book-cover, for whom it was painted, could hardly have thought of spoiling the beauty of its decoration. Moreover, even in cases where book-covers are not painted we hardly come across the name of the owner inscribed on it. The practice was perhaps never popular.

There are however cases where, when a manuscript later came into possession of another monk, mostly of a different spiritual lineage (*gaccha* etc.), care was taken to record the new ownership. Or at a much later date some less scrupulous owners have spoiled the beauty by inscribing names of texts etc. (but such cases are also very rare) as in the case of the *paṭṭikā* of *Śalākāpuruṣas* published by us, in *Western Indian Art*, *JISOA.*, *Op-cit*, pl. *XXV* twice inscribing the name of *Anuyogadvāracūrṇi*, in dirty hand-writing, but only where portions of their painting had peeled off.

Perhaps both these learned critics are unaware of certain Śvetāmbara Jaina manuscript traditions obtainable from a study of several Jaina manuscripts and their colophon and post-colophon entries in the different Bhaṇḍāras, or have ignored them. We have come across a number of cases which show that pious Jaina male and female devotees have acquired and protected an older manuscript and then either given it as a gift to a Jaina monk or have deposited in a manuscript library. Whenever we find such an extra entry recording the gift or deposit in a *citkośa*, the manuscript would certainly be of an age fairly earlier than the age of such an additional entry. Due to ignorance of this tradition, Khandalawala and Doshi have persisted as later in regarding the *Kalpasūtra* published by Moti Chandra and U. P. Shah in *New Documents of Jaina Painting*[5] which was assigned to *Saṃvat* 1403 on the basis of an entry in one of the margins. A later entry of *Saṃvat* 1505, also in a margin of another folio, especially refers to its deposit in a *cit-kośa* (manuscripts-library). Obviously this second entry can never be the date of its original copying. The last folio is missing. Possibly it was torn and ruined and instead of adding a new folio, both the entries were made on different folios. The original date of copying was preserved on the basis of the discarded ruined folio. The second entry was either on the basis of the last entry on the ruined folio or was made fresh in the margin while depositing the manuscript in the *cit-kośa*. Those acquainted with manuscript-collections would see the validity of this argument. Whatever the

5 Moti Chandra and Shah, U. P., *New Documents of Jaina Paintings*, pp. 41-44.

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original date of copying, no student of Jaina manuscripts would accept the following argument, recently advanced by Khandalawala and Doshi, in their above-mentioned article, when they state : "The end of the *Kalpa-sūtra* section states it was deposited in the Mahāvīra Bhaṇḍāra in *Vikrama Saṃvat* 1505 (1448). The latter date is in all probability also the date of the execution of the manuscript, it being deposited in the Bhaṇḍāra in the very year in which it was prepared." If this were the case, this entry would heve specifically referred to *V.S.* 1505 as the date of copying and then stated that it was deposited in the *cit-kośa*. The original copyist need not make an entry like this in the margin. A folio could have been added giving the details. For the information of scholars I may state that since Dr. Moti Chandra and Khandalawala had expressed their opinions personally to me I had mentioned this to Muni Puṇyavijayaji (from whose collections the ms. was published) and asked him what his final opinion would be. This veteran scholar, whose experience of formats of lacs of Jaina manuscripts is well-known, had told me that he still believed that *Saṃvat* 1403 was the date of copying and not *Saṃvat* 1505 which was the date for its later deposit in a Bhaṇḍāra.

The practice of retrieving, saving old Jaina manuscripts and then again preserving them in Jaina Bhaṇḍāras is still continuing amongst Jaina lay worshippers as well as Jaina monks. Even this *Kalpa-sūtra* under discussion was given as gift by a Jaina lay worshipper to Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayajī, about less than a decade before the latter's sad demise. Jinabhadrasūri who had centuries ago established the famous Jaina Bhaṇḍāra at Jesalmere, not only collected manuscripts copied in his life time but also preserved whatever was handed down to him in his line of teachers and also whatever older manuscripts he could collect or secure and preserve. The palm-leaf ms. of the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* in the Jesalmere collections is an instance of a tenth century manuscript preserved in a Bhaṇḍāra founded later.

Incidentally I may note here that cases are not unknown in Jaina manuscripts where names of *ācāryas*, places etc. are later made unreadable by applying yellow or other paints or even black ink over them. Such cases are rare and happened only when the manuscript came into possession of a monk whose *gaccha* was different from the *gaccha* to which the monk-owner of the original manuscript belonged. Sometimes the last page containing the colophon giving the original data of ownership etc. is removed and a fresh page is replaced. Sometimes the last page is torn or lost and it is replaced and so on. What happens to-day in the case of borrowed or stolen or lost books happened also in the past.

Khandalawala and Doshi try to date some *Pāṭalīs* later because of their pre-conceived hypothesis for which they have not been able to advance any

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concrete proof in their paper. They state, in that paper, while discussing the above *Pāṭalī*, their hypothesis in the following words : "In fact if it is acceptable that the very idea of illustrating these palm-leaf manuscript texts and providing them with painted wooden book-covers was derived by the Jainas from the practice of the Buddhists, then this influence is not likely to be of a date earlier than the mid-eleventh century." And then, because of this theory of derivation of this practice from the Buddhists by the Jainas, a theory which both the writers have not proved beyond doubt with evidence, both the writers seem to have been misguided in their judgements regarding the style and age of some of these paintings, so much so that, in the case of the *Pāṭalī* inscribed with the name of Vijayasiṃhācārya, they preferred to date it in the first half of the twelfth century (or early twelfth) even though regarding its style they had to write "These decorative paintings take us back to the spirit of the painted ceilings at Ajantā with their wealth of floral, animal and foliage designs. Here again we have evidence of a lingering Ajantā tradition of decorative motifs as practised in Gujarat and Rajasthan where such *Pāṭalīs* were painted."

Now as I have shown above, there is better reason to regard the *Pāṭalī* as painted prior to the age of Vijayasiṃhācārya (better, Jayasiṃhācārya). Thus the following further inference of the two scholars will also not be acceptable : "This inscribed *Pāṭlī* affords quite valuable material, based on stylistic characteristics, for dating other *Pāṭlīs* in which elephants, similar mythical lions and birds with foliated tails appear. Since it belongs to the first half of the twelfth century, there is good reason to ascribe most of the Jesalmere Bhaṇḍāra decorative *Pāṭlīs* to the same period or late eleventh century at the earliest."

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THE MEANING OF THE WORD VĀSAKA IN VĀSAKASAJJĀ OR VĀSAKASAJJIKĀ[1]

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Vāsakasajjā is the name of a *nāyikā*, in one of the eight stages. The *Daśarūpaka* says :

āsām aṣṭāv avasthāḥ syuḥ svādhīnapatikādayaḥ (II.23 (B))

Commenting on this, Dhanika says that the terms *svastrī*, *nāyikā* etc. are *dharmivācakas* (substantive nouns) whereas the words *svādhīnapatikā etc. are dharmavācakas* (adjectives) and they refer mainly to the various *dharmas*, *avasthās*, the stages or situations. A *dharmin* cannot be another *dharmin*. A *svastrī* cannot be a *parastrī* or a *parastrī* a *sādhāraṇastrī*. But in the same *dharmin* various possible *dharmas* can exist. The same *nāyikā* can be called a *svādhīṇapatikā*, when her husband (or the lover) is always with her, or she may be called a *proṣitapriyā*, when the husband is away on some business. (In both cases, the DR says : *āsannāyattaramaṇā hṛṣṭā svādhīnabhartṛkā*, and *dūradeśāntarasthe tu kāryataḥ proṣitapriyā*,—II.24 (A), and II.27 (A)—.) Dhanika brings out fine shades of differences between these *avasthās* to show that one cannot be included in the other. Bhaṭṭanṛsiṁha makes further clear the points by his brilliant comments In this context, Dhanika says :

nāyikāprabhṛtīnām apy avasthārūpatve saty avasthāntara-pratipādanaṁ pūrvāsāṁ dharmitvapratipādanāya. (P. 104)

and Bhaṭṭanṛsiṁha comments :

nāyikāprabhṛtīnāṁ dharmiṇīnāṁ svādhīnapatikātvādayo dharmāḥ etc. (*Ibid.*)

The names *svādhīnapatikā* etc. are self-explanatory (*anvarthas*) by themselves, and they do not involve any special difference in the interpretation. In the name Vāsakasajjā, though apparently self-explanatory, the meaning of the term *vāsaka* has not been made clear by many writers. That there is a difference in the interpretation of the term *vāsaka* seems to have escaped the attention of several writers. A few of them, however, including Siṅgabhūpāla, have noticed the difference, which I should like to explain here for the benefit of the students of drama and dramaturgy.

I. The word *vāsa* or *vāsaka* is generally understood in the sense of *veśma* (home or residence). Thus, some people analyse the expression *Vāsakasajjā* into *vāsakaṁ=kelīgṛhādikam sajjayatīti*, Vāsakasajjā (i.e. one who, having known the forthcoming visit of the *nāyaka*, has the residence ready). Some explain it

1 This paper includes extracts from the Introduction to my critical edition of the *Rasārṇavasudhākara*.

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as *vāsake sajjā*, meaning one who gets herself (or is) ready, expecting the visit, *at the residence* (*vāsake*). In both these cases, the word *vāsaka* is taken to mean the *veśma*, the residence.

II. But, there is another idiomatic and more significant meaning of the term *vāsaka*, which was indicated by Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Vidyānātha, and explained by Siṅgabhūpāla, our author. This meaning was also based on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself, and noted in the commentary thereon. This meaning seems to have escaped the attention of the writers who seem to have been content with the more commonly known meaning of the word *vāsaka*, as residence. Let us see the following statements :

The *Nāṭyaśāstra has this* :

ucite vāsake yā tu ratisaṁbhogalālasā,
maṇḍanaṁ kurute hṛṣṭā sā vai vāsakasajjikā.
(G.O.S., Vol.III, p. 208)

The meaning of the word *vāsaka* may not be clear yet. Just wait and see. The *Daśarūpaka* says :

mudā vāsakasajjā svaṁ maṇḍayaty eṣyati priye (II. 24 (B)—)

On this line Dhanika comments thus :

svam ātmānaṁ veśma ca (yā) harṣeṇa bhūṣayati
eṣyati priye (sati—sā) vāsakasajjā.

See what Bhaṭṭanṛsiṁha says here.:

svaśabdasya ātmavācitvam ātmīyavācitvaṁ ca
aṅgīkṛtyāha = svam ātmānaṁ veśma ceti.
(*Ibid.* p. 106)

Thus, the meaning of residence, the *veśma*, in this context, is conveyed by the word *sva*, and not by the word *vāsaka*. Then, the question arises as to what is the meaning of the word *vāsaka* intended? We will get the answer, when we see the following. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* has also the following :—

paripātyāṁ phalārthe vā nave prasava eva vā,
duḥkhe caiva pramode ca ṣaḍ ete vāsakāḥ smṛtāḥ.
(G.O.S., Vol. III, p. 207)

On this Abhinavagupta comments thus :

paripāṭiḥ yathākalpitānupūrvī, asyāḥ ekena bhinnena
vāraḥ, asyāḥ dvābhyām ityādi (ḥ).

ekena bhinnena seems to be in the sense of *ekāntaritena dinena*, i.e. by the day separated by one immediate, and *dvābhyām* means *dvābbyāṁ bhinnena dinena*, i.e. *dvyantaritena dinena*, *vāraḥ*. Here the word *vāra* is used as a synonym of *vāsaka*. *Vāra* stands for the *turn*, the occasion, the privilege, of meeting at a given time mutually agreed to by the partners. The day of such a *turn* as arranged previously to meet the particular *nāyikā*, came to be denoted subsequently by the term *vāra* and *vāsaka*. In the case of the items noted as *phalārthe* etc. (See Abhinava for meanings of this and others) the days of the visit or the

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meeting need not be pre-planned or pre-arranged. These come under special occasions during which a visit by the *nāyaka*, the king etc., that might spring a pleasant surprise, was not ruled out any time. *Vāsaka* is thus a synonym of *vāra* and *vāradivasa*, of which six are noted in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Abhinava also explaines the derivation of the word *vāsa* thus : *vāsayati tatra sthāne rātrim iti vāsaḥ* (and *vāsakaḥ*). It is this point mentioned by Bharata and Abhinava that seems to be intended by the line of the [2] *R.A.S.* which reads thus :

bharatādyair abhidadhe strīṇāṁ vāras tu vāsakaḥ, etc.

(I.125 (B) –)

Vidyānātha says on Vāsakasajjā thus :

priyāgamanavelāyāṁ maṇḍayantī muhur muhuḥ,
keligṛhaṁ tathātmānaṁ sā syād vāsakasajjikā.

(I.44; p. 21)

Kumārasvāmin comments on this verse first thus :

vāsake vāsaveśmani bhogopakaraṇaiḥ sajjā = saṁnaddhā; saiva vāsakasajjikā.

Immediately after these comments, he explains further thus :

strīṇāṁ vāras tu vāsakaḥ iti pakṣe, vāsake=vāradivase sajjayati=sajjīkaroti harṣeṇa keligṛhādikam iti vāsakasajjikā. ayam eva pakṣo vidyānāthasya vivakṣitaḥ (Ibid.)

The line *strīṇāṁ vāras tu vāsakaḥ* seems to be quoted by Kumārasvāmin from the *R.A.S.*, though the idea was already given in the *N.Ś.* It is not clear whether this line was also given as such in some earlier text. Now it is available only in the *R.A.S.* so far. The expression :

priyāgamanavelāyām

in the *kārikā* of Vidyānātha is the explanation of the meaning of the term *vāsako* (i.e. *vāre* or *vāradivase*), and the expressions *keligṛhaṁ tathātmānam* represent what was conveyed by the word *svam* in the *Daśarūpaka* (quoted with Dhanika's comments already). Thus Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Abhinavagupta, Vidyānātha and Siṅgabhūpāla have all noted the special meaning of the word *vāsaka* in the *vāsakasajjā*. The meaning of *vāsaka* as *vāra* was hinted by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, Abhinavagupta and Vidyānātha. That *vāra* is the same as *vāsaka* is not made clear even by Abhinava, though he explaines the *vāra* while interpreting the term *paripāṭī*. But the line of the *R.A.S.* : *bharatādyair abhidadhe strīṇāṁ vāras tu vāsakaḥ*, makes the point very clear, which line seems to have been quoted by Kumārasvāmin. Though commenting on the *Daśarūpaka*, it is strange, Bahurūpamiśra does not explain the significance of the term *vāsaka*, as hinted in the basic text.

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2 The *Rasārṇavasudhākara*. Reference is to my edition.

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MIDDLE INDO-ARYAN STUDIES XIII[1]

By

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The Palatalization of Vowels in Middle Indo-Aryan

1. *Introduction*

1.1. The palatalization of the vowel which developed from Skt.[2] *-ṛ-* in MIA, i.e. the tendency for *-ṛ-* to become *-i-* when in contact with a palatal consonant, has long been recognized, but the palatalization of original vowels in MIA, i.e. the development of *-a-* > *-i-* (or *-ĕ-* before a doubled consonant) and *-ā-* > *-e-* in the proximity of a palatal consonant, has not received the attention it deserves.

1.2. Trenckner,[3] without using the word ' palatalization ', explained P.[4] *peyyāla* as coming from **payyāya* < Skt. *paryāya*, with *-eyy-* for *-ayy-*, and compared P. *seyyā* < Skt. *śayyā* and P. *-teyya* < *-tayya* < Skt. *-tavya*. Pischel[5] quoted Jacobi's view that *-i-* in Pkt. *sijjā*, *nisijjā*, *sahijjā*, and *miṃjā* was due to the influence of *jja*, but nevertheless rejected this explanation and concluded that the change in these words, and also AMg. *asiṇa* < Skt. *aśana*, AMg. *majjhima* < Skt. *madhyama*, and Pkt. *kaima* < Skt. *katama*, was due to the position of the accent. Geiger[6] accepted the idea of influence by a palatal consonant, and quoted P. *seyyā* < Skt. *śayyā*, P. *miṃjā* < Skt. *majjan*, P. *jigucchati* and *jigucchā* < Skt. *jugupsate* and *jugupsā*, and P. *bhiyyo* < Skt. *bhūyas* as examples. Burrow[7]

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1 See *JOI* (Baroda) Vol. XXIV, Nos. 1-2, pp. 139-44.

2 General abbreviations Skt. = Sanskrit; MIA = Middle Indo-Aryan; (J)PTS = (Journal of the) Pali Text Society; PED = PTS's *Pali-English Dictionary*; PSM = *Pāia-saddamahaṇṇavo*; MW = Monier-Williams, *Skt-English Dictionary*; CPD = *Critical Pāli Dictionary*; CDIAL = Turner R. L., *Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages*; cty/cties = commentary/commentaries; Ms(s) = manuscript(s); *m.c.* = for metrical reasons; *v.l.*(*l*). = variant reading(s); *s.v*(*v*). = under that entry/those entries.

3 Trenckner's ' Notes to the Milinda-pañha ', p. 66 (= *JPTS* 1908, p. 117).

4 I use the following abbreviations for dialects and I list them in this order in §§2-3 : Aś. = Aśokan inscriptions; P. = Pāli; AMg. = Ardha-Māgadhī; Pkt. = Prakrit; BHS. = Buddhist Hybrid Skt.; G. = Gāndhārī; N. = Niya Pkt. I give specific references only if the words quoted do not appear (*s.vv.*) in Hultzsch E., *Inscriptions of Aśoka* (index), PED, PSM, Edgerton F., *BHS Dictionary*, Brough J., *Gāndhārī Dharmapada* (index), and Boyer A. M. *et. al.*, *Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions* (index), respectively.

5 Pischel R., *Comparative Grammar of the Pkt. Languages* (= Pkt. Gr.), §101 and n. 1.

6 Geiger W., *Pāli Literature and Language* (= P. Gr.), §9 n. 4 and §18.

7 Burrow T., *The Language of the Kharoṣṭhī Documents from Chinese Turkestan*, §6.

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listed the words in N. where *-aya-* > *-eya-*, but suggested that this was due to *-e* < *-aya* being readapted to the declensional system by the adding of *-a*.

1.3. In his edition of the G Dh., Brough[8] stated clearly that in that text there was the marking of palatalization of vowels in the neighbourhood of a palatal consonant, even though that consonant might not still be written. He gave some 20 examples from G.Dh., compared Aś. *meñati*, and N. *sveya*, referred to Burrow, and suggested that Pkt. *āiṇṇa* < Skt. *ājanya* and Pkt. *sejjā*/P. *seyyā* < Skt. *śayyā* should be brought under the same heading.

1.4. Palatalization of vowels in MIA is even more widespread than Brough suggested. In this paper, offered in celebration of the Silver Jubilee of the Journal of the Oriental Institute, I have collected together examples of the palatalization of vowels from a variety of dialects of MIA, including those suggested by the scholars mentioned above (although in §§ 4.2-5 I suggest that some apparent examples are wrongly so designated). I have classified them in terms of the consonants with which they are in contact, and whether these consonants precede (§§ 2.1-9) or follow (§§ 3.1-9) the vowel. I list them, with some exceptions (which I comment upon), by the consonant which occurs in the dialect I am quoting from, although in some cases it is likely that palatalization occurred in an earlier form of the word, e.g. I list G. *paje* under *-j-*, although the change could have taken place while the word was still pronounced as *pañca*. When the vowel has palatal consonants preceding and following, so that the situation is ambiguous, e.g. *ciccā*, I list it, for consistency's sake, as occurring after a palatal consonant, although I draw attention to the ambiguity.

1.5. In the light of this collection, I then try to show (§§ 5-8) how a knowledge and understanding of the palatalization of vowels enables us to suggest solutions to certain problems which occur in MIA, and I try to draw conclusions (§§ 9.1-7) about the place and time in which this phenomenon first occurred.

2. *The Palatalization of Vowels after a Palatal Consonant*

2.1. After *c* :

P. *cikkh-* < **cakkh-*	< Skt. *cakṣ-*[9]	
P. *viceyya*[10]	< Skt. *vicarya* (this could be before *-yy-* < *-ry-*)	
AMg. *ciccā*/*ceccā* < **caccā*	< Skt. **tyaktya*[11]=Skt. *tyaktvā* (this could be before *-cc-*)[12]	

8 G. Dh. §22a.

9 This derivation seems to be assured by the correspondence in P. between the roots *cikkh-* and (*k*)*khā-*, e.g. *abbhakkhāna* and *abbhācikkhati*; cf. the replacement in Skt. of *cakṣ-* by *khyā-* (MW, *s.v. cakṣ-*).

10 Not in PED; see Sn 517, 524-26, 529.

11 See 'Some absolutive forms in AMg.', *IIJ* II (1958), pp. 311-1

12 This is the only form from *cayat* listed in PSM with the change *-a->-i-*. This suggests that the palatalization is due to the *-cc-* following rather than the initial *c-*.

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	Pkt. *ciṃcā*	< Skt. *cañcā* (this could be before *-ñc-*)
	Pkt. *ciṇa*	< Skt. *caṇa*
	BHS. *cikṣ-*[13]	< Skt. *cakṣ-*
	G. *ci*	< Skt. *ca*
	G. *prace'a*	< Skt. *pratyaya* (this could be before *-y-*)
	G. *vicirya*	< Skt. *vicarya*
	G. *kici-'ali*	< Skt. *kṛtya-kāle* (this could be before *-y-* < *-k-*)
	N. *niceya*	< Skt. *niścaya* (this could be before *-y-*)
	N. *praceya*	< Skt. *pratyaya* (this could be before *-y-*)
2.2. After *ch* :	P. *vicchind-*	< Skt. *vicchand-*
2.3. After *j* :	P. *rajissara*[14]	< P. **rajassara*[15]
	P. *dighañña*[16] < **jighañña*	< Skt. *jaghanya*
	BHS. *jenta*[17]	< Skt. *yantra*
	G. *ji* < G. *ja*	< Skt. *ca*
	G. *paje*	< Skt. *pañca*
	G. *jimi* < **jammi*	< Skt. *jālmī*
	G. *vaji*	< Skt. *varjya*
	G. *ajetaṇa*	< Skt. *adyatana*
	G. *yuji*	< Skt. *-yujya*[18]
	N. *jeyaṃtasa*	< Skt. *jayant-* (this could be before *-y-*)
2.4. After *jh* :	P. *majjhima*	< Skt. *madhyama*

13 Found in BHS. *ācikṣati* etc.. As Edgerton suggests (*BHS Dictionary s.v.*), this is probably a hyper-Skt. form based on P. *ācikkhati*.

14 Not in PED; see DhA iii 231.21, 233.3.

15 For BHS. *rajasvara* see *BHS Dictionary s.v.*; for Skt. *rajasvala* see Charpentier J., 'Some Skt. and P. Notes', *IL* II (1932), pp. 57-60. Alsdorf ('Bemerkungen zum Vessantara-jātaka', *WZKSO* I (1957), pp. 20-21) explains the usual P. form *rajassira* as showing the change *-a->-i-* after the accent, and refers to P. Gr. §19.

16 This may be an early example of the change *j>d*, later found more frequently in Sinhalese, but *d-* is more probably due to the dissimilation of the palatal sounds *j-ñ-*, cf. P. *digucchā*<P. *jigucchā* < Skt. *jugupsā*, and P. *dighacchā*<P. *jighacchā*<Skt. *jighatsā*.

17 Skt. and BHS. *jentāka* (MW and *BHS Dictionary s.vv.*) is doubtless a borrowing from MIA.

18 Brough (G.Dh. index, p. 307) takes this as a present participle (=P. *yuñjaṃ*), but the BHS. version (Uv. V. 9) has an absolutive *yujya*.

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AMg. *nijjheriya*[19] < **nijjhāriya* < Skt. **niḥkṣārita*

2.5. After original *y* (sometimes replaced by zero or G. alif) :

Aś. *ayi*	< Skt. *ayam*
Aś. *saṃkheya*	< Skt. *saṃkhyāya* (see also § 2.6. below)
P. *pavecchati* < **payecchati*	< Skt. *prayacchati*[20] (with *-y-* replaced by *-v-*)
AMg. *-āe, -īe, -ūe* (oblique case endings of *-ā, -ī, -ū* stems)[21]	= Pkt. *-āya, -īya, -ū* (*y*) *a*
G. *a'i*	< Skt. *ayam*
G. *a'edi*	< Skt. *āyanti* (but perhaps = P. *ādenti*)
G. *aproha'i* (etc.)	< Skt. absolutive ending *-āya*
G. *ya'i* (etc.)	< Skt. fem. instr. sg. ending *-ayā*
G. *sa'i*	< Skt. *svayam*
G. *va'idi*	< Skt. *vāyati*
G. *pada'idi* (error for *pava'idi* ?)	< Skt. *pravāyati*

2.6 After original *y* in consonant groups (now elided) :

Aś. *saṃkheye*	< Skt. *saṃkhyāya*
Aś. *-siti*	< Skt. future ending *-syati*[22]
P. *pattiya*	< Skt. *pratyaya*[23]
P. *vīti-*	< Skt. *vyati-*[24]
P. *vīvadāta*	< Skt. *vyavadāta*
P. *abbhihāsi*[25]	< Skt. *abhyahārṣīt* (aor. of *abhi-har-*)
Pkt. *abbhiṃtara, bhittara*	< Skt. *abhyantara*

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19 Not in PSM; see *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* (ed. Charpentier) XII.29 and p. 326.

20 See PED *s.v.*; of the other suggestions made there, that of Barnett (*JRAS* 1925, p. 186) < *vṛścati* (= *dānakarmā*, Nigh III.20) is attractive from the point of view of form, but MW lists only the meanings ' cut off, cut to pieces, lacerate, wound ' for *pravraśc-* (*s.v.*).

21 Pkt Gr. §§375, 385. See Alsdorf L., " A Specimen of Archaic Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī ", *BSOS* VIII (1936), p. 328.

22 e.g. *vaḍhisiti*. Smith H., " Le futur moyen indien et ses rythmes ", *JA* CCXL (1952), 182-83, suggests an alternative explanation, based on the alternation *-ya-/-i-*, i.e. *-s-ya-ti/-s-i-ti*.

23 With *-ty-* > *-tt-*, cf. Pkt. pattekabuddha < Skt. *pratyekabuddha*.

24 With *vīti-* < **viiti-* < **viyiti-* < **viyati-* < *vyati*; cf. P. *vūpa-* < **vuupa-* < **vuyupa-* < **viyupa-* < *vyupa-*, and see Berger H., *Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre*, p. 52.

25 Not in PED; see J v 169.23.

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G. *katavi, bhayidavi* < Skt. *-tavya* (this may be the 'Māgadhan' nom. sg. ending *-i* < *-e*) [26]

G. *sabhe* < Skt. *sabhyāt*

G. *same* < Skt. *samyak*

G. *aviḷ'hidu* < Skt. *avyut(s)thita*

2.7 After *y* developed from a palatal (sometimes replaced by zero or G. alif):

AMg. *āiṇṇa* < Skt. *ājanya*

AMg. *rāiṇṇa* < Skt. *rājanya*

G. *rayerṣayu* < Skt. *rājarṣayo*

G. *eka'irya'i* < BHS. *ekacaryā-* (this could be before *-yy-* < *-ry-*)

G. *sama'irya* < Skt. *-carya*

G. *bramma-yiryeṇa* < Skt. *brahma-carya-*

G. *parikirya'i* < **pariyirya'i* < Skt. *paricaryā* (with *-k-* < *-y-* < *-c-*)

2.8. After *y* developed from a non-palatal (sometimes replaced by zero or G. alif) :

Pkt. *kai* < *kayā* < Skt. *kadā*

Pkt. *taiā* < **tayadā* < Skt. **ta-ka-dā*

Pkt. *kaima* < **kayama* < Skt. *katama*

Pkt. *kaira* < **kayara* < Skt. *kadara*

Pkt. *navalai* [27] < *navalayā* < Skt. *navalatā*

G. *uvaca'i* < Skt. *upatyagāt*

G. *udacha'i* = P. *udacchidā*

G. *(ji)kitsa* < Skt. *jighatsā* (with *-k-* < *-y-* < *-g-* < *-gh-*)

G. *yu'i, yo'i* < Skt. *yuvā* [28]

2.9 After *ś* and *s* (< *ś*) :

Aś. *seyaka* < Skt. *śalyaka* (this could be before *-yy-*) [29]

P. *seyyā* < Skt. *śayyā* (this could be before *-yy-*)

P. *āsiṃs-* < Skt. *āśaṃs-*

AMg. *sellaga* < Skt. *śalyaka*

AMg. *asiṇa* < Skt. *aśana*

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26 See G. Dh. §77.

27 Not in PSM; see Hāla's *Sattasaī* 28.

28 Brough (G.Dh. p. 211) suggests a connection with P. *yuvin*.

29 Skt. *seraka* (*Arthaśāstra* II.17) is doubtless < **śaryaka*, i.e. the *r/l* variant of *śalkyaka*.

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Pkt. *sijjā/sejjā*	< Skt. *śayyā* (this could be before *-jj-*)
Pkt. *sella*	< Skt. *śalya*
Pkt. *siṇa*	< Skt. *śaṇa*
Pkt. *Settuṃja*	< Skt. *Śatruṃjaya*
G. *aṇośe'a*	< Skt. *anuśaya* (this could be before *-y-*)
G. *deśehi*	< Skt. *deśayan* (this could be before *-y-*, prior to its change to *-h-*)
G. *praviśi*	< Skt. *praviśya*
G. *vaṇaśe'a*	= P. *vanathaja* (this could be before *-y-* < *-j-*)
G. *śe'adi*	< Skt. *śayati* (this could be before *-y-*)

3. *The Palatalization of Vowels before a Palatal Consonant*

3.1. Before *c:*	G. *ecasari*	= P. *accasārī*
	G. *precasari*	= P. *paccasārī*
3.2. Before *j:*	P. *miñjā*/Pkt. *miṃjā* < **mijjā*	< Skt. *majjan*
	AMg. *nisejjā*	< Skt. (lex.) *niṣadyā*[30]
	Pkt. *sahijja/sahejja*	< Skt. *sahāya*
3.3. Before *jh:*	P. *samijjhiṭṭha*	= P. **samajjhiṭṭha*
3.4. Before *ñ:*	Aś. *meñati*	= P. *maññati*

3.5. Before original *y* (sometimes replaced by zero or G. alif):

Aś. *mamiyā*	< Aś. *mamayā*
G. *veṇe'adi*	< Skt. *vinayanti*
G. *viṇi'adu*	< Skt. *vinayato*
N. *ubheya*	< Skt. *ubhaya*
N. *treya*	< Skt. *traya*
N. *bheyidavya*	< Skt. *bhayitavya*
N. *veyaṃ*	< Skt. *vayam*
N. *ṣeyita*	< Skt. **śrayita*
N. *saṃpreṣeyati*	< Skt. *sampreṣayati*
N. *sveya*	< Skt. *svayam*

3.6. Before *yy* developed from consonant + *y:*

P. *peyyāla* < **payyāla*	< Skt. *paryāya*
P. *-teyya*[31] < *-tayya*	< Skt. *-tavya*

30 Although this resembles Pkt. *sejjā* <Skt. *śayyā*, the derivation from Skt. *niṣadyā* seems preferable since MW does not quote **niṣayyā*.

31 Geiger (P. Gr. §203) quotes *ñāteyya, daṭṭheyya,* and *patteyya* from S i 61.26-27.

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3.7. Before *y* developed from a palatal (sometimes replaced by zero or G. alif) :

G. *pre'aṇadi* < Skt. *prajānāti*

3.8. Before *y* developed from a non-palatal (sometimes replaced by zero or G. alif) :

G. *radhe'aro* < Skt. *ratha-kāra*
G. *uṭ'haṇe-'alasa* < Skt. *utthāna-kāla*
G. [*pa*]*pavuṣe'aṇa* < Skt. *prapuṣpakāni*

3.9. Before *ś:* G. *aviśiśadi* < Skt. *avaśiṣyate*

4. *Alternative Explanations*

4.1. It is probable that some forms which are claimed to be examples of palatalization, including some quoted above (§ 1.2), are in fact examples of other phenomena.

4.2. Geiger[32] explained P. *jigucchā* and *jigucchati* as being palatalized from Skt. *jugupsā* and *jugupsate*. Since the change *-u-*>*-i-* is very rare,[33] it is perhaps more likely that we have here an example of vowel dissimilation, following the common pattern of *u-u*>*a-u*.[34]

4.3. Geiger[35] explained P. *bhiyyo* as being palatalized from *bhūyas*, but since I can quote no other example of the change of *-ū-*>*-ī-*, it is preferable to see here an example of the root **bhī-*, i.e. **bhīyas*, which is a variant of *bhū-*, and is elsewhere attested only outside India, in Old Persian *biyā* ' let it be ' and Latin *fio* ' I am made, I become. ' [36]

4.4. PED (*s.v. pavecchati*), when explaining the change *payacchati*> **payecchati*, compares *sa-yathā*>*seyyathā*. The correct explanation of *seyyathā*, however, is that it equals *taṃyathā*, with Māgadhan *se-* for *ta-* (as PED rightly states, *s.v. seyyathā*).

4.5. In view of AMg. *nisejjā*<Skt. *niṣadyā* (§ 3.2), it is tempting to see Pkt. *pasijjaṇa* ' being pleased ' as another example of palatalization. Since, however, the suffix-*ana* is normally added either to the root or the present stem in MIA, it is more likely that we have here the development of **pra-sīdy-ana*< Skt. **prasīdyate*.[37]

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32 P. Gr. §18.

33 I can quote only G. *aviṭ'hidu*<Skt. *avyut(s)thita* (see §2.6).

34 See Schwarzschild L. A., ' Some Sporadic Changes of Vowels in MIA ', *IIJ* VIII (1964), p. 29.

35 P. Gr. §18.

36 See Bloch J., *L'Indo-Aryen*, p. 14.

37 See CDIAL 8843.

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5. *P. Upecca*

5.1. We find in P. the line *na te dukkhā pamuty atthi upeccāpi palāyato* (Thīg 248ab).[38] The cty explains : *upecca sañcicca* (ThīgA 205.26), but it also quotes a *v. l. uppacca* which it glosses *uppatitvā*.[39] The reading *upecca* is also found at Peṭ 44.21, Netti 131.20, and Ud 51.17, with the gloss *sañcicca* being given at UdA 295.15. The same line at S i 209.6, however, has the reading *uppaccāpi* (with a *v. l. upecca* quoted from a Burmese Ms) and this reading is also found at Pv II. 7. 17[40] (= verse 236) and DhA iv 21.19 (which is a quotation of S i 209). SA i 307.22 explains ; *uppatitvā*, as does PvA 103.29 and DhA iv 22.1. PvA 103 also quotes the *v. l. upecca*, and glosses it by *sañcicca*.

5.2. Since *uppacca* makes better sense, it is probable that it is the correct reading. It is possible to deduce how the reading *upecca* arose. In the P. context, the word occurs at the beginning of the pāda, where the first syllable may be long or short. When the verse was first written down, double consonants were written as single in the Brāhmī script.[41] Consequently, when reading the verse, the scribes would have received no help from the metre to tell them whether what was written as *upaca* was to be pronounced as *upacca* or *uppacca*, but since the former made no sense it was clear that the correct reading was *uppacca*.

5.3. If, however, the situation arose that *-a-* was palatalized to *-e-* by the following *-cc-*, so that the word was pronounced **uppecca*, then a scribe faced with the written word *upeca* would have been forced to choose between pronouncing *upecca* or *uppecca*. Of these, only the first would have seemed to make sense, and *upecca* would then have been regarded as the correct reading in the tradition which showed the palatalized form. Since the usual meaning of *upecca* 'having approached' was not entirely appropriate in the context, the commentarial tradition assumed that this was the use of *upa- + -i* in the sense of 'comprehend, understand,' which is found occasionally in Skt.,[42] and it was therefore glossed as *sañcicca*.

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38 P. text abbreviations : Thīg = *Therīgāthā*; Peṭ = *Peṭakopadesa*; Netti = *Nettipakaraṇa*; Ud = *Udāna*; S = *Saṃyutta-nikāya*; Pv = *Petavatthu*; Vin = *Vinaya-piṭaka*; Sn = *Sutta-nipāta*; J = *Jātaka*; (X) A = *Aṭṭhakathā* on (X). All references are to PTS editions, except where stated. BHS. text abbreviations : Uv. = *Udānavarga* (ed. Bernhard); Mvu = *Mahāvastu* (ed. Senart); CPS = *Catuṣpariṣatsūtra* (ed. Waldschmidt).

39 The Burmese and Sinhalese editions gloss so; PTS edition glosses *upanetvā*.

40 The Burmese edition reads *uppacca*. The PTS editions of Pv and PvA read *upaccha*, but the gloss *uppatitvā* shows that this is an error for *uppacca*.

41 cf. Sn 763f where the PTS second edition reads *magā* at the beginning of a śloka pāda, with v.l. *magga-* and *maggā*, but SnA 519 gives an explanation which includes both *maga-* and *magga-*, indicating that the commentarial tradition had been confused by the fact that both *maga* and *magga* were written as *maga* in the early Brāhmī script.

42 See MW *s.v.* ^{1}*upe-*.

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5.4. Three (or possibly four) versions of the BHS. equivalent of this verb occur. Uv. IX.4d, which corresponds exactly to the P. pāda, reads *utplutya*; Mvu i 11.15 (referring to hell-dwellers leaping up) reads either *upetitvāna* (Mss BNAL) or *upentitvāna* (Mss CM); M iii 456.5 (also referring to hell-dwellers) reads *utpattitvāna*. The last is clearly a mistake for *utpatitvāna* (which the metre demands,[43] and which Senart reads as a conjecture at Mvu i 11.15), and is the equivalent of *utpatya* (= P. *uppacca*) *utplutya* is doubtless a back-formation from a Pkt. form **uppucca*, showing labialization of *-a-* > *-u-* after *-pp-*.

5.5. The BHS. forms with single *-p-* seem to be the equivalent of P. *upecca*, and I would suggest that *upetitvāna* (I assume that *upentitvāna* is merely a scribal variant of this) was the 'restoration' of a redactor who, faced with the reading *upecca* and realizing that if this were derived from Skt. *upetya* (*upa-* + *-itya*) then it was not very appropriate in the context, assumed that it was from **u* (*p*)*-pet-ya*, i.e. the absolutive of a verb **u* (*p*)*-pet-*.[44] He therefore replaced this by an alternative form of the absolutive of the same verb, viz. *u* (*p*) *petitvāna*.

5.6. It is of considerable interest that the two readings in the P. tradition, one palatalized and one non-palatalized, have their counterparts in one and the same BHS. text. We can deduce with certainty that the original, and correct, P. reading is *uppacca*, because this is the only form from which all the other readings, both P. and BHS., can be derived.

6. P. *nīyamānānaṃ / nayamānānaṃ*

6.1. We find in P. the following verse :

nayanti ve mahāvīrā saddhammena Tathāgatā
dhammena nīyamānānaṃ kā usūyā vijānataṃ. (S i 127.7-8)

A *v.l. nayy-* for *nīy-* is given from a Burmese Ms. The cty explains: *nayamānānanti, nayamānesu* (SA i 188.7). The verse recurs in Vin i 43.27-28 and 43.34-35, with *naya-* in place of *nīya-*, although *niya-* and *neya-* are listed as *v. ll.*, but the cty explains : *nīyamānānan ti, nīyamānesu* (VinA 976.31), with a *v.l. naya-* listed from a Burmese printed edition. It can thus be seen that there is canonical and commentarial authority for taking the verb in pāda c as either a middle or a passive participle.

6.2. The verse also occurs in G. Dh. 267, where the participle has the form *ne'amaṇaṇa*. This at first sight seems to support the belief that the correct reading in P. is *nīya-*, but Brough has pointed out that the G. form is ambiguous,

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43 In prose passages Mvu consistently reads forms with *-tt-* (see *BHS Dictionary s.v. utpattati*). Senart (Mvu i 374 n.) is doubtless correct in seeing a blend of *utpatti* and *utpatati*, which originating in the prose passages has been also incorporated into the verses.

44 For the variation between *u-* and *ut-* see G.Dh. §65.

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since *ne'a-* could stand for *nīya-*, but might equally well be for *naya-*, with the palatalization of *-a-* > *-e-* before *-y-*.

6.3. The verse occurs several times in BHS. Mvu iii 90.17 reads *nayamānānāṃ*; CPS 28.f.11 and 28.g.5 reads *nayatāṃ*, i.e. the active participle instead of the middle. Uv.XXI.8, however, reads *nadanti* in the first line and *nadamānānāṃ* in the second. The fact that all the other versions agree in reading forms of the verb *nī-* 'to lead' enables us to be certain that the redactor of the Uv. version (or the redactor of the version he was following) received a text containing the form *naya-*. We can deduce that that text was written in, or based upon, a Pkt. which changed *-d-* > *-y-*, and the redactor consequently produced a hyper-Skt. form *nada* -from the *naya-* he received. If he had received *nīya* -there would have been no reason for him to 'restore' *nada-*.

6.4 Although in G. the scribe sometimes omitted to write a front vowel in proximity to a palatal consonant, perhaps feeling that the consonant gave sufficient expression to the vowel, e.g. *vaśpaśa* is written (G.Dh. 162) for *viśpaśa*,[45] I cannot quote any certain examples of this phenomenon from other dialects of MIA.[46] It follows then that the original reading was *naya-*, and not only is G. *ne'a* an example of palatalization,[47] but so too is P. *nīya-*.

7. *P. Medio-passive Verbs in -iyati*

7.1. Geiger[48] explains *ādiyati* 'he takes' as a passive with middle meaning. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, because we should expect the passive of *ādā-* to occur in P. as either *ādīyati* or *ādiyyati*, except where *-iyati* occurs *m.c.* Other apparently passive verbs with active meaning are explained as denominatives in PED, e.g. *vivādiyati*, or as 'specific P. formations after the manner of the 4th class', e.g. *vediyati* (< **vedya-*), or as a 'specific P. formation as a causative in active and middle sense', e.g. *vādiyati* (*s.v. vadati*).

7.2. It would obviously be more satisfactory if a single explanation could be found which would account for all the P. forms in *-iyati*. I believe that this can be done, if we assume that they are derived from forms in *-ayati*, with palatalization of *-a-* > *-i-* before *-y-*. Skt. has, besides *vivadate* 'to dispute', a causative form *vivādayati* with the same meaning. Similarly, from *vid-* 'to know' Skt. has a causative form *vedayate* 'to feel, experience'. Confirmation of the suggestion that *-iyati* forms are derived from *-ayati* is afforded by the fact that *vivādiyanti* at Sn 832 is in close juxtaposition to the optative of the causative *vivādayetha* in Sn 830, and *vedeti* (< *vedayate*) occurs in P. as well as *vediyati*.

45 G.Dh. §23.

46 Pkt. *chail(l)a* which might be thought to be derived<Skt. (lex.) *chekila*, and is so taken by Schwarzschild L. A. (op. cit. p. 30) who suggests a dissimilation of *e-i>a-i*, is derived<**chalilla* by dissimilation of *l-l>(y)-l* by CDIAL 5004.

47 As in G.Dh. 96 *veṇe'adi* (= P. *vinayanti*) and G.Dh. 244 *viṇi'adu* (= *viṇayadu* in 243).

48 P. Gr. §§136.4 and 175.1.

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7.3. It may be argued that there is no verb **ādayati* in P. from which *ādiyati* could arise by palatalization. There is, however, *ādeti* which presupposes **ādayati*, just as *vedeti* presupposes *vedayate*. It remains to be explained how **ādayati* could develop from *ādāti*.

7.4. In this connection I should like to point out that there are in Skt. several verbs whose roots end in *-ā*, but which make their present indicatives in *-ayati*,[49] e.g. *chā-* 'to cut' has a form *chayet*, implying **chayati*; *²dhā-* 'to suck' has *dhāyati*; *³mā-* 'to exchange' has *mayet* and *mayante*; *vyā-* 'to envelop' has *vyāyati*; *²vā-* 'to weave' has *vāyati*; *śvā-* 'to swell' has *śvayati*; *hvā-* 'to call' has *hvayati*. Other verbs occur whose roots end in *-ā* and which in MIA have present indicatives in *-ayati*, or show forms based upon such a present stem, e.g. Pkt. *maia* < **mayita* from **mayati* (*¹mā-* 'to make'); Pkt. *layai* < **layati* (*lā-* 'to take').

7.5. There are also examples in MIA of verbs with present indicatives in *-eti* (< *-ayati*) or forms based upon such present stems, e.g. P. *uṭṭhehi*, *uṭṭhentaṃ* < **uṭṭheti* < **uṭṭhayati*, cf. P. *uṭṭhāti*; P. *ābheti* < **ābhayati*,[50] cf. P. *ābhāti*; P. (*sam*)*ādheti* < **(sam)ādhayati*, cf. Skt. *dhāti*; Pkt. *lei* < **layati*, cf. Skt. *lāti*.

7.6. In view of this evidence that some verbal roots in *-ā* form their present indicatives in MIA in *-ayati* or *-eti* < *-ayati*, I have no hesitation in concluding that *ādiyati* (and P. *ādhiyati*)[51] show palatalization of *-a-* > *-i-* before *-y-* just like the causatives discussed above (§ 7.2).

8. *P. appasmiṃ yācito*

8.1. We find in P. the pāda *dajjā appasmiṃ yācito* (Dh. 224b).[52] The cty explains: *appasmiṃ pi deyyamāne vijjamāne appamattakam pi dadetha* (DhA iii. 317.4-5), i.e. taking *appasmiṃ* as 'virtually a hanging locative absolute', as Brough states.[53]

8.2. The G. version of this pāda reads: *daya apadu yayida* (G.Dh. 281), where *apadu* may be taken as an ablative (*alpa-taḥ*) 'One should give even from a small store'. Brough points out[54] that a word division *apa du* (*alpaṃ tu*), although leaving *du* as an awkward verse-filler, would agree with

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49 All examples are quoted from Whitney W. D., *The Roots, Verb-forms, and Primary Derivatives of the Skt. Language*.

50 If G. *abha'i* (G.Dh. 50) is a present participle, then the existence of *-ayati* in G. is confirmed. See Norman, 'The G. Version of the Dh.', *Buddhist studies in honour of I. B. Horner*, p. 174.

51 CPD (*s.v.*) explains *ādhiyati* as 'a weak form of the root'. It is not in PED.

52 I follow the reading of Fausbll's first edition (Copenhagen, 1855).

53 G. Dh. p. 262.

54 G. Dh. p. 262.

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the modern translators' versions e.g. Max Müller's 'Give, if thou art asked for little'[55], and Radhakrishnan's 'One should give even a little'.[56] These translations seem to be based upon Fausbll's *det parvulum rogatus*,[57] although it is difficult to see why he translated in this way, since the cty was known to, and quoted by him.[58] It is almost as though he were translating the reading *appam pi* which he quotes from a Burmese printed edition in his second edition,[59] but it does not seem possible that he could have known of this reading in 1855. It seems likely that the Tibetan version of Uv. was also based upon a reading *alpam api* = *appam pi*, for Rockhill translates[60] 'Give to him who begs, even though it is but a little'.

8.3. The Skt. version of Uv. available to Brough was broken at this point, but Bernhard's edition[61] reads : *dadyād alpād api svayam* (Uv. XX.16), which confirms that G. *apadu* is to be taken as an ablative. A comparable phrase is found elsewhere in P. *appasmā dakkhiṇā dinnā sahassena samaṃ mitā* (J iv. 65.22), and this shows that an ablative is expected in such contexts. The question then arises of how the locative *appasmiṃ* came into existence.

8.4. It is noteworthy that Dh 224b, as quoted above, is unmetrical, in that the cadence is – – ⏑ –, which is unusual for a P. śloka. It was for this reason that Fausbll pointed out that the metre required *appasmi*.[62] The PTS edition of Dh reads : *dajjā 'ppasmim pi yācito*, but the G. version shows that *pi* is not original, and it has undoubtedly crept into the text from the cty's gloss quoted above. The text of the verse included in the cty does not include *pi*.

8.5. If the original verse which underlies the P. version had an ablative, e.g. *-asmā* or *amhā*, then this would have developed > *-asma* or *amha m.c.* to give the cadence ⏑ – ⏑ –. Before the initial *y-* of the following word *yācito*, the final *-a* of the ablative ending could have been palatalized to *-i*, giving *-asmi* or *-amhi*. These forms would have been indistinguishable from locative endings, and when the P. redaction took place the ending would have been taken for a locative, and therefore written with the usual P. form of the locative ending, i.e. *-asmiṃ*.[63]

8.6. If this is the correct explanation of the ending *-asmiṃ* then it is of interest in that it shows that the palatal consonant which causes palatalization does not have to be in the same word as the vowel which is palatalized, as long

55 *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. X, p. 58.
56 Radhakrishnan S., *The Dhammapada*, p. 132.
57 Fausbll's first edition, p. 40.
58. Fausbll's first edition, p. 365.
59 Fausbll's second edition (Copenhagen, 1900), p. 51 n.
60 Rockhill W. Woodville, *Udānavarga*, p. 88.
61 Bernhard F., *Udānavarga*, p. 274.
62 Fausbll's first edition, p. 365.
63 P. Gr. §78.

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as it is in contact with it. I cannot at present quote another example of this, but comparable cases of labialization by a consonant in the following word do occur in G.[64]

9. *Conclusions*

9.1. Although the majority of the examples of palatalization given above in §§ 2.1-9 and 3.1-9 were from G. and N. and after palatal consonants, which might have given the impression that the development was more common in that position, and occurred more in later Pkts. and in regions of India rather far removed from the central area, it is clear from the examples discussed in §§ 5-8 (which were all of palatalization before a palatal consonant) that the change took place in the central area and at an early date, for it is possible to give a date, even if only a tentative one, for these examples.

9.2. The fact that both P. and the Mvu contain forms based upon the non-palatalized *uppacca* and the palatalized **uppecca* proves that the palatalization must pre-date the separation of the Northern and the Southern traditions. Since the Mvu is based upon the redaction of the *Vinaya-piṭaka* made by the *Mahāsaṅghika*s, the *Lokottaravādin*s of the Middle Country, we can date the separation of the two traditions because the *Mahāvaṃsa*[65] states (5.4) that the 10,000 bhikkhus whose views about the Ten Points had been refuted at the Second Council held c. 383 B.C. founded the school called the *Mahāsaṅghika*. Even if we assume that the split between them was not immediate and absolute, it is likely that it had already occurred by 350 B.C.,[66] and the palatalization must therefore have taken place before that date.

9.3. The fact that the Northern texts Mvu, CPS, and Uv. agree in readings forms based upon *naya-* suggests that the palatalization in this word probably post-dates the separation of the two traditions. The fact that P. has both palatalized and non-palatalized forms, each explained by the other in the cties, suggests that the two readings were very well established and of equal authority at the time that the original cties, i.e. those brought to Ceylon by the missionaries, were compiled. We can therefore date this example of palatalization to the period 350-250 B.C. in North India.

9.4. The age of P. *ādiyati* can be deduced from the fact that a related form occurs in AMg. i.e. *āie*[67] < **ādiyet*, glossed by the cty : *ādadīta*, although

64 In 'Notes on the G.Dh.' (*IL* XXXII, p. 218) I quoted *viṇavana'u* (= P. *vinibandhāya*) *bhava'i* (G.Dh. 89) *gaṇa'u* (= P. *gaṇayaṃ*) *pareṣa* (G.Dh. 190). See also *bhodu* (= P. *hotha*) *bhikṣavi* (G.Dh. 124).

65 Geiger W., *The Mahavaṃsa*, p. 28.

66 The *Mahāvaṃsa* does not state how long after the Second Council the split occurred. Warder A. K., *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi, 1970, pp. 213-14, quotes evidence from Northern Buddhist sources which indicates that the split could have been as late as 349 B.C.

67 *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* X.29 and XXIV.14. See Charpentier's edition, p. 366.

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Pischel[68] rejects this explanation and suggests a derivation from **ādriyeḥ* = *ādriyethāḥ*. The occurrence of this form in ÁMg. is not likely to be due to an independent development in the dialect. It rather suggests that P. and AMg. took over the form from a common source, which must have been one of the dialects spoken in the Magadha region. We can therefore date its introduction into P. as being no later than 250 B.C., when missionaries were sent from North India to Ceylon.

9.5. The existence of the ablative forms in the two Northern texts suggests that the change *appasmā* > *appasmiṃ* took place after the separation of the two traditions, i.e. after c. 350 B.C. If we can believe the statement that Buddhaghoṣa translated into P. the cties brought from India to Ceylon by Mahinda[69] c. 250 B.C., then the fact that DhA (although possibly not written by Buddhaghoṣa)[70] explains a locative and not an ablative suggests that a locative was already in the text of Dh before the cty upon it was introduced into Ceylon. Since, however, there is evidence that additions were made to some cties in Ceylon,[71] we cannot take Buddhaghoṣa's statement too literally. It is nevertheless clear that, whatever the date of the compilation of the cty, it post-dated the palatalization of the vowel. The Sinhalese tradition recorded in *Dīpavaṃsa* (XX. 20-21)[72] states that the *Tipiṭaka* and the cties there-on, i.e. the old cties in Sinhalse Pkt., were written down in the time of Vaṭṭagāmini-Abhaya about the middle of the first century B.C. If we assume that this was the material which the author of DhA translated into P., then this gives the lower limit of time for the palatalization to have occurred.

9.6. We may thus conclude that palatalization of vowels before and after a palatal consonant certainly occurred in the Pkt. dialect(s) spoken in the Maghdha region in the fourth and third centuries B.C., upon which our P. and BHS. texts are based. This conclusion is of great importance for our understanding of the way in which variants arose between the various Buddhist traditions, and it enables us to reconcile divergent forms and thus establish the older and (probably) more correct readings.

9.7. If the suggestion that the alternation beween *uppacca* and *upecca* arose from a misinterpretation of a written word is correct, then it follows that

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68 Pkt. Gr. §460. In §577 Pischel explains *āittu*, which must be the absolutive of the same verb since it is glossed as *ādāya gṛhītvā*, as also coming from *ādriyate*.

69 See *Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā*, Vol. I, p. 1.

70 See *The Commentary on the Dhammapada*, ed. Norman, H. C. Vol. I, p. xvii.

71 As is shown by the fact that Buddhaghoṣa quotes from the Sinhalese cties he was using the names of individual Sinhalese theras whose views he is accepting or rejecting, e.g. VinA 538.

72 Oldenberg H., *Dīpavaṃsa*, p. 103.

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writing was in use in North India in the fourth century B.C., and lends support to Brough's conclusion[73] that the text underlying G. Dh. 144, J iv 494. 1-2, and Uv. I.6 was already being transmitted by manuscript copying, and not exclusively by oral tradition, at a date earlier than the redaction of the P. version.

73. G.Dh., p. 218.

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THE GENITIVE FORM AS THE BASIS OF SOME PRONOMINAL BASES IN PRĀKRIT

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In Prākrit the pronominal declension presents many interesting features and it stands as an object of serious study and investigation. The declension system of Sanskrit remains as a prototype for the declension of the Prākrit words and this is all the more true with regard to the declension of the pronominal bases. In Sanskrit one notes that the paradigm of a pronominal stem possesses many bases, which in connection with the different suffixes show multifarious forms. Here it is notable that as the bases are many so are the forms, that are built from them with the annexation of suffixes. Now it is a fact that Prākrit, which owes its existence to Sanskrit, derives this feature too from it. As a result of this in Prākrit too the bases are multifarious and the inflected forms retain remarkable variety and diversity in them.

It is quite natural that the bases of the pronominal forms of prākrit are derived from their Sanskrit prototypes. But in many cases the situation is otherwise. In many instances it will be found that new bases are constituted from the inflected forms some of which occur in the oblique cases—particularly the genitive. This is absolutely unexpected and revolutionary, because an inflected form occurring in the genitive could hardly be expected to provide forms doing the function of the direct cases or of the oblique cases other than the genitive. But this has happened in Prākrit. Here it is found—particularly in the declension of the pronouns of the first and second persons that the genitive forms lend elements to the reconstruction of the bases—which along with the case-suffixes present new forms in the different cases. In the present paper the pronominal forms of the first and second persons are being examined and how their bases have been taken from the Sanskrit genitive forms for the formation of the new Prākrit words in the different cases is being demonstrated. This will clearly show that in the age of Prākrit the proper significance of the cases and their mutual relations became considerably obscure to the people and the latter being overtaken by a feeling of confusion or careless of precision made the irrational use of these cases.[1] This loss of the sense of the case-significance is perhaps

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1 In the later stage of Prākrit—particularly of Ap. there was the tendency for the merging of the nom. and the acc. This gave rise to the direct case of the New Indo-Aryans. In the same manner the other cases from the instr. to the loc. adopted one particular form of the instr. or the gen., which was the oblique case of the later period. This gave rise to obscurity in the understanding of the case-relation. This needed the use of the post-positions for indicating

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responsible for the origin of the new bases from the genitive words, which together with the case-suffixes gave rise to multifarious inflected pronominal forms in Prākrit. This on the one hand indicates the disintegration of the rigidity, that was once maintained in the formation of the different case-forms of Sanskrit and on the other hand shows the violent urge for the reconstruction of the new case-forms in Prākrit, that is careless regarding the estimate of the justifiability and suitability of these newly acquired forms.

We take the forms of the second person first. In the nom. Sg. we find among many forms also the form *tuha*, that Hemacandra acknowledges in his Prākrit grammar.[2] We consider that it is originally a form of the genitive. The element *tu* comes from *tva*, the original base of the second person[3] and *ha* from *sya* the suffix of the gen. i.e. from **tvasya*. But it appears as a form of the nom. Sg. Again Hemacandra considers *tuvaṁ* too as a form of the same case (nom.). If this form may be connected with Sanskrit genitival form *tava* we may consider it as a genitive form providing the base, but there is no scope for this kind of assumption, as *tuvam* goes back to Skt. *tvam*, which by anaptyxis develops into the former. In the nom. Pl. Hemacandra suggests a number of forms, among which there occur *bhe*, *tubbhe*, *tujjha*, *tuyhe*, *uyhe*, *tujjhe*[4] etc. of these *tubbhe* comes surely from Skt. *tubhyam*, which is a form of the dative. But as the dat. and the gen. merged together in Pkt. we consider it as a form of the gen.[5] The element *e* is the suffix of the nom. pl. that is found in the Skt. pronominal forms *sarve*, *ye*, *te*, *ke* etc. The forms *tuyhe*, *uyhe*, *tujjha*, *tujjhe* etc. presuppose the Sanskrit dat. form **tuhyam*, which is built after the analogy of *mahyam*. It may also be considered as the result of contamination of *tubhyam* and *mahyam*. In the first two forms one notes metathesis between *h* and *y*, but in the last two assimilation of the same two sounds. The form *tujjha* is conspicuous by the absence of the nasal, that is found in the Sanskrit prototype.' The form *bhe* might have developed from *tubbhe* with the loss of the initial consonant, which is due to the occurrence of aphesis.

In the acc. sg. among a number of forms the form *tuha* is found.[6] According to our estimate it is based upon a form like **tvasya*, the base coming from the Skt. base *tva*. So it is originally a form of the gen. Among the forms of the acc. pl.[7] *tubbhe* and *bhe* come from *tubhyam* and *uyhe*, *tujjha*, and *tujjhe*

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the respective relations of cases. As case-significance became obscure in the later Prākrit stage, the use of the post-positions begins to grow from this period. This becomes remarkably immense in the age of the New Indo-Aryans, where we find the varieties of post-positions.

2 Vide the sūtra III.90: *taṁ-tuṁ-tuvaṁ-tuha-tumaṁ sinā.*

3 In the second person there are other bases like *yuya-*, *yūya*, *va* etc. in Sanskrit.

4 Vide the sūtra III.91: *bhe-tubbhe-tujjha-tumha-tuyhe-uyhejasā.*

5 Vide the sūtra III.131 of Hemacandra : *caturthyāḥ ṣaṣṭhī.*

6 Vide the sūtra III.92: *taṁ-tuṁ-tumaṁ tuvaṁ-tuha-tume-tue amā.*

7 Hem. III.93: *vo-tujjha-tubbhe-tuyhe-uyhe-bhe śasā.*

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come from **tuhyam*. The genitival character of the bases of these forms is unmistakable. In the inst. sg.[8] the form *bhe* is found, which proceeds from Skt. *tubhyam* and in the way, that has been explained above. In the inst. pl.[9] we find the forms *tubbhehiṁ, tuyhehiṁ, uyhehiṁ, tujjhehiṁ, ujjhehiṁ* etc. Of these the first one takes the base from Skt. *tubhyam*, the others from **tuhyam*. In *tuyhehiṁ* and *uyhehiṁ* there has happened a metathesis of *h* and *y* and the latter (i.e. *uyhehiṁ*) has shown besides the loss of the initial consonant *t*. In the remaining forms i.e. *tujjhehiṁ* and *ujjhehiṁ* the assimilation of *h* and *y* has taken place.

In the abl. sg.[10] the form *tuhatto* presupposes a genitive base *tuha*, that goes back to Skt. **tvasya*. The form *tubbhatto* comes from *tubhyam* as *tujjhatto* from **tuhyam*. Upon the latter is based *tuyha*, that is conspicuous by the absence of the final nasal, that is presumably the case-suffix in the present case. Such is indeed *tubbha*, that is derived from *tubhyam*. In the abl. pl.[11] the group of words *tubbhatto, tubbhado, tubbhadu, tubbhahinto, tubbhasunto* etc. proceed from *tubhyam*, similarly *tuyhatto, uyhatto, tujjhatto, tujjhado, tujjhadu, tujjhahinto tujjhasunto* etc. presume **tuhyam* as their source. In the gen. sg.[12] there is a large number of forms; these are directly obtained either from the Skt. corresponding forms *tava, te* or from *tubhyam* and *tuhyam*, which although originally forms of the dat., merged with the genitive and did its function. In the gen. pl.[13] the inflected forms adopted the base from the sg. but accommodated the suffix of the pl. Such is indeed to be found in *tubbhāṇa, tubbhāṇaṁ, tuhāṇa, tuhāṇaṁ, tujjhāṇa, tujjhāṇaṁ* etc. The form *tubbhaṁ* is a direct outcome from Skt. *tubhyam*, while *tubbha* is conspicuous by the absence of the final nasal. The form *bhe* is derived directly from *tubbhe* ; but is ultimately based upon Skt. *tubhyam*.

In the loc. sg.[14] forms, directly based upon Skt. loc. forms of the sg., are to be found. But such forms are not rare, in which the base has been taken from the gen. forms. We refer particularly to the forms *tuhammi, tubbhammi* and *tujjhammi*. As indicated before *tuha* goes back to Skt. **tvasya, tubbha* to Skt. *tubhyam* and *tujjha* to **tuhyam*. So the trace of the gen. base is found in the loc. sg. also. The same feature is conspicuous in the loc. pl. also.[15] This

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8 One should note the sūtra III.94: *bhe-di-de-te-taï-tae-tumaṁ-tumaï-tumae-tume-tumāi.*

9 One should note the sūtra III.95: *bhe-tubbhehi-ujjhehi-umhehi-tuyhehi-uyhehi.*

10 Vide the sūtra III.96: *taï-tuva-tuma-tuha-tubbhā ṅasu* and the sūtra III.97: *tuyha-tubbhatahinto ṅasinā.*

11 Hem. III.98: *tubbha-tuyhoyhomhā bhyasi.*

12 Hem. III.99: *taï-tu-te-tumhaṁ-tuha-tuhaṁ-tuva-tuma-tume-tumo-tumāi-di-de-ï-e-tubbhobhoyhā ṅasā.*

13 Hem. III.100: *tu-vo-bhe-tubbha-tubbhaṁ-tubbhāṇa-tuvāṇa-tumāṇa-tuhāṇa-tumhāṇa āmā.*

14 Hem. III.101: *tume-tumae-tumāi-taï-tae ṅiṁā* and III.102: *tu-tuva-tuma-tuha-tubbhā ṅiṁā.*

15 Hem. III. 103, 104.

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is evidenced by the forms *tuhesu, tubbhesu, tujjhesu, tubbhasu, tuhasu, tujjhasu, tubbhāsu* and *tujjhāsu*. The gen. base of these forms is unmistakable and the fore-going discussions have already clearly indicated their sources and the mode of developments.

Let us consider now the cases of the first person. In the nom. pl.[16] Hemacandra records among many the form *bhe*. It appears to be the result of an erroneous transcription. If this be not the case it is a form of the second person, that is transferred to the paradigm of the first person. In such a situation, it seems to go back to Skt. *tubhyam*, the form of the dative, which was considered as one of the genitive due to merging of the mentioned two cases (i.e. gen. and dat.) in Prākrit. As already mentioned before there happened the loss of the first syllable in the word. In the acc. sg.[17] we find the forms *mamaṁ* and *mimaṁ* along with some. In *maṁaṁ* the occurrence of the genitive form as the base is to be noted i.e. *mama* takes the acc. sg. ending *-ṁ*. In *mimaṁ* the development of the vowel *i* in the initial syllable is irregular. It may be explained as the result of contamination of *me* + *mamaṁ*, which at first develops into *memaṁ* and therefrom to *mimaṁ*. It might be a mistake as well.

In the inst. sg.[18] we find several forms, among which the word *mamaṁ* occurs. If seems to be the form of the acc., that is extended to the instr. The form *mamae* bears evidence of the annexation of the fem. suffix *-ye* (here *-e*) to the gen. base *mama*. The lengthening of the final vowel of the base, that is usually found in the fem. *ā-* stems, is conspicuous by its absence here. The form *mamāi* is developed from the earlier form *mamāe*, that itself being a product of the annexation of the fem. suffix *-ye* to the base *mama* (i.e. of *mamāye*). Perhaps the stress accent on the initial syllable might have caused the weakening of *e* to *i* in the final syllable, as is evidenced in the form.

In the abl.[19] the forms *mamatto, mamādo, mamādu, mamāhi, mamāhinto, mamado, mamadu, mamahi, mamahinto* etc. are all based upon the gen. base *mama*. The form *majjhatto*, which occurs in the same very abl. case, presupposes **mahyam* i.e. *mahya* as its base. To the latter the abl. suffix *-tas* is annexed. The form *mahatto* admits *maha* as its base, which is a form of the gen. of the first person according to Hemacandra. The source of *maha* is obscure, but it seems to have been derived from the base *ma* with the suffix *-ha*, that comes directly from the gen. suffix *-sya* (i.e. from **masya*). In the abl. pl.[20] there are

16 Vide sūtra III.106: *amha-amhe-amho-mo-vayaṁ bhe jasā.*
17 Hem. III.107: *ṇa-ṇam-mi-ammi-amha-mamha-maṁ-mamaṁ-mimaṁ-ahaṁ-ahā.*
18 Hem. III.109: *mi-me-mamaṁ-mamae-mamāi-maī-mae-mayāi-ṇe ṭā.*
19 Hem. III.110: *maī-mama-maha-majjhā ṅasau.*
20 Hem. III.112: *mamāmhau bhyasi.*

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several forms, among which *mamatto* is found, that is noted also in the sg. The forms *mamāhinto*, *mamāsunto* and *mamesunto* are all derived from the gen. form *mama*. But *mamā* itself seems to be the result of contamination of the words *mama* + *mā* and *mame* of *mama* + *me*. In all these instances the genitival character of the base is unchallengeable.

In the gen. sg.[21] most of the forms are derived from the Skt. gen. forms *mama* and *me*. But the dat. bases are also to be found due to transfer of the dat. to the gen. This explains the occurrence of *majjha* and *majjhaṁ* among the forms of the gen. The word *maha*, that has been explained above, can be recognized as a form of the gen., so is, *mahaṁ*, that is characterized by the occurrence of the nasal at the end. In the plural[22] *mamāṇa*, *mamāṇaṁ*, *mahāṇa*, *mahāṇaṁ*, *majjhāṇa*, *majjhāṇaṁ* the bases are all the forms of the gen. sg. i.e. *mama*, *maha* and *majjha*, which have been discussed above. Among these Hemacandra recognizes also the word *majjha* as a form of the gen. pl. Evidently the sg. form has been transferred here to the pl.

In the loc. sg.[23] among others we find the forms *mamammi*, *mahammi*, *majjhammi*, *mamassi* (Vararuci) and *mamāi*. Evidently the bases are formed here from the gen. sg. forms *mama*, *maha* and *majjha* and they do not conceal their identity. In all such cases except the last one (i.e. *mamāi*) the ending is Skt. *-smin*, which has developed both into *-mmi* or *-ssi* in Pkt. In the form suggested by Vararuci the latter is to be found. The form *mamāi* is also based upon the gen. form *mama* and, as described above, it proceeds from Pkt. *mamāe* presupposing *mamāye* as its ultimate source. The vowel *-e* develops into *i-* in *mamāi* due to the fall of a heavy stress accent on the initial syllable. In the loc. pl.[24] among some one would find the forms *mamesu*, *mahesu*, *majjhesu*, *mamasu*, *mahasu* and *majjhasu*. These are based upon the gen. forms *mama*, *maha* and *majjha*, which in connection with the loc. pl. suffix *-su* give rise to the above-mentioned forms. Those which possess the vowel-*e* in the stem elements are built after the pattern of the vocalic *a*-stems, which manifest the arrangement of this vowel for *a*. But other forms ignore this vowel and annex the loc. ending-*su* directly to the stems without exhibiting any change of the final vowel.

By a study of the above-mentioned forms of the second and first persons it becomes clear that gen. forms particularly of the sg. of these pronouns serve as the bases for the forms of the different cases, right from the nom. to the loc. This in fact was proposed to be exhibited in the present paper. Now it may be

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21 Hem. III.113: *me maī-mama-maha-mahaṁ-majjha-majjhaṁ-amha-amhaṁ ṅasā.*

22 Hem. III.114: *ṇe-ṇo-majjha-amha-amhaṁ-amhe-amho -amhāṇa-mamāṇa-mahāṇa-majjhāṇa āmā.*

23 Vide sūtras III.115, 116: *mi-maī-mamāi-mae-me-ṅiṁā* and *amha-mama-maha-majjhā ṅau.*

24 Vide Hem. III.117, *supi.*

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stated that this tendency is noted in Prākrit for the first time, since Sanskrit seems to be ignorant of this phenomenon as attempts have been made there to preserve cautiously the purity of expressions. This endeavour of retaining the purity of speech was more intense in the age of the Vedic, when the *ṛiṣis* fastidiously preserved the sanctity of words by devising the means of reciting words in multifarious ways, which were technically called the *Padopāṭha* (i.e. to recite each word separately) or *Kramapāṭha* (i.e. to recite the *mantras* in a particular order) or *Jaṭāpāṭha* etc. But in the case of Prākrit there was no such rigidity. This could hardly be expected here, as being spoken speeches the dialects of Prākrits were more exposed to changes introduced by the individuals and, as such, more amenable to the human elements.

Here it may be stated that this tendency of utilizing the gen. as the base in the different forms of the paradigm is not a desultory feature of Prākrit. In the later stages of the speech i.e. in the different new Indo-Aryan languages this feature has been very prominently found. In fact most of the modern Aryan languages have formed their bases of the pronouns from earlier gen. forms and thereby acquired diversity in the declension of the pronouns. This is also the reason for the abundance of forms in a case. This was augmented surely further by the arrangement of post-positions, which helped immensely the reconstruction and revitalization of the old declension system of the earlier speech.

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NOTES ON BAMBHADATTA'S STORY

By

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1. In Vol. XXIV, Nos. 1-2 (1974), pp. 145-147 of this Journal, R. Gombrich wrote 'A Lexical Note on Bambhadatta's Story', the text of which is edited in H. Jacobi's *Ausgewaehlte Erzaehlungen in Mahārāṣṭrī* (Leipzig, 1886). In it, he discussed the two Prakrit words *obheḍio* and *sarisarī/saribharī*, which occur in the episode of a cockfight (Jacobi, p. 10, lines 27-29)[1]. This is how Gombrich (p. 147, lines 35-37) translates this passage : "And Sāgaradatta, also unobserved, removed the needles and had his own cock fight with them on. He beat the second cock, so Buddhila too lost a lakh. Then they were both quits." This translation is an improvement compared to the one offered by J. J. Meyer which Gombrich quotes. With reference to it Gombrich makes suggestions regarding the etymology of both the above mentioned words. About his remarks on *obheḍio* I have nothing to say.

In *sari-sarī*—I read the two words in this way—, I see Pkt. *sari* derived from Skt. *sadṛś* which belongs, according to Berger [2], to the few remains of the older athematic formations in - *dṛś*: *tādin* < *tādṛś*, *sari* < *sadṛś*, meaning 'like ; suitable ; equal'. The reduplicated form *sari-sarī* reminds one of similar expressions in other languages too like English 'fifty fifty ; half and half', and German 'Halbe Halbe', indicating equal shares. Thus, *sari-sarī* 'at par at par', obviously used by dealers and fortune-hunters, understood in this way, supports Gombrich's ingenious translation : "Then they were both quits." Though *sari-sarī* is not attested elsewhere, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of its reading which Jacobi accepted in his text. Gombrich also considers the possibility of reduplication, and refers then to the many Dravidian loans of *sari*[3] and draws attention to Tulu *sarāsari* 'equally ; alike ; right ; proper ; on average', which Emeneau and Burrow[4] included s.v. Ta. *cari*, and wrongly connected with Skt. *sadṛśa* and Pkt. *sari*. Though similar in sound and meaning,

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1 *teṇāvi kaḍḍhiūṇālakkhaṃ piva sūī-obheḍio niya-kukkuḍo. tena ya parājio biya-kukkuḍo tti hāriyaṃ Buddhileṇa vi lakkhaṃ. tao jāyā doṇha vi sarisarī.*

2 Berger, H., *Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre*, Muenchen, 1955, p. 42. He explains why *ṛ>i*, e.g. in *tādiśa<tādṛśa*, through fem. *tādisī<tādṛśī*. Cf. Pischel, R., *Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen*, Strassburg, 1900 (reprint : Hildesheim—New York, 1973), §245, p. 172.

3 *Sari* occurs in this sense also in Hindi. See Prasād, K. and others, *Bṛhat Hindī Kośa*, Banārasa, samv. 2009 (= 1951), s.v. *sari*, p. 1431, left col. Here also *sarāsar*, *sarāsarī*.

4 Emeneau, M. B. and Burrow T., *Dravidian Borrowings from Indo-Aryan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962, § 147, p. 31.

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sarāsari is altogether different from *sari-sarī*, as it is a Persian loan of *sar-ā-sarī*[5], which can be traced in nearly all the main New-Indian languages of the North and the South of India. *Sarāsar* 'straightway ; without pause ; fully ; perfectly', and *sarāsari*, marked as of Persian origin, also exists in the Nepali language, noted by Turner[6], below *sarābari* 'Equality'. *Sarāsar*, and *sarāsarī* are also mentioned in Mehta's Gujarati Dictionary[7], where *sarāsara* is explained : 'sara, the head + āśaro (āśraya[7a]) a guess', and its meaning : 'In the average ; as an average ; 2. approximately'. Mehta's analysis of this word shows that he is also not aware of its Persian origin. Persian *sar*, of course, is related to Skt. *śiras*, but not derived from it.

My former view, expressed in a letter to Dr. Gombrich, dated 30.8.1975, that Persian *sar-ā-sarī* may be at the back of Pkt. *sari-sarī*, taking it for a Persian word included in a later Prakrit text, is wrong, though both look similar. From their very origin they are different words, as explained above.[8] This does not exclude the possibility that the formation of *sari-sarī* was favoured by current *sarāsarī*.

Gombrich also refers to the Variant Reading *saribharī* which Jacobi noted from MS B, (Vorwort, p. VII) dated samv. 1660 (= 1602 A.D.), including it under foot-note 7. In connection with it, Gombrich refers to Gujarati *sarabhara* 'equal ; equal in value ; at par', and *sarabhara khātuṃ* 'an account in which the credit and the debit sides are equal'. Mehta explains *sarabhara : 'sara* the head + Skt. *bhṛ* 'to fill'. In Guj. *sarabhara*, we might also see Persian *sar*. Pkt. *sari-bhari*, also not attested elsewhere, reminds me more of Old-Hindī, and Hindī *sari-vari*[9]*/sari vara*, pronounced *sari-bari/sari-bara*, the first member of

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5 Steingass, F., *A Comprehensive Perisan-English Dictionary*, London, [3] 1947, p. 668, left col. Platts, J. T., *A Dictionary of Urdū, Classical Hindī, and English, Oxford*, reprint of 1968, s.v. *sar* 'head' etc. : *sar-ba-sar* From end to end; totally; wholly; entirely (= *sar-ā-sar*) 'equally; Equal', p. 648, left col., and ib. s.v. *sar-ā-sar*, and *sar-ā-sarī*, p. 650, right col, marked by P (= Persian).

6 Turner, R. L., *A Comparative and Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali Language*, London, 1931, p. 590, left col.; see here also *sarī*.

7 Mehta, B. N. and Mehta, B. B., *The Modern Gujarati-English Dictionary*, Baroda, 1925, p. 1487, left col.

7a Inserted by me.

8 While some lexicographers do not fully take note of the influence of the Persian and Arabic vocabulary on Modern Indian Languages of both the Indo-Aryan and Dravidian stock, grammarians pay more attention to it. Under 'Phonology of the Foreign Element', not only Persian, but also Portuguese and English have been dealt with in detail by Chatterji, S. K., *The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language*, Calcutta, 1926 (reprint : London, 1970), Vols. 1-2, and Vol. 3 : Supplementary, London, 1972. See here Vol. 1, § 306-353 in particular, and many references in Vol. 2 and 3.

9 See Varmā, R., *Saṃkṣipta Hindī-Śabda-Sāgara*, Kāśī, saṃvat 2008 (= 1950), s.v. *sarivari*, p. 1150, middle col. It explains : 'Hindī *sari* + Skt. *prati*'. I do not understand

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which *sari* is derived from Skt. *sadṛś*, while its second member *vari/vara* merely fulfills a pleonastic function which is well known from the Prakrits. The whole word means 'equality, likeness'. It is this word which seems to be at the back of Gujarati *sarabhara* which was formed in this way under the influence of Persian word-formations. In other words, I see in *sara-bhara* a modernized variation of older *sari-bari/sari-bara*, and in *sari-bhari* with its *bh* instead of *b* the intermediate link between the two words, all having the same meaning. Thus, I would dare to draw the following line of development : *sari-bari*[10]*/sari-bara* > *sari-bhari/sari-bhara* > *sara-bhara*. The change from *b* to *bha* could easily take place under the influence of the many compounds which have *-bhara* for their second member. If this line of development be correct, it becomes clear that *sari-sarī* is the older and more original reading which Jacobi rightly accepted in his text, while *sari-bhari* belongs to more recent stage. One may even argue that a Gujarati scribe changed *sarabhara* familar to him into *saribhari* under the influence of *sarisari*. I would however prefer to see a true Variant in it, a rare specimen, preserved through the accuracy of the editor in his notes.

2. The above study has shown that Jacobi's mastership, as in so many cases, made its right choice. There is another Grand Master of Prakrit philology of the Past to whom to go always pays : Ernst Leumann[11]. This is also proved when we take note of his suggestion made in regard to one of the most impressive stanzas of the Bambhadatta story, which, composed in the *Āryā*-metre, runs in the Jacobi edition, p. 3, line 17-18, as follows :

jaha vaṇadavo vaṇadavaṃ davassa jalio khaṇena niddahai |
evaṃ kasāya-pariṇao jīvo tava-saṃjamaṃ dahai ||

Meyer[12] translates : "As the forest fire kindled by the forest fire burns the essence of the forest in a moment, so the soul changed by passions consumes ascetism and self-control."

In a long footnote 2), pp. 13-14, Meyer suggests: "the second *vaṇadava* may be = *vanadrava*, taking *drava* as 'juice, essence'. He continues: "A forest fire often leaves only the black trunks of the larger trees, which tower in the vast,

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why *vari* in *sarivari* should belong to Skt, *prati*. Prasād, K. and others, *Bṛhat Hindī Kośa*, Banārasa, saṃvat 2013 (= [2]1955), s.v. *sarivara, sarivari* : *barābarī, samatā*, p. 1431, right col.

10 Parallel to this, we have Nepali *sarābari*, and *sarobar*, both meaning 'Equality', noted by Turner-N. See n. 6. *Sarābari* is obviously influenced by the very common *bar-ā-bar* 'breast to breast, on a par', and by *bar-ā barī* 'equality', which are borrowings from the Persian language.

11 Leumann Ernst, born 11th April 1859, died 24th April 1931. Jacobi, Hermann Georg born 11th February, died 19th October 1937. See Rau, W., *Bilder Hundert Deutscher Indologen*, Wiesbaden, 1965.

12 Meyer, J. J. ,*Hindu Tales, An English Translation of Jacobi's Ausgewaehlte Erzaehlungen in Mahārāṣṭrī*, London, 1909, p. 13.

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ash-covered, smouldering cemetery like gigantic mourners draped in sable habiliments, dead themselves; their sap (*drava*) is gone, the branches and the leaves and the manifold beauty of the forest is gone. Such a spectre of a wood is the fit symbol of a soul ravaged and ruined by the unchecked sway of passions (*kasāya-pariṇao jīvo*). One passion, if indulged in, engenders other passions, the corrupted soul begets, so to speak, a soul still more corrupted, just as the fire is propagated by the fire (*davassa jalio* lit. kindled of the fire). So *vaṇadava* would be a punning word and not a bad one if we bear in mind that the soul itself destroys the soul, just as *vaṇadavo vaṇadavaṃ.*" Then Mayer refers to the famous stanza of *Dhammapada* 240.

Meyer takes note of Leumann's suggestion to read[13] *pāda* a: *jaha vaṇadavo vaṇaṃ davadavassa jalio,* "as the rapidly kindled forest fire burns up the forest" etc. *dava-davassa* = Skt. *drava-dravasya* means 'quickly' indeed.[14] The difficulty is that the first *dava* of *dava-davassa* just stands at the end of the first *pāda* of the *Āryā*-metre, while the second would open with *davassa.* On the other hand, if we take *davassa* before *jalio* according to Jacobi's reading, the construction with the genetive sg. sounds hard. I therefore suggest to conjecture *dava-saṃjalio,* and leave the first *pāda* unchanged. This would be in accordance with metre, meaning, grammar, and style.

In the following, I give my reading and translation of our *Āryā*-stanza under discussion, including the prose-sentence which comes before that: *avaraddhe vi na kovassāvagāsaṃ denti, jao dur-anto savvāṇatṭha-heū caraṇ' -indhaṇa-davāṇalo koho. bhaṇiyaṃ ca :*

jaha vaṇa-davo vaṇa-davaṃ dava-saṃjalio khaṇena niddhahai|
evaṃ kasāya-pariṇao jīvo tava-saṃjamaṃ dahai ||[15]

"Even those who have been insulted, do not give anger a chance, because anger has a bad end, it is the cause of all damages and a forest fire taking good conduct for its fuel. And it has been said :

"Just as the forest fire, blazed up in a moment by the forceful speed [of the wind] burns up the forest-wood, so the soul changed by passions burns asceticism and self-control."

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13 With reference to Pavolini. See n. 15 of this article.

14 *dava-davassa* s.v. *dava-dava* in : *Pāia-Sadda-Mahaṇṇavo.* A Comprehensive Prakrit-Hindi Dictionary by Pt. Sheth H. D. T., Varanasi, ²1963, p. 457. This entrance is not included in the first edition.

15 Pavolini P. E., *La Novella de Brahmadatta,* Estrato dal Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana, Vol. VI, 1992, pp. 111-148; Offprint, Leipzig, 1892, p. 11, translates : "Come l'incendio rapido divampa, la selva distrugge, rea di peccato l'anima l'ascesi de' sensi rifugge". And he notes : "Io ho tradotto secondo una semplice correzione del prof. Leumann, che mi propose di leggere : *jaha vaṇadavo vaṇaṃ davadavassa* (= rapidamente : rad. dru) *jalio ece.*"

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This stanza is composed in the manner of stylistic repetitions where the same word (*dava*) is employed three times and *vaṇa* in connection with it twice. In this repeated order *dava* has three different meanings : (1) forest fire, (2) forest-wood, (3) forceful speed. The second *vaṇa-dava* is merely a pleonastic expression, as *dava* itself can also mean ' forest ' according to the smaller *St. Petersburg Dictionary* which gives in German the following meanings: ' Waldbrand ; Feuer ; Hitze ; W a l d '. The third *dava* (= Skt. *drava*) ' quick motion ; flight ', which is also noted in Pt. H.D.T. Sheth's Prakrit Dictionary, s.v. second *dava*, and gives the meaning of *v e g a* ' rush ; speed ; rapidity ', is understood by me in the sense of ' forceful speed ' caused by the wind. This meaning occurred to me when I read *Uttarajjhayaṇa-Sutta* 32.11 :

jahā dav '-aggī paur '-indhaṇe vaṇe
sa-māruo novasamaṃ uvei [ve] [16]/
ēv ' indiy '-aggī vi pagāma-bhoiṇo
na bambhayārissa hiyāya kassai // 11 // [17]

" Just as a forest fire accompanied by blowing winds does not become extinct indeed in a forest with plenty of fuel, so the fire of senses is also not beneficial to a *brahmacārin* who enjoys objects of senses." [18]

The forest fire is the standard of comparison (*upamāna*) of both the treated *Āryā-* and *Vaṃśastha-* verses, a symbol of the soul consumed by passions (*kasāya*). *Thāna* 4.1, second *Aṅga* of the Jaina Canon, mentions four forms : anger (*koha-kasāe*) which is the chief concern of our Bambhadatta passage under discussion, pride (*māṇa-kasāe*), fraud (*māyā kasāe*), and greed (lobha-*kasāe*) [19], which for their part result from Karman. It is due to them that the substances continue to stick to the soul. A work of gigantic proportions Guṇabhadrācārya's *Kasāya-Pāhuḍa* [20] gives a detailed account of them, referring to eight and sixteen *Kasāyas*.

The forest fire is the bright symbol, which, beyond the limitations of dogmatic notions, signalizes the dangers which are engraved in ourselves.

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16 The metre is *Vaṃśastha*. I add tentatively *ve* = Skt. *vai*, as *pāda* b is short of one syllable here.

17 Quoted from—*Uttarādhyayanasūtram, Saṃskṛta-chāyāpadārthānvaya-mūlārthopetaṃ ātma-jnāna-prakāśikā-Hindī-bhāṣā-ṭikā-sahitaṃ ca*, tṛtīya bhāgaḥ, anuvādaka : Śrī Śrī Śrī 1008 Upādhyāya Śrī Ātmarāma Jī Mahārāja, Lahaur, 1942, p. 1421. Cf. *The Uttarādhyayanasūtra* edited by Charpentier, J. Upsala, 1922, p. 220. In his Notes on verse 11, p. 388, Charpentier observes nothing about the metre. Cf. *Suttāgame* Volume II, Edited by Munī Śrī Phūlchandjī Mahārāj, Gurgaon, 1954, p. 1039. All have the same text.

18 See Jacobi, H., *Gaina Sūtras Translated from Prakrit*, Part II, Oxford, 1895, p. 186 (The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV). His translation is very free. He does not take note of the deficiency in *pāda* b.

19 See *Suttāgame* Edition, Vol. I, p. 225, line 2.

20 Guṇabhadrācārya : *Kasāya-Pāhuḍam* with *Cūrṇi-Sūtra* of Yativṛṣabhācārya and the *Jayadhavala* Commentary of Vīrasenācārya, Edited by Pt. Siddhāntaśāstrī P. and Pt. Siddhānta-śāstrī K., Vols. 1-13, Chaurasi, Mathura, 1948-1972.

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THE APABHRAṀŚA PASSAGES FROM BHOJA'S ŚṚṄGĀRAPRĀKĀŚA, I-VIII

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The Apabhraṁśa passages cited in Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*[1] (= *SP.*) are found in a very corrupt form in the available Manuscripts of that work. Unlike many of the Prakrit passages[2] of the *SP.*, most of them equally corrupt, the original sources of the Apabhraṁśa passages are unknown and a majority of the passages we come to know here for the first time. Hence in their case we are totally deprived of any external aid towards restoring the text or making out the sense. Any effort in that direction is therefore bound to be basically conjectural. Depending upon the amount of corruption and luck in making the right hit, the results can vary from just making out the metre to restoring the text in bits and parts and making sense of the passage. The present effort is confined to the first eight chapters of the *SP.* In that portion there are twenty-two Apabhraṁśa citations, each made up of a single verse. They are to be found in *SP.* page 102 (one), 103 (five), 121 (three), 228 (one), 238 (one), 269 (seven), 273 (two) and 280 (two). Two of the citations occur twice in the *SP.* and hence in all there are twenty different passages. Five of these passages occur also in Bhoja's *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*[3] (= *SK.*) and four also in Hemacandra's *Siddhahema*[4] (= *SH.*). In what follows, first I give the context of the passage and the text of the passage as printed in the Mysore edition. Thereafter is given the text as it is found elsewhere, if the case is so. This is followed by the suggested reconstruction of the passage and Sanskrit *Chāyā*.

The metre of all the passages except no. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 11 can be identified as *Dohā*. It is an *Āntarasamā Catuṣpadī*, with 13 (i.e. 6 + 4 + ⏑ ⏑ ⏑) and 11 (i.e. 6 + 4 + ⏑) *Mātrās* in its odd and even *Pādas* respectively.[5] The metres of the rest are indicated individually in the treatment below.

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1 *Śṛṅgaraprakasha*, edited by G. R. Josyer, First eight chapters, Mysore, 1955.

2 For the restoration of the Prakrit passages of the *SP.* See Kulkarni, V. M.: 'The Śṛṅgāraprakāśa: Prākrit text restored', *Journal of Shivaji University*, Kolhapur, Vol. I, 1968; 'Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (Chapters XV-XXIV)—Prakrit text restored', *Journal of the University of Bombay*, Arts No. Vol. 39, no. 75, 1970; *Sambodhi*, Vol. 4, 1975-76.

3 Kāvyamālā Series, No. 94, 1934.

4 *Prakrit Grammar of Hemacandra*, edited by P. L. Vaidya, 1958. I have slightly revised the text of the Apabhraṁśa Citations in a few places.

5 See Jinavijaya Muni and Bhayani, H. C.: *Saṁdeśarāsaka*, Introduction, pp. 62-64 and the references given there.

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1. The illustration of *Āvantya* Apabhraṁśa (*SP.* p. 102). The text as given in the *SP.*:

एकदू असळोणी अळ आहरणसुसंठवी अच्छि उपलंपटं वीवउकहिम्मळं भइएवटपि अमइए ।
उणजाणिउं विरहातुरणेंजूरि अएमज्झ हरोदावणुदिण्णुवहिणे द्विण्णूरि अ ए ॥

Neither any clear word- and line-division, nor any sense can be made out of this jumble. It is tentatively suggested that the first line ends with °*susasṁṭhavīa*, the second line begins with *chiupalaṁpa* etc. and ends with °*evaṭapia*. The third line seems to be

मइ एउ न जाणिउं विरहातावण-जूरिअए
(i.e. मया एतद् न ज्ञातं विरहातापन-खिन्नया)

The fourth line begins with *majjhaha*° etc. and ends with °*viṇṇūriae*. Such a re-arrangement gives us rhymes *a* | *b, c* | *d*. Such an arrangement suggests that the metre is possibly a *Sama-catuṣpadī* type of *Mātrā* metre called *Rāsaka* or *Rāsā-valaya*. See under no. 2 below.

2. The illustration of *tāṭīya* Apabhraṁśa. (*SP.* p. 103) The text is given in the *SP.*:

हिरउ हरन्त हो चोरहोए भुजिदन्दुहले जप्पिउपणव्व सच्छिले विलोइ अउणे ।
एहूपुणपिण गणत्थणि संथहउक्कपणु जव्चन्दाणमेदिज्जइ अहरहोदन्तपणा ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

हिअउ हरंतहो चोरहो एहु जि दंडु हले
जं पिउ एण-वसच्छि लेवि लाइअउ गले ।
एहु पुणु पीण-घणत्थणि संघट्टउ कवणु (?)
जं चंदाणणे दिज्जइ अहरहो दंत-वणु ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

हृदयं हरतः चौरस्य एषः एव दण्डः हले
यद् प्रियः एण-वशाक्षि गृहीत्वा लागितः गले ।
एषः पुनः पीन-घन-स्तने संघट्टः कः (?)
यद् चन्द्रानने दीयते अधराय दन्त-व्रणः ॥

The metre can be identified as *Rāsāvalaya*, a *Sama-catuṣpadī* with twenty-one *Mātrās* per line[6] (i.e. 6 + 4 + 6 + 5, last three *Mātrās* having the form ⌣ ⌣ ⌣).

3. The illustration of *Ābhīra* Apabhraṁśa (*SP.* p. 103). The text as given in the *SP.*

लवियप्फउ वीउदुद्धडाकउ हहाण एच्छसि पुत्तहोमत्थजिभु ।
जळदहिडा उजं मे पि जवि आआसि ॥

6 See *Saṁdeśarāsaka*, Introduction, p. 53-56, and the references given there.

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The same passage is cited as an illustration of one variety of *Asambhavanaiṣedhikī Vyapekṣā* at *SP.* p. 273. The text given there is as follows :

लइवप्पडवि उदुदुत्थडाकउ अह्माणइएसि पुत्तमह ।
च्छ ..... जलदहि उजंमे विजिम आआसि ॥

Again this very passage is cited in the *SK.* at p. 145 as an illustration of Apabhraṁśa. The text given there is as follows :

लइ वप्पुल पिअ दुद्ध कत्तो अम्हाणहुं छासि ।
पुत्तहुमत्थे हत्थो जइ दहि जम्मेवि जअ आसि ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

लइ वप्पुड पिउ दुद्धडा कउ अम्हाणए छासि ।
पुत्तहो मत्थइ हत्थु जइ दहि जम्मेवि जिमिआ सि (?) ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā :*

गृहाण पितर (= वत्स) पिब दुग्धकं कुतः अस्मदीये तक्रम् ।
पुत्रस्य मस्तके हस्तो यदि दधि जन्मनि अपि..... ॥

4. The illustration of *Gaurjara* Apabhraṁśa (*SP.* 103). The text as given there:

अव अल्खो श्वी समुद्रुतरि सिलदुहि गरुकाणि ।
मन्दो हि ए पिलहि अउउजंपरुच्चइतें व अणि ॥

The same passage is cited at *SP.* p. 269 as an illustration of *Vikalpābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā.* The text given there is as follows :

अंबुरुखोच्चिअसमुद्दुतरेसिलदुहिडोग्गरुकाणि ।
तहिमोहिपतयीओकलहिओजेवरुच्च इते वअणि ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

अंबरु अंचि समुद्दु तरि सिलडहि (?) डोंगरुआणि ।
सहि महु पिउ गउ कलहियउ जेंव रुच्चइ तेंव आणि ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā :*

अंम्बरं गत्वा समुद्रं तीर्त्वा.....गिरीन् ।
सखि मम प्रियः गतः कलहायितः यथा रोचते तथा आनय ॥

5. The illustration of *Kāśmīra* Apabhraṁśa (*SP.* p. 103). The text as given there :

कंवळि आळ एकं ते कुदुच्छलदन्तहि विठि सुद्धि एमं इवि आलसीलंति ।
सव अंगापिदुसरासहि खवाचि डुं फलिनन्तेकी आआसण अईदसि ॥

The same passage is cited at *SK.* p. 692 as an illustration of the speech of a *lalaka* (i.e. a lisper, lolling his tongue and perhaps using numerous *lakāras*), a

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type of low character in the drama. The text given there is reproduced below along with a few important variants.

कंवलिवालिए कंत्ति कुडम्मल-
दन्ति धिद्धिलुद्धिए मइंवेआलसि ।
लतिंसोवरि जग्गिरि तुमं
सहि खराविदुपोप्फलि ण लेक्कीसि ण आगसि ॥

Variants :

कंवलिवण्णिए, कंवलवाणिए, कंवलवालिए ;
कुट्टमल ; जग्गिरिक्क ; पुप्फलि ; लोकी .

The suggested partial reconstruction :

कंवलिवालिए कंते कुड्मल-दंते धिद्धि लुद्धिए मइं वेआलसि ।
लत्तिं सोविरि जग्गिरि तुमं सहिखराविदु (?)
पुप्फलिणलेक्कीसिणआगसि (?) ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā :*

कम्बलवतिके कान्ते कुड्मल-दन्ते धिक् धिक् लुब्धिके मां प्रतारयसि ।
रात्रौ स्वपन्ती जाग्रती..... ॥

The metre is possibly to be identified as one of the *Ṣaṭpadī* type.[7] Even half has 12 + 8 + 16 *Mātrās*, with the rhyme scheme *a/b, d/e, c/f.*

6. The illustration of the *Paurastya* Apabhraṁśa (*SP.* p. 103). The text given there :

महणाहि अकुटुंवि सामइन्दीहिरेरेभाउ जपिहुरि ।
विण्णउजान्तां वव्हरिवामेक्करेधूजे वासां हावाथि ।
आंखीजणुकणांसहुंकाजाथितेहाथेश्चित उदूकराए ।
वळ आच्छइणी जीव उपाथरुस अणइ भवणहिं वाच्छरं ॥

The passage is mostly impenetrable. Possibly the third line ends with *tau dukkaru* and the latter part of the fourth line is made up by *jīvau pātharu* (?) *saaṇai bhavaṇahī vaccharu.* The beginning can be made out as *mayaṇāhia-kuḍumbi-sāma-indiṁdira* etc. (i.e. *mṛganābhi-kuṭumbi-śyāma-bhramara-*) The metre seems to be same *Sama-catuṣpadī* with possibly 28 *Mātrās* per line.

7. The illustration of *Sama Mātrācchandas* (*SP.* p. 121). The text as given in the *SP.*

वा ओनवुव्नवुपजिमु नविदव्खिणुवहइवणेनव्व्युनपाधनपादमझहइ ।
कोहलमोरमरालव्हकोळनवाहरइ माएनजाणं इमाहहे केव विरहिणी मरइ ।

[7] See Hemacandra's *Chandānuśāsana*, edited by H. D. Velankar, 1961, VI, 14 Commentary.

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The suggested reconstruction :

वाउ न पुव्वु न पच्छिमु न वि दक्खिणु वहइ ।
वणे न — ⌣ न — ⌣ न — ⌣⌣ महमहइ ॥

कोइल-मोर-मरालहं कोइ न वाहरइ ।
माए न जाणउं माहहे केवं विरहिणि मरइ ॥

The Sanskrit *chāyā* :

वायुः न पूर्वः न पश्चिमः न अपि दक्षिणः वहति ।
वने न... न... न... गन्धं प्रसारयति ॥
कोकिल-मयूर-मरालानाम् कः अपि न व्याहरति ।
मातर् न जाने माघे कथम् विरहिणी म्रियते ॥

The metre can be identified as *Rāsā-valaya*, for which see under no, 1 above.[8]

8. The illustration of *Ardhasama Mātrācchandas* (*SP.* p. 121). The text as given in the *SP.*

दिणहदिवञ्ठहो इति स उप्पिज्जइउ सुरेविओ ।
अवरणेह मिहइ घरुमादालव्च हि दूरे ॥

The first line seems to be something like

दिणह दिवड्ढउ होइ तिस उप्पिज्जइ ऊसूरे ।

Then the second line can be constituted as

विओअवरणेहमिहइ घरु मा ता वच्चहि दूरे ॥

No definite connected meaning can be made out. The metre seems to be *Dohā.*

9. The illustration of *Viṣama Mātracchandas* (*SP.* p. 121). The text as given in the *SP.*

जइविग्गव्हीजइ विवव्डुरव्हु पहुदुग्गमुतरु अरहीजइ विगहणेसूरु ।
विणदीसइ इतो इसु पुरिसु वसदि जहीते धुवञ्ठहरहव अञ्ठदि ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

जइ वि गड्ढहिं जइ वि बब्बुरहिं
पहु दुग्गमु तरुअरहिं जइ वि गहणे सूरु वि ण दीसदि ।
तो इ सुपुरिसु वसदि जहिं तेत्थु पट्टहरह (?) पअट्टदि ।

In the fifth line the middle portion seems to be defective.

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8 The basic idea of the verse is familiar to us from the following *Gāthā* :

दीसइ ण चूअ-मउलं अत्ता णअवाइ मलय गंधवहो ।
पत्तं वसंत-मासं साहइ उक्कंठिअं चेअं ॥

Saptaśataka, 6, 42.

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The Sanskrit *chāyā* :

यदि अपि गतैः यदि अपि वर्वुरैः
पन्था दुर्गमः तरुवरैः यदि अपि गहने सूर्यः अपि न दृश्यते ।
तथा अपि सुपुरुषः वसति यत्र तत्र..... प्रवर्तते ॥

The metre is to be identified as *Mātrā* with its fourth line of the *Mattabālikā* type. It is a five-lined metre with 15, 11, 15, 12, 15 *Mātrās* respectively for its consecutive lines, of which the third line rhymes with the fifth[9].

10. The illustration of one variety of *Viśeṣaṇa-viṣaya-guṇa nimittā Gauṇī-vṛtti* (*SP.* p. 228). The text as given in the *SP.* :

छदा..... वळअ दीहिअहिमंघळहिनि अदेह ।
अन्नजीदिहरलोअणहोतहोमुहअंदहोरेव ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

चंदा कुवलअ-दीहिअहि मं घळहि निअ-देह ।
अन्न जि दीहर-लोअणहे तहे मुहअंदहो रेह ॥

The Sanskrit *chāyā* :

चन्द्र कुवलय-दीर्घिकायां मां क्षिप निज-देहम् ।
अन्या एव दीर्घ-लोचनायाः तस्याः मुखचन्द्रस्य शोभा ॥

11. The illustration of *Lakṣita-lakṣaṇā* (*SP.* p. 238). The text as given in the *SP.*

एकाहिअद्धिहि सावणुअ नहि भद्दवओ ।
माहवुमहिअलपत्थ...उत्थवेसरओ ॥
अंगहिगिंहसुगच्छडितिलवणेमग्गरूमुद्धहे ।
मुमुहपंकअसरे आवासिओसिसिरु ॥

The same passage is cited as an illustration of *Prakīrṇa-ghaṭanā Śayyā* at *SK.* p. 185. The text as given there :

एक्कहिं अच्छिहिं सावणु अण्णहिं भद्दवउ ।
माहउ महिअलसत्थरी गंडत्थल सरउ ॥
अंगिहि गिम्ह सुहच्छिइ तिलवण मग्गसिरु ।
मुद्धिहिं मुहपंकअसरि आवासिउ सिसिरु ॥

This very passage occurs with minor variations under *SH.* 8.4.357. The text as given there :

एक्कहिं अक्खिहिं सावणु अन्नहिं भद्दवउ ।
माहउ महिअल-सत्थरि गंडत्थले सरउ ॥

9 See *Saṁdeśarāsaka*, Introduction, pp. 66-67 and the references given there.

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अंगिहि गिम्ह सुहच्छी—तिलवणि मग्गसिरु ।
तहे मुद्धरे मुह-पंकइ आवासिउ सिसिरु ॥

The *SP.* passage seems to have the variant *suhacchaḍi* for *suhacchii* (*SK.*) or *suhacchī* (*SH.*).

The Sanskrit *chāyā* :

एकस्मिन् अक्षिण श्रावणः अन्यस्मिन् भाद्रपदः ।
माघः महीतल-स्रस्तरे गण्डस्थले शरत् ॥
अङ्के ग्रीष्मः सुखासिका तिलवने मार्गशिराः ।
तस्याः मुग्धायाः मुखपङ्कजे आवासितः शिशिरः ॥

The metre is *Rāsaka* or *Rāsāvalaya*, for which see under no. 1 above.

12. The illustration of the first variety of *Vākyābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 269). The text as given in the *SP.* :

साउप्पन्नीगोटी डइनवखिकवि..... ति ।
भडुपच्चलि इसोमरहजासुननलग्गइकंठि ॥

The same passage is cited as an illustration of *Asaṅgati*, a variety of *Virodhālaṅkāra* at *SK.*, p. 341. The text as given there :

सा उप्पडी गोट्ठउडि ॥ णोक्खी कावि विसगंठि ।
भिडिय पच्चल्लिउ सो मरइ ॥ जस्स ण लग्गइ कंठि ।

This very passage with minor differences is cited under *SH.* 8.4.420 as an illustration of the substitution of *paccalliu* in Apabhraṁśa for *SK. pratyuta.* The text there is correctly preserved. It is as under:

साव-सलोणी गोरडी नवखी क वि विस-गंठि ।
भडु पच्चल्लिउ सो मरइ जासु न लग्गइ कंठि ॥

Here the first two or three words are different from the text found in the *SP.* or *SK.*

The suggested reconstruction :

सा उप्पन्नी गोट्ठडइ नवखी (v.l. नोक्खी) क वि विस-गंठि ।
भडु पच्चल्लिउ सो मरइ जासु न लग्गइ कंठि

The Sanskrit *chāyā* :

सा उत्पन्ना गोष्ठके अभिनवा[10] का अपि विष-ग्रन्थिः ।
भटः प्रत्युत सः म्रियते यस्य न लगति कण्ठे ॥

13. The illustration of the second type of *Vākyābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 269). The text as given in the *SP.*:

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10 Ap. *gaṁṭhi* (< Sk. *granthi-* m.) is feminine.

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वाणिधमोडिअच्चरुणखओ दारेएं तु न दिट्ठ ।
माएणजहुके मलडोल्लाहिअ इवइट्ठ ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

वाडि न मोडिअ सरु न सुउ (?) दारे एंतु न दिट्ठु ।
माए न जाणउं केम लहु ढोल्ला हिअइ पइट्ठु ॥

The Sanskrit *chāyā* :

वृत्तिः न भग्ना खरः न श्रुतः (?) द्वारि आयान् न दृष्टः ।
मातर् न जानामि कथम् लघु प्रियः हृदये प्रविष्टः ॥

14. The illustration of *Vikalpābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā.* (*SP.* p. 269). This has been treated under no. 4 above.

15. The illustration of *Samuccayābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā.* (*SP.* p. 269) The text as given in the *SP.*

हिअ इखुक्कइगोडरी गअणे हुडुक्क इमोहु ।
वासारत्तपवास अहं हसमासं कडुएहु ॥

The same passage is cited under *SH.* 8.4.395. The text there is correctly preserved. It is as under:

हिअइ खुडुक्कइ गोरडी गअणि घुडुक्कइ मेहु ।
वासारत्ति पवासुअहं विसमा संकडु एहु ॥

The Sanskrit *chāyā* :

हृदये शल्यायते गौरी गगने गर्जति मेघः ।
वर्षायाम् प्रवासिनाम् विषमम् सङ्कटम् एतद् ॥

16. The illustration of the first variety of *Sātideśābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 269). The text as given in the *SP.* :

हिअ इति रिच्छिवहि समुहच्छइगहिअकडवच्छ ।
पहिअहएकजिशोरडीनं चउभट्टअरच्छ ॥

The same passage is cited at *SK.* p. 353 as an illustration of a variety of *Nidarśanālaṅkāra.* The text as given there :

हिअअ तिरच्छीयइ संमुहपच्छा गहिअकडक्खास्स ।
पहिअ एक्केज्जे गोरडी णं चउहट्ट उवच्छ ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

हिअइ तिरिच्छी पहि समुह पच्छइ गहिअ-कडच्छ ।
पहिअह एक्क जि गोरडी णं चउहट्टअ रच्छ (?) ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

हृदये तिरश्चीना पथि सम्मुखा पश्चात् गृहीत-कटाक्षा ।
पथिकस्य एका एव गौरी ननु चतुर्हट्टका रथ्या (?) ॥

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17. The illustration of another variety of *Sātideśābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 269). The text as given in the *SP.* :

महिलत्ताणणिव्वाहि उअएक्कलविज्जप्पिआइ ।
णेहक्क उविअविर हुनम्मे विदट्टणजाइ ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

महिलत्तणु णिव्वाहिअउ एक्कइ विज्जु-पियाइ ।
महे.....कउ वि ण विरहु न.....ण जाइ ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā :*

महिलात्वं निर्वाहितम् एकया विद्युत्प्रियया ।
.....कदा न अपि न विरहः..... न याति ॥

18. The illustration of the first variety of *Prasaṅgābhidhānikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 269). The text as given in the *SP.* :

सावसलोणीगोरडी.....अहोमडुरइ साओ ।
तिक्खअप्पपलोव्वणएविरहुजिकडि अकसाओ ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

साव-सलोणी गोरडी अहरहो महुरउ साउ ।
तिक्ख० अंब पलोवणए विरहु जि कडुउ कसाउ ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā :*

सर्व-सलवणा गौरी अधरस्य मधुरः स्वादः ।
तिक्ता अम्ला प्रलोकने विरहः एव कटुकः कषायः ॥

The observations on the illustration in the *SP.* are somewhat helpful for reconstructing the passage.

19. The illustration of a variety of *Asambhavanaiṣedhikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 273).

This has been treated under no. 3 above.

20. The illustration of the first variety of *Virodhanaiṣedhikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 273). The text as given in the *SP.* :

ते पुच्छिज्जइपत्तडि जेतहि दिसहि न एंति ।
जेहीसदिट्ठिगोरधीतेदुक्करुजीअंति ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

ते पुच्छिज्जहिं वत्तडी जे तहि दिसहि न एंति ।
जेहिं स दिट्ठि गोरडी ते दुक्करु जीअंति ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

ते पृच्छयेयुः वार्ता ये तस्याः दिशः न आयान्ति ।
यैः सा दृष्टा गौरी ते दुष्करं जीवन्ति ॥

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21. The illustration of the second variety of *Virodhanaiṣedhikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 280). The text as given in the *SP.*

पिअसंगम किं वहि दृडिपि अहोपरोक्खहोक्केव ।
मइवेन्निविन्नासि आणिद्दणएव न तेव ॥

The same passage is cited under *SH.* 8.4.418. The text there is correctly preserved. It is as under :

पिअ-संगमि कउ निद्दडी पिअहो परोक्खहो केम्व ।
मइं विन्नि वि विन्नासिआ निद्द न एम्व न तेम्व ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

प्रिय-संगमे कुतः (कथम्) निद्रा प्रियस्य परोक्षस्य कथम् ।
मया द्वे अपि विनाशिते निद्रा न एवं न तथा ॥

22. The illustration of *Parisaṁkhyānaiṣedhikī Vyapekṣā* (*SP.* p. 280). The text as given in the *SP.* :

वेवावल्लचि उदेद्धमुहे सज्जिअतिलइतकंड ।
कअकण्णाप्पलिंपचसरतहकामहो कोअंड ॥

The suggested reconstruction :

बे वावल्ल विउद्ध-मुहे सज्जिअ-तिलइ ति कंड ।
कअ-कण्णुप्पलि पंच सर तहो कामहो कोदंड ॥

The Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

द्वौ बाणौ विबुद्ध-मुखे सज्जित-तिलके त्रयः काण्डाः ।
कृत-कर्णोत्पले पञ्च शराः तस्य कामस्य कोदण्डे ॥

The observations on the passage in the *SP.* are helpful for reconstructing the passage.

It will be conceded that with some persistent struggle, it may be more or less possible to recover from such chaotic jumbles of letters, the original material form, verbal structure or with rare luck, even the complete meaningful connected text, although quite obviously the results attained would have varying degree of plausibility.

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THE STUDY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA : A SURVEY OF RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS (1965 - 1972)

By

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I. *Historical Introduction*

The study of Indian thought in Germany owes much of its initial momentum to Romantic nostalgia : " For the German Romanticists,..India..was a symbol of their own spiritual origin and homeland, their own forgotten depth " [1]. Novalis, Görres, occasionally Schelling, to some extent already J. G. Herder, and above all Friedrich Schlegel were the heralds of this Romantic myth of India as the " cradle of mankind " [2]. It remains symptomatic that Friedrich Schlegel's brother August Wilhelm became the first professor of Sanskrit in Germany (Bonn 1818); and still in his later British years, Max Müller was well aware of the Romantic roots of his own Indological interest. [3]—G.W.F. Hegel, the most powerful critic of Romantic nostalgia, represents a different and highly critical approach to Indian thought; yet, he is a keen and watchful observer and tries to deal philosophically with Indian philosophy. [4] Other, and lesser, figures also demonstrate how Indian philosophy, however insufficiently known, enters the horizon of philosophers and historians of philosophy and contributes to articulating the idea of a world history of philosophy. K.J.H. Windischmann, e.g., includes Indian philosophy, with the aid of his son, the Sanskritist F.H.H. Windischmann, in his unfinished " Philosophy in the Progress of World History " (*Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte. I : Die Grundlage der Philosophie im Morgenlande*, 4 vols., Bonn 1827-1834). The philosopher-Sanskritist O. Frank presents an edition and German translation of Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra* (München-Leipzig 1835), one of the favorite texts in the early days of the study of *Vedānta* (also dealt with by F.H.H. Windischmann in the fourth volume of his father's work; E. Röer, 1845; L. Poley, 1869 [5]).—

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1 Halbfass, W. *Hegel on the Philosophy of the Hindus.* In : German Scholars on India (Varanasi 1973), p. 107-122.

2 *Loc. cit.*

3 Cf. *India—What Can It Teach Us?* (London 1883) 29-33.

4 E.g. in his Berlin " Lectures on the History of Philosophy " (*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*); cf. Halbfass, W. *loc.cit.*

5 Cf. Windisch, E. *Geschichte der Sanskrit-Philologie und indischen Altertumskunde* (I : Strassburg 1917; II : Berlin und Leipzig 1920; Grundriß der indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde I, I, B) 63 ff.; 207; 210 f. Potter, K. H. BIP; to Potter's list of translations, the German translation in O. Böhtlingk's *Sanskrit-Chrestomathie* (Leipzig ^{3}1909) nas to be added.

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The general and philosophical interest in Indian thought was, however, most successfully promoted by A. Schopenhauer—with the somewhat questionable effect, that it became almost automatically associated with "idealism" on the one hand, "pessimism" on the other hand. Inspired by Schopenhauer, P. Deussen became one of the most devoted Western students of Sanskrit and of Indian philosophy. His translations of sixty Upaniṣads and of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* [6], as well as the six volumes of his "*Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*" (General History of Philosophy, Leipzig 1894-1913; vols. 1-3 on Indian philosophy), bear witness to a unique combination of a somewhat one-sided enthusiasm with thorough scholarship. Deussen's younger contemporary, the philosopher-theologian R. Otto, contributes especially to the knowledge of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* [7]; and in general, Indian thought has become a really tangible factor of German thought and culture in the first decades of the 20th century. However, the attitude of the more conservative academic historians of philosophy remains hesitant, if not explicitly negative. Statements reach from basic doubts as to the accessibility and intelligibility of Indian philosophy [8] to categorically denying the title of philosophy to Indian thought. [9] In spite of the repeatedly manifested interest of such leading 20th century thinkers as M. Scheler, M. Heidegger and K. Jaspers [10], we may say that the contributions of German philosophers resp. academic teachers of philosophy to the interpretation of Indian philosophy remain somewhat scattered and casual; and there has been a certain tendency to leave this field to less academic thinkers, such as L. Ziegler, the count H. Keyserling, and H. Kassner.

Most of the pioneering and fundamental work has been done by Indologists, such as O. Strauss (for some time co-worker of P. Deussen), G. Thibaut, R. Garbe, also H. von Glasenapp, H. Jacobi, P. Hacker and, with a very different approach, W. Ruben. Others, like E. Hultzsch, E. Windisch, F.O.

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6 *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda* (Leipzig 1897); *Die Sûtra's des Vedânta....nebst dem vollständigen Commentare des Çaṅkara* (Leipzig 1887).

7 Cf. *Dîpikâ des Nivâsa* (Tübingen 1916); *Râmânuja, Siddhânta* (Jena 1917); among his other contributions, cf., e.g., *Viṣṇu-Nârâyaṇa* (Jena 1917); *West-Östliche Mystik* (Gotha 1916).

8 Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, Preface to: Dilthey, W.: *Grundriβ der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie* (Frankfurt 1949) 18.

9 E.g. Windelband, W.: *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Tübingen [15] 1957), 22, although granting the possibility of certain steps towards philosophy in Oriental cultures, presents the history of philosophy as a strictly European phenomenon and explicitly excludes Chinese and Indian thought.—A brief discussion of the problem of the applicability of the term "philosophy" to Indian thought is given by W. Ruben (cf. the book referred to in n. 33).

10 Cf. the sections on the Buddha and Nâgârjuna in Jaspers' Die groβen Philosophen (München 1957), also H. von Glasenapp, *Das Indienbild deutscher Denker* (Stuttgart 1960).

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Schrader, H. Oldenberg, whose main interest is in other areas of Indian studies, at least occasionally turn towards Indian philosophy. [11]

The most distinguished living representative of the study of Indian philosophy in Europe is, no doubt, E. Frauwallner of Vienna. Starting around 1930, with pioneering contributions to the study of early *Sāṃkhya* and, above all, of the school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, his research covers all major fields of Indian philosophy, with the exception of *Vedānta*. Two volumes of his *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* (Salzburg 1953 and 1956) have been published so far.[12]—Frauwallner's work is continued by a group of former disciples of his, such as G. Oberhammer and E. Steinkellner (now his successors in Vienna), L, Schmithausen, T. Vetter, G. Chemparathy, who pursue the study of Indian philosophy in the sense of working towards a sober and literal understanding of important sources, and of trying to integrate them into their proper historical context. As a rule, systematic philosophical evaluation and comparative studies are put aside by this group.—Apart from Vienna, the universities of Münster (P. Hacker) and Hamburg (L. Schmithausen ; A. Wezler) can now be regarded as centres for the study of Indian philosophy in the German-speaking area of Europe.[13]

Except for a few casual hints, the following brief survey of books and articles, which contribute to the study of Indian philosophy (*not* Indian thought in general) on an academic level of research, will be confined to the period from 1965 to 1972. Primary attention will be paid to contributions in German. —I am neither claiming completeness nor complete neutrality.

II. *Buddhist Philosophy*

Although E. Frauwallner's interest and scholarly competence cover many different areas of Indian thought, his name will above all remain connected with the exploration of that school of Buddhist philosophy which is known as the school of 'Buddhist Logic' and is most notably represented by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti; since the 1930ies. Frauwallner's efforts laid the foundations of a much more comprehensive and historically adequate understanding than it had been accessible to Th. Stcherbatsky.[14] It is true that his most recent contribu-

11 Cf. the indices in E. Windisch's *Geschichte* (see above, n. 5) and in BIP.

12 These two volumes have been translated into English by V. M. Bedekar (*History of Indian Philosophy*, 2 vols., Delhi 1972).

13 Marburg may be mentioned in this connection as a place where special attention is paid to Bhartṛhari (cf. W. Rau's philological work on the *Vākyapadīya* and its manuscript tradition; P. S. Sharma's translation of the *Kālasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya* (together with Helārāja's *Vṛtti*; Delhi 1972) was written as a doctoral dissertation under the guidance of W. Rau).—Two of Frauwallner's disciples, T. Vetter and G. Chemparathy, are now teaching at Utrecht (Holland).

14 Cf. the Frauwallner bibliography in BGI.

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tions focus on other themes; but his work is being continued by some of his disciples, mainly by E. Steinkellner and T. Vetter. After his *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti* (Wien 1964; VKSKSO. 1), which attempts a systematic philosophical interpretation of epistemological issues in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, Vetter published *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel : Pratyakṣam* (Wien 1966; VKSKSO. 3), containing the Tibetan version which is the basis of our knowledge of this text, together with an introduction, a German translation and the Sanskrit fragments which were known at that time. Although the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* reproduces a good deal of the textual material, especially of the verses, of the earlier and more famous *Pramāṇavārttika*, its mode of presentation is in a sense purified, i.e. more strictly epistemological.[15]—In 1968, a text was published in India which turned out to be an extremely rich mine of textual information on important thinkers of the Ist mellenium A.D., among them Dharmakīrti—sc. Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*.[16] Its numerous quotations from the first chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, which had not been identified as such by the editor, have recently been collected by E. Steinkellner (*New Sanskrit-Fragments of Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, First Chapter*. WZKS 16, 1972, 199-206), and they add considerably to restoring the original wording of the text.—An edition of the second chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (on *svārthānumāna*), which incorporates the relevant passages from the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, has been prepared by Steinkellner and is in the press; a translation will follow.[17] Already in 1967, Steinkellner made accessible another Dharmakīrti text, apparently a product of his later years—the *Hetubindu* (*Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*. 2 vols., Wien 1967 ; VKSKSO 4.5 ; Tibetan text, reconstruction of the Sanskrit text, German translation and extensive notes). That an actual and proper restoration of the Sanskrit text became possible in this case is mainly due to the fact that, in addition to the Tibetan translation, a paraphrasing commentary (by Arcaṭa) and a sub-commentary (by Durvekamiśra) in Sanskrit were systematically consulted. As its title indicates, the *Hetubindu* deals with the types of logical reasons, basically the *svabhāvahetu* and the *kāryahetu*, but it also contains an interesting discussion of the ' proof of momentariness ' (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*) ; its presentation by Steinkellner is a model case of a rigorously philoiogical approach, which tries to understand Dharmakīrti's words in their own context and horizon, and deliberately abstains from any further-reaching " philosophical" evaluation.

Several other contributions by Steinkellner have to be mentioned in this connection : *Bemerkungen zu Iśvarasena's Lehre vom Grund* (WZKSO 10,

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15 Cf. also Vetter, T.: *Das Problem des metaphysischen Beweises in der logisch-erkenntnistheoretischen Periode der indischen Philosophie.* (ZDMG 118, 1963, 351-356; on Dharmakīrti's criticism of what Vetter calls the " metaphysical proof ").

16 Ed. Yogīndrānanda, Vārāṇasī 1968 (Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśana granthamālā 1).

17 In VKSKS.

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1966, 73-85) examines some statements in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (with special reference to the *vaidharmyavacanārtha*) which are attributed to Dharmakīrti's teacher Iśvarasena; this throws some light on the hitherto rather obscure development between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti—*Die Entwicklung des kṣaṇikatvānumānam bei Dharmakīrti* (BGI 361-377) shows that the 'proof of momentariness' undergoes a development in Dharmakīrti's thought, from more traditional forms to its most advanced stage, the *sattvānumāna* in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*[18].—*Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti* (WZKS 15, 1971, 179-211) systematically examines the usage of one of Dharmakīrti's most important terms, *svabhāva*, in the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (347 occurrences). It classifies the meanings of this term according to its ontological, epistemological and logical functions and shows how its basic ontological meaning ('Eigenwesen', 'own-being') remains decisive for its specifically logical functions, notably in the compound *svabhāvahetu*; this is a result which is definitely incompatible with Stcherbatsky's widely accepted interpretation of the *svabhāvahetu* inference as "analytical proposition" in the Kantian sense.[19] —Regarding the theme of "inference", A. Wezler's *Diṅnāga's Kritik an der Schlusslehre des Nyāya und die Deutung von Nyāyasūtra I. 1. 5* (ZDMG, Supplement I/3, 1968, 834-840) may be mentioned, which discusses Diṅnāga's criticism of the *Nyāya* theory of inference and the meaning and implications of *Nyāya-sūtra* I. 1. 5.

As noted above, E. Frauwallner has recently been less concerned with the school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti.[20] In the field of Buddhist studies, he has mainly been engaged in the study of Abhidharma. In a series of four articles *Abhidharma-Studien*, published between 1963 and 1972[21], he discusses problems which may not be philosophical in any strict and proper sense of this word, but are nevertheless historically very important for the beginnings and early developments of Buddhist philosophy and have to be taken into consideration for an adequate understanding of that stage of development which was reached in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*. Starting with the early systematizations of

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18 Cf. in this connection Steinkellner's review of A.C.S. McDermott, *An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists'* (Dordrecht 1969). IIJ 14 (1972) 115-118.

19 This theme was developed in a paper read by Steinkellner at the 183rd meeting of the American Oriental Society, March 1973 (Washington, D.C.).—Cf. in this connection G. Oberhammer, *Der Svābhāvika-Sambandha, eingeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Nyāya-Logik* (WZKSO 8, 1964, 131-181); on Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti: 135-139.

20 But see his translation of a passage from Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā* (Wien 1968; VKSKSO 6).

21 I. *Pañcaskandhakam und Pañcavastukam* (WZKSO 7, 1963, 20-36); II. *Die kanonischen Abhidharma-Werke* (WZKSO 8, 1964, 59-99); III. *Der Abhisamayavādaḥ* (WZKS 15, 1971, 69-102); IV. *Der Abhidharma der anderen Schulen* (WZKS 15, 1971 103-121; 16, 1972, 95-152).

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the *Pañcaskandhaka* and the *Pañcavastuka*[22], he follows the development of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature, discusses its agreements with Pāli Abhidhamma works and the possibility of a common source, emphasizes the role of Dharmaśrī (*Abhidharmasāra*) as precursor of Vasubandhu, and finally reconsiders the Pāli *Abhidhammapiṭaka* and the *Śāriputrābhidharma* which has been attributed to the Dharmaguptaka school.—At this point, we may express our hope that the third volume of Frauwallner's *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* (History of Indian Philosophy) will be published soon and thus add to our understanding of the hitherto rather opaque philosophical developments in the *Hīnayāna* schools.

A new and thorough analysis of one of the most basic and central teachings of Buddhism, the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula, is given by F. Bernhard, the editor of a monumental critical edition of the *Udānavarga*[23], in his article *Zur Interpretation der Pratītyasamutpāda-Formel* (BGI 53-63); his conclusion is "that originally the second part of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula was not a continuation but a parallel of the first part"[24].—Referring to Bernhard's edition, L. Schmithausen presents a long series of penetrating philological observations concerning the different recensions of this text: *Zu den Rezensionen des Udānavargaḥ* (WZKS 14, 1970, 47-124); *Philologische Bemerkungen zum Ratnagotravibhāga* (Philological Remarks on the Ratnagotravibhāga) follow one year later (WZKS 15, 1971, 123-177). Other documents of the scholarship and linguistic sovereignty of this master philologist among contemporary students of Indian thought are: *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ* (Wien 1969, VKSKSO 9), making accessible, with the help of Tibetan, Chinese and Mongolian versions, an important section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which introduces a new concept of *nirvāṇa* and has not been preserved in the Sanskrit original; *Zur Literaturgeschichte der älteren Yogācāra-Schule* (ZDMG, Supplement I/3, 1968, 809-821), which discusses problems of the literary history of the older *Yogācāra* school; *Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā* (WZKSO 11, 1967, 109-136), which points out certain doctrinal divergences between these two short treatises by Vasubandhu, especially the fact that the term *ālayavijñāna* does not occur in the *Viṃśatikā* and that it does not advocate the Yogācārin's "eightfold complex of mental series", which we have in the *Triṃśikā*. However, Schmithausen finds certain

22 Cf. in this connection J. Imanishi, *Das Pañcavastukam und die Pañcavastuka-vibhāsā* (Göttingen 1969; Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse. Jg. 1969, Nr. 1). Imanishi presents and analyses Sanskrit *Abhidharma* fragments from the famous Turfan manuscripts.

23 *Udānavarga*, herausgegeben von F. Bernhard, 2 vols. (Göttingen 1965-1968; Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse III/54. Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden 10).

24 BGI 63.

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Sautrāntika traces also in the Yogācāric *Triṃśikā*. He concludes (— referring, of course, to Frauwallner's "two-Vasubandhu hypothesis") : "On account of these Sautrāntika-elements *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* may be attributed to the author of *Abhidharmakośa*" [25].

III. *Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika*

The classical period of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* in the Ist millenium A.D. is a period of constant conflict with Buddhist philosophy, but at the same time of a remarkable interplay and mediation of ideas. This specific relationship between *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and 'Buddhist Logic' has, in several exemplary cases, been accentuated by Frauwallner and his disciples.[26] However, in their most recent contributions only a somewhat casual attention is paid to the classical and ancient periods of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*. L. Schmithausen's *Zur Lehre von der vorstellungsfreien Wahrnehmung bei Praśastapāda* (WZKS 14, 1970, 125-130) critically discusses and rejects M. Hattori's interpretation of the role of 'non-qualificative perception' in Praśastapāda [27] and emphasizes the ambiguity which results from the applicability of *ālocanamātra* to both the *dravya* as qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and its qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*).—G. Oberhammer, *Zur Deutung von Nyāyasūtram I. 1.5* (WZKSO 10, 1966, 66-72) relates *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.5 to a passage in the *Carakasaṃhitā* and interprets the controversial '*trividham*' as implying '*trikālam*'. The legitimacy of such an interpretation is denied by A. Wezler, *Die 'dreifache' Schlußfolgerung im Nyāyasūtra I. 1.5* (IIJ 11, 1968/69, 190-211); Wezler tries to re-interpret the '*pūrvavat*', '*śeṣavat*' and '*sāmānyavat*' in the light of two Buddhist works, sc. the *Upāyahṛdaya* and 'Piṅgala's' commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakaśāstra*.

Some remarkable contributions to the study of *Navyanyāya* have recently been presented by Frauwallner. His *Die Lehre von der zusätzlichen Bestimmung* (*upādhiḥ*) *in Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇiḥ* (Wien 1970, VKSKS 9) gives the text, a German translation and an interpretation of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* II/14 (with references to the relevant passages in *Maṇikaṇṭha* and Vardhamāna) ; this chapter is an important source for our understanding of the concept of *upādhi*,

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25 WZKSO 11, 1967, 136.—Cf. also L. Schmithausen, *The Definition of Pratyakṣam in the Abhidharmasamuccayaḥ.* (WZKS 16, 1972, 153-164); this is a rejoinder to A. Kunst's review of Schmithausen's *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ* (BSOAS 30, 1967), mainly concerning the definition of *pratyakṣa* in Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* as "*svasatprakāśābhrānto 'rthaḥ*".

26 Cf., e.g. E. Frauwallner, *Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam.* (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 40, 1933, 281-304).

27 *Two Types of Non-Qualificative Perception* (BGI 161-169).—Classical *Vaiśeṣika* is a major field of research for the writer of the present survey; cf. Halbfass, W.: *Remarks on the Vaiśeṣika Concept of Sāmānya*, Añjali, Papers on Indology and Buddhism. A Felicitation Vol. pres. to O. H. de A. Wijesekera on his 60th birthday, ed. by J. Tilakasiri (Peradeniya 1970) 137-150: this is followed by several forthcoming publications on related topics.

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as it had been developed in the school of Udayana.[28] The article *Prabhākara Upādhyāya* (WZKSO 9, 1965, 198-226) discusses the role of the Naiyāyika (*not* the Mīmāṃsaka) Prabhākara as a forerunner of Gaṅgeśa, with special reference to his theory of *vyāpti* and *upādhi*. Frauwallner's most remarkable contribution in this field, however, is a series of articles on *Raghunātha Śiromaṇi* in WZKS (0): 10 (1966) 86-207; 11 (1967) 140-208; 14 (1970) 161-208. Raghunātha's explication of some passages of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (the *sāmānyābhāvaprakaraṇa*, the *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāvaprakaraṇa* and the *siddhāntalakṣaṇaprakaraṇa*) is confronted and compared with that given by his most important predecessors, such as Yajñapati, Jayadeva, Rucidatta, and Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma. Thus, Raghunātha's role and position in the development of *Navyanyāya* is critically examined, and his achievements and his philosophical stature are subjected to some serious questions. What distinguishes him from the older group of Gaṅgeśa commentators (Yajñapti to Vāsudeva), is, in Frauwallner's view, a rather one-sided interest in formal subtleties and in the applicability of concepts and definitions to a variety of often very remote and artificial cases.

IV. *Sāṃkhya and Yoga*

After a long and remarkable tradition of *Sāṃkhya* scholarship in Germany and Austria[29], relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* in the last decade. G. Oberhammer's article *Meditation und Mystik im Yoga des Patañjali* (WZKSO 9, 1965, 98-118) discusses the meaning and function of *samādhi* and *samāpatti* in Pātañjala Yoga. His *Gott, Urbild der emanzipierten Existenz im Yoga des Patañjali* (Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 86, 1964, 197-207) relates Patañjali's idea of God to that of the 'Great Seer' and points out its prototypical role for the conception of liberated existence. This discussion is to a certain extent continued by A. Wezler, *Der Gott des Sāṃkhya: Zu Nyāyakusumāñjali 1. 3* (IIJ 12, 1969/70, 255-262); starting with a passage in Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, which is supplemented by a number of thematically related passages, Wezler shows that, already in the days of Pañcaśikha, and in spite of the theoretical atheism of *Sāṃkhya*, Kapila played a quasi-divine role as ādividvāṃs, as prototype of the perfect knower and seer.— A very remarkable philological contribution to the study of *Sāṃkhya*, which has to be mentioned in this connection, is S. A. Srinivasan, *Vācaspatimiśra's Tattvakaumudī. Ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei kontaminierter Überlieferung* (Hamburg 1967; Alt-und Neu-Indische Studien 12); it also gives (54 ff.) a careful discussion of the date of Vācaspati and his *Tattvakaumudī*.[30]

28 The text of the anonymous *Upādhidarpaṇa*, which is also very relevant in this context, will be edited by G. Oberhammer in VKSKS.

29 Cf. Larson, G.: *Classical Sāṃkhya* (Delhi 1969) 16 ff.

30 Chronological problems concerning Vācaspati (with special reference to his relationship with Maṇḍana, Trilocana, Jayanta) are also discussed by L. Schmithausen, *Some Remarks*

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V. *Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta*

One of the central figures for contemporary research in the field of Indian philosophy is, no doubt, Maṇḍanamiśra. His *Vibhramaviveka*, according to our present state of knowledge the earliest work of Indian philosophy dealing exclusively with the theme of error, was made fully accessible by L. Schmithausen, *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ. Mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der indischen Irrtumslehre* (Wien 1965; VKSKSO 2). The text of the only known manuscript, an attempted reconstruction, a verse index, German translation and commentary are followed by a comprehensive historical survey of Indien theories of error which leads from the older developments in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, early *Vedānta*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsā* to Diṅnāga, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Dharmakīrti, their *Naiyāyika* contemporaries, and to Maṇḍana himself. What is thus presented to us, may be called a specimen of a philologically based philosophical "Problemgeschichte".—Another contribution to the study of Maṇḍana's thought is T. Vetter, *Maṇḍanamiśra's Brahmasiddhiḥ—Brahmakāṇḍaḥ. Übersetzung, Einleitung und Anmerkungen* (Wien 1969; VKSKSO 7), containing a German translation, together with introduction and notes, of the *Brahma*-section of Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* [31].—E. Frauwallner, *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā* (Wien 1968; VKSKSO 6) deals with problems of earlier *Mīmāṃsā*. Specifically, it presents and discusses two of the most important documents of ancient *Mīmāṃsā* epistemology :

1. *Śabarabhāṣya* I.1. 1-5 (Sanskrit and German);

2. Diṅnāga's polemics against *Mīmāṃsā* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* [32] (Tibetan and German). A third section of the book tries to clarify the role of the "*vṛttikāra*" mentioned by Śabarasvāmin; according to Frauwallner, he is not identical with the *Mīmāṃsā* "*vṛttikāra*" (identified as Bhavadāsa) who is mentioned in Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

In the field of *Vedānta* studies, P. Hacker continued his long series of remarkable contributions to an historical and philological exploration of *Advaita* literature. In *Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin* (BGI 119-148),

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on the Problem of the Date of Vācaspatimiśra (*Journal of the Bihar Research Society* 54, 1968, 158-164).

31 It is an interesting coincidence and symptomatic of the growing interest in Maṇḍana that in the same year M. Biardeau published her French translation and analysis of the complete text of the *Brahmasiddhi* : *La philosophie de Maṇḍana Miśra, vue à partir de la Brahmasiddhi* (Paris 1969; Publications de l'Ecole Française de l'Extrême-Orient. 76).

32 Cf. Frauwallner's rejoinder to the review by H. Scharfe (JAOS 91, 1971, 316-318), mainly concerning problems of translation and the indentity of the "*vṛttikāra*" : *Zum Vṛttikāragranthaḥ* (WZKS 16, 1972, 165-167).—A major part of the passages translated from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* has been made accessible in the same year by M. Hattori, *Diṅnāga, On Perception* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968; HOS 47).

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Hacker tries to establish the identity of Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda, author of a *Yogabhāṣyavivaraṇa* (published in 1952), with the famous author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. This amounts to the thesis that Śaṅkara was first an adherent of Pātañjala Yoga and then turned an Advaitin; in support of his thesis, Hacker finds numerous conceptual affinities to the Pātañjala system still in Śaṅkara's authentic *Advaita* works[32a] In *Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiṣṇavism* (WZKSO 9, 1965, 147-154) he argues for the equally unorhodox thesis that Śaṅkara did not come from a Śaiva, but from a Vaiṣṇava milieu. Another Śaṅkara-study is T. Vetter, *Zur Bedeutung des Illusionismus bei Śaṅkara* (BGI 407-423); it distinguishes two kinds of *avidyā* in Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, one related to the individual and its liberation, the other one to cosmic illusion, and both different from the *avidyā* concept of the *Māṇḍūkyakārikābhāṣya*, which is regarded as an earlier work by Śaṅkara.—An interesting chapter of *Advaita* philosopy of language is made available in German translation in T. Vetter *Sarvajñātman's Saṃkṣepaśārīrakam, 1. Kapitel: Einführung, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen* (Wien 1972; VKSKSO 11.)

A useful survey and analysis of the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* of the 10th century Advaita commentator Prakāśātman is given by K. Cammann, *Das System des Advaita nach der Lehre Prakāśātmans* (Wiesbaden 1965; Münchener Indologische Studien 4). Some passages in the same text are discussed by L. Schmithausen, *Zur advaitischen Theorie der Objekterkenntnis* (BGI 329-360); Schmithausen distinguishes and analyses three different theories of object-knowledge in Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa*. Continuing earlier articles on jīvanmukti in the Upaniṣads etc. J. F. Sprockhoff examines the concept of *jīvanmukti* according to Vidyāraṇya's *Jīvanmuktiviveka* in *Der Weg zur Erlösung bei Lebzeiten, ihr Wesen und ihr Wert, nach dem Jīvanmuktiviveka des Vidyāraṇya* (WZKS 14, 1970, 131-159).

Two contributions to the study of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* have recently been brought out by G. Oberhammer: *Die Theorie der Schlußfolgerung bei Parāśarabhaṭṭa* (BGI 253-273) illustrates a chapter of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* logic and epistemology between Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha, trying to reconstruct the theory of inference, as expounded by Parāśarabhaṭṭa in his *Tattvaratnākara*. Problems of early *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, paricularly its connexions with Pāñcarātra, are examined (with special reference to Yāmuna's *Āgamaprāmāṇya* and the relevant passages of Saṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*) in *Yāmunamuni's Interpretation von Brahmasūtram 2. 2. 42-45. Untersuchung zur Pāñcarātra-Tradition der Rāmānuja-Schule* (Wien 1971; VKSKS 10).

32a Cf. also Hacker, P.: *Notes on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad and Śaṅkara's Āgamaśāstra-vivaraṇa*. India Major: Congrat. Vol. pres. to J. Gonder, (Leiden 1972) 115-132.

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VI. *Some General and Miscellaneous Contributions:*

A representative of the Marxist approach to Indian thought and culture is W. Ruben of East Berlin; accordingly, he emphasizes naturalistic and materialistic trends and tries to understand the development of Indian philosophy in the context of social and economic developments. Among his more recent contributions are *Seit wann gibt es Philosophie in Indien?* (BGI 295-302), which discusses the question of the historical origins of Indian philosophy, and *Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im alten Indien. Bd. 4: Die Entwicklung der Philosophie* (Berlin 1971, VIO 67), a volume on Indian Philosophy which is part of a comprehensive social history of ancient India.[33] One of Ruben's disciples, H. Rüstau, discusses two ways of linking *Advaita Vedānta* philosophy with the ideology of the national liberation movement in India in *Swami Vivekananda* and *Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten ihrer philosophischen Auffassungen* (Neue Indienkunde—New Indology. Festschrift W. Ruben zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin 1970, VIO 72, 539-549).—Another contribution published in East Berlin is R. Hauschild, *Die Aṣṭāvakra-Gītā* (Berlin 1967; Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. -hist. Klasse, 58/2).—Indian approaches to the problem of "proving" the existence of God are discussed by G. Oberhammer, *Zum Problem des Gottesbeweises in der indischen Philosophie*[34] (Numen. International Review for the History of Religions. 12, 1965, 1-34); mechanistic and theistic types of Hindu cosmogony are contrasted by P. Hacker, *Mechanistische und theistische Kosmogonie im Hinduismus* (Zeitschrift für Missionswissemschaft und Religionswissenschaft 49, 1965, 17-28).—D. Schlinghoff, *Fragmente einer Palmblatthandschrift philosophischen Inhalts aus Ostturkistan* (*Ms. Spitzer*) (BGI 323-328), presents the oldest known evidence—from a palm-leaf manuscript discovered in Central Asia—for the Parvan arrangement of the *Mahābhārata* and for the existence of the doctrinal and philosophical parts of the Śāntiparvan.[35]

33 Ruben's book is divided into six main chapters, which discuss six "periods" of ancient Indian thought from "Rgvedic mythology (1200-900 B.C.)" to what Ruben calls "completion of epistemology (300-500 A.D.)".—One of the special features of the book is that at the end of each chapter it inserts a brief comparison with the respective developments in Greek thought; the main purpose of these synoptic sections is to illustrate how in both cultures different stages of philosophical development are conditioned by corresponding stages of socio-economic development.

34 Oberhammer's article follows the development and its attempted solutions in *Nyāya* thought from Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara to Trilocana and Jayanta, including a detailed discussion of Dharmakīrti's critical observations concerning the logical legitimacy of proving the existence of God (*Iśvara*).—In this context, the unpublished doctoral dissertation by G. Chemparathy, *Aufkommen und Entwicklung der Lehre von einem höchsten Wesen in Nyāya und Vaiśeṣika* (Wien 1963), has to be mentioned; in the meantime, the author has presented numerous other contributions in this field of research.

35 Cf. D. Schlingloff, *The Oldest Extant Parvan-List of the Mahābhārata* (JAOS 89, 1969, 334-338).

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Abbreviations

BGI = Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für E. Frauwallner (WZKSO 12-13, 1968-69)

BIP = K. H. Potter, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies (Delhi 1970; Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, 1)

HOS = Harvard Oriental Series (Cambridge, Mass)

IIJ = Indo-Iranian Journal ('s-Gravenhage)

JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society (New Haven, Conn.)

VIO = Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Orientforschung (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin)

VKSKS[O] = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens [since 1970, vol. 9: Südasiens], published by Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Wien), Philosophisch-historische Klasse, in the series of its *Sitzungsberichte*.

WZKS[O] = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens [since 1970, vol. 14: Südasiens]

ZDMG = Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft (Wiesbaden)

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF LAW IN OLD INDIA AND GREECE

By

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As a sanskritist and citizen of the GDR I regard it as my duty to help my countrymen to understand the old Indian civilization and history, in a situation when the relations between both countries become closer and closer every day. My countrymen need and want to understand the development of India as well as that of their own nationality in the history of mankind. They must know what is and was common to both evolutions and what is peculiar to each one. The best way for this purpose is to compare and contrast both societies and their specific evolutions in the frame of an allsided world-history. For the moment such a demand sounds utopian, but by scholarly discussion of Indian and Non-Indian indologists this task will be fulfilled in the course of time. As an example this small paper is written, dealing only with some aspects of the development of law in old India and Greece, leaving aside the corresponding developments in Persia, China, Africa etc. as well as that of poetry, philosophy etc. These restrictions are unavoidable for a single indologist for the moment, but even thus the necessity and growing possibility of a real allsided history of mankind in this sense may be demonstrated in this paper. It does not deal with influences of one or both these civilizations on the other one, or with historical dependence of both on a third society but it regards the development of both old laws and tries to find analogous elements of development in both countries. It regards both developments as typological and synchronous analogies, not as genetic ones. Thus, 23 years after the last volume of P. V. Kane's monumental work on the *History of Dharmaśāstra*, and some 80 years after J. Jolly's "*Recht und Sitte*" who had not yet heard of Kauṭalya and his *Arthaśāstra*, one may propose this new approach to the study of old Indian law.

The demand for an allsided history, mentioned above, is important especially as regards the evolution of law. Up to to-day it is difficult to differentiate exactly between law and morals. According to philosophers in the GDR law may be regarded as the system of norms and views of behaviour which are essential for the life of any society, for every individual; law is defined and enforced by the State. Morals are analogous norms, views and customs, defined and recommended not by the state but by religion or other institutions like political parties. The old Indians developed in a marvelous scholarly way of systematic moral thinking, the comprehensive doctrine of the four goals of human life: *dharma*, the religious goal of orthodox behaviour in this world, *artha*, the

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practical goal of social success, *kāma*, the goal of enjoying life and *mokṣa*, the final salvation from all rebirth in this world of suffering. Each one of these four goals became the subject of a learned tradition, (1) the doctrine of law and morals (the behaviour of the four *varṇas* and stages of life), (2) of politics (of success especially social and political success, the doctrine of the state), (3) of love and especially pleasure in the circles of rich and highly educated men and courtezans in towns, and (4) of salvation, idealist philosophy with its ethical discipline. But the ethics of the different idealistic schools did not discuss the theory of the four goals and their relative value for the four *varṇas* and *āśramas* in systematic ways, nor did so the materialists as represented in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. All this had no analogy in Greece, it was typical Indian.

Thus, the history of law can not be separated from that of morals, politics and religion, education, arts, philosophy, especially ethics, of the daily life, of sociology and economics and any other topic of human thinking, feeling and desiring. Mankind develops through the millennia by very complicated interactions of all such branches of material and mental life. For a single historian such an allsided task is, of course, impossible even if he restricts himself to old India. But if and when the necessity of a world history of such an allsided and comparing-contrasting type is acknowledged scholars will find the ways for a corresponding organization of their work.

When we intend to compare and contrast Indian and Greek developments we have to look first to the geographical regions of both societies. Developments went on in the vast subcontinent of ancient India with mountains and plains, watered by great and small rivers where rice could grow in the worm climate according to the favour of the monsoon in fields of village communities which spread in clearings of the vast forests to such an extent that finally in our own days all fertile soil seems to have been claimed for cultivation. On the other hand Greece was a very small country in the Mediterranean Sea where only the Eurotas was a river which could be used for watering fields. Wheat was cultivated, not rice, and the product became less and less sufficient for the increasing population; especially the small peasants, handicraftsmen and merchants had to emigrate into colonies, towns in the east and west along the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean. Thus, trade by sea was to be developed in Greece in quite different ways and to a much greater extent than in India, and the role of the merchants, of handicraftsmen for the production of commodities for export was by far greater in Greece than India. In India most people lived in villages, far from a town, and towns were first of all residences of kings and their administration. Only in very few towns private and state's commodity production and trade, which reached China and Rome, were organized by some *nāgarakas* and kings respectively.

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In the Greek city-states (polis) with their small territory like Attica around Athens every citizen (polites) owned some soil, and in the town itself lived big and mostly aristocratic landowners who were the big merchants, side by side with the small handicrafts and traders who had democratic interests. There were no kingdoms (besides Sparta on the Eurotas), but republics (1) aristocratic and (2) democratic ones and (3) some so called ethnē, backward peoples like the Boiotians, far from the coast and sea.

In India, on the other hand, there were mostly relatively big territorial states, (1) monarchies (despotics respectively), (2) *gaṇa*s, aristocracies like that of the Licchavis : In their town, in Vaiśālī lived according to Buddhist tradition some 7000 rājas ; of them every single one had his villages outside, but his granery in the town ; there were (3) tribes (*aṭavī*) in the jungles and hills, without towns.

The Indian subcontinent was full of village communities with only some few towns which in general were residences of monarchs, in contrast to Greece where every citizen was the citizen of a town-state although not every one lived in the town. When the Āryans, small groups of *viś* with their herds under kings and priests, no more tribes, invaded the Gaṅgā region from the Punjab, they left the Pre-āryan rice-growing village communities go on because they themselves did not understand the watering of fields. These conquered Pre-āryan masses became the *Śūdra varṇa* which had to " obey " the three upper *varṇa*s. Slowly the relatively small number of the Āryans gave up nomadizing and conquering and settled in some towns, residences of monarchical and aristocratic-republican type.

But the Greeks conquered a wheat growing country, did need the older, conquered cultivators only in the Eurotas valley were these became helots who were very similar to *Śūdra*s. There, in Sparta, the kingdom of the conquering leaders of war went on. In Attica the conquerors settled in Athens, divided the country among all citizens, the aristocrats and the poor ones, gave up the traditional kingdom, the king became the highest priest of the town-state's religion, and Athens became a republic. The conquered population became slaves of the single Greek landowners, and as a whole the slaves were suppressed by the Greek citizens in analogous—not identical—ways as the non-Āryan *Śūdra*s by the Āryans. Thus, big and small ownership of land and slaves began in Greece in contrast to India where the families of the *Śūdra*s in their village communities had the traditional, inherited, gentile right of using the ancestral part of the village land. The Greeks were interested in the juridical formulation of private ownership of soil, not the Indians.

In the Gaṅgā region the Āryan king who in Ṛgvedic times had been the tribal leader of war became the monarch of a territorial state. He was the poli-

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tical representative of the *Kṣatriyas*, Brahmins and *Vaiśyas* who had to force the *Śūdras* of the conquered village communities to surrender a part of their products on which the autocrat and his Brahmins and *Kṣatriyas*, his officials and soldiers lived. This very primitive type of government lead some of these kings, masters of great groups of village communities of the conquered masses, to become despots, i.e. kings who were in practice not responsible to any social institution of their subjects. Such despotism could in these early times not be judicially formulated. But when a king in a *Brāhmaṇa* has the patronymicon Jānamtapi, his father Janamtapa, the torturer of the people, must have been a despot, conscious of his despotism. Or king Pratardana in the Upaniṣad boasted that he had broken many contracts and had thrown ascetics as food to dogs without punishment. These old kings and their priests or theologists pretended that the monarch was responsible only to god Varuṇa. Thus began one of the most important problems of constitutional law, that of the obligation of the monarch to follow the traditional Brahmanical moral customs and rules which were founded on religion. In the Punjab in Ṛgvedic times this had been called *ṛtam*, the magical mythological cosmic order into which the tribal life was believed to be incorporated in such a way that the king was responsible for the moral behaviour of his subjects. From this conception of *ṛta* developed that of *dharma* in the Gaṅgā region from where it spread over the whole of old India in the course of time. From the time of the old Brāhmaṇas on one of the basic social, political, moral, religious and juridical problems was that of the duty of the autocrat to follow himself the rules of *dharma* as a just and moral king or not, i.e. as a despot, but there was no doubt that he was obliged to make his people follow these rules, whether he was a despot or not.

The Brahmins and *Kṣatriyas* from then on delegated the highest political and juridical power and responsibility to the monarch, and this one delegated the duty and privilege of teaching law and morals and of judging in the law courts to Brahmins. The monarch himself issued only orders (*śāsana*) which were recognized as law. But in contrast to the Greek republicans the Indian subjects of monarchs selected no "law-givers" like Solon and Lykourgos. In India there was therefor no "positive" law, no law which was formulated by law-givers for a single citystate like that of Athens, Korinth and others. But some Brahmins taught *dharma* in several rivalising theological schools which seem to have belonged to certain undefined regions, not states. They claimed that their *dharma* was eternal, not created by men, revealed to some ancient Brahmins like Manu by God and as applicable to the orthodox life meant for all Āryans in the whole subcontinent in contrast to the barbarians, the Non-Āryans, the *Śūdras* and *Caṇḍālas* as well as the jungle tribes and the foreigners outside India.

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When some points of the doctrine of *dharma* began in the *Brāhmaṇas*, writing was not yet used for literature, and the Brahmanical schools of law did not write their *dharma* in order to keep *dharma* and teaching of it as a privilege of the Brahmin *varṇa*, in contrast to the Greek law-givers. *Dharma* means orthodox custom of the four *varṇas* and *āśramas*, the way of life of the *Āryas* and *Śūdras*, based on the religious doctrine of rebirth and the magical causality of *karman*. Instead, Buddhists and *Jainas* followed their own *vinaya*, morals, formulated and taught for the respective monks and lay-men, for their religious societies inside the Brahmanical society of India.

Thanks to Aristotle in his study on the history of the Athenian town-state we know something of the development of Athenian law and constitution, founded by the law-givers Drakons, Solon and Kleisthenes in correspondence with the development of Athenian democracy. But we do not yet know an essential development of *dharma* in the line of the *Dharmasūtras* of Gautama etc. in the young Gaṅgā-society. But an other line of development of law begins to become clearer to us, that of these early *Dharmasūtras*, of the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya and of the later *Dharmaśātras* of Manu etc. In a very high abstraction one might say that in the *Dharmasūtras* judicial theory was beginning, but only in *Arthaśāstra*, which had already begun in the Brāhmaṇas and which after some generations of teachers was formulated (not written !) by Kauṭalya such scholarship developed and the *Dharmasūtras* went on in this line. *Arthaśāstra* in contrast to *Dharmaśāstra* was a non-theological rather rational or enlightened theory of custom and law in politics. Kauṭalya placed the first Maurya king on the throne of the Nandas. These had conquered a great deal the states of the Gaṅgā region, but Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra* recommended to avoid war and to build an empire on contracts between independent states. This policy was certainly popular and was a progress in so far as mankind, especially the masses strove and strive for peace. There was no analogy to the *Arthaśāstra* in Greece, but Platon wrote his utopian " Laws " and Aristotle his history of the Athenian town-state, especially its constitution, which have no Indian analogy.

Kauṭalya in his *Arthaśāstra* was very short on Brahmanical *dharma*, but he differentiated his own arthaśāstric law as civil and public law—if we use the later Roman terminology. Civil law according to Kauṭalya was used by the *dharmastha*-judges, public law by the *pradeṣṭṛ*-judges, and he distinguished further on the secret law of the king against those who were regarded by the king as his enemies, rebels. Kauṭalya was the first scholar to deal with civil law in a systematic way under 17 points of law, that of marriage (family), heritage, property of soil etc. and with public law under the points of keeping watch over fraudulent artisans and traders, inquest on murder etc.

Artha-and *Dharmaśāstra* acknowledged as other types of law the traditional oral law and custom of the village communities, of the guilds and castes of the

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different regions (*deśadharma*), and finally the proper theological law of expiating sinners by rituals. This last one is taught as part of *Dharma-*, not *Arthaśāstra*. To differentiate between all these kinds and points of law was an important success of Indian judicial scholarship.

The old Greeks did not succeed in doing so, in developing such a judicial theory at all. In Greece the social struggle went on between the aristocrats and democrats, the rich and poor, but there were no *varṇas*, especially not Brahmins, no theologists who claimed in India important privileges in leading the policy of the state and in teaching law and practising it as judges.

The four *varṇas* and the innumerable *jātis* preserved elements of gentile society in so far as every old Indian was born in one of them. A group of villages e.g. was inhabited by peasants of the same local caste. They were or believed to be related to each other by common ancestors, had taboos of commensality and followed rules of gentile exo- and endogamy like a tribe. Analogous were the customs of the blacksmiths of such a group of villages ; they also formed a local caste. In Greece some gentile elements survived in the "phylē" which were more or less preserved in order to give every citizen his place in the town-state. But the social struggle of the poor and the rich, of aristocrats and democrats was so important that Solon divided the Athenians into four groups or classes according to their income, a system of classification which developed upto modern states and meant a step forward in sociology and law beyond Indian law.

In India according to the *vinaya* (morals) of the Buddhists the importance of the differentiation of the four *varṇas* was not great ; a gardener e.g. who was despised according to Brahmanical *dharma* could become a member of the Buddhist order in the same way as a Brahmin, and in the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya also the conception of the four *varṇas* played no great role although it was not denied. This relatively democratic behaviour of the Buddhist may be connected with the origin of Buddhism and Buddha himself in an aristocracy (*gaṇa*) in which neither the privileges of the Brahmins nor despotism were customary. Kauṭalya on the other hand taught an ideal state, the head of which was not a despot but a patriarchal king as the father of his people, well trained in *Arthaśāstra* and himself leading his subjects to morals, avoiding passions but not living as an ascetic as pious Buddhists had to do. He quoted orthodox *dharma* to the effect that the *Śūdra* should obey the three Āryan *varṇas*, but at the same time he acknowledged that he should live as a peasant, herdsman, blacksmith or merchant. These occupations were those allowed to the *Vaiśya varṇa* in Brahmanical *dharma*. Kauṭalya knew well that the economic and political power of the state depended on the *Śūdra* masses. He regarded them with—one might say—relatively democratic eyes because—as we suppose—the social situation of the *Śūdras* had improved since the time of the Brahmaṇas. In these oldest times of the Gaṅgā society they had been regarded as conquered

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non-Āryans without any right, not even that of fixed rent (*bhāga*), and to be exploited—perhaps even to be killed—by every Āryan as this one wished. Similar to the view of Kauṭalya was that of Devala whose *Dharmaśāstra* may belong to the *Gupta* period (Kane II, 120 sq.). Between Kauṭalya and Devala, Manu in his *Dharmasmṛti* had regarded the *Śūdra* in similar ways as the Brāhmaṇas had done. And after the *Gupta* period the very conservative Manu became the highest authority on *dharma*. This means : From the Āryan conquest of the Gaṅgā region upto the time of the *Gupta*s the social situation of the *Śūdra* had improved slowly and this development is reflected in Kauṭalya's and Devala's texts. But after the *Gupta*s the Gaṅgā civilization decayed. Under the Moguls the peasants had nearly no rights at all, were again suppressed as in the Brāhmaṇa period. This line of social development, this up-and-down of the *Śūdra varṇa* through nearly 3000 years is basic for old Indian history, especially as regards democratization of law which interests us here and needs further discussion.

One may add that in the *Kāmasūtra* which belongs to the time between Manu and the *Gupta*s, the point is stressed that the hetaeras estimated only the wealth (not the *varṇa*) of their customers whether it has been gained in any of these four ways : by gift, victory, trade or salary (I, 4, 1), that means by members of the four *varṇa*s, by a Brahmin, *Kṣatriya*, *Vaiśya* or *Śūdra* respectively. All of them could participate in the society of the courtezans and of rich citizens (*nāgaraka*s). In Greek as well as in Indian towns there were such small circles of rich and highly educated men and hetaeras.

The general situation of the women was bad in both societies with their patriarchal families. Although the Greek women in contrast to their Indian sisters had succeeded in institutionalising monogamy, they were bound to the household in similar ways as the Indian women. They were never free but depended on men, on the father, husband and (as a widow) son. But Kauṭalya allowed the widow remarriage in contrast to Manu. In this regard as in others the law of *Arthaśāstra* was more liberal than that of Manu's *Dharmaśāstra*. Indian and Greek women had no political rights and could not participate in the public performance of dramas.

But the cultural influence of the circles of courtezans and rich *nāgaraka*s was great in both societies. In India one may ascribe to them the introduction of the use of writing in order to compose, publish and preserve individual literary works, dramatic as well as epical and lyrical poetry, perhaps even scientific and philosophical books. This began in the period of the Kushans when these conquerors had weakened the power of the conservative Brahmins who strove always to preserve their priviledge of oral teaching of "their" literature of as much kinds as possible. In the same time the sea trade of India

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had reached Rome and China and the big merchants had become relatively free, strong and civilized.

A couple of centuries later the Golden Age of the *Guptas* began and only by using script for literary purposes it became possible that great lawyers like Nārada, Devala, Yājñavalkya and others composed their individual law-books. Nārada was especially important in so far as he dealt only with civil law, and in this book written documents play a great role. He followed the juridical tradition of Kauṭalya, Manu and others and, to mention only two points, he allowed a woman whose husband had left home on business for more than three months, to choose another husband, provided the first had not touched her. And he formulated that free, independent were only three people, the king, the Brahmin as spiritual teacher and the father of the joint family; all the others were not free (as all women).

In the *Gupta* period Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra* was represented by the *nīti* of Kamandaka. He contrasted the despot Veṇa with the moral king Pṛthu in his mythological aetiology of the state and threatened the despot with moral teachings, but he did not recognize the *Śūdra* as the peasant who should be so free as was possible for him in an autocratic state and in a village community with the gentil heritage of *varṇa* and *jāti*.

In the Golden Age of the *Guptas* the drama *Mṛcchakaṭika*, ascribed to a king with the strange name Śūdraka, dealt with law and politics. Śūdraka characterized with full details the judges of Ujjayinī who were not in a position to find the truth, and he blamed the despot of the state for falsely punishing the falsely accused and condemned Brahmin Cārudatta with the death sentence, against the proposal of the judges and against *dharma*. This despot then is killed by a group of poor and rebellious Brahmins, and the people of the town liberate Cārudatta in the last moment before he is killed by the *Caṇḍālas*. In the circles of the *nāgarakas*, the spectators of such dramas, such a social, juridical, moral, criticism was possible and needed, highly appreciated in the Golden age of the Gaṅgā civilization. In the same time Kālidāsa criticized a despot in his *Raghuvaṁśa* and dared to blame even king Rāma for behaving unjustly against innocent Sītā. These critical attitudes of scholars and poets characterized the Golden Age of ancient India. The same holds true for Bhartṛhari's sentences on *artha*, *dharma* and *kāma*, for the *Pañcatantra* and for discussions in the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*; the archetypes of these epics belong also to this period.

When one looks back to the beginnings of *dharma-* and *arthaśāstra* in the beginnings of the Gaṅgā society, this happened from about 900 B.C. on as testified in the Brāhmaṇas, and from 900 on historians date the beginning of old Greek slaveholder-society also. Āryans had conquered the Punjab some centuries

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earlier just as Greek tribes had conquered Greece earlier, in several waves. One may estimate that the older Brāhmaṇas were composed during the 9th and 8th centuries, the Upaniṣads in the 7th. The earliest Greek literature is preserved in the Homeric epics and the works of Hesiodos, composed about 700 B.C. The earliest *Dharmasūtras* may belong to the 6th and 5th centuries, and historians estimate that the oldest Greek texts of civil law like that of Gortyn go with some elements back to 7th century.

There were no Greek analogies to Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and *Dharmasūtras*. Neither was there one of Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra* which was composed according to tradition in the 4th century, written, of course, later. Manu's *Dharmaśāstra* is estimated by Kane as a century later than Kauṭalya. Writing of Indian literature began only in the second century A.D. in Kushan times, and the law books of Yājñavalkya, Nārada, Devala and others as well as the *Kāmandakīya nītiśāstra* may be attributed to the *Gupta* age between 300 and 500. After that began the history of the commentaries on Manu etc. and Kauṭalya, and that of the *nibandhas*; one might speak of an age of scholasticism similar to that in Indian religion, theology and philosophy.

A difficult problem is still the periodization of Indian history. One can propose the following one : After the gentile societies of the stone ages, of Preāryan tribes, in the third millennium the Indus-civilization began which decayed just before the Āryans entered the Punjab in about 1500 B.C. At about 900 began the first main period of the development of the Gaṅgā-civilization which lasted upto the second main period which went on first in the *Maurya-*, then in the *Kushan-* and finally in the *Gupta* ages; the last one is commonly regarded as the Golden age of old India, the climax of the Gaṅgā-civilization, the *Maurya-* and *Kushan-*ages being the pre-climax. Then, especially after Harṣa about 700 A.D. (the first after-climax) followed the third main period of this civilization, it's period of slow decay or stagnation during the middle ages. By some Indologists it is regarded as the Indian variety of world-wide feudalism. Only from the midst of the 19th century or from 1885 on there followed the fight for national liberation as the beginning of the first main period of modern, capitalistic India.

When we look for Greek history its first main period lasted from the end of the 9th century to the end of the 7th century B.C. when the older tyranny which began at about 658 B.C. was finished and Drakon had formulated his law in 624. The second main period, that of the flourishing civilization of the Greek town-states followed up to about 400 B.C. when the Peloponnesian war had crushed Athens as well as Sparta. During this period Solon wrote his democratic law in 593 and Kleisthenes in 510, after the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos and before the Persian wars (490-480). After that followed in the 5th century the Golden

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age of Athens in the period of Perikles, the three great dramatists, Sokrates and Platon, Phidias and Myron. This was the time when sophists began some kind of philosophy of law and morals, and Sokrates taught that virtue can be taught (similar to Kauṭalya). But no Indian subject was officially condemned for his lack of faith in a state's religion (which was unknown in India) as Sokrates was, forced to drink poison, and as Alkibiades and Anaxagoras were banished from Athens. So strong was Greek religion, although there were still Greek theologists.

Contrasting and Comparing these two developments one can see that in both these civilizations there was a struggle between at least two standpoints, a more or less democratic, liberal, rational or enlightened one and a conservative, aristocratic, religious one, although the democratic tendency among the *Kṣatriyas* of a *gaṇa*-republic was quite different from that of a Greek town state with his poorer citizens. In all ages and regions progressive men strove and strive for democracy.

The development of law belonged as one expects in both societies to the first and second main period, that of the ascending and of the climax(es) of civilization. But there is an enormous difference in time: The Greek evolution of these two main periods lasted for some 500 years, the Indian one for some 1500 years. Some indologists in this regard speak of the astonishing continuity of ancient Indian civilization through 5000 years, from the beginning of the Indus civilization upto the end of the Gaṅgā-civilization. Some speak, instead, of the relative stagnation of old India which included, of course, some evolution and refinement up to the end in the 19th century. Whatever technical term is used, these figures show that the Greek development was much quicker than the Indian one.

After the Greek law (and civilization) followed the Roman one up to about 500 A.D., just when the *Gupta* age ended. Roman law was much more developed than it's precursor, the Greek law, and it must and can be compared with and contrasted to the nearly synchronous Indian law from Manu up to Nārada. After 500 A.D. began the middle ages or feudalism, at least in Europe. For some centuries Christian theological morals and law side by side with peoples laws, the heritage of gentile German, Celtic, Slawic and other laws followed the Roman one and became scholastic in its type, in this regard analogous to contemporaneous Indian law. From the so called renaissance on Byzantine-Roman law was rediscovered by western Europeans and adapted to their social needs up to the 19th century when capitalist law began, still on the foundations of the heritage of Roman law. This new law spread in colonial times to all continents, to India also, and in this way modern Indian law became based on old Indian and Greek-Roman law. But the old Indian law does not belong to the

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cultural heritage of modern Europe. On the other hand one can try to formulate that the Gaṅgā society from 900 B.C. to 1885 A.D. grew in other forms as the contemporaneous Greek-Roman society of antiquity, as the feudal and capitalist societies of Europe, but the evolution of Indian law and morals was to a certain extent similar to the contemporaneous evolution in the West.

Since 1917 socialist law has begun to develop in some parts of the world. In this way it will become possible to define the place of ancient Indian law and custom in the world-wide human history. Not every indologist will agree with this paper, with this conception of the development of law or this periodization of world history. But discussion, contradiction, scholarly fighting from different points of view is indispensable as the base of the life of all scholarship.

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UNUSUAL ICONS OF VAIKUṆṬHA VIṢṆU WITH AŚVAMUKHA

By

R. C. AGRAWALA, Jaipur

Images of Vaikuṇṭha Viṣṇu, with side-heads of a lion and a boar and the fourth head of a demon on the back, are so well-known to the students and scholars of Indian Iconography. The earliest extant depiction of this *caturmūrti* aspect of Viṣṇu is to be seen in the Kuṣāṇa stone relief in Mathura Museum wherein the side heads are still human. *It was during the Gupta period that animal heads came to be associated in such icons*[1], the main central one being that of Vāsudeva in complete human form, typifying *Bala*. The southern one, that of a lion, was symbolic of *Jñāna* whereas the boar's head (to north) indicated *Aiśvarya* (*Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, 47, verses 9-10; *ibid* 85, verses 43-45). The demon's head on the back represented Kapila or *Raudra* aspect.

Recently some interesting Vaikuṇṭha images have been reported wherein we come across the head of a horse in different positions. The Lakṣmaṇa Temple at Khajurāho (M.P.) enshrines a statue of Vaikuṇṭha in the main sanctum but on the side-niche on the exterior-preserves an elegant image of horseheaded Hayagrīva[2] who should represent none else but Vāsudeva as also described in the *Mahābhārata*.[3]

अहं हयशीर्षो भूत्वा समुद्रे पाश्चिमोत्तरे ।
पिबामि सुहुतं हव्यं कव्यांच श्रद्धयान्वितम् ॥

A. Horse Head in the centre—Hayagrīva is considered to be one of the forms of Vāsudeva. This recalls to our minds a few interesting mediaeval icons from the districts of Chittor and Bhilwara in Rajasthan, as discussed by me in detail in the *Arts Āsiatiques*, Paris. XXIII, 1971, pp. 135-40, figs. 1-4 such as :—

(1) Standing Vaikuṇṭha with side-heads of a lion and a boar in the Temple of Mahakāla at Bijolian, district Bhilwara.

(2) Standing Vaikuṇṭha from Chittor, holding a wheel and a mace in upper hands.

(3) A unique image of the *Śakti* of Vaikuṇṭha from Bijolian and having side-heads of a lion and a boar, the central one being that of a horse. The lion gazing at her is to be seen to the left below.

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1 Agrawala, R. C. *Lalit Kalā*, No. 16, 1974, pp. 11-21 and plates I-VI; Kalpana Desai, *Iconography of Viṣṇu*, New Delhi, 1973, pp. 37-61; Maheswari Prasad, *Bhārati, Bulletin of College of Indology*, Varanasi, No. 4, 1960-61, p. 145; V. S. Pathak, *J.U.P.H.S.*, Lucknow, Old series, 24-25, 1951-52, pp. 209-220..etc.

2 Avasthi, R. A. *Khajurāho kī Deva Pratimāyen*, 1967, Agra, Plate 68.

3 Deṣai, Kalpana *Lalit Kalā*, No. 13, pp. 51-52.

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The *Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā* recognises the *Śaktis* whereas the ritual in the *Jayākhya*[4] *Saṁhitā* (ed. B. Bhattacharya., G.O.S., Baroda, 1931, XXXIII, 54-56), one of the earliest *Pāncarātra* Texts, refers to *Śakti-Catuṣka* or *Devī Catuṣka* according to which the female counterpart of *Vaikuṇṭha Caturmūrti* is represented by four goddesses Lakṣmī, Kīrtti, Jayā, and Māyā. Here Lakṣmī-Vaikuṇṭha is associated with the central head of a horse (*Hayagrīvo Hari Rūpadharaḥ Prabhuḥ*). The above statues from Rajasthan are thus very imortant additions to the cult of Vaikuṇṭha during the mediaeval period as no such icons, specially that of *Devī*, are reported from other parts of the country at the present moment.

B. *Horse head on the back side*—The Museum at Khajurāho also preserves an interesting Vaikuṇṭha Viṣṇu with side-heads of a lion and a boar. The fourth head on the back is that of a 'horse' instead of a 'demon'. This recalls to our minds the interesting reference in the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of *Mokṣadharma* in the *Śānti Parva* of *Mahābhārata*[5] (V. S. Sukthankar and S. K. Belwalkar edition, Poona, Chapter 327, verse 86), wherein it is stated that 'Aniruddha appeared before Brahmā with a horse's head (*Haya Śiroḥ*) bearing the *Daṇḍa* and *Kamaṇḍalu*'. The *horse head appearing on the back of the existing Vaikuṇṭha in Khajurāho*[6] *Museum thus represents Aniruddha in an unusual manner.*

C. *Horse head on the left side*—The Museum at Śrīnagar (Kaśmīr) preserves a number of Vaikuṇṭha images because the cult thereof was quite popular in Kaśmīr during the early mediaeval period. Of these, one unusual specimen (*Fig. 1*) is of immense iconographic interest. Vaikuṇṭha here, though depicted with all the usual weapons and other motifs, has got the additional face of *a 'horse to left' instead of 'a lion', thus representing the 'Saṁkarṣaṇa' aspect in an extraordinary manner.* This recalls to our minds a reference in the *Mahābhārata* (VI. 66. 40) which alludes to his being the expounder of the *Sātvata Vidhi*; as a manifestation of knowledge he was shown in the form of a horse. According to the *Viṣṇudharmottara* (cited above) also, Saṁkarṣaṇa, typified by a lion, suggests 'knowledge'.[7] We have already noticed that Viṣṇu in his *Hayagrīva* form was deemed as the great protector of the Vedas. It was probably with this intention that the sculptor had probably presented the head of a horse instead of the usual one of the lion. The existing Vaikuṇṭha statue from Kaśmīr thus deserves careful scrutiny and further corroboration from

4 *Ibid*, p. 52.

5 As suggested by Adris Banerji, *Lalit Kalā*, No. 12, p. 22.

6 Pathak, V. S. *Journal of M.P.I P.*, Bhopal, II, p. 14, suggested it to be a bull's head but the mistake was duly corrected by K. Deva, *ibid*, f.n. 4 on p. 14. The photograph of this image is published by R. A. Avasthi, *Khajurāho kī Deva Pratimāyen*, Agra, 1967, plate 63 and front side on plate 62.

7 Banerjea, J. N. *Development of Hindu Iconography*, Calcutta, 1956, p. 409.

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Vaikuṇṭha (Śrīnagar Museum)
[Photo:—Dr. Hertel]

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literary texts. The lion-crowned mace for Saṁkarṣaṇa in the Gupta statue from Gwalior Museum[8] and likewise lion-crowned *hala* in early Indian sculpture is so well-known to the students of early Indian iconography.

The above Vaikuṇṭha images, with an *Aśvamukha*,[9] are therefore important from iconographic point of view.

8 This was till now been regarded as Viṣṇu but the lion on the top of the mace seems to suggest identification with Saṁkarṣaṇa Bala-Rāma.

9 I am thankful to Dr. H. Hartel for a photograph of the image from Śrinagar Museum.

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A RARE SCULPTURE OF THE CONSORT OF VAIKUṆṬHA

By

V. S. Parekh, Baroda

The *Pāñcarātra* system centres round the concept of four *Vyūhas*, resulting into the evolution of the four-faced image of Vaikuṇṭha Caturmūrti, the faces representing Lord Vāsudeva together with his three primaeval emanations Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha—one emanating from the other. This caturvyūha concept symbolises the whole creation. They carry on their creative activity with the help of their *śaktis*.

The North Indian[1] *Pāñcarātra* texts unanimously enjoin the worship of the four *Vyūhas* incorporated into one Caturmūrti. However their *śaktis* are not given equal importance by all of them. For instance, the *Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā* recognises the *śaktis* but does not attach much importance to their personified forms[2]. The entire ritual described by the *Jayākhya Saṁhitā*, one of the earliest *Pāñcarātra* texts, consists of the worship of Vaikuṇṭha and his consort designated as Śakticatuṣka or Devīcatuṣka. According to the *Jayākhya Saṁhitā*, the female counterpart of Vaikuṇṭha Caturmūrti is represented by four goddesses, viz. Lakṣmī, Kīrti, Jayā and Māyā[3]. The iconographic forms of the consorts are not described in detail. Lakṣmī is said to occupy the eastern side of the *maṇḍala*, Kīrti occupies the southern, Jayā the western and Māyā the northern, corresponding with Viṣṇu in the eastern, Narasiṁha in the southern, Kapila in the western and Varāha in the northern direction of the Vaikuṇṭha image[4]. They are to be placed in front of Vaikuṇṭha holding the *pāśa* and the *aṅkuśa*[5]. The rest of the iconographic details are left to the imagination of the sculptor. Though nothing is said about the form of the four faces, they are understood to be resembling the faces of Vaikuṇṭha with whom this composite form of the goddess is associated.

One rare image of the standing consort of Vaikuṇṭha, having eight hands, discovered from the Uṇḍeśvara Mahādeva of Bijolian (Rājasthāna), has a horse-face in the front[6] (in the centre). The faces of this *śakti* as consort of

1 The South Indian *Āgamas* like the *Vaikhānasāgama* and *Atri Saṁhitā*, do not consider *Vyūha*-theory to be very important.

2 *Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā* (ed.), Schrader, O. F., Madras 1916, LI, 30-34.

3 Bhattacharya, B. (ed.), *Jayākhya Saṁhitā*, Baroda, 1931, VI, 77.

4 *Ibid.*, XIII, 108-109.

5 *Ibid.*, VI, 85-90.

6 Banerji, Adris, 'Interesting Images from South-East Rājasthāna', *Lalit Kalā*, No. 12, pp. 21-25, Plates XV, XVI, figs. 1, 2, 8; and see also, Dr. Kalpana Desai's detailed note on this image, *Lalit Kalā*, No. 13, pp. 51-52.

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

Consort of Vaikuṇṭha, Pāṭaṇ
[See V. S. Parekh's article, pp. 390-392]

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Vaikuṇṭha are exactly like the faces found in the Vaikuṇṭha images. The face on the right side is that of a lion and on the left that of a boar representing the *śaktis* of Saṁkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha respectively personified as Narasiṁha and Varāha. The only striking feature is the face of Hayagrīva or horse In the front. Though generally Vaikuṇṭha images have a human face in the front, the Hayagrīva face is not unusual as Hayagrīva is considered to be one of the forms of Vāsudeva even in the *Mahābhārata* (V. 13508). Besides, Hayagrīva-worship seems to have been common in northern Rājasthāna as his images are preserved in the Koṭāh Museum. The image of Lakṣmī-Vaikuṇṭha having a Hayagrīva face in the front is described in the *Jayākhya Saṁhitā*. Its rarity shows that it must have been known and worshipped by very few in Rājasthāna only.

It may also be surmised from its very clear references in the *Jayākhya Saṁhitā* that both the consort of Vaikuṇṭha and its Hayagrīva face were known in Kāśmira where this text is supposed to have been composed. This Bijolian image was previously noticed in the Progress-Report of the Archaeological Survey of India (Western Circle at Poona for 31st March 1905, p. 53) by Dr. Bhandarkar (Mahākāla Temple of Bijolian).

The aforesaid statue from Bijolian, depicts also a lion with its neck raised up and gazing at the goddess. The goddess puts on a *karaṇḍamukuṭa* on her head and may represent the consort of Vaikuṇṭha or Trimukhī Nārāyaṇī Durgā. This is really an unusal represeentation of the devī having all the three animal faces. It deserves careful scrutinity by experts of ancient Indian iconography. This image is the only specimen of this type, known so far.

Next to the Bijolian-specimen, the second sand-stone image of the consort of Vaikuṇṭha, found from the site-museum of the Sahasraliṅga Lake, Pāṭaṇ (North Gujarat), is an eight-handed standing goddess with a rudra face in the centre; the remaining two faces of a lion and a boar are seen on the right and the left sides respectively. The fourth face representing the Hayagrīva aspect of the *śakti* is to be imagined.

Kapila is considered to be the incarnation of Viṣṇu and as such, the rudra face of Kapil whose cult was well prevalent in Kāśmīra, is found sometimes in the composite image of Vaikuṇṭha.[7] It appears that the rudra-face in the centre of this icon of Pāṭaṇ depicts Lakṣmī, the *śakti* of the rudra-form of Viṣṇu (Kapila), possibly inherited from Kāśmīra.

This goddess wears a two-stringed and three-signed necklaces of pearls found hanging between the breasts, armlets, *Keyūras*, a *bandha* of pearls passing

7 Banerji, Adris, *op. cit.*, figs. 1, 2 : Vaikuṇṭha Image from Kāśhmīra; and see also, Agrawal, R.C., 'Unusual Icons of Vaikuṇṭha-Viṣṇu with Aśvamukha,' *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda, Vol. XXV, Issue nos. 3-4, pp. 387-9 and also refer to Dr. Kalpana S. Desai, '*Iconography of Viṣṇu*', pp. 41-2 and fig. 33.

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below the breasts and a four-stringed *Kamarabandha*. All the eight hands of the icon are mutilated and except an *aṅkuśa* and a mace seen in two of the raised right hands, no other attributes are visible. The ends of an *uttarīya* are seen flying near the waist.

The huge body, heavy head and the ornaments of this icon assign it to the 12th Century A.D. Such big-sized sculptures were common during the Caulukya period in Gujarāta.

Over and above the above-described image of the consorts of Vaikuṇṭha, images of Vaikuṇṭha are available from Kadawāra—(Saurāṣṭra), Pālanapura and Sanḍera (North Gujarat) also. Harihara and Bilhaṇa, the poets of Kāśmīra brought the literary traditions of the '*Naiṣadhīyucaritam*' of Srī Harṣa and '*Bilhaṇa-Pañcāśikā*' from Kāśmīra to Gujarāta. And as such, it is possible that the cult of Vaikuṇṭha and his consort might have migrated to Gujarāta due to cultural relations between Kāśmīra and Gujarāta.

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INSCRIPTION OF THE JAINA TEMPLE OF VĀḌĪ PĀRŚVANĀTHA AT PĀṬAṆ AND GENEALOGY OF THE TEACHERS OF THE KHARATARA GACCHA

By

B. J. SANDESARA, Baroda

Architecturally and artistically beautiful *Śvetāmbara Jaina* temple of Vāḍī Pārśvanātha in the Jhaverivada locality at Anahilavad Patan or Patan (North Gujarat), the historical capital of Gujarat, was built by one Kunvaraji, descendent of the minister Bhīma and a follower of the *Kharatara gaccha* of the *Jaina Śvetāmbara* sect, in V.S. 1652 (1596 A.D.). This temple is famous among the art-lovers and historians of art for its very richly carved wood-canopy or *Maṇḍapa*, now preserved and well-kept in the Baroda Museum. The temple is described, splendid photographs of its wood-carvings are printed and plans of the structure are given in details in the *Architectural Survey of Northern Gujarat* by Burgess and Cousens (London, 1903). But the long Sanskrit inscription of the temple covering 52 lines is not edited and published so far, though a brief summary of it has been given by Burgess and Cousens. The inscription is published here in Sanskrit original.

As the very name of the temple suggests, it is dedicated to the 22nd *Jaina Tīrthaṅkara*, Pārśvanātha. The inscription is fixed in the wall opposite the principal image. The text is inscribed in elegant but minute *Devanāgarī* characters of *Jaina* mode on a slab of black marble measuring 28″ × 16½″.

The Sanskrit language of the inscription, though somewhat ornate, is occasionally influenced by vernacularisms conveniently termed '*Jaina* Sanskrit'. The first forty lines give genealogy of teachers; initially the inscription respectfully mentions Mahāvīra, the last *Tīrthaṅkara*, but begins the genealogy of the *Ācāryas* of the *Kharatara Gaccha* from Udyotanasūri and ends with Jinasiṁhasūri at whose teaching the temple was built. The rest of the inscription gives information about the family of the builder of the temple. This edifice was constructed during the reign of Akbar the great, and it is noteworthy that the line 48 of the inscription mentions *Saṁvat Allaī 41*, which is year 41 of the *Ilāhi* Era commenced by Akbar to commemorate the syncretic sect of *Din-i-Ilāhi* founded by himself. It would be interesting to note that a few other contemporary *Jaina* inscriptions and literary works mention the year in *Ilāhī* Era along with the prevalent *Vikram* Era, though the former was short-lived as it is hardly ever noted even in Muslim sources, except on the coins of Akbar's two successors—Jehangir and Shahjahan, because after the demise of the great Emperor few were interested in his creed which considered all religions equal.

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Now a few words about the name of the temple. It is a temple dedicated to Pārśvanātha no doubt, but why the deity is called *Vāḍī* Pārśvanātha ?

In the first and second lines of the inscription the presiding deity is referred to as *Vāḍīpurapārśvanātha*. There is a popular tradition in Patan and adjoining region that the image of Pārśvanātha was earlier installed at Vāḍīpura, a suburb of the city of Patan, but when the population in the said suburb dwindled on account of political and other reasons, the image was re-installed in a new shrine at the present site. There is no trace at present of a place called Vāḍīpura anywhere near Patan, but the tradition is amply borne out by literary references.

In *Jaina* literature in old Gujarati there is a class of versified compositions called *Caityaparipāṭī*, that is, 'list of shrines' (of a particular place), and a large number of such works are available, which throw important light on contemporary cultural and religious conditions and also on historical Geography. To employ modern parlance, they are contemporary accounts of 'conducted tours' of *Jaina* pilgrims. More than one *Caityaparipāṭī*s of the city of Patan are available, and some of them mention the suburb of Vāḍī or Vāḍīpura and the shrine of Pārśvanātha there.

The *Pāṭaṇa-Caityaparipāṭī* of Siddhisūri[1] composed in V.S. 1576 (1520 A.D.) refers to the following shrines in the suburbs of Patan—

वाडी दउलतिपुरी सही सा भमरोली, भवियण सारइ सेव,
वडली, वावडी, कउंणगिरइ सा भम०, नमसिउं सीस नमेवि.
कतउपुरि पणमउं सदा सा भम० **मगलीपुरि** जिणचंद त,
इण परि चैत्रपवाडि करी सा भम० भेट्या संति जिणंद त,
(Vv. 57-58)

There is another work entitled *Pāṭaṇa-Caityaparipāṭī*[2] by Lalitaprabhasūri composed in V.S. 1658 (1592 A.D.), that is, only four years before the construction of the new temple in the city. Lalitaprabhasūri mentions the older shrine in the suburb in the following verses—

वाडीपुरवर-मंडणउ ए, प्रणमीय २ अमीझरउ पास तु,
आस पूरइ सयल तणी ए, पूजीइ २ आणी भाव तु, **वाडीपुरवर-मंडणउ** ए.
(V. 83)

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1 This poem contains 60 verses. For a critical edition of the text prepared on the basis of a single manuscript found by me at Jesalmer in Rajasthan in 1950, vide *Sambodhi*, Vol. IV, nos. 3-4.

2 Edited by Muni Kalyanavijayaji and published by Hansavijayaji Library, Ahmedabad, V.S. 1982.

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Inscription of the Jaina Temple, Vāḍī Pārśvanātha at Pāṭaṇ (N. Gujarat)

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Lalitaprabhasūri, like the earlier poet Siddhisūri, has also referred in the subsequent verses to Jaina shrines in other suburbs near Vāḍīpura, viz., Dolatpura, Kumaragiri, Vavadi and Vadali. Dolatpura (and also Magalipura mentioned by Siddhisūri) cannot be identified at present, but Kaunagiri or Kumaragiri is the modern village of Kunaghera, three miles south-west of Patan. According to *Prabandhas*, Kumaragiri was a *Jaina* temple built by the king Kumārapāla of Patan in the 12th Century and apparently a village of the same name grew up around the temple in course of time. Vavadi and Vadali are about four miles in the west. So it is clear that Vāḍīpura must be a few miles away from Patan either in the west or south-west, though no remains of it are found on the surface at present. Moreover, the *Caityaparipāṭī* of Lalitaprabhasūri is composed in 1592 A.D., and the new temple of Parśvanātha in the city was built in 1596 A.D., and it can be reasonably surmised that Vāḍīpura might have become a deserted village during the intervening four years.

As stated earlier, the long inscription of the temple gives a *Paṭṭāvalī* or list of teachers or genealogy of *Ācāryas* of the *Kharatara gaccha*. Several other *Paṭṭāvalīs* of the said *gaccha* are extant,[3] and it is noteworthy that the historical facts and traditional accounts as well as chronological sequence of teachers given in our inscription are fully supported by available historical sources.

The following is the text of the inscription :—

[१] ॥ द० ॥ स्वस्ति श्री**वाडीपुरपार्श्व**जिनसंघचैत्यकाराय ॥ लक्ष्मीउदयं श्रेयः।

[२] पत्तनसंस्थः करोतु सदा ॥ श्री**वाडीपुरपार्श्वनाथ**चैत्यश्री**बृहत्खरतर-गुरुपट्टावली**

[३] लिखनपूर्वं प्रशस्तिर्लिख्यते ॥ अर्हं नत्वा ॥ पातिसाहि श्री**अकब्बर**राज्ये श्री**विक्रमनृपसम**

[४] **यातीत्संवते १६५२ मार्गशीर्ष सित नवमीदिने सोमवारे पूर्वभद्रपदनक्षत्रे** शुभवेला

[५] यां आदिप्रारम्भः ॥ शासनाधीशश्री**महावीरस्वामी**पट्टाविछिन्नपरंपरया उद्यतविहारोद्यो

[६] ति श्री**उद्योतनसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्टप्रभाकरप्रवर**विमलदण्डनायक**कारितार्बु-दाचलवसतिप्रतिष्ठापक

3 As for example *Vide* the summary of a *Paṭṭāvalī* given by Klatt in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI; also *Vide Kharatara-gaccha Paṭṭāvalisaṅgraha* (Calcutta, 1932) and *Kharatara-gaccha Bṛhad Gurvāvalī* (Bombay, 1950) both edited by Jinavijayaji; *Aitihāsika Jaina Kāvyasaṅgraha* (Calcutta, V.S. 1994) edited by Agarchand Nahata and Bhavarlal Nahata, etc.

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[७] श्रीसीमन्धरस्वामिशोधितसूरिमन्त्राराधक **श्रीवर्धमानसूरि** ।. तत्पट्टप्रभाकर **अणहिल्लपत्तनाधी**

[८] श**दुर्लभराज**संसचैत्यवासिपक्षविक्षेपाऽशीत्यधिकदशशतसंवत्सर**प्राप्तखरतरबि**

[९] **रुद श्रीजिनेश्वरसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० श्री**जिनचन्द्रसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । शासनदेव्युपदेशप्रकटित

[१०] दुष्टकुष्टप्रमाथहेतुस्तम्भनपार्श्वनाथ नवाङ्गिवृत्त्यानेकशास्त्रकरणप्राप्तप्रतिष्ठ श्री

[११] **अभयदेवसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । लेखरूपदशकुलकप्रेषणप्रतिबोधितवागडदे-शीयदशसह

[१२] सश्रावक सुविहितकठिनाक्रियाकरण पिण्डविशुद्ध्यादिप्रकरणप्ररूपणजिनशासन

[१३] प्रभावक श्री**जिनवल्लभसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । स्वशक्तिवशीकृतचतुःषष्टि-योगिनीचक्रद्विपञ्चा

[१४] शद्वीरसिन्धुदेशीयपीर **अम्बडश्रावक**करलिखितस्वर्णाक्षरवाचनाविर्भूत-युगप्रधा

[१५] नपदवीसमलंकृत पञ्चनदीसाधक **श्रीजिनदत्तसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० ॥ श्रीमालउशवालादिप्रधान

[१६] श्रीमहतीयाणप्रतिबोधक नरमणिमण्डितभालस्थल श्री**जिनचन्द्रसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । **भण्डारीने***

[१७] **मिचन्द्र**परीक्षितप्रबोधोदयादिग्रन्थरूपषट्त्रिंशद्वादशोधितविधिपक्ष श्री-**जिनपतिसूरि** ॥

[१८] तत्पट्ट० । लाडउलविजापुरप्रतिष्ठितश्रीशान्तिवीरविधिचैत्य **श्रीजिनेश्वर-सूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० ।

[१९] **श्रीजिनप्रबोधसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । राजचतुष्टयप्रतिबोधोद्भुद्धराजगच्छसंज्ञा-शोभित

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* This Nemicandra was the author of the well-known Prākrit work, *Saṣṭiśataka Prakaraṇa*. A Critical Edition of this text with three *Bālāvabodhas* or prose-commentaries in Old Gujarati is prepared by me and published as Vol. I of the *Prācīna Gurjara Granthamālā*, Baroda, 1953.

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[२०] श्री**जिनचन्द्रसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । श्रीशत्रुञ्जयमण्डनखरतरवसतिप्रतिष्ठापक विख्याता

[२१] तिशयलक्ष श्री**जिनकुशलसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । श्री**जिनपद्मसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । श्री**जिनलब्धिसू**

[२२] **रि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । श्री**जिनचन्द्रसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । देवाङ्गनावसरवासप्रक्षेपो-दितसंघपतिपदा

[२३] द्युदयश्री**जिनोदयसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । श्री**जिनराजसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । स्थानस्थानस्थापित

[२४] सारज्ञानभाण्डागार श्री**जिनभद्रसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । श्री**जिनचन्द्रसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० पञ्च

[२५] यक्षसाधक विशिष्टक्रिय श्री**जिनसमुद्रसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० । तपोध्यान-विधानचमत्कृ

[२६] तश्री**सिकंदरपातिसाहि**पंचशतबंदिमोचनसम्मानित श्री**जिनहंससूरि** ॥ तत्पट्ट० ।

[२७] पञ्चनदीसाधकाधिकध्यानबलशकलीकृतयवनोपद्रवातिशयविराजमानश्री

[२८] **जिनमाणिक्यसूरि** ॥ तत्पट्टालंकार सारदुर्वारवादिविजयलक्ष्मीशरण पूर्वक्रि

[२९] यासमुद्धरण स्थानस्थानप्राप्तजय प्रतिदिनवर्धमानोदय सदसन्नय त्रिभुवन

[३०] जनवशीकरणप्रवण प्रणवध्यानोपात्तामितपवित्रसूरिमन्त्र विजितभय दू

[३१] रीकृतसकलवादिस्मय निजपादविहारपावितावनितल अनुक्रमेण **संवत्**

[३२] **१६४८** श्री**स्तम्भतीर्थ**चतुर्मासकस्थानसमुद्भूतामितमहिमश्रवणदर्शनोत्कं

[३३] ठित**जलालदीनप्रभुपातिसाहि**श्री**मदकब्बर**समाकारणमिलन स्व-गुणगण

[३४] तन्मनोनुरञ्जन समाश्वासितसकलभूतलाखिलजन्तुसुखकारि आषाढाष्टाहि

[३५] कामारिफुरमाण श्री**स्तम्भतीर्थ**समुद्रमीनरक्षणफुरमाण तत्प्रदत्तसत्तमश्रीयु

[३६] गप्रधानपदधारक तद्वचनेन च **नयनशररसरसामित संवति (१६५२)**

माघसितद्वा

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[३७] **दशी**शुभतिथौ अपूर्वपूर्वगुर्व्वाम्नायसाधितपञ्चनदीप्रकटीकृतपञ्चपीरप्रासप

[३८] रमवर तदादिविशेषश्रीसंघोन्नतिकारक विजयमान गुरुयुगप्रधानश्री १०८

[३९] श्री**जिनचन्द्रसूरी**श्वराणां श्री**पातिसाहि**समक्ष स्वहस्तस्थापित आचार्य्य

[४०] श्री**जिनसिंहसूरि**सपरिकराणामुपदेशेन **ओसवाल**ज्ञातीय मन्त्रि**भीम**-सन्ताने

[४१] मं० **चांपा**भार्या **सूहवदे,** तत्पुत्र मं० **महिपति** तद्भार्या **अमरी** तत्पुत्र मं० **वस्तपाल**

[४२] तद्भार्या **सिरियादे** तत्पुत्र मं० **तेजपाल** तद्भार्या श्री० **भानू** तत्कु-क्षिसरोमराल अ

[४३] र्थिजनमनोभिमतपूरणदेवसाल देवगुरुपरमभक्त विशेषतो जिनधर्मानुरक्तस्वां

[४४] त **ऊकेश**वंशमण्डण साह **अमरदत्त**भार्या **रतनादे** तत्पुत्ररत्न **कुंअरजी** तद्भार्या

[४५] **सोभागदे** वाहिनि बाई **वाछी** पुत्री बाई **जीवणी** प्रमुख पुत्रपौत्रादि-सारपरिवारयुतेन

[४६] तेन श्री**अणहल्लपुरपत्तन**शृंगारसार सुरमनोनुरञ्जन सुरगिरिसमानचतुर्मुख

[४७] विराजमान विधिचैत्यं कारितम् ॥ श्रीपौषधशाला पाटकमध्ये ॥ तदनुकर

[४८] करणकायकुप्रमित(?) **संवत् अल्लई ४१** वर्षे **वैशाख वदि द्वादशी वासरे गुरु**

[४९] **वारे रेवतीनक्षत्रे** शुभवेलायां महामहःपूर्वं प्रतिमा श्री**वाडीपार्श्व-नाथ**स्य स्था

[५०] पिता ॥ एतत्सर्वं देवगुरुगोत्रजदेवीप्रसादेन वंद्यमानं पूज्यमानं । समस्त श्रीसं

[५१] घेन सहितेन चिरं जीयात् ॥ कल्याणमस्तु । एषा पट्टिका पं० **उदय-सागरगणि**ना लिपी

[५२] कृता । पं० **लक्ष्मीप्रमोदमुनि** आदरेण । कोरिता **गजधर-गल्लाकेन** । शुभं भवतु नित्यम् ॥

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CHAMPANER AND HUMAYUN

By

R. N. MEHTA, Baroda

Introduction

One of the important incidents at Champaner was its temporary conquest by Humayun. The incident of this conquest is described by Jauhar Aftabchi[1], Sheikh Abul Fazl[2], Khwaja Nizammuddin[3] and Sikandar bin Manjhu[4]. Gul Badan Banu[5] Begam passingly refers to the movement of Humayun to Champaner. Some of these writers have narrated this incident at the request of Akbar, who wanted to trace the history of his dynasty. Abul Fazl was given the task of compiling the History and for the sources the narratives were written by those who participated in the activities or by those who heard them and had some knowledge about them.

These Persian sources provide important data which agree in some respects and differ in others from one another. This situation gives rise to the fundamental search of what should really have happened at that time. The critical comparison and evaluation of these sources help to some extent in clearing some doubts, but they fail to clear the others. This course of action is usually followed by the Mediaevalists for interpretation. Often, while reading the histories produced from literary sources, arm-chair arguments seem to hold the line. If the site is mentioned in the sources, sometimes it is described in the Histories as is done by late M. S. Commissariat[6], but its linking with the narratives for better interpretation is lacking.

This process leaves a gap in the narrative and the site. Though they are juxtaposed, the result remains weak. Critical evaluation of both the sources is important to understand the actual dynamics of the incident on the local theatre. Therefore, an effort is made in this short-note to understand the incident of the conquest of Champaner by an analysis of the data presented by the Persian sources and archaeology, as well as taking the later works in English into consideration.

Persian Writers

A look at the authors, Gulbadan, Jauhar Aftabchi, Khwaja Nizammuddin, Sheikh Abul Fazl and Sikander Bin Manjhu will immediately indicate that except the last, all others belong either to the family of Babur or were directly connected with the Delhi Court.

The last knew the tradition of Gujarat and had written for the Delhi Court. As such, the differences in the narrative were glaring in many details.

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The points where the general agreement is seen in the narrative are detailed below:

1. Bahadurshah came to Champaner from Mandu.
2. Humayun pursued him to Champaner.
3. Bahadurshah left Champaner for interior parts of Gujarat.
4. Humayun tried to pursue him, but had to return to Champaner.
5. Champaner fort was not conquered till this time.
6. Humayun went to the Fort by secret passage and won the fort.
7. The defender Ikhtiyarkhan went to Mauliya.
8. Ikhtiyarkhan surrendered.

In this general outline the movements seem to be fairly clear. But the details by various writers require some comments. Gulbadan Banu Begam[5] has written Humayun Nama. In this work she cursorily dismisses the acconnt. She informs that on 14th Shaban Humayun left Agra (February 18, 1535). Then he won against Bahadurshah at Mandsor and followed him to Mandu, Champaner, Cambay and returned via Baroda to Champaner and from there he came to Agra.

Evidently the sister of Humayun did not bother about the battles, and hence she has not described them. So, for the struggle at Champaner one has to turn to another writer. Jauhar Aftabchi[1], who was in service of Humayun, has given some more information.

He notes that Bahadur was followed by Humayun, so he left Champaner for Surat[7]. He is silent about the movement of Humayun in Gujarat as well as his return to Champaner.

He notes that somebody informed about a secret passage to the fort. This passage was followed and Humayun went into the fort with drums and *Surna*. The musical instruments were sounded, the besieging army was attacked. The defenders became nervous, jumped from the fort. They beggged for pardon and surrendered.[1] Compared to these two accounts from the court of Humayun, two others are more detailed. They are by Abul Fazl[2] and Khwaja Nizammuddin Ahmed[3]. Apparently their sources are different. They have common idea that Humayun came after Bahadur, but they differ in certain details. Abul Fazl gives the name of the place, at which Humayun came to Champaner. It is noted as exisiting on the Hauz of Imad-Ul-Mulk near Pipli Dvara. He also notes that Champaner was burnt by Bahadurshah. He handed over the charge of Champaner to Mir Hindu-beg and went in the pursuit of Bahadur[2]. These details are not given by Khwaja Nizammuddin Ahmed. The place of retreat of Bahadur is noted by the latter as Ahmedabad while Abul Fazl notes it as Cambay.

The return to Champaner is noted by both. They also agree that Ikhtyarkhan was protecting Champaner. Humayun continued the seige for four months

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

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according to Abul Fazl while Khwaja Nizammuddin is silent about the time factor.

During this time Humayun tried hard to find a way to enter Champaner. This is noted by both authors. It is also agreed by both, that persons coming from the Jungle showed the way, and a general agreement is observed in the modus operandi of the attack.

Again here the minor details are different. Abul Fazl gives the probable area of the incident. He notes that when Humayun was coming from Hanol he came across the group of people coming form the forest. They had neither the axe nor any equipment for collecting wood. He therefore, questioned and threatened them. They confessed that they were taking supplies to the fort. Humayun moved on the way. Khwaja Nizammuddin adds that those who came out of the forest ran away as they saw the army. They were captured after pursuit. The other details of the attack are identical in broad outlines.

Humayun fixed iron pegs on the precipitous cliff and with the help of this passage entered the fort at night. Humayun himself participated in the campaign. Khwja Nizammuddin tells that the final assault was done in the morning while here Abul Fazl is silent about it. He mentions that the attack was launched from both sides. As the arrows shot by the party led by Humayun started coming to the enemies, they were scared and took to their heels.

Khwaja Nizammuddin however informs that the war cry of "Allah-O-Akbar" from the attacking party was enough to scare away the enemy. Humayun rushed at the gate and opened it. As a result of the attack a number of soliders tried to jump from the fort and killed themselves. The commander, Iktyarkhan, retreated to Mauliya. It is agreed by both the authors that Ikhtyarakhan was given royal pardon and hence he submitted and joined Humayun.

This analysis of the incident indicates that Abul Fazl and Khwaja Nizammuddin use different sources than those used by Jauhar Aftabchi and Gulbadan Banu Begam. A close analysis of Sikandar's narration [4] indicates that he is using sources that seem to give a version known in Gujarat. They indicate a more mature move on the part of Bahadurshah. His narration differs in many details from those given by the other historians. The analysis of his report gives interesting information for the preparation of the struggle and some other factors.

It is well-known that Bahadur came to Champaner from Mandu. After his arrival he started preparing for the battle. The charge of the town was given to Iktyarkhan and Narsimhadeva before going to Div via Cambay. The garrison had started the work of strengthening the defences. In this effort they wanted a cannon " Bahadurshahi " to be taken in the fort. Before they could complete the assignment, Humayun's army reached Champaner and hence the cannon was

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punctured and abandoned, and the defence of some part of Champaner began. Interesting information of a Cannonade by both sides is given. In the defence the death of Narsimhadeva was a heavy blow and Bahadur also gave up the hope of defence of Champaner. Humayuns' pursuit of Bahadurshah had failed but his return to Champaner is not noted by Sikandar. He notes, catagorically, however, that 200 kolis were sent out by the garrison. They were captured by the battery of Humayun. He ordered that they should be killed and only after some 70 or 80 of them were killed, one of them agreed to show a secret way. Humayun sent experienced warriors. Here Sikandar does not give the incident of 300 soliders and Humayun leading the attack. The soliders of Humayun attacked with the war cry of " Allah, " the defenders got scared, some of them were killed, some jumped over the fort wall and ran away and the fort was conquered. The other details about Ikhtyars' going to Mauliya are similar to that given by other authors. But for his surrender the version of Jauhar Aftabchi and Sikandar are similar. About the date of the conquest also there is a difference of opinion. Sikandar puts it as Safar 7, 942 (8th August, 1535) whereas Abul Fazl puts it as first week of Safar 943 (20th-27th July, 1536).

This analysis indicates that there is a general agreement about the conquest of Champaner by Humayun on the following basic points.

(1) Humayun followed Bahadurshah to Champaner.
(2) He could control parts of Champaner, but the resistance continued for a long time.
(3) The Fort was taken by an attack with an element of surprise.
(4) After this conquest enough area for retreat was existing.
(5) Ikhtyarkhan gave up the struggle.

Problems

While pursuing these sources for the conquest of Champaner, numerous lacunae become obvious. A few of them are as noted below :—

(1) What was the town of Champaner that was conquered by Humayun ?
(2) Which area was set on fire by Bahadurshah ?
(3) If Sikandar's source has any validity, which is the area of the struggle?
(4) Where does the secret passage of Humayun lie ?
(5) Which was the Fort captured by Humayun ?
(6) Where did Ikhtyar move ? Could he really move there ?

Method

All these questions remain unanswered if the traditional sources are utilized. However, interesting light could be thrown upon the problem concerning the progress of the war if the archaeological sources, especially the defence system

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of Champaner, is carefully analysed. Here an effort is made to follow the course of the action and identification of its theatre for clearer understanding of the operation. While doing this, both archaeological and literary sources are used.

Bahadur had suffered a severe loss at Mandasor and had to beat hasty retreat to Mandu and then to Champaner. Champaner was the then capital of Gujarat, but it had decided disadvantages in this war.

It is to be noticed that Champaner was conquered in 1484 by Mahmud Begda and a new capital of Champaner-Mahammudabad was established. This capital controlled the routes from Gujarat to Malwa, but it was on the outer border of the state. It acted as a place of refuge but was to be converted as a centre of resistance if the onslaught of Humayun was to be stopped. It seems that Bahadurshah took the step of developing this fort as a centre of resistance by appointing Ikhtyarkhan and Narsimhadeva to defend Champaner.

Defences of Champaner

Champaner was defended by a series of seven fortifications one overlooking the other, as could be indicated by the archaeological remains. Their order is as follows :—

I—The fort-line on the north-eastern plain—Sahar Panah. This fort-line moves from Saria-Vakaria hill to Pavagadh. It has nine gates and on one side it touched the Atak line of fortification, while the other disappeared in the hill. This line had its walls about 6 meters high and about a meter broad. It was built of bricks and stone rubble set in lime mortar. Two minor lines exist here, one in Jorvan valley and the other in Bhadrakali valley.

II—This line is about a kilometer inside the first line. It is built of dressed sand-stone; had three gates and is 10 meter high. It enclosed the Royal residence and probably government offices.

III—This fort-line protected the area between the hill and line II. Its western and eastern walls moved to the hill. The former disappeared in the inaccessible part of the hill and the latter met the Atak fort.

IV—First fort-line on the lower part of the hill. Due to popularity of one of its gates, it is noted as Atak. It is an irregular fort-line with four gates, and a small sally gate on the east. This strong fort is protected by a series of catapults, Manjaniks or Makaryantras.

V—Overlooking this fortification there was a heavy complex of fortification on the middle escarpment known as Machi. This complex has the Rajput fort-line, that was strengthened by the Gujarat Sultans. On the north-western side of it is a plateau called Hālol-no Māḷa.

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VI—Above this fort is another fort-line protecting the small ledge that connects the south-eastern plateau called Bhadrakali. Here a beautiful three-storied palace exists.

VII—Top most fort or Mauliya. Its walls are seen on the north and east. South and west which are too precipitous to climb, and hence a wall is apparently absent.

Each fortification has its places of residence, water reservoirs, etc., and hence when one deals with the literature of Humayun's conquest the questions that are posed above become more poignant, and call for detailed analysis, which is attempted here :—

Humayun's arrival

Humayun had pursued Bahadurshah from Mandu which lies to the east of Champaner. The good way for movement is from Mandu to Dhar, Zhabuva, Dohad and Champaner. Probably Humayun pursued this way and came on the eastern side of Champaner. Here the large pond noted by Abul Fazl exists. At this place a holiday resort with Mosques, hauz and place for residence exist. The pond is to-day called Vada Talav. At this place Humayun reassembled his army and might have moved towards Champaner (Fort I) that was on the ground. From this place the army could easily cover the east, north and parts of south. The small fort-line and probably the lack of sufficient armed personnel might have led Bahadurshah and the garrision to give up this fort, as well as Fort II & III and strengthen the defences of the Atak fort.

As reported by Sikandar Bin Manhu, the garrison was busy carrying the ordinance Bahadurshai to the Fort when Humayun's army arrived at Champaner. This seems to have been the effort to strengthen the fort defences, but the quick movement of Humayun foiled this attempt.

An important feature that requires clarification is the burning of Champaner by Bahadurshah or at his connivance as noted by Abul Fazl. Two areas excavated out-side the Royal residence have not indicated destruction by fire. The deposits of ash, charcoal etc. were absent from both these areas. Moreover the Gujarat army was defending a large part of Champaner and hence the evidence of burning of Champaner is too scanty to do any justice to the statement of Abul Fazl.

Inside the Royal enclosure however, while digging a pit for latrines, good stratigraphy came to light. It indicated that over the natural earth, that was made even by little filling, brick structure was built. The strata above it contained ash. It was followed by a compact layer, that was sealed by modern surface. If the ash with the structure can be interpreted as the evidence of fire, then the statement of Abul Fazl would indicate that some structures in the Royal

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enclosure were set on fire, and those might have been extinguished by Humayun. But archaeologically this interpretation will rest on very weak foundation.

An interpretation of both the evidences indicates that if Abul Fazl's statement has to be positively construed, one has to admit that it is an exaggeration that is not supported by the evidence from the town, but has doubtful support from the Royal enclosure. If this interpretation is held valid, then one can imagine a hasty retreat by the Sultan from the Champaner fort I, II and a vague possibility of burning some part of the royal enclosure. Eventually Fort III would have become no man's land where the battle between Mir Hindu Beg, Narsimhadeva and Ikhtyar's garrison continued for sometime.

This situation would indicate that Humayuns' army marched from Imadul Mulk's Hauz, took possession of fort I, II when Humayun was present. The Gujarat army occupied all other forts. As they were on the hill, the advancing army had to continue the seige. Bahadur had gone to the interior of Gujarat and hence Humayun could take liberty to pursue the retreating Sultan after making sufficient arrangement to keep the Gujarat garrison at bay.

This would have not caused much trouble because Rumikhan who knew the area was with Mir Hindu Beg. The movement of the war began to take place in fort III. The incidence of repairing Bahadurshahi and the breaking of one gate, as well as a tree as noted by Sikandar [4], is of some interest in identifying the place of the incident.

He notes that Bahadurshai Cannon was fired after it was repaired. It broke a gate and a tree but Firangkhan broke it by a Cannon fire from the Fort. Eventhough the gate of the Fort was broken, the army of Humayun could not take it, is implied in the action of Firangkhan. Therefore one has to take cognisance of two facts while accepting the incident as true.

(1) What was the condition of the Fort that prevented taking it?

(2) Where is the situation that could account for such an event ?

It has already been argued above that the battle was being fought in Fort III. This action seems to have taken place at the major gate of Fort IV or the Atak gate. Here the main gate has two entrances: the inner one on the western end and the outer one towards the east. This entrance faces the road coming from the lower level. If a cannon is fired against it, the door would collapse but the entry to the fort could be barred effectively by the garrison. This might have happened and the effort of conquering the Atak Fort might have failed for the time being.

During the battle, Narasimhadeva who was also commanding the garrison had died as reported by Sikandar[4]. This according to Bahadurshah was a blow and he was sure that Ikhtyarkhan could not defend it. This seems to have

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happened in the Atak fort that was not given up till his death. But after the incident, the garrison might have given up the defence of this fort and concerntrated its effort in the defence of the Machi Fort or Fort V.

The Machi escarpment is steep and the Fort is very strong. Its only passage moves in a meandering line of fortification that could be easily defended. It was possibly this area that was required to be conquered and this was achieved by Humayun after his return to Champaner.

The main point of interest here is the element of surprise that helped Humayun to conquer it. The incident leading to it is variously described in the chronicles. Here Sikandar[4] too gives a version that from the fort 200 kolis were sent down. They were captured by the invading army. Humayun ordered that they be killed. After 70 or 80 persons were killed, the living confessed the knowledge of a secret way and were willing to take the army by that passage as noted before.

The versions of Abul Fazl[2] and Khwaja Nizammuddin[3] are different and seem to rely on Mugal sources. These persons who were engaged in the job of supplying necessities to those inside the fort were caught while they were moving. Humayun simply threatened them and possibly harassed them. This led to their showing the way to him. Here Humayun is shown in more merciful temperament than Sikandar's version. Jauhar Aftabchis' version is also different but it is silent on this aspect.

About the attack also Jauhar Aftabchi does not suggest that Humayun personally led the party. But Abul Fazl and Khwaja Nizammuddin both give the credit to Humayun himself. Here the description of a precipitious cliff and the difficulty of assault is given. Iron spikes were driven in the cliff for climbing but the enemy did not know about this activity. This fact requires careful consideration for finding out the movement of Humayun. Here Abul Fazl[2] notes that when Humayun was returning from Hanol (Halol) he saw people coming from the forest. This is a fairly accurate clue. The forest described by the authors has almost disappeared. The cliff fortunately survies, on a hill track. This track moves from Halol in a ravine. At its head is the cliff, which is about 20 meters high (Fig. 1). On it the passage is very difficult and the top was protected by a wall making the passage more difficult. The wall has collapsed and its debris filled up parts of it. From this points on the north is a small peak. Between the peak and the main hill the track moves through the jungle and descends on the Machi area, near Panchkuva. From there the track leads to the lower part, that is protected by fort V. The distance between the cliff and the fort is nearly three kilometers. The distance of the cliff from the defenders would rule out any knowledge of the noise made by the hammer. The heavy

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

Fig. 1
Humayun's Passage to Machi Fort from Halol side

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forest would give protection to the advancing army and hence it could use the element of surprise (See Map).

This passage was used by Humayun and the attack was launched. The description of the attack is also different. Abul Fazl notes that from both sides the attack was launched and the garrison dispersed. Khwaja Nizammuddin and Sikandar give the war cry in two versions. " Allah-o-Akbar " or " Allah-Allah." While Jauhar Aftabchi notes the noise of Nagara and Surna. This description simply could be construed as a routine narration rather than factual occurrence. Again Humayun opening the gate as noted by Khwaja Nizammuddin seems to be fictitious. These are possibly after-thoughts and the correct action could be inferred as follows. As the garrison was surprised, it lost courage, was thrown into confusion and left the defences. The gates were opened and from the lower fort Humayuns, army entered the Machi area i.e. fort V.

In this situation Ikhtayarkhan could have defended the VI fort by reaching there, but he preferred to abandon it and moved to the tompost fort of Maulya. It was a strong fort with many defences and he could have kept the enemy at bay. But he was not a man of courage as rightly commented by Bahadur, so he submitted without resistance. It could be argued that the surprise attack had broken his nerves. His submission is also variously interpreted as asking for pardon by Ikhtayarkhan or showing grace by Humayun.

When did this event take place ? An accurare date is not available. Abul Fazl put it in the first week of Safar 943 (20th, 27th July, 1536)[2] and Sikandar puts it as Safar 7, 942[4]. Here is a discrepancy of one year. Gulabadan Banu Begam notes that Humayun left Zarafsan Bag on 14th Shaban, 941, i.e. 18th February, 1535[5]. Abul Fazl takes the movement from Jamadi-Ul-Avval 941 (November, 1534)[2]. In 1535, April the battle of Mandsor was faught. Bahadur-shah went to Mandu and in May, 1535 the struggle was going on there. So by the end of May 1535 Humayun might have come to Champaner and his command over the lower fort might have been established in either May or June 1535. Atter this Humayun pursued Bahadur to Cambay, sent people in Sorath and came back to Champaner. The time factor of this operation is unknown. At Champaner it is reported by Abul Fazl that he continued the seige for four months, and then the fort was conquered in the month of Safar as noted by him.

This time factor indicates that Humayun came to Champaner towards the end of May or early June, 1535. At this time the lower forts I and II were conquered, but the complete operation required more time. During this time Humayun moved in Gujarat, came back to Champaner and again continued the seige for four months. If this time factor is considered the month of Safar should be that which falls in the year 1536. This time factor indicates that the struggle over Champaner continued for more than a year, proving thereby that the conquest of Champaner was a prolonged affair and it was not conquered easily.

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It is clear from the above analysis that for a more detailed understanding of activities in the mediaeval period, a coordinated effort on the basis of primary literary sources and archaeological investigation is very necessary. Such a study will add new dimensions in the understanding of mediaeval history and culture.

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1. Atahar Rizvi *Mugal Kalin Bharat*—Jauhar Aftabchi p. 585-590.
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3. Khwajah Nizammuddin Ahmad, *Tabaqat-I-Akbari*, Translated by B. DE.
4. Sikandar bin Manjhu, *Mirati Sikandari*, Translated by Fazulullah Lutfullah Faridi.
5. Atahar Rizvi, *Mugal Kalin Bharat*, Hindi Translation of *Humayunnamah* of Gulabadan Banu Begam, p. 22.
6. Commissariat, M. S., *History of Gujarat.*
7. The word in the Persian script could be read as Surat or Sorat. As the script does not have a symbol for "th" the actual word Sorath would be spelled as Surat and that seems to have created confusion. Persian chronicles have spelt the placename with Shin and Svada, which also changes the meaning.
8. The author gratefully acknowledges the help of Shri W. Siddiqi, Superintendent, Western circle, Archaeological Survey of India and Dr. S. K. Desai of the Department of History, M. S. University of Baroda, Vadodara.

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EXPOSITION ON PURUṢĀRTHA IN THE DHARMASŪTRAS AND SMṚTIS

By

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The ancient law-givers of India, known as the *Dharmaśāstrakāras*, whose counter-parts in the West are known as sociologists contributed a unique feature to Indian Culture by establishing the concept of *Puruṣārthas* (aims of life). This concept gave a spiritual direction to the daily material life of Indians. This contribution of the law-givers to the Indian Culture is not a mean contribution to the world in general. According to *Agnipurāṇa*[1], *Dharma, Artha, Kāma* and *Mokṣa* are called *Puruṣārthas*. The term can be explained etymologically as follows : "*Puruṣaiḥ arthyante = Puruṣārthāḥ*" (those which are hankered after by *Puruṣas* are the *Puruṣārthas*). Thus the etymology conveys a sense that the people hanker after any one or more of the above *Puruṣārthas* according to their predilections. The life of a person who is not able to achieve any one of these in his life is considered useless.[2] The *Manusmṛti* and its precursors, namely the *Dharmasūtras*, have discussed these four *Puruṣārthas* in detail.

Out of these four *Puruṣārthas*, which one in particular should be given more importance, is difficult to say; because different scholars have expressed divergent views on this point. For example, the law-givers consider *Dharma* as most important; Kauṭilya, the author of *Arthaśāstra* believes *Artha* to be more important. Vātsyāyana, the author of *Kāmaśāstra* gives preference to *Kāma*; while the Philosophers like Gautama (the propounder of the Nyāya-sūtras), etc. consider *Mokṣa* as of primary importance among the four *Puruṣārthas*. That *Mokṣa* is the highest achievement of the human life cannot be questioned by anybody; but the remaining three which were known earlier by the technical name '*Trivarga*' stand on a different footing from *Mokṣa*. Firstly the former, is an attribute of the society as well, while the latter (*Mokṣa*) is an achievement of an individual alone. Secondly the former relates to the mundane plane, while the latter to the ethical plane; Thirdly the former is moral while the latter is metaphysical; and lastly the former concerns primarily with this world while

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1 धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाश्च पुरुषार्थाः प्रकीर्तिताः ।
—अग्निपुराण (?)

2 धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणां यस्यैकोऽपि न विद्यते ।
अजागलस्तनस्येव तस्य जन्म निरर्थकम् ॥
—ब्रह्मपुराण १२० (?)

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the latter exclusively to the yonder one. Hence in Indian works on sociology, called the *Dharmaśāstras*, it is generally the first three that are discussed in detail ; while *Mokṣa* is treated in philosophical works.

The common people who form the majority in society generally hanker after the achievement of *Artha* (Wealth); and with the help of *Artha* they try to fulfil their manifold desires (*Kāma*). According to them *Artha* and *Kāma* are the only two goals of human life. Under these circumstances the social law-givers, in order to maintain harmony and peace in the society and happiness peace and prosperity to the individual, admonish that the instinct for amassing wealth and for the fulfilment of desires should be controlled by *Dharma*. In other words, nothing should be acquired through foul means but should be achieved in a right and moral way. Similarly, the fulfilment of desires should also be achieved in conformity with the rules and regulations governing the life of a house-holder.

The *Viṣṇudharmasūtra* (= *VDS*) (300-100 B.C.) specifically mentions that *Artha* and *Kāma* which come in the way of *Dharma* should be discarded[3]. VDS goes even further and says that even Dharma which is not in conformity with the feelings of the society should be given up. Manu[4] and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* reiterate the same idea with striking similar phraseology[5], suggesting their indebtedness to *VDS*. Āpastamba in his *Dharmasūtras* (= *ADS*) (600-300 B.C.) endorses the same view when he says that—" One should enjoy pleasures which do not come in the way of *Dharma*. By doing so one wins both the worlds[6] ".

The *Bhagavadgītā* seems to have taken this idea from *ADS*. The Lord says :—" In the living-beings I am desire, not detrimental to *Dharma*[7] ". Thus the influence of Āpastamba on the *Gītā* is evident.

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3 धर्मविरुद्धौ चार्थकामौ (परिहरेत्) लोकविद्विष्टं धर्ममपि ।—विष्णुधर्मसूत्र ७१ ८४

4 परित्यजेदर्थकामौ यौ स्यातां धर्मवर्जितौ ॥
धर्मं चाप्यसुखोदर्कं लोकविक्रुष्टमेव च ॥
—मनुस्मृति ४.१७६

5 परित्यजेदर्थकामौ धर्मपीडाकरौ नृप ।
धर्ममप्यसुखोदर्कं लोकविद्विष्टमेव च ॥
—विष्णुपुराण ३.११.७

6 भोक्ता च धर्माविरुद्धान् (v.l. धर्मविप्रतिषिद्धान्) भोगान् ।
एवमुभौ लोकावभिजयति ॥
—आप. ध. सू. २.८.२०, २२, २३

7 धर्माविरुद्धो भूतेषु कामोऽस्मि भरतर्षभ ।
—भ. गी. ७.११

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Ancient authorities, however, do not intend to deprive the people of their due pleasures. Thus Kauṭilya has very frankly laid down that one should enjoy pleasures in such a way that they do not clash with *Dharma* and *Artha*. One should not be totally devoid of pleasures.[8]

Manu discusses this concept in all its details. He introduces views of others on the relative importance of these *Puruṣārthas*, and finally expresses his own view, in very clear terms. He says—" According to some people *Dharma* and *Artha* combined are better ; according to others *Kāma* and *Artha* together are worth-following ; according to some *Dharma* alone is to be preferred ; while according to others *Artha* alone is preferable". But according to me "says Manu, "all the three together are to be followed[9]". Thus he refers to the *ekapradhānavāda*, that is, the theory of one *Puruṣārtha* being important ; the *dvipradhānavāda*, (i.e. two *Puruṣārthas* combined being important) and *tri-pradhānavāda*, where all the three are given due importance. In *ekapradhāna-vāda*, there are two views : (1) according to some *ācāryas*, *Dharma* alone is important ; (2) while according to others *Artha* alone is important. In the *dvi-pradhānavāda* also there are two views : (1) *Saṃyuktadharmārthapradhānavāda* (where *Dharma* and *Artha* combined are important) and (2) *Saṃyuktakāmārtha-pradhānavāda* (where *Kāma* and *Artha* combined are important). Thus Manu quotes four views and gives his own view of *trivargapradhānavāda*, where all the three viz. *dharma*, *artha* and *Kāma* are equally important. Thus from the sup-port of *trivargapradhānavāda* by Manu, it is clear that according to him *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma* are equally important in the human life.

Kauṭilya who establishes *Artha* as the main *Puruṣārtha* is also alternatively corroborating this view of Manu. He says : " One should enjoy all the three simultaneously as they are interdependent. If one of the three is over-stressed at the cost of the remaining ones, it will affect the other two as well as itself adversely[10] ".

In this manner the Indian scholars have ultimately decided in the favour of all the three *Puruṣārthas* and thus have put forth the harmonious view

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8 धर्मार्थाऽविरोधेन कामं सेवेत । न निःसुखः स्यात् ॥
—अर्थ. १.७.३

9 धर्मार्थावुच्यते श्रेयः कामार्थौ धर्म एव च ।
अर्थ एवेह वा श्रेयः त्रिवर्ग इति तु स्थितिः ॥
—मनुस्मृति २.२२४

10 समं वा त्रिवर्गमन्योन्यानुबद्धं (सेवेत) । एको ह्यत्यासेवितो धर्मार्थकामानाम् आत्मानम् इतरौ च पीडयति ॥
—अर्थ. १.७.४-५

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(*samanvayavāda*). Gautama in his *Dharmasūtras* (= *GDS*) (600–400 B.C.) tried to show this harmony of three *Puruṣārthas* not only in human-life in general but even tried to prescribe different parts of day in the daily life of an individual for the enjoyment of these three. He fixes earlier part of the day for performing *Dharma* (religious activities), the middle part of the day for earning money (*Artha*) and the last part of the day for the fulfilment of desires (*Kāma*); and advises to make the day fruitful thereby[11].

Yājñavalkya also supports this theory and seems to have drawn upon the *GDS*. He says—" After getting up before the dawn, one should give thought to one's personal welfare and should not miss, as far as possible, proper attendance to *Dharma, Artha and Kā*ma in their stipulated period[12].

In this manner the social law-givers, whether they be earlier *Dharmasūtra*-writers or later *Smṛti*-writers, gave proper thought to the concept of three *Puruṣārthas* and proved their due importance in the daily life of an individual. Thus they defined the problem keeping in view both the theoratical as well as practical aspect of the problem.

This scientific discussion shows what a clear and deep insight these Indian sociologists had and how they applied it to life to make it as harmonious and fruitful as possible.

Thus this concept of *Puruṣārthas* is a unique contribution of Indian social law-givers to Indian culture, inasmuch as it serves as a line of demarcation for distinguishing Indian culture from other cultures which are conspicuous by the absence of a parallel concept.

(Abbreviation : *ADS* = *Āpastambadharmasūtra* ; *GDS* = *Gautama-dharmasūtra* ; *VDS* = *Viṣṇudharmasūtra*)*.

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11 न पूर्वाह्णमध्यन्दिनापराह्णान् अफलान् कुर्याद् यथाशक्ति धर्मार्थकामेभ्यः ।
—गौ. ध. सू. ९.४५

12 ब्राह्मे मुहूर्ते चोत्थाय चिन्तयेदात्मनो हितम् ।
धर्मार्थकामान् स्वे काले यथाशक्ति न हापयेत् ॥
—याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति १.११५

* Above study brings out incidentally one more fact regarding the relation of (1) *ADS* and the *Gītā* (2) *GDS* and the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* and (3) *VDS* and the Manusmṛti and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*—so far as borrowings are concerned.

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